International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals

Selected Papers of the UNFPA Expert Group Meeting
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Selected Papers of the
UNFPA Expert Group Meeting

Marrakech, Morocco

11-12 May 2005
NOTES:

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the participants who attended the *Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals* and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The papers included in this report have been published as submitted.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expressions of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNFPA concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The term ‘country’ as used in the text of this report refers, as appropriate, to territories or areas. The designations of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries are intended for convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process.
FOREWORD

The five-year review of progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed upon by the international community at the Millennium Summit provided the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) with a good opportunity to convene an Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals in order to analyze migration as both a facilitating and constraining factor in the achievement of the MDGs. The meeting was also an opportunity to present information necessary for policy makers in planning and policy development and to facilitate the exchange of best practices in this complex area.

With the decline in fertility in many parts of the world, migration has taken on increased significance, becoming an important component of population growth in many countries. Population decline, largely a result of below-replacement fertility, and population ageing have already emerged as significant concerns in many countries and their effects are expected to exacerbate in the future. Researchers have speculated as to the possible role of migration to offset these two demographic trends.

When Member States signed off on the MDGs in 2000, they did not include migration in the final document. Indeed, migration is not mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals. Moreover, the relationship between migration and the MDGs has not been adequately explored despite the fact that the link between migration and development is increasingly recognized. Development can reduce migration pressures and migration can have a significant impact on a country’s development. Migration is still not adequately addressed in development frameworks such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Common Country Assessments (CCAs) and United Nations Development Frameworks (UNDAFs). Yet migration can play an important role in the achievement of the MDGs. Although it can serve as a constraint, if properly managed, migration can also contribute to the realization of the goals.

The Expert Group Meeting analyzed migration and its effect on those MDGs that are most closely affected by migration, including the goals pertaining to poverty reduction; gender equality; improving maternal health; prevention of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and global partnerships for development. The meeting explored migration as a development vehicle that can both facilitate and hinder the achievement of the MDGs. It addressed the complexity and diversity of migration, and showed how it affects not only the migrants themselves but also the sending and receiving countries and their ability to reach the MDG targets. It looked at how migration fosters development by bringing in remittances, and how it can potentially hinder development through the brain drain. It discussed the circulation of human capital not just as a brain drain, but looked into diaspora networks and how they contribute to technological transfers and the development of the community of origin.

International migration is an integral aspect of the global development process. The challenge before the international community is to harness the potential of migration in such a way as to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits for both sending and receiving areas in order to facilitate the achievement of the MDGs.

Special thanks go to François Farah and Ann Pawliczko from the Population and Development Branch at UNFPA Headquarters and to Georges Georgi and Naima Ghemires from the UNFPA Country Office in Morocco for organizing this event, and to Lorena Duharte from UNFPA Headquarters and Mona Benzeriane from the UNFPA Country Office in Morocco for their able assistance with the logistics of the meeting. We also wish to thank the publication team – François Farah, Ann Pawliczko and Madeleine Sacco – for the preparation of this report and Colleen Thouez of UNITAR for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of the introduction.

Mari Simonen
Director
Technical Support Division
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction

   - International Migration Trends Since 1980
     (Hania Zlotnik, DESA, United Nations)
     
   - International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals
     (Erica Usher, International Organization for Migration)
     
   - The Impact of Remittances on Development
     (Colleen Thouez, UNITAR)

2. Migration and Poverty Reduction

   - Linkages between Migration and Poverty: The Millennium Development Goals and Population Mobility
     (Ronald Skeldon)

3. Migration and Health

   - Migration and the Health System: Influences on Reaching the MDGs in Africa (and other LDCs)
     (Delanyo Dovlo)
     
   - Migration and Maternal and Child Health: The Example of Western Europe
     (Manuel Carballo)
     
   - Reversing the Spread of HIV/AIDS: What Role has Migration?
     (John Anarfi)

4. Migration and Gender

   - International Migration and Prospects for Gender Equality
     (Maruja Asis)
     
   - Trafficking in Human Beings and the Millennium Development Goal No. 3, Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
     (Gerda Theuermann)
6. Migration and the Environment

*The Other Migrants: Cause and Prevention in Involuntary Displacement and the Question of “Environmental Refugees”* ................................................................. 141
   (David Vine)

7. Migration and Global Partnerships for Development

*The Economics of Migration under Globalization* ................................................................. 155
   (Atif Kubursi and Madona Mokbel)

*Globalization and Migration* .................................................................................................. 169
   (Alan Simmons)

8. Panel on Partnerships: Case Studies


   b. *Migration Policies in Australia and their Impact on Development in Countries of Origin* (Graeme Hugo) ................................................................................... 199

   c. *Moving Out of Poverty: Making Migration Work Better for Poor People* (Charlotte Heath) ................................................................................................................. 217

   d. *Migration and Millennium Development Goals: DFID-RMMRU Partnership* (Tasneem Siddiqui) ............................................................................................... 221

   e. *Migration et Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire: Cas de la Migration Arabe* (Khaled Louhichi) .......................................................................................... 231

*Annexes*

I. Agenda ......................................................................................................................................... 245

II. List of Participants .................................................................................................................... 247

III. The Millennium Development Goals ...................................................................................... 251
INTRODUCTION
Introduction

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) hosted an Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals in Marrakech, Morocco on 11-12 May 2005. Invited experts were requested to speak on a number of topics relating to migration and development, including: poverty reduction, health, gender, environment, and global partnerships for development with a view towards exploring migration as both a facilitating and constraining factor in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

This report is a compilation of selected papers presented at the meeting together with a synopsis of the discussion highlighting some of the more salient points raised by the experts. It also reflects an attempt to spur the debate further by suggesting possibilities for programmatic activities in the areas of data and research, policy and capacity development. As international migration gains greater scope and impact, UNFPA and other international entities have a critical role in facilitating strategic directions that strengthen responses to its challenges while capitalizing on the opportunities that migration presents to the individual migrants, their larger community and both sending and receiving countries.

Background

International migration is a phenomenon that is shaped by population dynamics, regional developments, social, economic and political push and pull factors and other factors such as history and culture. A number of contemporary global migration patterns distinguish today’s migration landscape from that of the past. First, there is a rapid increase in the stock of migrants in developed countries over developing ones. Second, a high concentration of migrants is to be found in a small number of countries: three fourths of the world’s migrants are found in just 28 countries—with one in every five migrants residing in the United States. Third, three per cent of the world’s population is international migrants but developing countries have larger migrant stocks. Fourth, an increasing percentage of women migrate, estimated to be about 49 per cent, though this is not true for developing regions where the number has decreased. Fifth, all countries are now affected by migration and many, if not most, can be categorized as countries of “origin, transit and destination”.

Migration has been recently associated with increased globalization and development and presents both challenges and opportunities to the achievement of the MDGs. It will be in facing and overcoming the challenges of international migration that the achievement of the MDGs will be facilitated or constrained. This can be expedited through appropriate policy and actions at global, regional, national and grassroots levels.

Migration and the MDGs

One might ask why there is no MDG on international migration. The most obvious answer is because it is simply too politically sensitive and divisive an issue between developed and developing nations, between different or divergent cultural values and mores, and between people on the “inside” and those trying to enter. In addition, the MDGs consist of clear goals and targets and the setting of targets for migration can be extremely difficult and controversial since it concerns more than one party and is entangled in the development parameters of both sending and receiving countries.

Nevertheless, the fact that no targets were established for international migration at the Millennium Summit may not have been a missed opportunity as migration one would argue, is a fundamental dimension of the MDGs without being defined as a particular goal or target. Of late, migration has increasingly been considered something of a development tool and not solely an indication of development failure of countries of origin. Our understanding of the relationship, however, remains far from clear. For instance, can we say that migration is invariably a response to poverty when often it is not the poorest who can afford to migrate?
Or, can migration be an antidote for structural poverty when issues of governance, open markets, job availability, staff-retention capacity of government or economic institutions and other more complex political, economic and social processes are also quite clearly at play? The need is perhaps to build migration into the present MDGs to see how policies implemented to achieve the MDGs are likely to impact on population movement.

Migration is inextricably bound up with the achievement of the MDGs, the most salient of which, include: Goal 1 (Poverty Reduction), Goal 3 (Gender Equality), Goal 6 (Prevention of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other Infectious Diseases), Goal 7 (Environmental Sustainability) and Goal 8 (Creation of Global Partnerships for Development). The papers that follow discuss each of these in more detail in relation to international migration.

The overall argument made regarding the complex linkages between migration and the MDGs is that the impact of migration on development can both challenge and support the achievement of the goals. It is therefore important to examine the benefits of the orderly flow of migration and ascertain the negative impact of the barriers to slow or even reverse population flows, notwithstanding the fear or anxiety migration can engender in particular circumstances. Attempts to constrain migration (including internal migration) generally lead to increases in migration, especially clandestine migration, and more to the point, might hamper the attainment of the MDGs and ultimately of broader development objectives. By contrast, policies that accept the wider mobility of people is more likely to contribute to the attainment of the MDGs.

There are a number of challenges posed by international migration, including social, health, gender and economic factors.

Social Factors: A Key Challenge for the International Community

Social considerations tied to migration may be considered a key challenge for the international community. This is partly due to the gradually more politicized perception of and responses to migration and migrants’ increasingly visible presence in new communities, and concurrently, due to the fact that migration takes place in an environment of perceived growing threat and social resistance.

As a result, migrants often remain on the fringes of societies, where little is known of them and where they tend to be presumed sources of disruption and criminality. They often accept jobs that natives will not take and are more likely to be exposed to occupational hazards. Efforts to include them in the community imply a difficult and complicated balance between the will of the local residents (often influenced by socio-economic standing, cultural and religious affinities, temporariness of stay, etc.), available resources, and the desire of the migrants themselves as to whether they want to play an active part in the new community.

In addition to the issue of co-existence, other important social impacts must be considered as the social costs of migration for migrants and their dependents and communities may be outweighed by its benefits. Indeed, migration may lead to long-term developmental benefits, however, the short-term costs on families and communities can be considerable.

Social factors are complicated because, at least in part, they are tied to human nature, to fundamental questions of education, transparency and acceptance of differences of all sorts. Some communities and States have found prescriptions that work well for their particular context. Others are still struggling to arrive at peaceful co-existence and embrace and appreciate diversity.
Health Factors: Multiple Considerations

International migration has important implications not only for the health of migrants themselves but also for issues of concern to public health and the public health system in both countries of origin and destination, making migration and health a growing development issue, with significant economic repercussions. Three of the eight MDGs specifically address health issues and all three are very much affected by, and affect, migration. They are child mortality, maternal health and prevention of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. The very experience of migration can expose migrants to increased risk of physical and mental health problems. Hardening of social attitudes and more restricted policies are among the causes of major health-related costs of migration. Many migrants do not have access to adequate health care for a variety of reasons including undefined status, lack of health insurance, cultural barriers and lack of economic resources. Social exclusion, discrimination and poor living conditions negatively affect the health of migrants and their dependents. Many labour migrants are likely to be working in dangerous conditions and at risk of work-related accidents. Cultural and language barriers may prevent them from being aware of dangers and how to avoid them or may imply a negative health seeking behaviour that is difficult to change. Migrants in irregular situations, many of whom find themselves in crowded and unsanitary living quarters, face an increased threat to their health but usually do not access health and social services because of their illegal status. Women, particularly those subject to trafficking are especially vulnerable to exploitation and human rights abuse, including rape-related trauma, unwanted pregnancies, STIs and HIV/AIDS. The social, economic and physical conditions in which migrant women find themselves often exact a toll on maternal and child health. Migrants who are forced to leave their homes because of humanitarian or environmental disasters are also vulnerable to exploitation, violence and abuse.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic presents a special case. The spread of any infectious disease can be accelerated by large-scale migration and HIV/AIDS is no exception. Incoming migrants may spread the HIV infection in areas of destination; migrants themselves are in a vulnerable position during the migration process. Migrants may contract the disease while abroad, and they may spread the infection upon returning to their countries of origin. Human smuggling and trafficking pose particular risks for HIV transmission, as does the commercial sex industry which employs many migrants who are subject to risky behaviors. Moreover, the circular nature of migration puts populations in both areas of origin and destination at greater risk.

On the other hand, the emigration of health professionals from areas with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates serves to further destabilize health systems already crippled by staff losses and absenteeism resulting from AIDS-related morbidity and mortality. Migration of health professionals reduces the health care worker-to-population ratio and affects the sustainability of health systems training and delivery. In worst-case scenarios, critical services performed by specialists may no longer become available because there are no new trained cadres to perform them. Many sub-Saharan African countries will not be able to reach the MDGs by 2015 because of the out-migration of health care professionals. The challenge is to address the health implications of migration and invest in health, including that of migrant health, in order to not only enhance quality of life and raise life expectancy but to reduce the burden of disease on individuals and communities.

If properly managed, migration may serve as a channel for the exchange of qualified health care professionals rather than a brain drain. Increased income from remittances may translate into access to better health services while increased exposure to a culture of healthy lifestyles and disease prevention may result in the acquisition of healthy habits. A number of interventions can be put in place to minimize the public health costs of migration, including improving the working conditions and wages of health care professionals, encouraging the return or circulation of qualified professionals, targeting migrants in HIV prevention programmes, and channeling remittances to improve quality and access to health care.
Gender Factors: Female Migrants Present a Special Challenge

Women currently comprise almost half of all international migrants. In some regions of the world, they outnumber their male counterparts. Women no longer migrate solely to accompany their husbands, but also migrate on their own in search of employment opportunities. Men and women circulate differently in the global economy, with women found predominantly in the service and welfare sectors. This makes women more vulnerable to human rights abuses because they are often found in gender-segregated and unregulated sectors of the economy, including domestic work, entertainment, and the sex industry which often are unprotected by local labour legislation. Women migrants also typically lack access to social support systems.

Prior to migrating, women have less access to information, education and training than men, they experience restrictions or bans on migration and detention in training centers where they are often exposed to physical, sexual and emotional abuse. Women often lack knowledge of travel routes and destination sites and may experience abandonment en route and physical and sexual abuse. While they are on site, women can experience restrictions on freedom of movement and association, poor health, gendered forms of racism and xenophobia. Upon return, they often face severe social costs such as marital instability and discord and social stigmatization.

Female migration can potentially be much more disruptive for the family unit. The social cost of migrating mothers cannot be overlooked. Like men, women migrants often leave children behind, but generally this consequence is more sorely felt by the mother’s absence than the father’s. The phenomenon of care work, which can be a painful experience for the migrant mother, deserves particular attention, as it often leads to ‘social dumping’ or a ‘care crisis’ such that multiple transfers of care take place with the female migrant at the center.

The international community’s attention to migration and gender reflects in part an increase in the number of female migrants globally, the impact of the migration of women on home communities and the unregulated high risk industries in which women migrants often work. Though female migration is associated with empowerment as women are more in control of their mobility, and able to exercise their rights and fulfill themselves, they often face considerable obstacles during the migration process. Further, as women are often recruited in domestic work or the sex industry, they rarely have opportunities to acquire skills that would equip them to better integrate into the economy and the labour market in their home countries when they return. The development benefits of the migration experience are often difficult to perceive in these circumstances notwithstanding the remittances or the transfer of money women are likely to send back home.

Women are much more susceptible to falling prey to the perils of human trafficking. Indeed, around 80 per cent of trafficked victims are estimated to be women. Severe reproductive health consequences include rape-related physical and psychosocial trauma, unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. Prevention is the key to the anti-trafficking response and reduction of vulnerability to trafficking and re-trafficking is crucial. Attainment of the Millennium Development Goal of gender equality and the empowerment of women will be an important step in reducing the vulnerability of women and their risk of falling prey to traffickers. Anti-trafficking policies should be based on a human rights framework and include both repressive strategies that target the perpetrators as well as empowerment strategies that assist victims. There is also a need for better data at national, regional and global levels on the extent of the phenomenon and research on what happens to victims of trafficking.

To ensure that migration can also be a pathway to gender equality, migration policies should be reviewed to detect provisions that disadvantage migrants, especially women. Positive steps would include:
increasing the number of “solid” employment opportunities in regulated sectors; undertaking supervisory actions beyond positive efforts to regulate recruiting agencies; and ensuring basic rights and access to medical and social services.

**Economic Factors: Still Unclear Tally**

At the micro individual level, migrants are motivated to leave their homes in pursuit of what are perceived to be better economic opportunities elsewhere. It is generally considered that migrants would eventually improve their economic well being by moving.

At the macro global level, migration is more likely to be stimulated and promoted by the combination of an increasing and globalizing world trade particularly among rich countries and the rapid growth of the labour force in low-income countries with limited or no employment opportunities. Migrants who are able to move legally have therefore been able to benefit from greater opportunities for economic development and social well-being perhaps less than those who use illegal channels to enter a country or who overstay residency rights.

Migration can have an impact on poverty and can increase or decrease inequality. Some of the topics discussed during the meeting included: globalization and labour mobility; remittances; and ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain waste’.

♦ **Globalization and Labour Mobility**

An international division of labour has emerged in the wake of globalization forces and the extension of capitalism into distant regions. Globalization has created a large pool of highly mobile labour in developing countries while simultaneously creating the linkages and connections to advanced countries’ labour markets. Borders of rich and industrial States are open for professional, technical and skilled immigrants, in contrast to a dwindling acceptance rate of semi-skilled and low-skilled migrants.

The movement of skilled labour manpower reflects the ‘workers-to-work’ trend in contrast to unskilled labour manpower movement of ‘work-to-workers’. The bulk of migrants, however, remain low skilled laborers in pursuit of a better life. Many enter countries clandestinely and therefore contribute to the growth in illegal employment or non-standard job contracts. These workers run the risk of unfair exploitation and human rights violations. In spite of this however, their numbers continue to increase.

In that context, a number of MDG facilitating development policy options could be considered ranging from reducing unemployment and redressing low wages in migrant sending countries, to better integrating skilled return migrants into emerging economic and development sectors, to designing appropriate policies to improve the welfare and development impact of migrant remittances to eventually encouraging transnational community projects and involving diasporas in the development efforts of their home countries.

♦ **Remittances**

Migrants generally send a portion of their earnings home in the form of remittances. The global scope, quantity, and characteristics of remittance flows have recently caught the international community’s attention regarding how these can assist in promoting and supporting development in countries of origin.
Some studies indicate that an increase in remittances reduces the poverty headcount thereby fulfilling MDG 1 namely “Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”. Indeed, remittances represent a significant proportion of household income in some countries. When channeled through official routes, they also constitute an important source of foreign exchange for developing countries.

However, whether remittances actually contribute to long-term development in poor countries is up for debate. Remittances can be used to generate productive investment and create employment opportunities. Yet they can also have inflationary effects prompting unsustainable patterns of ostentatious consumption. Some countries have been able to capitalize on remittances and have established various forms of incentive schemes for this purpose. The danger however lies in the extent to which countries overly depend on migration and remittances as a development tool. In so doing, they overlook more sustainable, productive, wealth generating and equitable development paths that work towards ensuring equal economic opportunities at home so that jobs are generated nationally and individuals are not forced to seek employment or economic opportunities abroad. Working on providing alternatives to migration should thus be a medium to long term development focus in developing countries as well.

Moreover, remittances are personal capital flows. Over-regulating channeling and use of these capital flows in remittance-destination countries and tying them to decisions regarding official development assistance in donor countries are likely to affect their spontaneous flow, drive them underground or redirect their destinations and use.

♦ Brain Drain or Brain Waste

Another facet tied to economic considerations is that of ‘brain drain’. There is documented evidence that ‘brain drain’ of certain professions can have devastating impacts in developing countries, particularly the smaller ones. However, when no outlets exist at home for exercising one’s profession, neither the person nor the country benefits from his/her skills. The end result may be one of ‘brain waste’. A significant challenge for development in countries of origin remains how to encourage return of skilled migrants, which is tied to prospects for employment. Human mobility is thus set in the larger context of economic development, where migrants and their contributions constitute one aspect of the overall development strategy of States.

PROGRAMMATIC AREAS FOR ACTION

1. Data and Research: Still Room for Progress

Migration is a field in which the data are often incompatible and sparse. Challenges of data collection on a topic that implies a mobile subject matter, and which requires cooperation and coordination between States adds to the challenges of obtaining reliable and timely data. Further, the dearth of internationally accepted definitions makes available data difficult to compare. Research without solid data is, of course, problematic. Nevertheless, much research is being undertaken in this field as witnessed by the plethora of research centers around the world dedicated to this task. While the collection of international migration data is performed regularly by the United Nations, the international community’s commitment to quality migration data and what would be required to obtain it, is fairly weak.

Beyond these obstacles, some concrete efforts could be undertaken to improve the quality of data. For instance, while figures on migration are generally still calculated by stocks, a greater concentration on the dynamic nature of migration and its various forms, by looking at flows and trends, would provide more information. Further, much attention has rested on patterns in developed countries whereas the perspective of origin States would bring much to bear.
In research, there is a dearth of pedagogical work in this field, what has been termed “un manque de cadrage”, where established methodology and terminology are lacking. In addition, much research does not consider the time factor, particularly in terms of the medium- or long-term development impact of migration. There is a need for more consistent and comprehensive longitudinal studies on how migrants and their families, States and regions are affected by migration over time. Moreover, many areas of migration are still under-researched. Here below are just a few of the topics that would benefit from further research and which were raised during the UNFPA Expert Group Meeting:

- Though international migration seems to be creating “ripple waves” in large part due to the social and economic factors touched upon above, a question for further research remains: Why don’t more people move?
- More research on the relationship between migration and development is necessary and should include studies on how and in which circumstances migration rectifies or causes greater inequality. Some of this research should concentrate on how to bridge social imbalances.
- As very little is known about the conditions of migrants in an irregular status, more research both longitudinal and cross-country is required to study whether migrants in an irregular status also benefit from the migration experience and how concretely this experience differs from those with legal status.
- With the greater presence and influence of transnational communities, more research is needed on what we know about them. For example, what binds these communities together? (Are there more negative elements - targets of discrimination for example - or more positive elements?). In addition, what is their role in influencing migration patterns?
- Similarly, little is documented concerning circular migration. What are its constraints and opportunities for individual migrants and its impact on communities? Such research should include studies on the challenges of return migration and reintegration, including how women face old stereotypes upon their return.
- Longitudinal and cross-country research on migration and gender looking specifically at how gender shapes migration experiences and opportunities. Such studies should include a look at how to regularize domestic work so that domestic workers have the right to adequate protections and regular wages.
- Longitudinal and cross-country research on migration and social services. For example, generalizable lessons on how to improve migrants’ access to basic health care services, in particular of female migrants and reproductive health care.
- Longitudinal and cross-country research on migration and the issue of “brain drain”, “brain circulation” and “brain waste”. Such research should also include studies on “brain gain” and the extent to which “brain exchanges” are occurring in some regions (e.g., Australia is losing its own skilled people, and gaining Africa’s).
- Given the huge shortfalls in health professionals projected in developed countries and the significantly high-intention-to-leave rate of health personnel in many African countries, more data and research are needed on the migration of medical personnel and impact on communities. This research should include scenarios for the potential impact of GATS Mode 4 if there is no caveat to protect “critical industries”.
- More research is required on how to develop and implement responses in order to counter human trafficking that have a human rights approach focused on the needs of the victims. Such approaches must also incorporate repressive measures for traffickers and their accomplices and be multi-partner in nature (including NGOs). What are some of the best approaches that can be applied across countries?
- More research is required on what measures can be taken prior to environmental disasters to protect the future displaced. Such research should include assessing the “impoverishment risks and reconstruction model”.

Improving our understanding of migration with respect to development but also to a wide gamut of other issues would be beneficial to the interests and rights of migrants and the international community as
a whole. To begin with, a greater understanding would dispel myths about migration and would enlighten the path to new approaches on how to foster its benefits.

2. **Policy Considerations: Common Goals for Migration and Development**

   Investigating areas for international migration policy development is a fairly new trend, beginning in 2001 with the “Berne Initiative” and followed more recently with the contributions of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005-2006). Its genesis rests on States’ growing recognition of their common interests and objectives since all are affected by international migration and most have become countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants. Defining policy priorities has been coupled with more dialogue between States on this issue. Non-governmental sectors of society are progressively included in such discussions, adding valued insights.

   During UNFPA’s Expert Group Meeting, a number of suggestions were made concerning policy considerations that should be studied by all actors affected by migration. These suggestions included:

   1) **First and foremost, policies must be formulated on migration and development** as very few countries (if any) have them. One consideration in this regard will be ensuring that national development strategies recognize the role of migration. Governments must thus work to integrate migration into their poverty reduction strategies, encompassing a wide array of components including: labour market, health services, and access to health, trade, etc.

   2) **On migration and the MDGs, proposals for a set of “minimum common denominators” to measure the progress towards achieving the MDGs** were suggested. Even if the MDGs make no specific reference to migration, “migration impact statements” could be developed with different follow-up policies envisaged. These would include national assessments to determine the progress achieved.

   3) **Despite the progress made in incorporating non-State actors in migration policy dialogue,** this dialogue should be institutionalized so as to occur on a more consistent basis and to ensure their independence as important actors in their own right. One suggestion by experts was for ILO to consider how migration associations could be further included in its tripartite structure.

   4) **Young academics in major migration countries should be supported by assisting indigenous research centres,** which bring insights and perspectives that cannot be gained outside the country. Moreover, indigenous research and dissemination can have a positive impact on public opinion by helping to break down negative stereotypes and an impact on policy through reform. This was the case of a university-affiliated research center in Bangladesh for instance, which with the support of the United Kingdom development agency (DFID) was able to lobby its government and influence positive change including a reversal on the ban on female migration.

**Capacity Development: Getting to Good Policy and Implementing It**

Strengthening States’ and other actors’ abilities to respond to migration challenges often requires capacity development and training. For decades, States have received such assistance from international organizations such as the IOM on migration issues ranging from return of migrants, border control, data collection, protection of trafficking victims, reintegration assistance for returnees, etc. Training activities are likely to continue given their considerable, varied, and often pressing need. A challenge for the international community remains as to how to ensure that capacity development and training are meeting current demands and serving their intended objectives. Indeed, it is notoriously difficult to measure, in any quantifiable terms, the beneficial impacts of capacity development and training activities.
Following from the policy considerations above, capacity development and training would be required on:

1) *How to develop policy on migration and development, including its main components and how to implement them and achieve their goals.* What does this mean conceptually and how to go about it practically? Training would thus also include how to implement such policies.

2) *How to incorporate migration considerations into the achievement of the MDGs and how to measure progress towards achieving the different goals.*

3) *How to strengthen coordination and collaboration between countries and within them on migration and development.*

4) *How to assist national and sub-national research centres to build their knowledge base, to develop innovative migration projects and to enable them to provide relevant and evidence-based answers to development policy questions.*
Introduction

It is a common view that international migration increased markedly over the last decades of the twentieth century. Using the estimates of the number of international migrants in each country of the world prepared by the United Nations Population Division (United Nations, 2004a and 2004b), this paper assesses the changes taking place in international migration since 1980.

Between 1980 and 2000 the number of international migrants in the world rose from 100 million to 175 million in 2000, rising therefore at a rate of 2.8 per cent per year, faster than at any other period since 1960. However, a major contributor to that increase was not population mobility per se but rather the emergence of newly independent States after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Without such a break-up, the number of international migrants in 2000 would have been some 27 million lower and their number would not have grown as fast.

This paper shows that the growth of the stock of international migrants has varied considerably among regions. Even without the effect of the break-up of the USSR, the number of international migrants grew rapidly in developed regions after 1980 and slowly in the developing world. In fact, during the 1990s the number of international migrants in developing countries as a whole hardly changed.

The steady and rapid increase in the number of international migrants in the developed world has led to a greater concentration of international migrants in developed countries. The United States, in particular, now accounts for one fifth of all international migrants in the world.

Although all countries host international migrants, the majority of the migrants in the world are concentrated in relatively few countries. In 2000, 28 countries hosted three-quarters of all international migrants in the world. They included 13 developing countries, 10 developed countries and 4 successor States of the former USSR.

Women have long been active participants in international migration. Estimates for the 1960s show that women and girls already constituted by then nearly 47 per cent of all international migrants. By 2000, they constituted nearly 49 per cent. Female migrants are more numerous than male migrants in developed

* This paper draws heavily on Chapter II: International Migration Trends of the World Economic and Social Survey 2004 (United Nations, 2004c) and on “The global dimensions of female migration” (Zlotnik, 2003). The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations.
countries. In the developing world, females are particularly underrepresented among the international migrants living in Northern Africa and South-central Asia, where their share of the migrant population decreased to 43 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively. That is, increases in female migration have not been either universal or uniform among regions.

**Trends in the Number of International Migrants at the Regional Level**

In 2000, one out of every 35 persons in the world was an international migrant whereas a mere two decades earlier one in every 44 persons had been an international migrant. Between 1980 and 2000, the number of international migrants in the world increased by 75 per cent, from nearly 100 million to 175 million. Slightly more than a third of that increase, however, was due to the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, in 1991, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was replaced by 15 independent States, persons who had been internal migrants within the USSR because they were living in a republic other than that in which they were born became, literally overnight, international migrants. An estimated 27 million persons were in that category.

In deriving estimates of the total number of international migrants worldwide, the effects of the disintegration of the former USSR were backdated to 1990 to reflect better the actual increase in the number of migrants during 1990-2000 (table 1). Consequently, the increase between 1980 and 1990 is the one distorted by the effects of disintegration. At face value, the number of international migrants increased by 54 million during that decade. If the number of migrants in the USSR is subtracted, the increase during 1980-1990 drops by half, to 27 million, still higher than the 21 million rise estimated for 1990-2000. That is, even without the effects of disintegration, there was a slowdown in the increase of the number of international migrants worldwide during 1990-2000. If the rates of increase prevalent during the 1990s were to continue, the number of international migrants in 2005 would be close to 190 million.

The slowdown in the rise of the number of international migrants worldwide is mostly associated with the virtual stagnation of the number of international migrants in developing countries as a whole. Thus, whereas the number of international migrants in developing countries rose by 12 million in the 1980s, from 52 million to 64 million, it remained virtually unchanged at 64 million during the 1990s. In contrast, disregarding the changes involving the former USSR, the more developed regions gained nearly 15 million in 1980-1990 and over 21 million in 1990-2000. That is, whereas in the 1980s developed countries without the USSR gained just 20 per cent more international migrants than the developing world, by the 1990s they were absorbing virtually the total increase in the number of international migrants worldwide.

The stabilization of the number of migrants in the developing world owes much to the sharp decline in the number of refugees worldwide. As table 2 shows, excluding refugees, the number of migrants in developing countries rose from 44 million in 1980 to over 47 million in 1990 and then to 51 million in 2000, implying a rise of approximately 3 million per decade. In contrast, the number of refugees in the developing world rose sharply between 1980 and 1990 (from 8 million to 17 million, a rise of 9 million) but then dropped markedly (by 3.5 million) during the 1990s, to reach 13.5 million in 2000. Consequently, the reduction in the number of refugees during the 1990s counterbalanced the continued increase in the number of other migrants in developing countries during that period and led to no change in the overall migrant population in the developing world.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries excluding USSR</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of international migrants (millions)</th>
<th>Average annual rate of growth of the number of international migrants (percentage)</th>
<th>Percentage distribution of international migrants by region</th>
<th>International migrants as a percentage of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These developments have resulted in a notable shift of international migrants toward the developed world. Thus, whereas in 1980, 48 per cent of all international migrants lived in developed countries other than the USSR and 52 per cent lived in developing countries, by 2000, 46 per cent of all international migrants lived in the developed world and just 37 per cent lived in developing countries (table 1). With the inclusion of the former USSR among the developed countries, the proportion of international migrants in those countries rises to 48 per cent in 1980 and 63 per cent in 2000. Even taking into account that some of the successor States of the former USSR are now classified as developing countries, the proportion of the international migrant stock in the developed world remains at nearly 60 per cent in 2000.

At the regional level, increases in the share of international migrants occurred mostly in Northern America (from 18 per cent in 1980 to 23 per cent in 2000) and in the former USSR (from 3 per cent to 17 per cent between 1980 and 2000). The share of all other regions declined, with the reductions being particularly marked for Asia, whose share of international migrants dropped from 32 per cent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 2000, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, whose share dropped by nearly half during 1980-2000 (from 6 to 3 per cent).

The sharp rise in the number of international migrants in Northern America is noteworthy, since their number more than doubled during 1980-2000, passing from 18 million to 41 million, rising at an average rate of 4.1 per cent per year. That increase is mostly the result of the increasing foreign-born population in the United States, whose numbers passed from 14 million in 1980 to 35 million in 2000. As a result of such changes, the percentage of international migrants among the total population of Northern America more than doubled, rising from 7 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 2000.

In Europe, excluding the former USSR, the number of international migrants also increased significantly, particularly in the 1990s. Between 1980 and 2000, that number rose from 22 million to 33 million, and as a share of the total population it increased from 4.6 per cent in 1980 to 6.4 per cent in 2000. That is, whereas Europe had in 1970 nearly double the number of international migrants as the United States, by the end of the century, there were more international migrants in the United States than in Europe if one excludes the former USSR.

The migration flows leading to the changes observed have been driven by a variety of factors. Continued disparities in income and work opportunities between developing and developed countries have made the latter increasingly attractive as destinations for migrants from the developing world, particularly when other types of ties already exist between countries on both sides of the development divide. In addition, the political transformation that began in the 1980s and culminated with the demise of Communist regimes in Europe and the former USSR led to a liberalization of international mobility in the former Communist countries and to significant outflows of migrants. Many of the emigrants from Eastern bloc countries gained admission to the West as asylum-seekers. The conflict associated with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, in particular, produced major flows of people seeking protection in neighbouring countries. In addition, by facilitating the immigration of ethnic minorities from former Communist countries, countries such as Germany, Greece and Israel received unprecedented numbers of migrants over very short periods during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

As already mentioned, trends in forced migration changed considerably between the 1980s and the 1990s. The overall number of refugees, which had been increasing steadily until the early 1990s, declined over that decade. The 1980s was a period of particular upheaval, with the number of refugees under the mandate of UNHCR rising from 7 million to 16 million between 1980 and 1990. With the resolution of a number of long-standing conflicts in the late 1980s and the 1990s, voluntary repatriation became possible for several refugee populations and the number of refugees declined. By 2000, the number of refugees under UNHCR mandate had dropped to 12 million which, together with the 5 million refugees under the mandate
of UNRWA, constituted 9.7 per cent of all international migrants in the world. The majority of refugees in the world had found asylum in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. Refugees constituted an important share of all migrants in these developing regions. In Asia, for instance, refugees accounted for 23 per cent of all international migrants in 2000 and refugees were 22 per cent of those in Africa. The reduction in the number of refugees during the 1990s was most marked in Africa, where their numbers dropped from 5.4 million to 3.6 million, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the number of refugees declined from 1.2 million to virtually none. In contrast, in 1980 and 2000 the number of refugees in the developed world rose steadily, reaching 3 million in 2000, a number that accounted for just 3 per cent of all migrants in developed countries.

Among the 90 per cent of international migrants who were not refugees, the vast majority moved in search of better economic opportunities. However, traditionally, a distinction is made between the economically active migrants and persons who move for other reasons, usually to accompany economically active migrants or to study abroad. There are no global data showing how many international migrants are economically active. ILO estimates that roughly 50 per cent of all international migrants, that is, 86 million, were economically active in 2000 (International Labour Organization, 2004).

### Table 2. Estimates of Number of Refugees and of other International Migrants by Major Area, 1980 to 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of international migrants excluding refugees (millions)</th>
<th>Number of refugees (millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>107.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and former</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Levels of Female Migration

Until the late 1970s, most writings on international migration either focused explicitly only on male migrants (usually conceived as male migrant workers) or seemed to be based on the implicit assumption that most migrants were male. That assumption was particularly prevalent when attention was focused on the economic aspects of international migration because it was widely believed that the participation of women in international labour migration was negligible. Of course, such beliefs were rarely based on statistical evidence. Current estimates of the number of international migrants by sex reveal that women and girls have
accounted for a very high proportion of all international migrants for a long time. Already in 1960, female migrants accounted for nearly 47 out of every 100 migrants living outside of their countries of birth. That proportion increased only slightly by 1980 and has since risen to 49 per cent in 2000 (table 3). Although this trend is consistent with an increasing “feminization” of international migration, the increase recorded is small compared to the high level of feminization that already existed in 1960. For more than 40 years female migrants have been almost as numerous as male migrants: in 1960 there were 35 million female migrants and 40 million male migrants, by 2000, although the total number of migrants had more than doubled, the gap between females and males remained about the same, 85 million female migrants vs. 90 million male migrants.

Female migrants have generally accounted for a larger fraction of the migrant stock in developed countries than in the developing world. In 1980, 50 per cent of all migrants in developed countries were women or girls, whereas the equivalent proportion in developing countries was 45 per cent. By 2000 the difference between the two had risen further, since female migrants constituted nearly 51 per cent of all migrants in the developed world and accounted still for about 45 per cent of all international migrants in developing countries. The cause of these differences should be sought in the laws and regulations governing the admission of migrants in countries of destination and those governing their departure from countries of origin, in conjunction with the interplay of factors determining the status of women in countries of origin and countries of destination. By permitting the family reunification of legally admitted migrants, developed countries facilitate the admission of migrant women. In addition, the social and economic situation of women in developed countries, where women have access to a variety of educational and employment opportunities, acts as a magnet for women wishing to be economic and social actors in their own right.

Table 3. Proportion Female Among the Stock of International Migrants by Major Area, 1980, 1990 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major area</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries excluding USSR</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia a</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe b</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR (Former)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a: Excluding Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
b: Excluding Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

In contrast, in the developing world, countries that are major receivers of international migrants generally admit them exclusively for the purpose of working and male migrants tend to predominate in labour migration flows. However, since the late 1970s, the participation of women in labour migration directed to developing countries has been increasing. The major magnets for female labour migration are located in Western Asia (among the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council) and in the countries of the
Pacific Rim in Eastern and South-eastern Asia. In both of those regions, the proportion of women among all international migrants has been rising steadily since 1980. By 2000, the number of female migrants was estimated to have surpassed the number of male migrants in Eastern and South-eastern Asia (5 million vs. 4.9 million), and the 7.4 million female migrants in Western Asia were estimated to constitute 39 per cent of all migrants in that region. However, it bears stressing that not all the female migrants in those regions are migrant workers. In the oil-producing countries of Western Asia, for instance, already by 1975, before female contract migration became a major component of their migration flows, the number of female migrants was significant, amounting to 43 per cent of the foreign population in Kuwait, 33 per cent of that in Saudi Arabia, about 30 per cent of that in Bahrain and 20 per cent of all foreign migrants in the United Arab Emirates. Most of those female migrants were likely admitted as dependants of male migrant workers, although some may have been hired as teachers, nurses or to perform other occupations reserved for women.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of female migrants rose in parallel with the increasing numbers of refugees in the continent. In the early 1990s, when attention began to focus on the plight of female refugees, those involved in advocacy popularized the notion that 80 per cent of all refugees were women and children. Because data on refugees classified by age and sex were not available, that estimate seemed plausible for the high fertility countries of sub-Saharan Africa where women and children accounted for high proportions of the total population. When UNHCR began in the late 1990s to publish data on refugees classified by sex, female refugees in Africa turned out to account for about half of all assisted refugees, implying that they were not over-represented among the refugee population in the continent. In fact, in 2000, women and girls accounted for 47 per cent of all migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, a figure only slightly below the world average, and still indicating that men outnumbered women among migrants in the continent.

Female migrants have been particularly under-represented among all migrants in Northern Africa and South-Central Asia. In both regions, the proportion of female migrants declined since 1970, partly because those regions have few magnets for international migrants. Most countries of Northern Africa are sources of emigrants rather than receivers. In South-Central Asia, forced migration has led to very sizable flows within the region but data on the sex composition of the migrant stock are scarce. Consequently, the estimated levels presented here may not be reflecting accurately the changes taking place in the share of female migration in the region.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, data on the stock of international migrants are abundant and the trend toward the increasing feminization of international migration is well established. It is particularly noteworthy that Latin America was the first region of the developing world to record near parity in the number of female and male migrants: in 1990, 3.5 million of the region’s 7 million international migrants were women. The number of migrants in the region is estimated to have declined during the 1990s, but by 2000 women constituted slightly more than half of the nearly 6 million migrants in the region.

The Distribution of International Migrants at the Country Level

International migration is a universal phenomenon. All countries have some international migrants. However, the proportion of international migrants in the population varies widely among countries. In 1980, international migrants constituted less than 0.1 per cent of the populations of countries such as Cambodia, China or Viet Nam, while at the same time they accounted for at least 65 per cent of the populations of small countries that had been important migrant destinations, such as Kuwait, Monaco, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates. In at least a quarter of all countries in the world, international migrants accounted for less than 1.1 per cent of the population. At the upper end of the distribution, international migrants accounted for 11.7 per cent or more of the population of a quarter of all countries in 1980. At that time, the median proportion of migrants in the populations of the countries of the world was 3.5 per cent. By 2000, that median value had increased somewhat (to 3.8 per cent) but still a quarter of all countries had populations where migrants accounted for at most 1.1 per cent of all inhabitants.
In the majority of countries or areas, international migrants accounted for relatively low proportions of the population. In 1980, migrants constituted less than 5 per cent of the populations of 122 countries or areas out of 212, while in 2000, with the same number of units, the equivalent number of countries was 117. In 2000 the number of countries with high concentrations of migrants was still small. In Andorra, Macao Special Administrative Region of China, Monaco, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates the proportion of international migrants was above 65 per cent.

Most of the countries or areas with high proportions of international migrants tended to have fewer than a million inhabitants. Among the 53 countries with more than 10 million inhabitants in 1980, in only three—Australia, Canada and France—did the proportion of international migrants surpass 10 per cent. By 2000, that number had increased to 9 out of the 78 countries with 10 million inhabitants or more, namely, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and the United States. In 1970 the three populous countries with the largest concentration of international migrants accounted for 13 per cent of the world’s migrant stock, whereas in 2000 the 9 countries listed accounted for 40 per cent.

In fact, the stock of international migrants remains concentrated in relatively few countries. Thus, in 1980 just 26 countries accounted for over three-quarters of the international migrant stock and in 2000, just 28 did so, representing 12 per cent of all countries in 1970 and in 2000 (table 4). There has been a marked concentration of international migrants in the major receiving country, the United States, whose share of the migrant stock rose from 14 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 2000. Other countries whose share of all international migrants increased substantially include Australia, Canada, Germany and Saudi Arabia. In addition, countries such as Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan, which were absent from the list of major receiving countries in 1980, were in the list corresponding to 2000. They had replaced Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kuwait, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, the former USSR and Venezuela, which dropped from the 2000 list. Among the latter, most of those in Africa saw their number of international migrants fall as a result of the repatriation of refugees during the 1990s.

In 1980, the main receiving countries included 9 in the developed world plus the USSR and 16 in the developing world (table 4). By 2000, the 28 major receiving countries included 11 developed countries, 4 successor States of the former USSR and 13 developing countries. But although the distribution of major receiving countries by development group had not changed much, there had been a substantial shift in the share of international migrants corresponding to each group. Thus, in 2000 the 11 major receivers in the developed world accounted for 41 per cent of all international migrants, up from the 42 per cent share of the 10 developed countries in the list in 1980. Concomitantly, the share of the developing countries had declined markedly, from 33 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 2000, with most of the gain going to the main receivers among the successor States of the former USSR whose share had risen from 3 per cent to 14 per cent between 1980 and 2000.

These changes point to the declining importance, in relative terms, of international migration for developing countries of destination. Although sizable numbers of international migrants exist in a number of developing countries, their weight both as a proportion of the global migrant stock and in relation to the population of developing countries as a whole is declining. Accordingly, international migrants as a proportion of the population of developing countries dropped from 1.6 per cent in 1980 to 1.3 per cent in 2000, a trend that contrasts with that in developed countries, where the share of international migrants in the population rose from 3.6 per cent to 8.7 per cent over the same period (table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country or Area</th>
<th>Migrant stock (millions)</th>
<th>1974-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China, Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations Population Division, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision (POP/DB/MIG/2003/1 and ESA/P/WP.188), data in digital form.
The significance of international migration in developed countries is also evidenced by the role it plays in population growth. In 1980-1990, the rate of natural increase\textsuperscript{1} in the more developed regions as a whole was 4.6 per thousand whereas the net migration rate was 1.4 per thousand, implying that when net migration was added to the rate of natural increase it yielded a growth rate of 5.9 per thousand (table 5). That is, net migration contributed the equivalent of 30 per cent of natural increase to population growth in the more developed regions. In contrast, in the less developed regions, where the rate of natural increase was 21 per thousand, a net migration rate of –0.4 per thousand contributed to reduce the rate of natural increase by just 1.9 per cent. During 1990-2000, the relative impact of international migration on the growth of the more developed regions increased markedly, with net migration more than doubling the contribution of natural increase (2.2 per thousand vs. 1.6 per thousand). In the less developed regions, net migration was still reducing the rate of natural increase by a small percentage (3.3 per cent).

In other words, although developing countries as a whole have been consistently losing population because of international migration, their overall rate of natural increase is still so high that net emigration has had only a small impact on population trends. In sharp contrast, the rising net inflows of international migrants to the more developed regions have been and will continue to be crucial in increasing levels of population growth or, in some cases, preventing population reductions from taking place. Europe, in particular, would have experienced a population decline of 4.3 million during 1990-2000 had it not been for migrant inflows, since the population of Europe gained about 11.4 million migrants between 1990 and 2000 but its population increased by just 7.1 million people. As shown in table 5, the net migration rate of Europe in 1990-2000 (1.6 per thousand) has offset the negative rate of natural increase of –0.6 per thousand experienced during the period. The contribution of net migration to population growth has also gained significance in Northern America, where it rose from the equivalent of 50 per cent of natural increase in 1980-1990 to 68 per cent in 1990-2000. In contrast, the relative contribution of net migration has declined slightly in Oceania, from 28 per cent to 25 per cent of natural increase between the two decades.

At the country level, Germany’s population would have been declining since at least 1970 were it not for the net migration gains the country has experienced. In the late 1990s, positive net international migration has made major contributions to the growth of countries such as Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland, where it has at least tripled the level of natural increase.

In sum, the number of international migrants is increasingly being concentrated in developed countries and relatively few countries account for the majority of international migrants in the world (28 in 2000). Virtually all the increase in the international migrant stock during the 1990s has been absorbed by developed countries, especially the Western bloc countries. Although the number of countries where international migrants constitute at least 10 per cent of the population has increased from 59 to 70 between 1980 and 2000, the vast majority of those countries have small overall populations and small numbers of international migrants. The impact of international migration is particularly important for Western bloc countries, not only because they are attracting more international migrants than the rest of the world, but also because international migration is contributing significantly to raise their low or negative rates of population growth stemming from natural increase. Lastly, the primacy of the United States as a migrant receiving country has increased markedly. In 2000, one out of every five international migrants lived in the United States.

Conclusion

The late 20\textsuperscript{th} century witnessed important changes in international migration trends, though they may not be as dramatic as often portrayed. Since 1980, migration directed to developed countries has increased

\textsuperscript{1} The rate of natural increase indicates how fast a population would grow because of the difference between births and deaths in relation to population. That is, it does not take account of the contribution to population growth or decrease made by net international migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1980-1990 Net migration</th>
<th>1980-1990 Rate of Net migration</th>
<th>Rate of Natural Increase</th>
<th>Net migration as percentage of natural increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
markedly. Europe, in particular, became a major destination for migrants originating in other regions. During the 1980s, the former labour-sending countries of Southern Europe, especially those that were newly admitted to the European Union, became destinations for international migrants seeking employment abroad. In addition, East to West flows of migrants increased as liberalization began to take hold in the Communist countries, and those flows became major components of the migrant intake of a number of Western countries, especially after the disintegration of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia. Admissions of asylum-seekers and refugees as well as of migrants for family reunification gained weight as components of the migrant intake of Western bloc countries in Europe. Concomitantly, the opening of borders among the former Eastern bloc countries and the break-up of the USSR produced important migration flows among those countries, driven in part by the “unmixing” of nationalities as certain ethnic groups sought to return to their republics of origin.

In the 1990s, developed countries either started or redoubled efforts to attract temporary skilled workers from abroad to satisfy the growing demand for labour in particular sectors of their economies. Consequently, temporary admissions of workers grew in number both in the countries of immigration, such as Australia and the United States, and in European countries. These changes have led to some diversification in the countries that are the major sources of migrants to the major receiving countries in the developed world. However, the migrant stock in most receiving countries continues to be dominated by a handful of nationalities.

In the developing world, especially in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, migration directed to destinations outside each region is more important in magnitude than that occurring within the region. Largely because of the resolution of long-standing conflicts in the developing world, major voluntary repatriation movements of refugees took place during the 1990s, leading to a reduction in the number of refugees. This reduction resulted in slow growth in the number of international migrants in Africa and a contraction of the numbers in Latin America. In both regions, some of the important poles of attraction of times past have been experiencing economic or political difficulties that have resulted in sizeable return flows of former migrants or the outright emigration of citizens. Consequently, the major receiving countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil or Venezuela, have become net senders of international migrants.

There have been important changes in the major poles of attraction within regions. One of the most significant has been the transformation of the rapidly industrializing countries of Eastern and South-eastern Asia into destinations for migrant workers in the late 1980s and the 1990s, especially because a number of those countries had been important sources of emigrants just a decade before. Some of them, such as Malaysia or the Republic of Korea, experience both significant outflows of citizens and inflows of foreign workers. In this respect, they are similar to a number of European countries that have, since the 1970s, been registering net losses of citizens and net gains of foreigners.

Clearly, international migration evolves as the economic, social and political situation of countries changes. With more independent States, the possibilities for international migration increase. Furthermore, because there continue to be considerable economic disparities among countries, there is ample room for population movements to respond to the opportunities available in the better-off countries, be they in the developed world or the more prosperous parts of the developing world. Differences in demographic dynamics also play a part, as the better-off countries tend to be those where fertility levels have been lower and where population ageing is accelerating. International migration is already contributing to prevent or slow down the decline of a number of populations in the developed world, and it is expected to continue playing that role in the future.
References


INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS *

Erica Usher
Migration Policy, Research and Communication
International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Introduction

International migration, despite its growing scope and magnitude, does not feature prominently in the original framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The relationship between migration and the Millennium Development Goals has not been widely explored, although both the migration and development communities have become increasingly mindful of the link between international migration and development, and official United Nations documents and progress reports have started to reflect this shift.

Integrating migration into development policy agendas is taking on a new importance in many countries. Several Governments of states that are primarily countries of destination for migrants, such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, have started to move in this direction. Similarly, more and more Governments of countries of origin are establishing policies to strengthen the involvement of their diasporas in national development processes.

However, the coherent and comprehensive integration of international migration in the development agenda of donors, or in strategic development policy frameworks such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)\(^1\), Country Strategy Papers\(^2\) or Common Country Assessments (CCAs)/United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs)\(^3\), is still lacking. While some of these reports hint at problems experienced in relation to international migration, for example the loss of qualified human resources or the lack of adequate labour migration management capacity, very few mention the potential benefits migration could yield for their development. As DfID has outlined in a recent report of the House of Commons: “A recent review of 48 poverty reduction strategy papers found that 21 made no mention of migration; nine saw it as a cause of ‘brain-drain’.” (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2004). The 2005 report of the UN Millennium Project, “Investing in Development – A Practical Way to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals” does begin to draw links between migration and development targets, albeit in a nominal manner.

There is a noticeable gap in research and analysis on how migration is linked to attaining the Millennium Development Goals as in light of available evidence, there is no simple cause and effect relationship between migration and the achievement of the MDGs. Though migration may have a direct and positive impact, it can equally constitute a challenge.

Migration cuts across all or most MDGs, but those with the closest links are Goal 1 (Poverty Reduction), Goal 3 (Gender Equality), Goal 6 (Prevention of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other Infectious Diseases), Goal 7 (Environmental Sustainability), and Goal 8 (Creation of Global Partnerships for Development).

---

Migration and the Millennium Development Goals

The United Nations “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration” mentions migration only as one of the causes of the worsening global malaria problem, and migrants as “victims of discrimination, racism and intolerance”.

Furthermore, the Road Map states that strategies for moving forward to achieving the MDGs include: “continuing United Nations work to provide technical advice and training and to lead dialogue on specific policies dealing with migration issues and their implications.”

Migration is also only briefly mentioned in some of the Millennium Project Interim Task Force Reports, where it is noted mainly for its potentially negative impact on development. Health-related reports, for instance, stress that the brain drain of health professionals impacts negatively on the health situation of the population as well as on the general development situation in countries of origin. In the report on improving the lives of slum dwellers (Task Force 8), migration is described as a phenomenon that needs to be understood in order to achieve the MDG targets in this regard.

Some of the more recent sector specific Task Force reports of the UN Millennium Project do contain references to migration. The Task Force on Trade and Development, for example, stresses the importance of a multilateral trading system, leading, inter alia, to a further liberalization of services, including the temporary movement of people. Other reports mostly focus on potential challenges migration presents to development efforts, such as the report of the Task Force on Health, which deals extensively with the negative impacts of the emigration of health workers from developing countries and the ensuing human resource shortages.

Similarly, some of the country progress reports mention migration. In the reports of Albania, Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, migratory movements have been identified as a concern related to the inability of the administrative and registration systems to cope with the extensive population movements. The lack of reliable registration systems and data makes a sound understanding of the country’s population size and development more difficult.

The January 2005 report of the UN Millennium Project, entitled “Investing in Development: A Practical Way to Achieve the MDGs” also discusses migration in various contexts: while it points to the challenges arising from the increasing migration from rural to urban areas, as well as from the outflow of professionals, it also mentions remittances as a possible positive effect of migration, and emphasizes the necessity of comprehensive approaches to migration management in the context of poverty reduction.

The following section will briefly look at the inter-linkages between migration and the MDGs, in particular poverty eradication, gender, health, sustainable environment and global partnerships.

1. Poverty Eradication

   a. Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
      Target 1: Halve between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.

      Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
b. **Inter-linkages between Goal 1 and Migration**

Migration can be either the cause or the effect of poverty. Likewise poverty might be reduced or amplified by migration. The inter-linkages are as complex as the individual migrants’ situations.

Most migrants do not belong to the poorest of the poor, but are individuals who have access to some resources. Empirical evidence demonstrates that an increase in international migration can be positively linked to a decline in the number of people living in poverty (Adams and Page, 2003). On the other hand, one of the issues of growing concern for many countries is the outflow of professionals at a rate faster than they can be replaced, resulting in a shortage of skills. This depletion of the human resource base can present a challenge to development efforts in some countries, potentially contributing to impoverishment.

Nonetheless, the emigration of skilled professionals can also have positive repercussions on the development of countries of origin and eventually turn into a “brain gain”. This has been the case, for example, in some Asian countries, where diasporas have helped to foster economic development and establish close economic and political linkages between countries of origin and of destination (Skeldon, 2002). According to the report by the United Kingdom House of Commons, this positive impact depends upon the extent of migrant remittances, on the skills migrants acquire whilst overseas, and on whether they eventually return to their home country (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2004). Remittances and skills and knowledge transfer are the most notable areas in which migrants are seen to engage in the development of their countries of origin.

**Remittances**

The most direct link between migration and poverty reduction is through remittances – the funds migrants send home. According to the World Bank, remittances increased by more than 20 per cent from 2001 to 2003, reaching an estimated US $93 billion in 2003 (World Bank, 2004), a figure that does not include the large share of remittances that is transferred through informal channels and therefore goes unrecorded (Puri and Ritzema, 1999). Remittances remain the second-largest financial flow to developing countries after foreign direct investment, more than double the size of net official finance (World Bank, 2004).

Remittances help to reduce poverty by providing families in the countries of origin with additional income. This income is often used for consumer goods, but also enables families to make necessary investments in education and health. Often remittances assume the function of a social safety net. Remittances are used to finance community projects such as hospitals and schools, or they are invested in business ventures, particularly in countries with a sound economic environment (Ratha, 2003). A recent study found that “on average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international remittances in a country’s GDP will lead to a 1.6 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty” (Adams, and Page, 2003).

It is well established that remittances are an important source of finance for developing countries. Remittances transferred to low income countries are generally considered to be a stable flow of income, which, studies have shown, can even increase in times of hardship (Ratha, 2003). In 2003, for 36 countries, the amounts of remittances were greater than both official and private flows (World Bank, 2004). Remittances therefore constitute an important source of foreign exchange, enabling a country to acquire vital imports or to pay off external debts. Remittances, according to the World Bank, can have a positive effect on macro-economic growth to the extent that they are used to finance health and education expenses (World Bank, 2004). But even when remittances are directed exclusively towards consumption, they generate multiplier effects, especially in poor countries with high unemployment (Ratha, 2003).

Beyond their positive effect on consumption and their potentially long-term development effects, two other characteristics enhance the value of remittances as an important resource for poverty reduction.
Remittances are largely unaffected by political or financial crises and violent conflicts, and even tend to increase in terms of hardship. Secondly, remittances are more equally spread among developing countries than other capital flows (Ratha, 2003).

Skills and knowledge transfer

Migrant communities abroad are not just a source of remittances. In addition to their financial engagement, diasporas can help to foster innovation, learning processes, and even political change in the countries of origin. Closer contacts and close coordination with diasporas helps the home countries to benefit from the non-financial resources that their diasporas may bring. This can lead to increased temporary or permanent return migration, and may also trigger a flow of ideas, know-how and resources between diasporas and the home country.

The Indian government, for example, recently adjusted its citizenship policies to grant dual citizenship to Indians living abroad. This has helped to remove obstacles for Indians abroad to invest and travel in India. This initiative fits into a plan of action initiated by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, whose objective was to achieve a growth of foreign direct investment by the Indian Diaspora up to US$ 5 billion by 2008, which is ten-times higher than the current level of foreign direct investment.13

Another opportunity for diaspora involvement in development is through programmes of temporary return. Such programmes are undertaken through initiatives such as the International Organization for Migration’s programme on “Migration for Development in Africa”. This programme aims at the transfer of vital skills and resources of migrants from different African countries abroad to support the development of their countries of origin.

Such benefits are not limited to temporary return programmes, however. Managed labour migration in general can individually and mutually benefit the concerned Governments, migrants and societies. Labour migration programmes are closely linked to several areas of development, including the amount and stability of remittances, skills development, training, and the empowerment of women. As a result, an increasing number of developing and transition countries seek to adopt policies, legislation and structures to promote the foreign employment of part of their workforce and generate remittances, while providing safeguards to protect their migrants.

2. Gender14

a. Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.

b. Inter-linkages between Goal 3 and migration

The MDGs mirror the Millennium Declaration’s commitment to gender equality. Gender equality is seen not only a goal in its own right, but an essential ingredient for achieving all the other MDGs.

There are two major links between gender equality and migration: on the one hand migration can contribute to the empowerment of women, thereby helping to promote gender equality (International Organization for Migration, 2002a), on the other hand, particular migration situations can pose a challenge to achieving gender equality.
About half of the world’s migrants today are women. In 2000, about 49 per cent of the world’s migrants were women, up from 46.6 per cent in 1960 (Zlotnik, 2003). Although women have migrated in large numbers for the past fifty years, female migrants today assume an increasingly significant role within the migration process, a phenomenon attracting more and more attention from academics and policy makers.

Instead of moving to follow their husbands or families as “dependants”, more and more women migrate independently or as heads of families themselves (International Organization for Migration, 2003). This type of migration can help to empower women with greater independence and autonomy and help eliminate gender disparities by increasing the proportion of women in paid employment situations, one of the targets identified in Goal 3.

It is not only the money earned but also heightened self-esteem associated with employment, education and knowledge that can make female migrants more powerful in their host and home community. As stated in a recent report for the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, “Migration of women within and from developing countries affects the development process itself for those countries” (Martin, 2004). The survival and coping skills they develop during the migration process can and should be tapped as potential sources of change and development. In turn, the empowerment of women in each generation will have effects on the next, providing children with female role models and helping to influence ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education. Furthermore, research has shown that women migrants tend to send a larger share of their income home as remittances, which in turn contributes to poverty reduction. In Sri Lanka, money transfers by female migrants made up 62 per cent of the total sum of remittances in 1999 (International Organization for Migration, 2003).

On the other hand, migration of women or men independently of their families can contribute to the disruption of traditional family relations and social systems in the countries of origin in ways which are only beginning to be understood. Furthermore, migration still holds more dangers for women than for men. Women are more vulnerable to deprivation, hardship, discrimination, and physical, sexual and verbal abuse when travelling, and they are more likely to fall prey to human trafficking and exploitation. Similarly, upon arrival in the country of destination, a female migrant in a situation of relative dependency may face greater difficulty with regard to integration than does a male migrant. Psychosocial pressures and divergent sets of cultural expectations often result in a higher degree of marginalization of women migrants in the host country. In addition, as women and foreigners, migrant women often face double discrimination in the labour market, and their access to employment, social and health programmes can be more limited. Legally, many migrant women are vulnerable if their legal residence is dependent upon a relationship with a citizen or a “primary migrant” (Martin, 2004).

3. **Health**

   a. **Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**

      Target 7: To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

      Target 8: To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

   b. **Inter-linkages between Goal 6 and Migration**

      Three out of the eight MDGs aim to improve global health in order to reduce poverty. Migration is linked to the attainment of Goal 6, in particular, in two major ways:
First, during their journey as well as upon arrival in their countries of destination, migrants are particularly vulnerable to health risks, and their situation has to be taken specifically into account by public health programmes (International Organization for Migration, 2002b). This is especially important since migration can contribute to the spread of infectious and other communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Failure to address the health of migrants during the various phases of migration will hinder successful integration and can hamper effective reconstruction in the case of post-conflict or post-emergency situations (International Organization for Migration, 2003).

Second, the emigration of health workers from developing countries has become a major impediment to the functioning of the healthcare systems of some countries. This issue needs to be addressed jointly by countries of origin and countries of destination.

Migrants’ individual health on the move and in countries of destination

Mobility patterns (especially the distinction between regular and irregular migration) strongly influence the conditions of the journey and thus also have an impact on the health situation of migrants. For irregular migrants in particular, health concerns during the transportation phase are often directly related to dire travel conditions such as overcrowded and unsanitary surroundings or unseaworthy vessels. In extreme cases, migrants are sometimes forced to travel hidden in cargo, containers, and closed compartments and sometimes lack access to air, food and water for extended periods.

It is often the migrants’ legal status that defines their access to health and social services in the destination country. Linguistic, cultural, and religious estrangement or barriers can contribute to making provision and receipt of health care difficult for migrants. Migrants are disproportionately afflicted with disease, often with considerably higher incidence than locals in the country of destination and their counterparts in the country of origin (International Organization for Migration, 2002b).

Evidence shows that even despite the issue of legal status, the risk for migrants to contract diseases is highest after their arrival in the country of destination, and not while still in the country of origin or while being in transit. Often marginalized, migrants are sometimes unaware of their rights or how to request treatment from local governments, non-governmental or inter-governmental organizations. With such large migration flows taking place between developing countries, this can be particularly significant.

Individual and public health in countries of origin

The emigration of health professionals from developing countries can seriously impede the delivery of health services and the standard of health education. The global shortage of health workforce is aggravated by an unequal distribution of human resources sustained by a steady ‘internal migration’ of health personnel from rural to urban areas, from the public to the private sector, and out of the health professions itself. Coupling this is the growing exodus (both through “South/South” and “South/North” migration) of health professionals to more developed countries that experience difficulty in filling vacancies through domestically trained personnel alone. One way to help address these challenges is through mobilizing diasporas to temporarily return to countries of origin to work and take up training assignments in the health sector as well as in other professional sectors.

Countering brain drain of health workers by mobilizing diaspora resources for temporary return is one important means for re-building the health infrastructure and the availability of human resources for health in developing countries. International organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO) or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
are concentrating their research and operational activities in this area. Projects in developing countries can involve temporary labour assignments of members of diasporas for training and education purposes.

4. **Sustainable Development**

   a. **Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability**

   Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.

   Target 10: To halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.

   Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

   b. **Inter-linkages between Migration and Goal 7**

   Ensuring environmental sustainability becomes especially challenging in the context of internally displaced persons and refugees as well as in relation to migration to urban areas.

   **Camps of Refugees or Internally Displaced People (IDPs)**

   In crises, a large number of people can be uprooted in a very short period of time. During the Rwandan crisis more than a million refugees crossed the borders to Goma in only three days (Ertegun, 2002). Camps are set up to accommodate refugees and internally displaced persons with their direct safety being the most important concern. Considerations about the impact of the camps on local ecosystems certainly are of less immediate importance. However, the depletion and deterioration of the areas in which camps are located is a critical problem in the medium to longer term. The high demand for wood in order to build shelters and to cook food, for example, can leave local populations with immense ecological challenges after the completion of humanitarian operations.

   In addition, to build an infrastructure that can support a certain quantity of persons with access to safe water and sanitation is a challenge in itself. But safe water is a prerequisite to prevent the outbreak and spread of epidemics and diseases.¹⁸

   On the other hand, environmental degradation can also be the cause, rather than the effect, of the migration of a large number of people, for example in the case of environmental catastrophes, land degradation and drought. But not all movement in this regard is unplanned. Large-scale resettlement schemes can also result in huge numbers of the population being uprooted.

   **Slum Dwellers**

   Migration, both internal and international, to urban centres is not a new phenomenon, but the number of city dwellers is internationally at an all-time high. The inter-linkages between internal and international migration systems differ between regions and countries.¹⁹ In Asia, fast economic growth in urban areas has sustained a significant migration from rural areas into the cities. While this might alleviate pressures in the rural areas, it certainly creates new challenges in the urban centres with regards to infrastructure, access to safe water, sanitation, employment and education (United Nations, 2003a).
Urbanization is a phenomenon of the modern world. Studies estimate that more than 50 per cent of the world’s population will live in urban areas by 2007 (United Nations, 2004). Urban centres will absorb most of the population growth until 2030. In 2001, according to the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 924 million people were living in slums worldwide. With an urban population of 2,923 million this means that 31.6 per cent of the urban population were slum-dwellers. If the present growth rate of urban areas continues, UN-HABITAT forecasts that about 2 billion people will be living in slum areas by 2030 (United Nations, 2003b).

Whereas the growth of most cities in the industrialized world has slowed almost to a stop, urban areas in developing countries continue to grow both through population growth (birth rate) and through immigration. Sixty per cent of urban growth is generally estimated to be due to natural increase, i.e., the excess of fertility over mortality in urban areas (Brennan, 1999). About 40 per cent of urban population growth can be attributed to migration both internal (national) and international as well as reclassification of formerly rural areas on the periphery of cities (United Nations, 2001).

Urban areas in developing countries will absorb most of the population growth forecast for the coming years. These urban areas are fed, in part, by migrants, as a large portion of migrant flows are between developing countries (International Organization for Migration, 2003).

Rural-urban and international migration remain two vital strategies for individuals to improve their livelihood. But in order to achieve target 11, the connection between rural-urban, international migration and urban poverty has to be understood and migration needs to be managed for the benefit of cities, societies and individual migrants.

Migration will continue to be a major source of urban growth, especially in developing countries. Migration to urban areas does not inevitably have to be a destructive force, nor does it necessarily lead to the formation or growth of dangerous and unhealthy slum areas. The term “slum” covers a variety of different scenarios including so-called informal settlements. Some studies suggest that some forms of informal settlements can be seen as signs of a vital and to a certain extent “successful” and thriving city. Slum areas are sometimes viewed as areas in transition, which ease the integration process of migrants (Mumtaz, 2001).

5. **Global Partnerships**

a. **Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development**

Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.

Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.

b. **Interlinkages between Goal 8 and Migration**

The opening up of trading and financial systems has an impact on migration in two major areas.

First, the issue of transfer costs for remittances and the establishment of legal channels for the transfer of these financial flows need urgently to be considered in the development of a non-discriminatory and predictable financing system (target 12). Transfer costs for migrants’ remittances amount to up to 20 per cent of the transferred money (Newland, 2003).
Second, in the international trading system, there has been substantial liberalization of trade in goods, capital and some services. But liberalization of the movement of persons, to provide services pursuant to Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, has not kept pace. For many developing countries the liberalization of trade such as under Mode 4 movement, is seen as an important contribution to the economies of their countries and the employment opportunities of their nationals. Some studies suggest that increased movement of service providers also increases the flow of foreign direct investment. This is the case in India, where the government has facilitated investing and trading in the country of origin for members of Indian diasporas.\textsuperscript{21}

Furthermore, Target 18 concerns close cooperation with the private sector to make available benefits of new technologies. This can be done through networks that facilitate market access in both low- and high-income countries. Diasporas are often found to be important agents linking private and public sector in host and home countries. Their networks can be “the basis of business partnerships, trade, and flows of investment” (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2004).

Often, members of diasporas have accumulated the necessary knowledge to establish and manage their own enterprises and are conversant with the culture and business of both their countries of origin and of destination. Thus they can contribute to private sector development in their home countries by either establishing their own business, or through investments, the provision of training or the transfer of knowledge to countries of origin. Due to their contacts with potential business partners in destination countries, they can establish a link between companies and facilitate trade.

The potential for development through global diaspora networks and transnationalism is only starting to be understood. In close cooperation the private sector, as well as sending and receiving countries, can achieve a global partnership that has the potential to successfully work towards achieving the MDGs.

At the regional level consultative processes on migration are considering migration and development in their discussions as a necessary element in international migration management. In the Americas the issue of remittances has been included in the programmes of action of the South American Conference on Migration (Lima Declaration). Participants in the Regional Conference on Migration in North America (Puebla Process) are equally considering issues pertaining to migration and development.

In Africa, the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa and the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa seek to tap the potential of respective diasporas to contribute to development processes in the countries of origin. The 2001 programme of action of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development maps out strategies “utilizing the know-how and skills of Africans in the diaspora for the development of Africa.” It envisions promoting networking and collaboration between experts in the country of origin and those in the diaspora.

Asian countries have included the issue of remittances in the programme of action of the Manila Process.

In the context of the Western Mediterranean Cooperation Process (“5+5 Dialogue”), one of the topics discussed by the Ministers of the ten participating countries, in October 2003 in Rabat, was migration and co-development including the necessity to facilitate the involvement of migrants in the economic development of their region of origin (investment aid, know-how transfer aid, migrants’ reintegration support).
Conclusion

The interlinkages between migration and the MDGs are complex and the impact of migration on development can both challenge and support the achievement of the goals. These complexities need to be taken into account when formulating strategies for attaining the MDGs. Although it is difficult to obtain reliable data and statistics on migration, with additional focused research and analysis, policy strategies can be developed to mitigate the negative impacts while enhancing the positive impacts of migration.

Endnotes

1 PRSPs are prepared through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as external development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes over a three-year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing.

2 Country Strategy Papers describe the European Union’s assistance strategy for a specific country.

3 CCAs are the common instrument of the United Nations system to analyse the national development situation and identify key development issues. The UNDAF is based on the CCA and is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the United Nations system at the country level.


5 Ibid.


10 The country reports are prepared to regularly monitor and report on the progress made in achieving the MDGs. For a list of country reports prepared to date see http://www.undp.org/mdg/countryreports.html (accessed on 15 November 2004).

11 Ibid.

12 For an in depth discussion of these relationships, see: Skeldon (2002).
13 For more information see http://www.ficci.com/ficci/index.htm (accessed on 16 November 2004).

14 “Gender” is commonly used to describe the roles and responsibilities of women and men that are determined by society. Gender roles are shaped by culture, tradition, education, power relations, beliefs, parents, religion and society and therefore, gender roles may vary from one culture to another. This section draws on International Organization for Migration (2002a).

15 This section draws on International Organization for Migration (2002b).

16 Health and poverty are closely linked. A selection of papers exploring this inter-linkage is available on the homepage of the Development Gateway Foundation. This forum was created to collect papers and statements discussing health and poverty with regards to achieving the MDGs. www.developmentgateway.org (accessed on 15 November 2004).

17 UNESCO focuses on international communication technology by developing an open-source software that enables the contact between diasporas and their countries of origin.

18 In order to take a managed approach to this challenge, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in 1996, published “Environmental Guidelines”. This is an attempt to involve refugees, IDPs and the local population in projects that will help to mitigate the impact of camps on the environment through agro-forestry and practices for composting and recycling organic waste. While such an approach allows for sustainability in times of emergencies it also provides training that can be useful to refugees and IDPs when they return home. http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue4/0402p48.html (accessed on 15 November 2004).

19 The Development Research Center on Migration, Globalization and Poverty looks at the inter-linkages between internal and international migration in its Sub Theme “Inter-relationships between Internal and International Migration and their Inter-linkages”, http://www.migrationdrc.org/projects/theme2/sub-theme5.html (accessed on 15 November 2004).

20 See also this paper’s section on remittances under Goal 1, Poverty Reduction and Migration.

21 See also this paper’s section on diasporas and Foreign Direct Investment under Goal 1, Poverty Reduction and Migration.

References


THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON DEVELOPMENT

Colleen Thouez
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

Introduction

Remittances are “the portion of international migrant workers’ earnings sent back from the country of employment to the country of origin.”¹ Central Banks record official flows of remittances as part of their Balance of Payment statistics, which are then reported to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Broadly speaking, remittances reflect the monetary dimension in the complex web of linkages that exist between migrant diasporas and their home countries.² Remittances are an old phenomenon. After the Great Famine of 1846-1848, for example, the remittances from Irish female domestics in the United States became the single most important source of capital for the Irish countryside. From 1950-1960, remittances were key to the development of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia.³ Interestingly, it is only recently with the contribution made by the World Bank’s Global Development Finance 2003 Annual Report and more particularly Dilip Ratha’s Chapter 7 entitled “An important and stable source of external development finance”, that formal notice was taken of remittances.⁴ This turn has spurred greater appreciation in discussion and policy circles on their development potential in countries and communities of origin.

This paper focuses on the development impact of remittances as we currently gauge it.⁵ By remittances, it refers only to financial remittances and not more recent interpretations such as “social remittances”, i.e. the flow of ideas and attitudes. It begins with the premise that remittances are certainly positive for development, and that they do contribute to increasing general welfare. In this vein, it highlights what a host of actors are doing to encourage remittances and to promote their development impact.

However, it is unclear whether remittance effects impact “transient poverty” or longer term development. This issue is further explored as are two negative externalities tied to remittances, namely brain drain and what might be termed the “migration dependency cycle”: brain drain leading to remittances, and remittances potentially fueling the cycle of migration dependency.

What is clear is that there is a need to pursue dual objectives—promoting remittance flows and their good use. Remittance transfers without more thorough efforts at longer-term development considerations will not do much for development over the long term. The forthcoming World Bank Report entitled “Global Economic Prospects 2006: International Remittances and Migration” suggests greater investigation of the impact of remittances on development so as to design and implement policies to enhance its positive impacts.⁶ An important additional consideration is the fact that remittances are personal transfers and therefore intervention by governments or other sources in pursuit of such objectives cannot impede on ultimately a migrant’s wishes.⁷
The paper concludes with the following policy recommendations: encouraging formal transfer channels; banking the “unbanked”; reducing transaction costs; improving the banking industry in remittance receiving countries; balancing efforts to fight money laundering and remittance flows; and improving remittances data and knowledge management. These recommendations are intended to assist governments in furthering the benefits of remittances both in terms of increasing official flows; capitalizing on these for development purposes mainly by establishing a conducive environment for investment; and avoiding potentially jeopardizing inflows.

**Caveats to Research on Remittances**

A number of caveats challenge generalized research on remittances, including: the different remitting and spending behaviours in many parts of the world that make it difficult to generalize on global trends; the ever-present data comparability and collection challenges plaguing many aspects of migration research including remittances; the difficulties associated with determining how remittances are spent; and the use of informal channels which adds to the burden of collecting accurate information.

**Main Characteristics of Remittances**

The most salient characteristics of remittances, as highlighted by Dilip Ratha, are their volume, growth and stability.8

**Volume:** Remittances to developing countries from overseas resident workers are estimated to have increased by USD $10 billion (8 per cent) in 2004, reaching $126 billion.9 Actual figures may be much higher. A recent study by the ADB states that if the Philippines were to achieve targets of increasing use of the formal sector, flows through the formal banking system would be USD $3.5 billion greater, at around USD $10.5 billion.10 Remittance flows constitute the largest source of financial flows to developing countries after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and indeed in many countries exceed FDI flows. Although the top recipients of remittances are large countries, smaller countries receive more remittances as a share of GDP. Some of the biggest receivers of remittances in 2004 were India (USD $8.4 billion), Mexico (USD $13.2 billion), the Philippines (USD $8.0 billion), Egypt (USD $2.9 billion), Pakistan (USD $4.2 billion) and Morocco (USD $3.2 billion).11 If calculated as a share of GDP, in 2002 lower middle-income, and low-income countries were the biggest recipients with remittances constituting on average 2.1 per cent of GDP.12 Regionally speaking, in 2001 South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa were significant recipients of remittances relative to size of GDP.13 In terms of geographical variations in remittance flows, some regions have increased their share of global remittances while others such as sub-Saharan Africa, have suffered.14

**Growth:** Official figures for remittances reflect an increase from USD $88 billion two years ago to 20 per cent more last year. Again, this does not count unofficial flows. Remittances are expected to show a stable increase in tandem with international migration which the United Nations Population Division has placed at a figure of between 185 and 192 million migrants in 200515 and which is expected to increase to approximately 230 million by 2050. In particular, persistent income inequalities between source and destination countries, the increase in temporary and circular migration trends as well as increasing South-South migration, assisted by the low cost of travel are factors contributing to increasing global migration.

**Stability:** Furthermore, evidence suggests that remittances are counter-cyclical, flowing most strongly in times of crisis. Remittances have therefore been termed “unrequited in nature” as they are not tied to factors in sending countries that might otherwise determine investment there.
Remittances are also perceived as providing more financial stability as households tend to be much more specialized in income than they are in consumption. Devesh Kapur has thus qualified remittances as a form of “social insurance”. By spreading income sources to include remittance earnings, poor households are provided with a social protection which reduces their vulnerability to shocks.16

**Other Characteristics:** Not surprisingly, the tendency to remit varies depending upon factors such as the strength of the migrant’s kinship ties and intent to return to the country of origin. Migrants who intend to return tend to remit more funds than migrants who are permanently integrated into host countries, so long-term growth in remittances may slow as ties weaken with time. In addition, what may seem to be counter intuitive is that migrants who earn less money are more likely to send money home. Research from credit unions suggests that in the United States for example, Latinos who are making less than USD $20,000 per year are more likely to send money home than those making over USD $40,000 per year.17

And, interestingly, men and women spend remittance income differently, with men tending to purchase conspicuous consumer items such as televisions or cars while women more commonly choose healthcare, food and schooling.18 These differences in spending patterns may have important long-term consequences for remittance receiving households because education and health care have investment type effects which might help raise families out of poverty in the long-run while conspicuous consumption may not.

**Figure 1:** Resource flows to developing countries, 1988–2003


**Recipient Governments’ Perspectives on Remittances**

A number of general observations can be made about recipient governments’ view on remittances. The main points highlighted here are a result of the International Migration Policy Programme’s (IMP) work with governments over the period 1998–2003.19

First, recipient governments consider that remittances have a positive effect on their economies and development prospects. As a result, they are seeking ways to proactively encourage remitting behaviour by establishing targeted incentive schemes and improving financial infrastructures and macro-economic environments. In doing so, they are also working to enhance the developmental impact of remittances by adopting effective policy tools and strategies.

Over the years, these same governments have also expressed some concerns about remittances. A first concern relates to the continuing use of informal channels to transfer funds and the resulting loss of developmental value as compared to that of remittances transferred through formal channels. A second
concern, as mentioned above, is the paucity of reliable data on actual remittance flows to their countries and need for further research on the developmental impacts of remittances. And a third category of concerns is connected with the negative impacts of migration, and will be discussed further below.

Let us look into greater detail into what some recipient governments have undertaken to encourage remittance flows and to promote their good use. These include: incentive schemes; policy frameworks; and establishing stable macro-economic environments.

**Incentive Schemes**

Through targeted incentives governments have tried to influence both the inflow and the way in which remittances are spent or to channel them into preferred economic activities. In many cases, this was attempted by policy measures aimed at reducing the costs of importing capital goods and raw materials or by offering temporary incentives, such as special saving schemes or guarantees for converting foreign exchange at premium rates. Recently, some countries have been experimenting with remittance-backed securities as a way of raising additional external finance.

Earlier research has questioned the efficacy of national incentive schemes that rely on measures for increasing total remittance flows through special foreign exchange deposits or premium exchange rates. Comparative analysis of the impact of remittances on Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey found that fluctuations in the economic activity or wage rates of the host country, the number of migrant workers abroad and other demographic factors were more important in explaining variations of flows than the structure of the national incentive system or the relative rate of returns on savings. In the case of Turkey, evidence exists that "appears to show that official incentives or disincentives are not as important as an environment of confidence in the safety and liquidity of the assets held by the migrants and in the strength of the economy in general."20

Thus the long-term prospects for attracting remittances and putting them to good use seem to depend more on the prevailing institutional, economic and political framework of the labour-sending countries.

**Policy Frameworks**

In recognition of the importance of remittances for economic development, governments across the developing world have taken various forms of policy action to encourage remittance flows, including in the areas of monetary and fiscal policy reforms, reforms in financial sector regulations, migration policy reforms et alia. Some have created governmental agencies mandated to deal with diaspora issues. Others have resorted to inter-ministerial agencies to coordinate efforts in these areas and better share information on diaspora activities between the various governmental bodies.

Governments are beginning to see remittances and diaspora issues as sufficiently important to warrant institutional attention. An increasing number of countries have set up governmental bodies on remittance and diaspora issues.

**Stabilizing Macro-economic Environments**

The economic environments of developing countries may pose obstacles to remittance transfers, for instance because of unstable political and financial systems and government policies imposing foreign exchange controls, import restrictions, etc. In this context, participants at the IMP/IOM seminar in Dakar (2001) recognised the need for “providing an environment of domestic political, social and economic stability.”21 At the IMP Santo Domingo meeting for the Caribbean, the participating governments, “pointed to on-going obstacles to maximising the value of remittances including … the important loss of value of
remittances once converted into local currencies.” In the African context the document on the Implementation and Follow-up to the Dakar Declaration highlights similar recommendations including the promotion “of economic and financial stability” as key to fostering migrant reinvestment in home countries.

While no single prescription for a relaxed trade or foreign-exchange regime can exist for all countries at all times, available evidence seems to support the crucial role of economic and political stability together with an efficient and flexible financial system that can increase the amount of remittances channelled through formal banking institutions by progressively closing the gap between official and black market exchange rates. In the end, the stability of the economy also seems paramount for the success of a national incentive system: “Under this condition, measures such as incentive schemes and foreign exchange premium may actually succeed in shifting remittances from the informal intermediaries to the regular banking system. (...) Where such confidence has been eroded, however, remittances would largely end up in the hidden economy...where monetary policies have very limited scope for influencing behaviour.” By entering the banking system, these funds are thought to become more secure, earn interest and, indirectly, to make fresh money available for business loans and thereby stimulating economic activity. Special remittance banks or community funds have been suggested by Caribbean government representatives to facilitate the transfer of funds, encourage savings and simultaneously invest in regional development projects or provide matching funds.

Positive Contributions

Remittances are considered to have a direct link to poverty reduction. In some countries, households’ dependency on remittances can be as high as 90 per cent. Further, households are considered to be more financially well off if they benefit from remittances. For countries of origin, remittances, in addition to providing important sources of foreign exchange, can also spur economic growth. Another indicator of their importance is states’ dependence on remittances over aid.

Remittances and Poverty Reduction

Empirical findings in a study done by John Page and Richard Adams looking at 74 low and middle-income developing countries reveals that on average, a 10 per cent increase in the number of international migrants in a country’s population can lead to a 1.9 per cent decline in the poverty headcount. Similarly, a 10 per cent increase in the share of remittances in a country’s GDP can lead to a 1.6 per cent decline in poverty, that is to say, the number of people living on $1 per day.

Household Dependency

Though difficult to calculate, many remittance recipients are heavily dependent on this source of capital to sustain their livelihoods. Further, evidence suggests that poor households with diversified portfolios—both financial and human capital assets, will gain relative to those with domestic portfolios only in times of devaluation and economic downturn. One example is that of Philippine households with remitters who fared much better than households without remitters following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.

Having said this, it is important to note that the most likely to migrate at least initially are not the poorest of the poor. As such, remittances may have a negative impact on income distribution as most remittances are received by upper-income families and poor households would not benefit directly from these. For instance, in a study conducted by Koç and Onan in 2001 in Turkey, only 5-20 per cent of remittance receiving households were poor families. However, there are also indications that remittances reduce income inequality in the long run, as migration by poorer persons becomes easier through the information and assistance provided by migrant networks in host countries.
Multiplier Effect

Remittances also foster economic growth via the aggregate demand and output through consumption, as well as on savings and investments. For instance, in Mexico, remittances receipts of $2 billion are estimated to have generated $6.5 billion worth of additional economic activity accounting for 3 per cent of GDP. Similarly for the Egyptian economy, it was estimated that with an increase of $10 million received from migrants abroad, the country’s GNP would increase by $22 million. And, in most Central American countries, remittances have increased the average per capita income by 7 to 14 per cent.30

Dependence vis-à-vis Aid

Studies indicate that a number of developing countries rely much more heavily on remittances than on aid. In terms of the relationship between the two forms of inflows Gammeltoft cites to the following ratios examples: 39:1 in Turkey; 34:1 in Mexico; 24:1 in Costa Rica; 15:1 in Jamaica; 8:1 in the Philippines; 7:1 in Nigeria; 6:1 in India; 5:1 in Tunisia; and 4:1 in Lesotho.31 By contrast, most sub-Saharan countries are highly dependent on aid. While this comparison is interesting to look at from the perspective of countries’ dependency on remittances, it is nevertheless important to stress that remittances should in no circumstance be tied to aid, and certainly should not replace aid.

Negative Consequences

Relationship with Brain Drain

Though by no means are all migrants who remit highly skilled, there is nevertheless an important relationship between remittances and brain drain. According to ILO estimates, developing countries are currently experiencing a 10-30 per cent loss of skilled manpower through “brain drain”.32 A recent OECD study qualifies that countries that are most apt to suffer from the effects of brain drain are small countries and less developed countries, notably in Africa and in the Caribbean.33

Some have argued, however, that because of the positive effects of migration, origin countries in the long term experience a net gain from migration, whether it be skilled or unskilled. The 2003 World Bank report put it in the following terms: “Developing countries worry about a ‘brain drain’ even though any output losses from emigration of skilled workers may be more than offset by remittances and positive network effects of trade and investment.”34 The “network” effects specifically refer to the web of linkages migrants maintain to their countries of origin and which create beneficial feedback effects, such as, return migration, technology, knowledge and skills transfers, and of course, remittances. Within this spectrum of positive feedback effects, the role of remittances figures prominently as having a significant, and as of yet, untapped developmental potential, which may offset some of the adverse effects of “brain drain.”35 Indeed, some of the more optimistic assessments of remittance impacts claim that they may even contribute in the long run to a reduction in the migration pressures which caused the highly skilled to migrate in the first place.36

Migration Dependency Cycle

Do remittances encourage a culture of migration? Signs of a migration dependency cycle are exhibited at country, migrant, and remittance-recipient levels. Some governments cater to exporting labour in order to reduce unemployment pressures and to attract remittances. One example is the case of the Philippines but this issue was raised more generally for countries in the Asia Pacific region during the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)’s Regional Hearing for Asia and the Pacific in May 2004. There, participants pointed to the emergence of a “migration culture and dependency syndrome” in the region that can detract from needed economic reforms for development which would create rewarding opportunities for people to stay at home”.37
Often, remittances can be used for purchases that can only be sustained by further migration. In a study conducted on the growth role of remittances in Albania, the authors suggest that the monetary amount injected into the Albanian economy has not been used to stimulate domestic production (and strengthen political stability) rather it has been used for the import of consumption commodities. The author states that nearly 12 years after the beginning of the transition, 1 in 5 Albanians or more than 600,000 have migrated abroad and continue to do so.38 Further, in many parts of the world, there is evidence of the creation of what have been called “migra-villages”39, which consist of empty homes that are sustained by earnings from abroad. Such homes’ very existence is based on a need to go abroad thereby undermining their long-term viability.

Finally, a financial dependency is often created between migrant and remittance-recipient in part because the remittances received outweigh what the recipient could earn at home. Remittances are thus known to have reduced the motivation of its recipients to seek out their own existence. Further, remittance-recipients may be more prone to spend on consumer items than remitters.

The real challenge remains how to ensure that remittances are fueled towards development so that rather than encouraging more migration, an environment is fostered such that viable employment opportunities are possible at home and where the general macro-economic environment is more suitable to longer term development.

![Migration Dependency Cycle](image)

### Policy Recommendations

The following is a list of policy recommendations for how governments can further the benefits of remittances in terms of increasing official flows; capitalizing on these for development purposes mainly by establishing a conducive environment for investment; and potentially avoiding jeopardizing inflows.

#### Encouraging Formal Transfer Channels

The actual amount of remittance flows that pass through informal channels is difficult to estimate. In a UN report describing informal channels as “the poor man’s private banking vehicle”, estimates indicate the annual turnover at $100–300 billion USD.40 As described in the World Economic and Social Survey (2004), informal channels range from person to person transfer (either by the migrants themselves or by relatives and friends) to informal monetary transfer (IMT) systems characterised by elements of trust, proximity or familiarity. These include the hawala and hundi services available in North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. These informal systems are often connected to a currency exchange bureau, import-export business
or retail shop and involve an agent in the remittance-sending country and a counterpart who will be paying out in the home country. IMT systems are thus based on very little (paper or electronic) documentation.41

When informal channels are used, governments lose out on the developmental value of the remittance. As noted by several experts at IMP consultations, funds that are transferred through, and deposited, in bank accounts are more likely to be used for purposes which have direct developmental impacts, such as savings and investments, by comparison to cash transfers which are more likely to be used for immediate consumption purposes.42 Formalised remittances also increase foreign exchange reserves which are critical for developing countries, and have multiplier effects in terms of the banking sector’s abilities to finance loans, etc. Moreover, the ability of a government to tap remittances for their development potential, for instance by securitising remittances, depends on channelling them through banks.

Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for the continued use of informal transfer systems. From the point of view of the remitter, technological gaps between sending and receiving countries, archaic banking practices on the receiving end, the absence of rural bank branch networks, prohibitive costs of remitting, inability to open bank accounts in host countries due to lack of identity documentation and/or lack of regular status, and lack of confidence in official institutions, are all contributing factors.

Banking the “Unbanked”

As a researcher from the Asian Development Bank put it, “banking in a modern economy is economic enfranchisement”.43 Indeed, a banked population is an indicator of development, which in turn facilitates further development. Spain was 80 per cent unbanked in 1960, and now has 90 per cent of its population banked.44 According to Manuel Orozco of the Inter-American Dialogue and based on a survey of Latino remittance senders carried out in New York, Los Angeles and Miami in 2003, only 25 per cent of Mexican workers in the US have bank accounts; 29 per cent of Hondurans, 31 per cent of Guatemalans and 36 per cent of Salvadorans.45 This figure is perhaps less surprising when considering banking rates within countries. The unbanked, meaning those without a deposit money account in Mexico City, for example is 76.4 per cent46, and in the Philippines, 80 per cent of the population at home is unbanked.47

At the DfID/World Bank/IMP Conference in 2003, it was emphasized that improving access to financial services is central to enhancing the development impact of remittances. The conference suggested that there is a need to improve migrants’ access to the formal financial sector through mechanisms such as: improved information sharing, efforts to overcome migrants’ cultural barriers to formal institutions, increasing cost efficiency and transparency of transfers, strengthening of financial infrastructures and outreach to underserved communities.

Many of these areas are the subject of current innovations. In terms of access, one of the major constraints after insufficient information is the inability to open bank accounts due to lack of identity documents and/or lack of regular status. One notable innovation in this area, developed by the Mexican Government has been the issuance of Mexican government consular documents (‘matriculas consulares’) which are photo identity cards attesting to valid Mexican citizenship. This document, in addition to a social security number, is recognized in a growing number of American states as adequate documentation to open a bank account. They thus serve as a means of granting Mexican immigrants access to banks, and wire transfer agencies which were previously inaccessible to them. Today, more than 100 cities, 900 police departments and 100 financial institutions and 13 states recognise the consular identity card.48

In the area of outreach, commercial banks in the United States, Spain and Mexico, for example, have made the most significant headway in terms of offering more services to remitters. Credit unions also
have had a high success rate in certain regions with regard to establishing rural bank branch networks and working to counter the high pricing and abusive practices of the remittance industry. A case in point is the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU). An international trade association, representing 40,000 credit unions in 80 countries serving 118 million members, established a credit-union based distribution network in 6 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with over 1,000 rural points of service and a distribution-based network in 41 countries with over 40,000 points of service world-wide. WOCCU’s IRNet—its distribution network for remittances—distributed $190 million USD of remittances to rural dwellers in 2003 and $ 300 million USD in 2004.49

Reducing Transaction Costs

One of the main objectives highlighted in the forthcoming World Bank Report entitled “Global Economic Prospects 2006: International Remittances and Migration” entails designing and implementing policies to reduce transaction costs of remittances and improving the efficiency of the formal financial infrastructure.50 Transaction fees represent a significant “tax” on an important inflow of income for poor families especially women and children. Some suggestions to reduce transaction costs include: greater competition among money-transfer agents; better access to the financial services sector; standardization of the infrastructure supporting remittances (ACH); and removal of exchange-rate restrictions in recipient countries.

In 2002, the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) began to address the outrageous costs of sending money home to Latin America which was estimated in 2002 to be $4 billion for that year alone, the highest of any region in the world. The goal is now to reduce remittance costs to an average of 5 per cent over 5 years. At 5 per cent, the net remittance flows into Latin America would have been $2.4 billion higher in 2002. In an Asian Development Bank Report, it is estimated that reducing transaction fees over 3–5 years to 5 per cent in the Philippines, would increase net formal sector remittances by about $500 million per year.51

Private transfer companies such as Western Union and Money Gram have thrived because of the lack of alternatives for migrants. However, growing interest of the banking sector, credit unions and bank payment card companies has placed considerable pressure on private transfer companies who have had to reduce their fees. In Latin America, for example, average costs plus foreign exchange spread of sending USD $200 to Latin America fell by USD $20 in 2002, about half of what it was in 1999 and there is some anecdotal evidence that Western Union has reduced to as low as USD $3 in some markets to retain its market share and foreign exchange spread income.52

Improving Banking Industry

Improvements in the financial infrastructures of developing countries are central to increasing the volume of remittance flows. The relative success of the Cuban government in attracting a growing inflow of remittances from the US since the early 1990s, constitutes an interesting case example of how governmental reforms to monetary policies and the creation of viable and modern financial infrastructures can dramatically increase remittance flows.53

Further, in research conducted by the IOM in Central America it is revealed that in general, remittances have better local investment potential where modern and flexible financial infrastructures exist and where government technical assistance institutions are capable of supporting migrants’ financial needs. Successful initiatives in this area include creating “financial platforms” capable of facilitating the management of income generated in the United States as well as the transfer of funds such as for instance through the use of banking services in local bank accounts in U.S. currency.
Balancing Efforts to Fight Money Laundering and Remittance Flows

At the UNITAR/World Bank Briefing on Remittances and Development, Dilip Ratha cautioned the need to strike a balance between curbing money laundering and facilitating the flow of funds between hard working migrants and their families through formal channels. He went on to assert that the perceived link between unrecorded (unofficial) remittances and funding of international crime was misleading as financial crime is more likely to be tied to formal flows of capital than informal ones.\textsuperscript{54}

In recent years, the US Treasury, the World Bank and regional international financial institutions with national governments have all focused on the linkage between informal channels; terrorist financing; money laundering issues; and increasing financial integrity more generally. The consensus strategy for counter terrorist funding and anti-money laundering is not to drive informal remittances further underground but to try to regulate them to the formal sector as much as possible. Specifically, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing No 6 requires: 1) registration or licensing of all informal money transfer services such that they be subject to all FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions, and 2) that countries must enforce FATF Recommendations through administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.\textsuperscript{55}

As pointed out at the 2003 London Conference, there is thus a need to strike a balance between appropriate levels of regulation aimed at minimizing financial abuse and promoting cost efficient and accessible transfer services. Regulation is needed in the interest of transparency, but regulatory and supervisory policies should not inhibit transfers by driving up costs and reducing access to financial services and products. Remittances play a vital and life sustaining role for millions of vulnerable people and every effort must be made to maintain and enhance their effectiveness.

Moreover, many informal money transfer services cannot become formalised under the policy and regulatory regimes in which they currently operate because the environment in which they operate lacks the basic financial infrastructure for a formal financial institution. This is particularly true in conflict afflicted countries and some developing countries with weak financial systems. In line with this observation, the suggestion was made at the London Conference to include informal money transfer agents into the process of finding an appropriate level of regulation.\textsuperscript{56}

Improving Remittances Data and Knowledge Management

At IMP Meetings, governments have cautioned that any initiatives in this area will be hampered by the lack of data on remittance flows and impacts. In Africa, the concern about reliable data is particularly pressing. For a significant number of sub-Saharan countries, reliable data on remittance flows is inexistent. However, concern about reliable data is also felt in other regions. For instance, in the Caribbean context, experts called for increased study on remittances: “Our understanding of what motivates the portfolio choices of Caribbean migrants is extremely limited and the analysis is hindered by the paucity of information on the flow of remittances. Countries may need to systematically improve the volume and accuracy of the information available to undertake the analysis, which would inform policy action in this area.”\textsuperscript{57}

The World Bank also highlights the issue of improving remittances data and knowledge management in its forthcoming 2006 Report.\textsuperscript{58} Mr. Ratha has suggested that a way forward would be to conduct surveys of remittance senders and recipients, their sources and destinations, the channels used, and their uses.\textsuperscript{59} In doing so, perhaps some inconsistencies would also be addressed such as spurts in remittances recordings.\textsuperscript{60}
Endnotes


2 Ahlborg, Dennis, Remittances and their Impact – A study of Tonga and Western Samoa, National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra 1991, p. 6.


5 Many of the points drawn out here reflect the most salient conclusions from a major international conference on this subject entitled ‘International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Developmental Impact and Future Prospects’ that took place in London on 9-10 October 2003 organized by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank in collaboration with the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP).


7 This point was emphasized most recently by Dilip Ratha during the UNITAR/World Bank Briefing on Remittances and Development that took place at United Nations Headquarters on 16 June 2005. Briefing note available at unitary.ny@un.org


15 Ratha challenges the assertion that sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global remittances has decreased. The fact that World Bank figures have not accounted for key African States like Nigeria, combined with the use of informal channels, he has stated, leads to misleading conclusions about the undoubtedly significant flows to the region. Ratha, Dilip. Op. cit., 2005. UNITAR/World Bank Briefing, New York, 16 June 2005.


18 DeFilippi, Pablo, The Impact of Remittances in Development: Facilitation Role of Credit Unions, the UNITAR/World Bank Briefing on Remittances and Development, United Nations Headquarters, 16 June 2005.


20 These were first reflected in the paper entitled “Migrant Remittances: Country of Origin Experiences: Strategies, Policies, Challenges and Concerns”, David Nii Addy, Boris Wijkstrom and Colleen Thouez, October 2003.


49 Also, credit unions pride themselves on providing “migrant friendly service” such as bilingual tellers. DeFilippi, Pablo, Op. cit., 2005.
55 FATF, “Interpretive Notes to the Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing”. http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/TFIrterpnotes_en.htm#Special%20Recommendation%20VI
60 In the case of Morocco, for example, a 57 per cent increase in remittances was recorded between 2000 and 2001. Nyberg Sorensen, Ninna, Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool, IOM Migration Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 2, June 2004.
MIGRATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION
Background

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have become the guiding principles of countries seeking to eradicate poverty and improve the welfare of people around the world. The Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 countries in September 2000, led to the adoption of the MDGs, which consist of eight goals with 18 specific targets to achieve those goals. Population migration is not one of these goals and does not figure directly or indirectly in the various targets that will be used to judge progress towards the goals themselves. This statement does not mean that migration is absent from the development horizon of the international community. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is well aware of the global significance of population migration as a force for change and of political concern around the world. He has set up the Global Commission on International Migration to report back to him on how the international community should best respond to the situation. Without in any way trying to second-guess the results of that enquiry, I think that it is fair to say that migration is the most complex of the population variables and that its relationship with development is both contested and highly variable.

Should migration have been included as one of the goals of the MDGs? Here, I think that the answer must be a clear “no”. This might seem strange, given that I will go on to argue in this paper that migration is a fundamental dimension of the MDGs. However, the MDGs consist of clear goals and targets that I think are difficult to apply to migration. We cannot say, for example, that migration should be increased by a factor of x, or decreased by a factor of y, by 2015, in order to improve people’s welfare in areas a, b, or c. The setting of targets for migration is extremely difficult and controversial. The traditional settler societies set targets through their immigration plans or acts but these are clearly set unilaterally by the countries themselves with little consultation with countries of origin. Countries that import labour to fulfil particular needs in the economy are more likely to reach agreement on specific numbers to be imported on a government-to-government basis rather than through any multilateral framework. It is impossible to generalize about specific targets in the area of migration across the needs of countries of origin, of transit and of destination.

Even to focus on the needs of the migrants themselves is contentious. While virtually every country might agree that migrant protection should be increased by 2015, many would see existing human rights and other conventions on labour protection as adequate: why should migrants be singled out for special attention among a whole series of potentially vulnerable groups? Hence, the reluctance of a large number of countries to sign, let alone ratify the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990). Agreement could probably be secured to
reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances by 60 or 70 or 80 per cent by 2015. However, such a target would not quite have the same weight as the existing MDG targets of reducing child and maternal mortality, increasing basic education and reducing poverty. International migrants account for about 3 per cent of the world’s population at any point in time and any MDG directed towards them would seem unnecessarily specialized and a diversion from targets that, if achieved, would be likely to affect the majority of the population irrespective of migrant status.

Yet, migration is inextricably bound up with the achievement of the MDGs and it would be remiss of governments and the international community not to take this fact into consideration when pursuing policies to achieve the MDGs. This paper will elaborate on the first of the MDGs, goal 1, to eradicate poverty and then will briefly touch upon linkages between migration and another four of the eight MDGs: goal 2, to achieve universal primary education; goal 3, to promote gender equality and empower women; goal 6, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and goal 7, to achieve environmental sustainability. These other MDGs are goals that are essential to the first MDG, to eradicate poverty and, as such, the whole discussion is about linkages between poverty alleviation and migration through the MDGs. It can be argued that every MDG has some linkage, direct or indirect, with migration.

Goal 1: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Much of recent international concern relating to the role of migration and development has been directed towards the importance of the remittances that are sent back by international migrants to their country of origin. Certainly, remittances can have a significant impact on poverty reduction. To take one example, in the South Indian state of Kerala the remittance income in the year 1999-2000 was estimated by Indian researchers at the Centre for Development Studies at Trivandrum at over US$3 billion and represented 23 per cent of the state domestic product and 113 per cent of government expenditure (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2002). The migration, primarily to the countries of West Asia, has been such as to reduce the natural increase of the population, the level of unemployment and, perhaps most importantly, the incidence of poverty by 12 per cent.

However, remittances cannot be seen as a general panacea to poverty alleviation. As seen above, relatively few people from any population migrate across international boundaries and those that do tend to come from a fairly small number of areas of origin in any country. The benefits of remittances are likely to be concentrated in quite limited areas of any country and are as likely to increase inequalities as to alleviate poverty. By increasing inequalities, remittances may actually lead to increasing feelings of relative deprivation among those who do not receive income from overseas thus exacerbating poverty. The current preoccupation with remittances has a certain downside. It has diverted attention away from other equally important dimensions of the migration-development nexus and countries are looking carefully at the international flows of remittances relative to their allocation of aid (Skeldon 2004). In general, international migration is unlikely to be the decisive factor in the eradication of poverty at the national level. Large areas in any poor developing country are likely to lie beyond the ambit of the receipt of remittances from overseas and other strategies need to be pursued in order to reach them.

Nevertheless, the majority of those who move do so internally and the emphasis on the linkages between migration and poverty must be upon internal population movements, which essentially implies the linkages between rural and urban sectors. Remittances from internal migrants to the largest cities in a country back to the villages may be a significant factor in poverty alleviation. At the national level, however, such remittances clearly do not contribute to any gains in foreign exchange earnings. Neither may they be as significant in terms of total amounts of cash sent back to particular villages as remittances from international sources. However, their spread throughout rural origins is likely to be greater simply because the range of origin areas is greater in internal migration than it is in international migration.
The internal migration to the cities need not be permanent but can consist of regular or irregular circular movements between villages and city and town. Evidence suggests, too, that the poorest people may move only locally, perhaps to a plantation or other centre of commercial agriculture within the rural area itself. Essentially, households are seeking to diversify their resource base in order to minimize risk. Temporary employment in a city becomes as much a niche in the household resource base as are access to fields in both wet and dry agricultural areas. It is not so much that rural householders are using migration to better their position as migration, sui generis, does not exist “out there” as a “thing” that can be manipulated. Rather, household members choose to move or not to move depending upon a number of reasons or needs and subject to a number of constraints. Modern communication systems allow greater numbers of people to travel more frequently over greater distances than before, for example. Networks of relatives and friends established through prior migration facilitate future migration. Institutional networks of labour recruiters and brokers link household members with opportunities outside the local.

Amid all the complexity of any explanation for migration, what appears clear is that societies that allow the free movement of people within their borders are likely to see a reduction of poverty in rural areas. Those that attempt to control migration or limit or reverse movements to towns and cities are likely to see little change or a deterioration in conditions. For example, internal movements of population were tightly controlled in both China and Viet Nam until the reforms from 1978 and 1986 respectively. Poverty in both these countries has dropped sharply over the subsequent decades. The number of poor in China declined from around 260 million in 1978 to between 42 and 100 million in 1998 depending upon which poverty line is being used. Even taking the higher World Bank estimate in 1998, the decline from about one quarter of the population in 1978 to about 8 per cent of the population within 20 years is a remarkable achievement (UNDP 2000). The poverty rate in Viet Nam declined from 58 per cent in 1993 to 29 per cent in 2002 (VDIC 2003). As in China, the numbers moving away from their communities of origin in Viet Nam has increased markedly since the reforms were introduced. In China, since the early 1980s over 100 million farmers have left their villages to work as labourers and traders in towns and cities constituting “the largest peacetime movement of people in history” (Murphy 2002: 1). In Viet Nam, census estimates place the numbers who moved between 1994 and 1999 at 4.5 million, or 6.5 per cent of the population five years of age and older, with the majority moving to urban places (Dang 2001: 34).

It would be misguided to attribute these declines in poverty to the increasing mobility of the populations. Fundamental shifts in national policies, the opening up of economies to external markets, patterns of foreign investment and trade, and so on, underlie the new prosperity in China and Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the redistribution of national populations and the increasing interactions of rural and urban populations have been fundamental in the spread of benefits into the rural sector. A recent report from the Ministry of Agriculture in China draws attention to the fact that up to 40 per cent of average peasant income in that vast country may come from remittances from towns and cities. While some caution in interpretation of the numbers is required, the data suggest that the sharp reduction in poverty in China over recent years has been at least partially due to increasing internal population mobility.

Examining the distribution of poverty by sector, we find that poverty throughout most of the developing world is still concentrated primarily in the rural sector. In the mid-1990s, in Bangladesh, for example, the proportion of the rural population living below the poverty line was virtually 40 per cent compared with but 14 per cent in urban areas. For Ghana, over one third of the rural population was deemed to be living in poverty compared with around one quarter in urban areas. In Guatemala, the respective figures for rural and urban poverty levels were 72 and 4 per cent. While there were a few exceptions to this picture, World Bank figures published in 2002 suggest an overwhelming bias in the distribution of poverty towards the rural sector. Thus, any target to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day, or to halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, implies some change in the nature of the relationship between urban and rural. It would be naïve to assume that policies to reduce poverty can
be achieved without a redistribution of population towards urban areas. Those countries in East Asia that have already reached the MDG of halving their poverty levels, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam, have seen a sustained growth in their urban populations over the last decades and, by implication, an increase in rural-to-urban population movements through migration and human circulation (tables 1-3).

It is generally known where the poorest countries are located in the world: of the 36 countries classified by UNDP as of “low human development”, all but three are located in sub-Saharan Africa. As the data above suggest, it is known that most poor people are to be found in the rural sectors of a country. Much less well known is where poor people are to be found within the rural sector. It is perhaps worth looking at one country, Viet Nam, for which data exist to map the distribution of both the numbers of poor and the incidence of poverty. It can be clearly seen that, although the distribution of the absolute numbers of poor mirrors, by and large, the distribution of the population as a whole, the map of the incidence of poverty is virtually the mirror image of the distribution of the population. Thus, poverty is most intense in those areas that are remote from the major urban areas, are in marginal mountainous environments and close to border areas and, perhaps not obvious from the maps, are in areas of ethnic minorities. Linking these poor areas with wider circuits of mobility immediately raises sensitive issues that revolve around border security and around the treatment of minorities. The incorporation of such populations leads to the transformation of such groups as they are assimilated into the cultures and economies of the majority group, or the Kinh in the case of Viet Nam. Thus, programmes to eradicate the most entrenched poverty, “extreme poverty”, are likely to have to deal with critical issues of security and of the identity of specific groups. The eradication of poverty is rarely a simple matter of raising living standards alone.

**Goal 7: to ensure environmental sustainability**

Associated with the discussion above that urbanization will be accompanied by any programme to reduce poverty by half by 2015, is specific target 11, one of the three targets to achieve goal 7, environmental sustainability. Target 11 proposes a significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of 100 million urban slum dwellers. One assumes that the most significant improvements would revolve around access to regular and remunerative employment under humane conditions. Access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, which is target 10 in MDG goal 7, as well as acceptable standards of housing, would seem to be integral to the achievement of target 11. However, given the intense circulation between urban and rural sectors described above, the results of programmes to improve significantly the lives of urban slum dwellers will be quickly passed by word of mouth to the rural sector, further encouraging migration to urban areas. Thus successful achievement of this target is likely to reinforce trends towards an urban society.

The provision of sufficient employment, as well as the upgrading of low-income urban settlements, has been shown to be beyond the resources of the governments of many developing countries. Nevertheless, if bureaucratic procedures can be relaxed and governments work with the residents of low-income settlements rather than try to remove or relocate their inhabitants, self-help schemes in which the residents themselves take the responsibility for improvements have been shown to provide an effective and relatively low-cost solution to the problem (de Soto 1989). Such a strategy liberates scarce resources for deployment to the rural sector where improvements, such as in education (see below), may actually further facilitate the rural exodus.

Almost parenthetically, one might add that the debate to eliminate agricultural subsidies in the developed world appears to provide the way towards a more level playing field in global trade. Developed countries are selling agricultural products at below costs of production undermining any attempts in developing countries at competition on an equal basis. However, the elimination or reduction of subsidies is likely to lead to an increase in the overall costs of agricultural products that would be good for farmers in
developing countries but perhaps not so good for the urban poor in these countries. Around 33 of the 49 poorest countries in the world import more food than they export (The Economist, 26 March 2005, p. 102). The pressure brought by the urban poor, who tend to be concentrated in capital cities, on weak governments in the face of rising food prices might further aggravate problems of good governance in these economies.

The third of the specific targets to achieve MDG 7 is target 9 which is to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources. This is a broad strategy the adequate discussion of which lies beyond the objectives of this paper, except for one specific point. For example, in the areas of the highest incidence of poverty among ethnic minorities discussed above, one of the critical issues revolves around watershed management. The agricultural practices of the minorities, and particularly deforestation for the clearance of land for cultivation, have been seen to have detrimental environmental effects. Yet, the root of the problem is to be found in programmes of resettlement of the minorities in which governments seek to make sedentary once migratory peoples.

The general point can be made that governments, irrespective of whether they are dealing with once migratory peoples in border areas in mountainous environments, with rural migrants coming into cities, or with immigrants from overseas, tend to see migration in a negative light. Such attitudes can be counterproductive and programmes that seek to accommodate rather than to change or reverse existing migration trends are likely to meet with greater success.

**Goal 2: to achieve universal primary education**

In the discussion of household strategies above, it should have been clear that rural households are responding to opportunities outside their community through the migration of family members. In order for this situation to happen, information regarding those opportunities must first reach the household and, second, that information must be understood. Household members can then respond to the information by migrating or not migrating. One way that householders will respond more positively to the information regarding the opportunities is through improved levels of education. One virtually universal finding of studies of migration is that those who migrate tend to have higher levels of education than those who do not.

Goal 2, that by 2015 children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary education, will almost certainly lead to higher levels of population migration both directly and indirectly. Directly, because not all the educational facilities will be able to be built precisely where the children are located and some daily and weekly commuting on foot, bus or boat will be required in order to reach the school. Thus, children may be taken outside the immediate community if they are to embark upon, or improve, their education. More important, however, will be the indirect effects of raising aspirations and expectations that cannot be met in the local area. Accelerated migration to nearby towns, cities and even overseas is likely to be the outcome of the successful achievement of this MDG, although these migrations, as suggested above, are also likely to facilitate a movement out of poverty.

**Goal 3: to promote gender equality and empower women**

Education is seen to be the critical path towards gender equality with the specific target to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015. As suggested under goal 2 above, increasing education is likely to lead to higher rates of migration both internal and international and attempts to promote gender equality are likely to see the rising participation of women in migration. Women in the rural sector are often living in patriarchal societies where they are controlled by fathers, brothers, husbands and sons. Any movement away from such a context is likely to empower women and migration and empowerment can thus be positively related. Clearly, for such an improvement to occur, women need to migrate independently from husbands, brothers or fathers but while women
(and obviously, men) still migrate as part of family groups, increasingly women are moving independently. One significant study of the migration of Mexican women to the United States concludes that women gain more than men in terms of improvement in status through the migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Women may also be empowered indirectly by migration; not by their own migration but by that of their husbands or brothers, that projects the women left behind into positions of greater authority in the rural household.

Nevertheless, some women are exploited through their migration. Trafficking, particularly of women and children, and specifically into the sex trade has become one of the principal concerns of governments, non-governmental organizations and international agencies. That exploitation through trafficking occurs is unquestionable. That all possible measures should be taken to eradicate such exploitation is indisputable. However, the number of women who fall victim to traffickers as a proportion of the total number of women migrants is much harder to conclude. Also, even the migration, legal or irregular, to engage in such an apparently abuse industry as the sex trade is not necessarily unmitigated exploitation as some studies and the testimonials of sex workers themselves attest (see Kempadoo and Doezema 1998; also Lim 1998). Some commercial sex workers, as well as some domestic workers, are the subject of abuse and exploitation but not all are. It is wrong to see all female migrants as victims: the majority, and probably the vast majority of both internal and international women migrants, are empowered rather than exploited by their migration. Unfortunately, the agendas of many national and international organizations have chosen to focus on the plight of the minority which, if these were to lead to restrictions on the movement of women, are likely to lead to the slowing of progress towards achieving the MDG to promote gender equality. While it is incumbent for the international community to work towards the minimization of the risks and the maximization of the benefits that are likely to accrue from migration, it is equally important to recognize that in life, just as in the financial markets, greater benefits come from greater risk. All migration involves risk, which perhaps explains why migrants, particularly international migrants, represent such a small proportion of the world’s population.

Goal 6: to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

The darker side of migration that was raised in the preceding paragraphs is perhaps continued in the discussion of MDG 6, to combat the spread of disease. As discussed, migrants can be placed into vulnerable positions that can exacerbate poverty but the particular issue raised here relates to goal 6, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. It is known that highly mobile groups in developing countries such as truck drivers, traders and commercial sex workers are instrumental in the diffusion of HIV. Of course, it must be recognized that it is not the movement of people, as such, that directly leads to the spread of HIV but the high-risk behaviour, at points along the way, of those who move. Hence, the restriction of movement is unlikely to achieve results; the emphasis must be on behavioural change at critical “hot spots” along the migration or mobility routes, at truck stops, rural and urban markets and brothels. Migrants themselves, and particularly contract labourers, are also often seen as key vectors in the spread of the disease. There is little empirical evidence to suggest that migrants in general, as distinct from a few particular high-risk groups who engage in frequent short-term movement, have higher prevalence rates of HIV than the populations from which they come. Again, the fear of the migrant tends to drive policy rather than any objective data on which to base solid analysis.

The discussion of the spread of disease and migration introduces other categories of mover that are not normally considered in work on population migration: tourists and short-term business travellers, for example. In the spread of disease, length of stay is not necessarily a critical factor, simply the fact that an infected person moves from one place to another or the uninfected move into an infected area for a short time, become infected and move on. Currently, some 700 million tourist arrivals are registered around the world each year. Only a tiny proportion of tourists move specifically as “sex tourists” and of these a minority will engage in high risk encounters, particularly after they return home. While tourists can contribute to the spread of diseases such as HIV and malaria, their role is more important in such infectious diseases as SARS and particularly influenza.
Although influenza is not specifically identified in the MDG, but presumably subsumed under “other diseases”, its consequences can be devastating. The 1919 outbreak claimed some 40 million lives (AIDS to the end of 2003 had killed somewhere over 20 million since its identification in 1981) and experts around the world are currently monitoring the avian influenza in East Asia. This “bird flu” has currently affected 11 countries, caused the destruction of 120 million birds and killed 50 people. So far, no mutation of the disease into a form that can be transmitted between humans has taken place but it may only be a matter of time. The World Health Organization has modelled a best-case scenario that would kill between 2 million and 7.4 million people with 1.2 billion sick and 28 million hospitalized, although worst-case scenarios go up to 60 million dead (The Economist, 16 April 2005, p. 53). If such a pandemic should occur, and one is long overdue according to influenza experts, its rapid spread will be the result of the short-term mobility of people. If it occurs, one might add, all the MDGs will be set back for an unspecified period of time and perhaps made irrelevant altogether.

Conclusion

In an ideal world, and in contradiction to a remark made towards the beginning of this paper, a “migration MDG” could indeed be mooted: “to halve by 2015 the fear that migrants seem to engender in any state or any community”, that, by 2015, governments would have learned that migration is not necessarily a bad thing and that action taken to prevent people from moving is likely to be counterproductive. However, which indicators could realistically be used to measure any progress towards such a goal? Equally, would there be the political will to pursue such a goal? Migration, as seen in the current election campaign in the United Kingdom, can so easily become a political football to whip up xenophobia and calls for restriction. Idealized unchanging native identities and “imagined communities” are created that are seen as being at risk from immigration. The possibilities of constantly changing national identities, in which immigration plays only a part, are conveniently sidelined.

Returning to the real as opposed to an ideal world, the need is to build migration in to the present MDGs to see how policies implemented to achieve the MDGs are likely to impact on population movement. Thus, migration impact statements for the targets of the MDGs should be considered. The form that such statements take would be variable but at least they would force policymakers to examine the possible migration scenarios of the policies being implemented to meet the MDGs. Here, one might add that an important deterrent to including migration as an MDG is the weakness of the database available for the assessment of the impact of migration. There are few internationally comparable indicators of migration or mobility that can provide the necessary information to link clearly changing patterns of migration with developmental variables. Hence, a priority is to improve the existing data on migration at both national and international levels before they can be incorporated into any indicator for monitoring progress towards the existing MDGs, let alone develop a migration MDG itself and its associated indicators.

Given the fear that migration always seems to create, both nationally and internationally, the temptation will always exist to construct barriers to migration and to attempt to slow or even reverse population flows. Any such temptation must be resisted at all cost as it seems likely that policies that accept the wider mobility of people will contribute to the attainment of the MDGs while attempts to limit migration, internal and international, will act to slow the progress towards their attainment.
References


Table 1. Levels of Urbanization, Selected Asian Countries, 1960-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Components of Urbanization, Selected Asian Countries, 1960s to 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3. Proportion of the Population below the National Poverty Line, Selected Asian Countries, 1990-1991 to 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The information on Malaysia refers to proportion of households below the poverty line in 1990 and 2002 and is thus not strictly comparable.
MIGRATION AND HEALTH
Introduction and Background

An HRH crisis is overwhelming the world. Shortages of doctors, nurses, pharmacists and other health professionals are reaching remarkable levels in many parts of the world. Aging populations in the developed world require more and more health workers even as declining birth rates reduce the level of entry into the health workforce, for example in the United Kingdom, in 2002 over 50 per cent of new registrations unto the Nurses Council Register were from external sources\(^1\). In many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, continuous low supply of trained health workers have been exacerbated by increased disease burdens from HIV/AIDS and resurgence of various communicable diseases, and increased loss of health workers to migration and other causes.

Recent work by the Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health (JLI) shows wide variations in the availability of trained health workers around the world, with variations found even in different parts of the same country, and between countries on the same continent with similar social and economic situations. Within this context, there are some developing countries with large health worker supply traditions often aimed at export to developed countries to reap the remittances that such workers send back home. India, Philippines and possibly Cuba represent this kind of situation. However, by far more developing countries, especially in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa remain well below a suggested health worker density of 2.5 per 1000 population deemed the approximate level of staffing required to deliver services at a level that impacts on the MDGs.

A Health and Human Resources Crisis in Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa faces a particularly serious problem. There has been resurgence of various diseases that were thought to be receding; it has received the worst effects of the new epidemic of HIV/AIDS which has expanded Africa’s disease burden and health resource needs considerably\(^2\). At the same time, low levels of production of health professionals is now worsened by the rise in demand for health workers in the developed countries (particularly English speaking ones) which has fuelled migration from countries with some of the lowest availability of health workers\(^3\) even as the disease burden explodes in Africa. Thus very poor countries already facing health worker shortages subsidize training of health workers for rich developed countries.
Figure 1. Health Service Coverage and Worker Density


Figure 2. HRH Crisis in Africa

Africa’s Burden of the World’s Diseases

Africa’s Share of the World’s Health Workforce

Each of the eight Millennium Development Goals does reflect somewhat on enhancement of health of populations and individuals. However goals 4, 5 and 6 (reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) probably reflect more direct health service inputs and are especially likely to be dependent on the availability and skills of health workers. In sub-Saharan Africa, no country appears to be on track for meeting targets of under-five mortality with only 7.3 per cent on track for meeting maternal mortality targets. Again whilst 77 per cent of people living in the developed world are on track to meet malnutrition targets only 15 per cent of people in SSA live in a country which is on track4.

Health worker migration on its own probably has many positive aspects to it through allowing the inter-change of ideas, skills and linkages for the development of health at home, and the fact that migrants can gain training and skills that may eventually benefit their home countries. Remittances may also form part of the benefits that sending countries can gain from migration of its health workers and in some cases remittances from citizens abroad far exceeds development aid. It is not clear how remittances can offset the operational problems that arise from health workers migration and influence for example the Millennium Development Goals.

However, when migration reaches levels that are unsustainable for the source country (as the numbers exiting become much higher than inflows) then these countries may become gradually denuded of the level of skills availability needed to ensure essential services and poorer populations are often the first to lose access to services when losses occur. Perhaps a more insidious but debilitating effect of external migration of health professionals is when it affects the skilled educators, trainers and specialists necessary for a country to continue to produce local health workers, to support on the job learning and to strengthen the professions and may then also erode ethics and professional standards. But it is the influence of migration on the density/ availability of health professionals and the secondary effect on sustaining health systems training and continuing capacity building that creates the most difficulties for developing countries in meeting health targets and development goals.
Table 1: Comparing Remittances and International Development Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances (USD)</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
<th>ODA (US$)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>3.71 %</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>855.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>19.68 %</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>85.81 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1.95 %</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>17.41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3.26 %</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>23.72 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3.08 %</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>34.59 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11.87 %</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>50.73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2.59 %</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>16.83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.21 %</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57.14 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: African Union: Labour and Social Affairs Commission, April 2003. LSC/9 (XXVI Role of the African Diaspora in the Development of their Countries of Origin)

Discussing the current situation

Work published by the Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health (2004) using WHO health worker statistics proposes that the density of health workers in a population (especially nurses, midwives and physicians) has an impact on health outcomes. It was shown statistically that reductions in maternal, infant and child mortality occurred with increasing availability of health workers and suggested that an average of 2.5 trained health workers per 1000 population represented the basic level of access needed to sustain health service delivery. However, a World Bank report on meeting the MDGs found that evidence from field studies were varied and not incontrovertible enough to show that health worker density readily influenced health outcomes. However for health workers to be effective, other factors such as effective supervision and management, appropriate training and deployment, location of facilities, how health workers are distributed etc will all affect their ability to impact on health service targets. Thus it may be surmised that if all other things are in place, high levels of migration could influence countries’ ability to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Human resources connects all the other factors within a health system to produce healthy populations.

A core issue around migration is the fact that movement is from countries with health worker densities below 30 per 100,000 population to countries with densities above 300 per 100,000 population. Migration affects the performance of health systems in a number of ways. The most obvious is the shortages that may occur as migration outstrips supply of new health workers into health systems and this is especially important in countries already well below the accepted standards of availability of staff. The second is the effect it can have on morale and the productivity of the work-force as staff leaving results in poor supervision and in erosion of standards and quality of care. Thirdly, is the quality or type of emigrants which can magnify the numbers lost and the effects on the population. The loss of trainers and critical specialists from a small country can completely decimate supply of new professionals or in some cases lead to closure of certain services completely because of the absence of the only available specialists.
Data on migration especially from source countries are rather difficult to find. HRH information systems are poor and often the reasons health workers depart from their countries’ workforce are difficult to get even for the public sector. However, some recent surveys in selected countries by WHO’s Africa Regional Office indicate that the intention to migrate is high (though varies fairly widely) among health workers in African countries ranging from 68 per cent in Zimbabwe to 26 per cent in Uganda. Studies by Dovlo and Nyonator (1999) of physician migration from Ghana showed that some 61 per cent of the products from a medical school in Ghana had migrated over a ten year period. From the recipient side, Buchan and Dovlo (2004) indicate that foreign nurses now constituted about half of all new registrations onto the United Kingdom Nurses Register with 5 countries from SS Africa among the top ten sources of nurses. There are estimates that the United States will have a short fall of about 500,000 nurses by 2015 and similar figures for the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia mean ongoing significant demand for migrant health workers will continue during the period of the MDG target.

Another side of the argument mentioned previously is that remittances from migrants may exceed foreign aid but whether these receipts will be invested into health systems strengthening and targeted towards the MDGs cannot be determined at this stage but inputs from remittances will obviously be variable depending on countries’ systems and several other factors.

What has been the performance so far in achieving the MDGs in Africa? The evidence suggests that many least developed countries are unlikely to reach their targets for the Millennium Development Goals. The reasons are many and varied and reflect the poor health systems and the severe lack of funding for health services found in many low income countries which are sometimes seen as a macro-economic necessity or as impositions from donors. Investments in the social sectors of many developing countries fall short of the amounts needed to effect real change. The budgetary constraints imposed as part of conditionalities for development loans have often restricted governments’ ability to expand their services. These fiscal constraints create difficulties for countries to pay a high enough remuneration to motivate and retain staff. But even in poor economies, the salary components of recurrent budgets can be as high as 80 per cent and health sector reforms (and structural adjustment programmes) have restricted employment of health professionals and in some cases led to significant reductions in public sector workforce levels (eg; Tanzania).

It may be argued that health workers are often responsible for health well after diseases have already occurred (i.e. treat people who are already ill) whilst the MDGs require responses largely in terms of preventive measures. However, skilled health workers are essential for preventive work and are needed to deliver quality services to make an impact. Anand and Baernighausen’s (2004) work for the Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health showed that the density of health workers in a population correlated with positive effects on infant, child and maternal mortality. These 3 health indicators are relevant to key indicators representing goals 4, 5, and 6 of the MDGs.

The availability of health workers in a community influences significant aspects of the attainment of the MDGs but health workers without the right skills and tools, who are poorly supervised and motivated and are not accepted by their clients will not hasten the achievement of the MDGs. Logistics support, quality supervision systems and appropriate infrastructure are all essential components for provision of health services that contribute to attainment of the MDGs. Conventional wisdom may dictate that having all these other components in place without enough health workers will certainly not facilitate health work.

Infant and child mortality are probably more dependent on a variety of interventions such as adequate breastfeeding, good nutrition and the benefits of maternal education than on the direct actions of health workers. Maternal mortality on the other hand appears to be more sensitive to the availability of trained professionals as skilled interventions are necessary in an emergency and significant competence is required to assess the situation and to put appropriate interventions into effect to save life. The JLI report’s analysis...
suggested that a 10 per cent rise in density of health workers in the population correlated with about a 5 per cent drop in maternal mortality but correlated with only a 2 per cent drop in infant and under-five mortality\(^\text{11}\) (See Fig 4).

Figure 4. Density of Health Workers and MMR, IMR and U5MR

![Figure 4: Density of Health Workers and MMR, IMR and U5MR](image)


It may therefore be surmised that for developing countries to reach the health related goals it will be important to increase the density of health workers (especially doctors, nurses and midwives) in each country. Clearly however, the situation in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa is that of low supply and inflow of health workers into the workforce, complicated by poor management and retention (more so in the public sector) and plagued with high staff attrition rates.

Determining migration rates from countries is difficult due to poor information systems as the fact that most emigrants are unlikely to officially state the reasons for leaving the workforce in a country. In Ghana, nurses requesting verification of their professional qualifications (a requirement for registration abroad) were about twice the number of new graduates entering the workforce (Buchan and Dovlo, 2004). Work done by WHO’s Africa Regional Office in 2003 also showed high (though variable) rates of intention to migrate among health workers from the 6 African countries studied (Fig 5)\(^\text{12}\). Buchan and Dovlo (2004) also show that nurses from 5 sub-Saharan African countries are among the top ten registrations into the Nursing Register of the United Kingdom - South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Kenya being the leading countries. Munjanja et al (2005) show from WHO data that in 4 of 5 SSA countries they examined nurse numbers have dropped between 3.3 per cent (Cameroon) and 11.9 per cent (South Africa) with only Uganda showing a rise between the mid 1990s and 2000\(^\text{13}\).
The poor health worker availability situation in sub-Saharan Africa is exacerbated by the huge demand for more health workers from industrialized countries already with much high densities of health workers exemplified by the US State Department’s estimates mentioned earlier (Table 2). The existing shortfall in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at some 600,000 nurses to match the average density for low income countries and it is unlikely that SSA countries will be in a position to provide their own needs as well as those generated in Europe and America. There is a particularly strong draw from English speaking industrialized countries. Ferrinho and Omar14 in a consultancy report on Mozambique’s workforce have suggested that migration was not a major issue though it is now being seen going to South Africa and Portugal. An OECD analysis of foreign participation in their workforce shows English speaking countries and Norway probably

Table 2. Nurse Shortfalls in English-Speaking Industrialized Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Nurse Shortfalls and Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>500,000 – 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>113,000 – 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>35,000 – 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>31,000 – 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from US State Department Website (2003).
having the highest proportion of expatriate physicians. Data for 2000\(^1\) show that France, Japan and Austria, for example, have proportions of foreign trained practicing physicians between 1 per cent and 4 per cent of total physician stock whilst New Zealand (34.5 per cent) England (30 per cent), USA (24 per cent), Canada (21 per cent) and Norway (14 per cent) maintain at quite high levels\(^15\).

**Key Issues on Migration and Health Systems Performance**

Is the migration phenomenon enough to influence attainment of the MDGs and to what extent does migration reduce the density of health workers? Empirically, the issue is about shortages of health workers and several factors as discussed earlier, contribute to these shortages – including economic and fiscal constraints as well as pre-existing low supply levels in the workforces in sub-Saharan Africa in particular.

As data on human resources for health and on their migration in particular are very difficult to find in many African countries quantifying the suspected contribution of migration is quite difficult. Secondly, the migration of health workers is not immediately translated into a job in the developed world. Emigrant health workers spend periods in orientation or simply doing odd jobs between migration and formal registration in a recipient country and thus may not be captured by migration information systems. In addition, the previously mentioned “qualitative factors” in migration suggests a major influence of migration on productivity of the remaining workforce.

The effect of the large wage differentials on migration described by Vujicic et al (2004)\(^16\) poses a major motivational nightmare along with the loss of critical supervisors and reduced capacity to train new entrants into the workforce. Investments into increasing health worker training without adequate retention management does not seem a feasible strategy and will eventually become difficult as skilled trainers and staff continue to be lost to migration. Kurowski (2004)\(^17\) calculates that for Africa to reach health worker density which is at the level of the average of all low income countries, it will require to meet an existing shortfall of 720,000 doctors and 600,000 nurses at the minimum. The JLI report (2004) estimates an average density in sub-Saharan Africa of less than one trained health worker per 1000 population compared to a global average of 4/1000 but estimates that a basic level of 2.5 health workers per 1000 population will be needed in order to reach coverage levels that can influence maternal and child mortality. Africa and Asia remain the only continents below this level (2.5 per 1000).

Migration may cause morale drop among staff as workloads increase amidst shortages and quality of care is eroded. The shortages often mean the internal labour markets may redistribute more staff to urban areas where demand and wealth to pay remains high whilst the rural poor with the poorest health indicators are further deprived of access to trained health workers. Similar adjustments may also occur into the private for profit health sector, which are often urban clinical service providers. This mal-distribution of staff, an indirect result of migration can influence the availability of nurses to tackle the MDG sensitive indicators services.

The outflow of health workers may also undermine the fabric of internal professional systems as experienced supervisors and professional leaders emigrate. Attempts to compensate one group of health workers may create other problems. In Ghana, the perceived unfairness of the government instituted “additional duty hours allowances” (ADHA) skewed in favour of doctors is thought to have fuelled a rise in the migration of nurses\(^18\). Whilst non-financial incentives and morale boosting systems such as transparent management, leadership and sense of fairness and of being appreciated by their communities play a role in the retention of staff, the wage differential between source and recipient countries remains a major influence. Vujicic et al (2004) found purchase parity pay differentials between some sub-Saharan African source countries and the

---

\(^{1}\)The data does not show the proportion that comes from African countries.
recipient countries ranging from about 4 times for South African doctors to 22 times for Ghanaian doctors. This gap is insurmountable. Attempts to enhance financial incentives in largely public sector health services (in many countries NGO/faith based services staff are paid by the government) often the government’s wage bill distorts budgets leaving little resources in recurrent budgets for the implementation of services.

Managing migration is a difficulty that faces many source countries. Some countries (possibly the Philippines, India, and Nigeria) appear content to see emigration from the perspective of the economic gains from remittances made back home. These countries usually have fairly large supply of health workers but for smaller countries with a workforce of a few thousand nurses and a couple of hundred doctors the loss of a few key professionals can spell disaster for service delivery. With the huge financial incentives in recipient countries, linked language and similar professional and health systems (especially among official English speaking countries), resource starved source countries cannot on their own mitigate the outflow of trained workers. Any attempts to stop the outflow through restrictions also poses risks of rules being flouted anyway and can further affect the morale and performance of health workers if they feel their rights and freedoms being curtailed.

A number of countries, (for example, Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, etc) have introduced pay enhancement schemes and a variety of incentives that though costly to the source country, have little effect on bridging the remuneration gap. Cadre substitution or utilization of locally unique cadres that substitute for internationally tradable professionals has been tried in some sub-Saharan African countries but these have generally not been in enough numbers and their impact has not been evaluated. International agreements between

**Figure 6. HRH Availability and Requirements for Sub-Saharan Africa**

[Bar chart showing HRH Availability and Requirements for Sub-Saharan Africa]

*Source: Kurowski C (2003)*
source and recipient countries are a possibility but these appear to have been more effective when concluded between two developing countries than between a developing source country and a developed recipient one. South Africa has quite effectively reduced recruitment of health workers from its neighbours in the SADC region but the United Kingdom’s internal code for NHS institutions and the Commonwealth Code of Conduct on International Recruitment of Health Workers have both been seen as not being very effective.

**GATS and trade negotiations**

There is fear that the General Agreement on Trade in Services with its mode four on the free movement of persons may be detrimental to low income countries by removing any protection from losing key skilled personnel and may serve to further expand the huge HRH imbalances. Kinuthia (2002) suggests that GATS assumes that governments can disengage themselves from providing basic services such as health and leave these to free market forces without any repercussions. It is felt that health services should be excluded from the GATS agreement as health workforce that is controlled under binding trade liberalization agreements will leave vulnerable groups in poor countries at great risk. International labour markets must consider health workers as core assets of countries to be protected within the agreements in order to sustain development in an unfairly globalized world.

**HIV/AIDS and the impact of the health workforce**

The impact of HIV on the health workforce both creates a need for additional human resources as well as possibly fuelling emigration from high prevalence countries due to a perception of high risk among health workers (Fig. 7). In addition, HIV/AIDS contributes directly to reducing the availability of one of the key resources needed to tackle the epidemic – by causing the deaths of trained health workers.

HIV/AIDS creates major problems with productivity through “burn-out” among stressed health workers, increased absenteeism either because of their own illness or their need to care for affected family members. Sick leave rates have increased substantially in some places and anecdotes suggest that trained midwives may be avoiding working in labour suites in order to avoid handling blood. As mentioned earlier, the atmosphere of fear, stigma, risk perception and high workloads may also further fuel intentions to emigrate. Deaths among health workers in Zambia and Malawi have risen significantly and a WHO study showed that deaths constituted about 40 per cent of the annual output from training.

Dedicated case management of HIV/AIDS requires significant expansion of services requiring relatively sophisticated laboratory support and a whole new range of skills. Managing testing, counseling, care of the terminally ill are now required skills of all health workers and the major shift in health workload from curative/preventive care to a more palliative regimen requires quite a shift in the way health workers delivered services previously.

Kinoti (2003) analyzed projections that suggest that African health systems will lose one fifth of their employees to HIV/AIDS and calculates that adult sero-prevalence rates of 15 per cent in a country will lead to the loss of between 1.6 and 3.3 per cent of health workers annually. Mortality among Malawian health workers has seen a six fold increase between 1985 (0.5 per cent) and 1997 (3.0 per cent) and South Africa’s HSRC in a recent survey reported that some 13 per cent of deaths among health workers between 1997 and 2001 may be HIV/AIDS related. The report further found an average HIV prevalence among all health workers at about 15.7 per cent, but at 20 per cent among younger health workers aged 18-35.

Attrition from the African health workforce arising from the HIV epidemic, coupled with the increased levels of migration will most likely undermine how health workers can impact on the MDGs.

---

i HSRC: Human Sciences Research Council (of South Africa).
Conclusions and Recommendations

It is impossible to ascribe the failure of countries of sub-Saharan Africa to meet the MDG targets directly to the migration of their health professionals. However, there is no question that these countries start from a very low supply base of HRH which is unable to cope with the high disease burden and so even moderate losses to emigration can become magnified into a health sector disaster. There is some evidence that the density of health workers correlates positively with good service indicators though this varies widely between countries and is linked to the income of countries. The morale and motivation of health workers appears low in many countries and with huge wage differentials the attractions are simply difficult to avoid. With many countries’ health services under pressure, the loss of professionals to migration especially what can be said to be deliberate targeting of certain countries can only undermine meeting the MDGs. It is in this vein that one has to conclude that migration can become “the straw that broke the camel’s back”.

The existing crisis requires a clear understanding of the issues and systematic actions by countries in order to manage HRH adequately. National Health Systems and HRH policy and planning have been inadequate and need to be strengthened if countries are to respond adequately to the threat. The very nature of the health worker migration problem puts poor source countries at the mercy of rich developed ones and this situation may be worsened further with GATS. In an international labour marketplace, source countries on their own cannot depend on only their internally generated strategies to retain and motivate staff. There is therefore a strong need for an agreed international framework that facilitates arrangements between source and recipient countries and provides for firmer guarantees from excessive poaching and that could possibly arrange for investment from recipient countries into health systems of source countries.


Figure 7. Proportion of Health Workers Who Worry About Contracting HIV Through Work-Related Injuries
As things stand at the moment, many sub-Saharan African countries in particular, will be unable to meet the Millennium Development Goals. The reasons are varied and multifarious but clearly the loss of already scarce health professionals that are enticed and migrate to rich countries cannot in any way help the situation. Poor countries need help to expand the supply of health workers and to retain them. This may mean expanding the cadres of workers most likely to work in communities and not be taken up abroad. The skills of such cadres should focus on the well known community and family interventions that enhance well-being and reduce mortality of the vulnerable. At the same time the productivity of health workers needs to be improved through better efforts at enhancing non-financial motivation factors, improved deployment and skill-mix and appropriate logistics support.

The negative impacts of high levels of migration on health systems can only be mitigated by improving the international environment that facilitates these effects. OECD countries, especially English speaking ones such as the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, need to expand training and retention of health workers within their own countries, they are in better financial situation to do this than most of their source countries. The trade liberalization in health and movements of persons should factor protections for fragile economies and the interests of countries whose health systems are under stress and in which large vulnerable populations are at risk. Innovations are needed in managing the macro-economic and fiscal constraints that also fuel migration and restrict countries from improving access to skilled health workers. These issues must be considered as major factors in development and in the security of the global community at large.

Sub-regions within Africa could work at harmonizing HRH needs and utilizing spare capacity in training institutions to meet supply needs. Regional institutions and organizations can play a role in facilitating the networking and sharing of knowledge and resources that this entails. Perhaps most important is the strengthening of health system governance within countries, the major role transparent stakeholder consultations have to play within countries in developing acceptable strategies. Again the poorest countries require the support and moral obligation of development partners to achieve the MDGs.

Endnotes


8 US Department of State Website; XI Appendices – Appendix A: Human Resources Capacity; http://www.state.gov/s/gac/el/or/29737.htm (accessed on 15 April 2005).


16 Marko Vujicic, Pascal Zurn, Khassoum Diallo, Orvill Adams, Mario Dal Poz. The role of wages in the migration of health care professionals from developing countries. Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:3.

17 Kurowski C: Scope, characteristics and policy implications of the health worker shortage in low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 2003 JLI Commissioned Paper.


19 Kinuthia J: Trading in Healthcare Services in Kenya, are we prepared? Case study on the implications of committing healthcare services in Kenya under GATS November 2002


23 WHO 3by5 Initiative: Human capacity-building plan for scaling up HIV/AIDS treatment. 2003


INTRODUCTION

Disparities in health

Key health indicators suggest that health in the countries that make up Western Europe continues to improve. There is nevertheless growing evidence that some groups are not benefiting as much as others, and that the reproductive health of migrants, and their political and economic condition, is lagging behind that of host populations. Indeed in some situations it may be worsening. Migrants of different types constitute a significant and growing proportion of the national populations of many countries in Western Europe, and for public health reasons as well as for ethical and human rights reasons, the reproductive health of migrants calls for urgent attention.

Accelerating migration

The growing pace, magnitude and geographic scope of migration in and between countries everywhere is accelerating, and with it the size and impact of the problems associated with migration are becoming more evident and potentially more serious. Conservative estimates place the number of people living outside their place of birth at around 175 million, but the number of people “on the move” including refugees, internally displaced people, rural-urban migrants, tourists, market people, students, seasonal workers and clandestine migrants may be as many as 2 billion (UN; 2002).

The increased pace of migration has been most marked in and between developing countries, but it has also become very evident in Western Europe where rapidly changing economic and demographic conditions are attracting and necessitating new human resources, while offering political sanctuary to others.

Factors affecting migration

Contemporary migration is being fuelled by a complex mix of social, economic, demographic and political forces. The growing perceived, if not real, distance between the quality of life and opportunities available to people in rural versus urban centers is pushing millions of people in developing countries to move to towns and cities that are overpopulated, under-financed and under-served. Meanwhile, the increasingly wide gap between developed and developing markets of the first and third worlds, and the relative stagnation of markets in the latter, continues to provoke a demand for cheap labour by rich countries and a need by people in poor countries to move in search of a better quality of life. Political instability and conflict also remains an important push factor that in the last twenty years has caused the forced migration of millions of people within and across borders.
Changing attitudes and policies

The growth in migration is occurring against a generalized background of hardening social attitudes and policies, and even in developing and transitioning countries, responses to migrants are becoming restrictive and exclusive. Contrary to the pattern of migration that was fostered by countries such as Canada, the USA, and Australia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, migration regulations are becoming highly age and sex selective, and are producing relatively distorted demographic and social situations in both sending and receiving countries. The hardening of attitudes and policies to migrants is also being reflected in access to health care, and in many parts of Western Europe, poorly defined legal conditions governing insurance coverage has become a major obstacle to good health care for migrants.

Migration and health

The link between migration and health is always a complex one. Migrants, no matter where they are from, carry health profiles that reflect their social, economic and ecological past, including the health care that was or was not available to them. At the same time, migrant health also reflects the conditions surrounding their movement and resettlement, their access to health care in host countries, and their capacity to achieve and maintain a good quality of life.

Migration, moreover, always involves profound psychosocial as well as physical uprooting, and even under the most ideal conditions (which are rare), migration can be an important source of stress for those who move, those they leave behind and those who eventually host them. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the case of humanitarian emergencies where physical and psychosocial trauma is commonplace and where mortality is typically high.

In all types of migration, however, the forced break with family, culture, traditional values and personal “security” brings with it uncertainty and a perceived loss of control over day-to-day events. The subsequent need to adapt to new values, customs, policies and languages can also bring with it fear, poor self-esteem and psychosomatic problems. Despite the complexity of the relationship between migration and health, most of the attention that has traditionally been given to the problem has focused on classic infectious diseases such as TB. Far less attention has been given to domains such as family and reproductive health or psychosocial well-being.

Diseases of poverty

Most economic migration involves people going from poorer regions to areas that are economically better off and in which there is a promise of a better life. In some parts of the world, the massive and still-growing movement of people from rural areas to large towns reflects this push-pull phenomenon, is being rapidly associated with the reintroduction of parasitic and other infections provoked by poor access to clean water, sanitation, and good housing. In much the same way, the movement of people from poor countries to resource-rich countries has been linked to a resurgence of diseases of poverty such as TB (Carballo, Divino and Zeric, 1997). And just as in the large under-served urban centers of developing countries, many of the social and economic conditions into which migrants are moving in Western Europe may be heightening the risk of infectious diseases such as TB (ibid.).

Diseases of occupation

Economically motivated migration typically means accepting to take on the occupation that nationals are no longer interested in doing. In Western Europe this has historically meant work in mines, construction, intensive agriculture and heavy engineering industries where the risk of injury and disease is high even un-
der the best of circumstances. In the case of a migrant labour force that is often seen as too short to warrant training and rigorous safety measures, work-related accidents, musculoskeletal and respiratory problems are common and significantly higher among migrants (Carballo, Divino and Zeric 1977).

**Diseases of insult**

Because migration often involves poor people desperate in their search of work, or refugees in search of safe haven, opportunities for abuses of power abound. Nowhere is this more evident than in situations of war, where intentional injuries (physical and psychosocial) are common and where sexual exploitation has been an integral feature of aggression. Economic migration, however, is not without its own diseases of insult. In the context of growing trafficking and clandestine migration where migrants have few rights, the potential for sexual violence and abuse is high. That this should not have been more recognized until now is indicative of the extent to which girls and women - and to a lesser extent boys and men - “on the move” have always been seen as legitimate “spoils”. Both forced and so-called voluntary migration also appears to be associated with higher rates of a type of domestic violence provoked by insecurity, stress and poor self-esteem.

**Responses to health aspects of migration**

Responses to the health aspects of migration have typically been geared to protection of the host community and hence programmed exclusion of newcomers. At different times in history countries have responded to the perception that migrants are vectors of infectious diseases by introducing regulations and practices such as quarantine and outright rejection of people with infectious diseases such as TB. With time, some of these laws and regulations have been modified so that rather than emphasize rejection of migrants and refugees, they increasingly call for routine screening and treatment before entry. Conversely there are few examples of steps being taken to promote and protect family and reproductive health. The reasons for this are no doubt many, but there has always been an underlying notion that with the exception of certain infectious diseases, most problems tend to be self-correcting and in any event are unlikely to affect host populations in any profound way.

**Access to health care**

Within the framework of international migration, sound and consistent access to health care is a major challenge. Lack of access to care is both real and perceived. An ICMH survey in the Canton of Geneva suggests that while poor access to health care is real in the sense that access to insurance is restricted, unfounded fears and beliefs about what is and is not possible are also barriers to care. Poor language and communication skills on the part of both migrants and health care staff also appear to be a problem, and in some countries this has given rise to serious misdiagnoses and interventions. Cultural differences with respect to how health is perceived and when and how care should be sought are also frequent problems that limit access to health care.

**TYPES OF MIGRATION**

There are many reasons why people move but, in general, five major types of migration stand out today. Of these, the two most serious from a health point of view are economically and politically instigated migration. The impact of environmental change nevertheless merits attention, and in developing countries this has become an important force in uprooting. Tourism and the international movement of students are two additional types of migration that include growing numbers of people and health concerns.
Rural-to-urban migration

Data for rural-to-urban migration are difficult to obtain, but the pace of internal movement to urban centres is increasing and is reflected on the one hand by the rapid unplanned growth of massive urban centres, and on the other hand, by the relative depletion of rural areas (Wahba, 1996; World Bank, 1995). The capacity of new cities to absorb migrants economically and socially, and provide them with the types of services needed is being largely outpaced in developing countries with serious consequences for environmental health.

Cross-border migration

Precise figures for economically provoked cross-border migration are difficult to obtain. The UN statistics suggest that at least 175 million are officially living outside their countries of origin, but this figure probably represents a very small percentage of the true situation. In developing countries where political and social borders between countries are often too porous to permit rigorous immigration control and recording there is little opportunity for precise reporting. Elsewhere the increase in illegal or clandestine migration has equally rendered good statistics difficult to come by. Clandestine migration is associated with serious disruption of family life and opportunities for exploitation of all kinds.

Humanitarian emergency-related migration

Forced migration linked to humanitarian disasters has grown in the last twenty years; and has been especially evident in developing countries. Altogether over 60 million people are estimated to have been displaced by conflicts in the last two decades. For many of them the possibility of return, even after conflicts have ended, has been limited and the number of people forced to remain as refugees or IDPs has increased. Conflict related migration disorganizes family life as well as social structures in complex ways. Men tend to be conscripted into armies, or are sought out and killed early on in conflicts. Women, children and the elderly thus often become the core of refugee and IDP populations, and although family reunification is given priority by humanitarian relief agencies, reunification is difficult. At the end of the war in Bosnia over 34 per cent of all people had still not been able to establish any contact with lost spouses and children (Carballo, Smajkic and Zeric; 1996). Such are the legal, economic and social ambiguities surrounding forced migration that refugees and IDPs are always vulnerable to exploitation and sexual abuse.

Environment-change migration

The 20th century was marked by massive public works and engineering projects financed by the international community and governments. The extent to which dams, irrigation projects, river diversions schemes and other large scale undertakings have displaced and continue to displace people remains unclear, but the World Bank acknowledges that its own projects alone may be displacing up to 12 million people per year. Few steps have been taken to address the needs of people displaced in this way, even though poverty, family disruption, and poor reinsertion into other communities are common problems with serious implications for health and access to health care (Carballo, 2000).

Tourism-related migration

Tourism has become a major source of population movement in all parts of the world. In 1990 the World Tourism Organization reported 456 million tourist “arrivals”, and in 2002 the figure rose to more than 700 million. The WTO estimates that by 2020 there will be 1.6 billion, and that the one of the top three receiving regions will be Europe with 717 million tourists. The growth of inter-regional travel has introduced new health problems, including the transport of malaria and other parasitic diseases. Sexually transmitted diseases, however, are another albeit less well known aspect of tourism.
Students

Students are moving across borders in increasing numbers. According to UNESCO, 1.6 million students were studying abroad in 1996 and the OECD reports that the proportion of foreign students in its Member States rose by 30 per cent between 1995 and 2001 (UKCOSA and CEC, 2000). In 2000 over 44 per cent of the foreign students came from Asia, 30 per cent from Europe, 12 per cent from Africa, 6 per cent from North America, 4 per cent from South America, and 1 per cent from Oceania, and Western Europe hosted 50 per cent of all international students.

MIGRATION INTO WESTERN EUROPE

The pace of migration has increased everywhere, but in some parts of the world it has increased more rapidly and become more politically and demographically evident than in others. Western Europe is one of those.

Changing nature of migration to and in Western Europe

Until recently, European countries had been used to exporting people to the New World, and indeed throughout much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, emigration to the New World helped prevent or mitigate serious economic, social and political pressures in Europe. Following World War II, however, reconstruction and then the establishment of the European Community made Western Europe such a major pole of attraction to migrants and refugees, that today most of the countries in question have become net “importers” of people from other regions.

Changing direction of migration

The direction of migration has also changed. Initially the migration that followed WWII in Europe involved workers from Southern Europe moving to more industrialized parts of Northern Europe where the war years had eroded the human resources, especially manpower, to sustain industrial reconstruction (Carballo, Divino and Zeric, 1997). Countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal thus became providers of the manpower Northern Europe needed, and for over twenty years they were the main source of imported labour. With the creation of the European Community, however, these countries experienced their own economic booms, and like their Northern European partners, went on to require imported, cheap and flexible human resources. The main sources for this new labour have become Latin America, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, North Africa and Eastern Europe.

Gender-based migration

For countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the need for foreign-born labour in the 1960s and 1970s called for a primarily male workforce that could sustain the re-growth of construction, mining and heavy engineering industries. The demand was primarily for a male-dominated workforce and many receiving countries went on to see the formation of migrant communities that were almost entirely devoid of women. Countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal that went on to provide the labour needed in the North in turn experienced a serious depopulation of men from rural areas and cities with high unemployment. In many of these countries, women, children and elderly became the demographic mainstay of villages and small towns, and in many communities the economic base changed from subsistence agriculture and small artisan enterprises to a dependence on remittances sent by spouses and sons. Today this pattern has changed, and the number of women migrating to Western Europe, including to what were the main sending countries, is exceeding that of men. Most of them are arriving from Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe, and a large proportion of them are doing so with unclear legal status.
Family migration policies

Most of the initial policies that emerged around the movement of guest workers into Northern Europe were designed to meet little more than the immediate labour-shortages of the countries in question. There was little or no promotion or consideration of long-term settlement by migrants, and most national policies specifically excluded family migration. Such was the success of these exclusion policies that in the early 1980s over half the migrants who were married and working in Northern European countries were living alone without their wives, partners, and children (Carballo, Divino and Zeric 1977).

The rationale for these policies was that since so-called guest workers would come for only limited periods (even though 11 month contracts were often repeated for 10 and more years) there was no need for their family members to accompany them. In other instances the argument was that host countries would be unable to economically and/or socially accommodate the extended families of migrant workers. Many of these policies remain in force today, and although the profile and background of migrants has changed to include more women, and migrants from other parts of the world, restrictions on family migration remain in place.

Clandestine migration, smuggling and trafficking

Growing concern in European countries about the number of people from abroad that can be “meaningfully absorbed” has led to a variety of restrictions, and keeping migrants out of Western Europe has become a major preoccupation of governments. The response to these restrictions has been varied, but one of them has been that the number of people arriving unofficially has increased to such an extent that the number of clandestine migrants (not gone through any official application and/or registration) is estimated to be as much as 10 per cent of the total resident foreign population (Muus, 2001). Clandestine migration covers a range of experiences. In most cases it refers to people using their creativity to overcome local administrative restrictions by entering on tourist, short stay, or student visas and then seeking work for longer periods of time. Other ways include simply crossing what have become porous borders without any registration. Because of their clandestine nature, they are afforded and can seek little protection.

Smuggling

A proportion of all contemporary clandestine migration is organized and facilitated by agents. Some agents are little more than “passeurs” who help (often voluntarily) people to cross borders, but others have become smugglers who assist people to (a) leave their home countries, (b) travel abroad, and (c) enter third countries. Smuggling has become a major industry involving complex re-payment schemes that in many cases indenture migrants to the agents through highly exploitative financial schemes that place migrants in precarious economic situations. The earnings they keep to live on are minimal, and the amount they are able to send home as remittances (major source of foreign currency in many developing countries) is severely diminished. To what extent migrants who are smuggled are exploited in other ways is not clear, but given the growing number of women involved, the risk of sexual exploitation is probably high.

Trafficking

Unlike people who are smuggled, many people who are trafficked are involuntary participants, and trafficking has become an even larger industry than smuggling. An estimated 4 million people are trafficked every year (IOM 2002), and in Western Europe alone an estimated 500,000 women are involved (300,000 from or through the Balkans) every year. In Western Europe most trafficked women are forced into sex work-related activities, and rape is commonly used to cut women off socially and psychologically from their families and so reduce the risk of their escaping. The immediate public health consequences associated with
the trafficking of women include rape-related trauma (physical and psychosocial), STIs and HIV/AIDS, unwanted pregnancy and abortion, but the introduction of STIs into communities of origin by women if and when they return home should be a major concern too.

**REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF MIGRANTS**

As with health and health care in general, migration, be it voluntary or involuntary, places people in situations and under conditions that affect their reproductive health and their access to, and use of, reproductive health care services.

**Gender**

Gender issues run through the gamut of reproductive health and health care issues. The fact that female migrants are now outnumbering men in many parts of Western Europe calls for special attention to be given to problems such as work-place exploitation, discrimination in terms of remuneration, and sexual abuse. The status of migrant women within migrant communities also calls for attention, especially since there is evidence that in “strong” ethnic communities many of the gender-based abuses associated with previous life often persist and place women in situations that are replete with contradictions for health.

**Legal status**

One of the most important factors affecting the reproductive health of migrants is their legal status. It determines their vulnerability to abuse in the work place and in the street, and can influence the extent to which they have, and feel they have, access health and social services, and to protection before the law. No matter whether they are refugees, asylum seekers, clandestine migrants, or “legal” migrants, legal status can influence access to insurance, the right to housing and the perceived right to register complaints. In the Canton of Geneva where migrants, including “illegal” ones are in principle eligible for health insurance, the legal precariousness of illegal migrants and the resistance of insurance companies often results in their fear to request and insist on insurance coverage and hence health care.

**Health care seeking behaviour and language**

Poor language skills constitute a frequent obstacle to reproductive health care. Poor communication between migrants and healthcare providers, and insufficient use of trained interpreters has been identified as a key cause of poor gynecological care in Denmark and the increased risk of delayed or missing obstetrical care (Jeppesen; 1993). In Sweden too, a study found that young, single, multiparous immigrant women were likely to register late (more than 15 weeks) at prenatal care centers and then use these services poorly. The study concluded that prenatal care could have been improved by training staff in trans-cultural skills and providing them with interpreters (Darj & Lindmark; 2002).

**Health seeking behaviour and culture**

Health care seeking behavior is influenced by cultural background and personal experience. Stronks et al. (2001) in the Netherlands reported that visits to general practitioners and use of prescription drugs was higher among migrants from Surinam, Turkey and Morocco than among nationals, but that their use of tertiary services was low and inefficient. While the low socioeconomic status of migrants might have explained some of this difference, the study concluded that poor use of specialized health care was low among some migrant groups because of “cultural” reasons (Stronks et al.; 2001). A Belgian study, also concluded that cultural factors governed the way in which migrants accessed and used specialized care (Van der Suyt et al.; 1993), especially in the case of Moroccan and Turkish migrants. Traditional beliefs and the inclination
to first seek non-conventional medical care has been cited as a factor in the late health care seeking behavior of Turkish women in Germany, and in their response to menopause-related problems and opportunities for treatment (David & Borde; 2001).

**Contraception and migrant background**

As it does in all populations, the use of contraception by migrants varies according to socio-economic background and experience with family planning. On the whole, however, the data suggest that “migrants” are often unaware of the availability of contraceptive services in the countries they move to, and they access these services far less than nationals do. In the United Kingdom where female refugees from the former Yugoslavia with a previous history of induced abortion continue to seek abortions, they have poor attendance of both family planning and cervical screening programmes (Newell et al.; 1998). In Germany contraceptive use by migrants is also low, and one study concluded this is because migrants tend to come from countries where information about family planning is poor, and because German health care services fail to provide counseling out-reach for migrants in their national languages (Spycher & Sieber; 2001). A Swiss report similarly concluded that effective prevention of unwanted pregnancies and STIs will only be achieved through the use of same-culture family planning counselors, and that without them, the likelihood of good contraceptive take-up by migrant women will remain low (Fontana & Beran; 1995). Migrant women’s decision-making about contraception also appears to be influenced by fears that their status in traditional family settings may change if they are seen to attend family planning clinics and use contraceptive services. This was the case among North African women in Paris where contraceptive use patterns were also adversely influenced by the attitudes of mothers and mothers-in-law, as well as fears linked to body image and the possibility of sterility related to the use of contraception (Fellous; 1981).

**Requests for abortion**

Most Western European countries have introduced legislation that provides abortion on the request of the woman within the first twelve weeks of gestation if the health of the woman is in question and/or if there is evidence of rape and incest. With the exception of Ireland this includes mental as well as physical health. Requests for abortion nevertheless appear to be falling in much of Western Europe and in some countries such as Denmark, Finland, and Italy have dropped by up to 50 per cent (IPPF; 1999). Migrant women, on the other hand, continue to be placed in situations where abortion is often seen as the only option. In Sweden where requests for induced abortion typically range between 10.1 and 42.6/1,000, the highest rates in one study were among women with low socio-economic background, especially migrants (Soderberg et al.; 1993).

Similarly in Norway, where 15.5 per cent of the population is of non-Western origin, women of non-Western origin account for over 25 per cent of requests for induced abortion (Eskild et al.; 2002). A recent study in Switzerland reported that the number of non-Swiss women seeking abortions was 23 times higher than that of Swiss women (Narring et al.; 2002), and that achieved abortion among women from former Yugoslavia and Africa was twice that of Swiss women (Addor et al.; 2003). In Italy a study in the region of Lazio found the likelihood of induced abortion to be approximately three times higher (34.8/1000 women) among foreign born women than local Italians (10.5/1000).

The same study reported that spontaneous abortion was also higher among foreign women than Italian women of the same age and socioeconomic background (Medda, Baglio, Guasticchi, Spinelli; 2002).
Maternal health and pregnancy outcome

The maternal health of migrant women and poor pregnancy outcome has long been a major problem throughout much of Western Europe with serious implications for gestational age, birth weight, perinatal health, and post-natal care (Carballo, Divino and Zeric; 1997). Some of these as well as other pregnancy-related problems may be linked to the pre-migration health condition of women, but the social, economic and physical conditions in which many of them are forced to live when they arrive in host countries can also have an adverse effect (ibid.). Thus even when socioeconomic and educational background are taken into account, migrant women seem to be less likely to seek, and/or receive, adequate antenatal care and have good pregnancy outcomes. This is especially so where the legal status of migrants is unclear, and when women believe local policies and social attitudes towards them to be negative.

Data on women from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa who delivered in Paris between 1988-1995, point to high incidence rates of pregnancy complications, among African and Maghrebian women than French women (Gayral-Taminh et al.; 1999). Another French study reported high rates of alcohol consumption linked to stress and poor adaptation among Cambodian pregnant women (D’Avanzo & Barab; 2000).

In Greece a study found high rates of viral hepatitis (especially B) among pregnant Albanian refugees, (Malamitsi-Puchner et al.; 1996), and a Norwegian study of mothers born in South Asia and North Africa reported that pre-gestational diabetes (8.9/1000 births) was twice that of ethnic Norwegians (Vangen et al.; 2003).

In Ireland, African, Romanian and Kosovar refugee women were found to have perinatal mortality rates that were almost three times higher than among “nationals”. The same study found a 3 per cent prevalence of HIV among refugee women and a 7 per cent rate of Hepatitis B and C (Lalchandani et al.; 2001).

A study of perinatal mortality risk factors in France found a much higher risk of perinatal death among migrants from Southern Europe, North and sub-Saharan Africa (Zeitlin et al.; 1998). In Sweden perinatal mortality among infants born to migrant women is significantly higher than among Swedes even after adjustment for diabetes, anemia, preeclampsia, placental abruption and small-for-gestational-age. There is also a high risk of small-for-date babies and severe neonatal distress in babies of migrants especially from sub-Saharan Africa (Essen et al.; 2000).

The possible role played by female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM) remains unclear (see below). However data collected on births between 1986-1996 support the thesis that FGM may present complications such as prolonged labour and the need for surgical delivery (Vangen et al.; 2002), but is not in itself the cause of perinatal mortality.

Caesarean section births

In France caesarean sections appear to occur twice as frequently among women coming from Africa than among “French” women (GayralTaminh M et al.; 1999). The same trend was reported in Norway where the prevalence of caesarean section in ethnic Filipinos was significantly higher than for Norwegian women and women of mixed parenthood (Vangen, Stray-Pedersen et al.; 2003). A 1992-1998 study in Italy also reported a significantly higher incidence of caesarean sections births among non-European migrants compared to Italians, and stressed the need for better ‘cultural’ sensitivity training of hospital staff assisting in labour and delivery among migrants (Diani et al.; 2000).
Reproductive health and infectious diseases

STI sentinel surveillance data in Italy show that between 1991 and 1995, 4030 new STI episodes were diagnosed among migrants, more than one-third of them coming from North Africa. The most frequent STDs were non-specific urethritis and genital warts among men and nonspecific vaginitis and latent syphilis in women. High HIV rates were observed in homosexual men and heterosexual intravenous drug users from Central and South America (Suligoi & Giuliani; 1997). A study of foreign sex workers reported a 70 per cent prevalence of cervicitis, vaginitis, and vaginosis (BMJ; 2001) while another highlighted chlamydia as a major problem among immigrant sex-workers, and in those coming from Eastern Europe C. trachomatis infection was a major problem (Matteelli; 2003).

In Spain the prevalence of hepatitis B and syphilis as well as other STIs is markedly higher in migrant populations than nationals (Del Amo et al.; 2002). In Switzerland where between 1998-1999 AIDS accounted for 50 per cent of infectious disease mortality in asylum seekers (Koppenaal et al.; 2003) another study revealed major gaps in knowledge about how to prevent HIV/AIDS among seasonal migrant workers from Spain and Portugal (Haour-Knipe et al.; 1993).

In the United Kingdom where there has been a marked increase in HIV among some immigrant groups, studies have highlighted the complex nature of, and constraints on sexual decision-making among African female migrants and the urgent need to address this. Attention has similarly been drawn to the risk of mother to child transmission among migrants arriving from countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Kesby et al.; 2003). In the Netherlands a recent study of the causes of death among asylum seekers found that AIDS accounted for half of the mortality, during the period 1998-1999 (Koppenaal et al.; 2003). Previous data on the subject of HIV/AIDS among migrants (Carballo, Divino and Zeric; 1997) highlighted the fact that incidence/prevalence rates among migrants tend to reflect rates in their counties of origin. Thus, for example, rates among African and Brazilian migrants in Germany are higher than among Turkish migrants, and within the African migrant community, incidence of HIV tends to reflect individual country of origin patterns.

Although HIV/AIDS and other STIs have generated major concern, and are seen everywhere as major threats to public health, relatively little attention has been given to the politics of migration and their impact on vulnerability. Thus, most countries continue to require that migrants do not arrive with their regular partners and are expected to live “alone” for months and sometimes years (if consecutive contracts are provided). Just as military garrisons do, male migrant communities attract groups of sex workers. Sometimes these groups are small and serve large numbers of men, including domestic men. In so doing they become part of a sexual dynamic that is replete with opportunities for transmission of HIV as well as other STIs.

Gynecology

The findings from a number of different studies suggest that migrant women do not access gynecological care services in the same way and or to the same extent as nationals, and suffer the consequences of this. A United Kingdom study reported that refugee women from former Yugoslavia were far less likely to access cervical screening programmes than “nationals”. For example, 30.5 per cent of refugee women compared to 17.5 per cent nationals said they had never had a cervical smear, but among those that had, the proportion with abnormal smears was 40 per cent compared to 21.2 per cent in the national population (Newell et al.; 1998), highlighting the fact that many women may be delaying their check-ups until it is too late.

Ethnic background and migrant status also appears to play a role in the risk of poor breast cancer detection. A study in Denmark found that while 71 per cent of Danish born women readily accepted mammography, far fewer migrant women (Pakistan, ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey) were likely to do so, and almost half of
those who said they would accept to have a mammography failed to show up for their appointments. One of the many implications of this was that by the time the women did go for examination, those who did have tumors tended to have more advanced and less easily treatable ones (Holk et al.; 2000; Norredam et al.; 1999).

Female Genital Mutilation

As well as being a major cause of physical and psychological trauma (WHO; 1997), female genital mutilation is frequently associated with problems such as hemorrhage, severe abdominal pain, urinary retention, tetanus, risk of infections (including HIV), pelvic infections, infertility, obstructed labour and depression. A ritual that is practiced in parts of Africa, FGM is now becoming an issue of concern in Western European countries. In Denmark where there has been a major influx of Somali refugees the Danish Medical Association is training health professionals in the management of FGM (Jorgensen; 1998), including complications that often present in its wake.

In Sweden where there is a high rate of perinatal mortality among babies born to migrant women coming from the Horn of Africa, the possibility of an association between FGM and perinatal death was explored. Despite the difficulties that FGM can present for delivery, no direct link was found between FGM and perinatal mortality, nor was obstructed or prolonged labour caused by scar tissue from circumcision found to be linked with perinatal deaths (Essen et al.; 2002). Other studies have nevertheless referred to gynecological problems associated with FGM among migrants in France (Gallard; 1995), Italy (Bonessio et al.; 1996) and the United Kingdom (Cameron and Anderson; 1998).

Violence

For a variety of social, economic and psychological reasons, some types of migration experiences appear to lend themselves to violent behavior within migrant groups, and to a lesser extent, from migrant groups to the host community (Carballo and Divino; 1997). The perceived lack of personal power, lack of clarity of legal situation, loss of status, and loss of hope are some of the factors that appear to contribute to stress and the use of violence. Violence against women has been especially apparent in humanitarian emergencies, but there is evidence that may be relatively common among migrants whose legal, social and economic situation is not clear (ICMH 2004). Reporting of violence in situations where migrants are and feel they are excluded from mainstream society is difficult. As with rape, many victims of violence do not know whom they can turn to for help, and indeed do not believe that meaningful help, including prosecution of aggressors and protection to them, will be forthcoming.

Domestic violence

In the case of migrant women there are limited data on domestic violence. However, the data available suggest that the problem is exacerbated by the relative isolation of migrant women and their inability to access support and care (even from friends), and to report violent incidents to the police. Poor language skills, different cultural attitudes to acceptance of domestic violence and the role and status of women are some of the factors that prevent domestic violence being reported, prevented and mitigated in migrant settings (Menjivar and Salcido, 2002). The Department of Community Medicine in Geneva has noted the tendency for foreign-born women and men presenting at the hospital with injuries not to spontaneously refer to domestic violence because they do not consider it “unusual”.

Forced sexual intercourse

Previous reports have highlighted the chronic nature of forced sexual intercourse and other forms of gender-based violence among refugee and internally displaced women in Bosnia (Carballo, Smajkic and
forced marriage

Migration into Western Europe has meant that some of the children of migrants are growing up in social situations where forced/arranged marriages are common in the ethnic community they live in but not in the host society. Where this occurs serious psychological (and in some cases physical) injury can be done to the children concerned. High suicide rates reported among adolescent South Asian girls in the United Kingdom (Carballo, Divino and Zeric; 1997) may be due to many factors but the role of forced/arranged marriages must be taken into consideration in areas with large South Asian communities.

There are few statistics on forced marriages but in Norway between 1996 and 2001, 82 per cent of Norwegian daughters of Moroccan immigrants who married, did so to Moroccan citizens. For Norwegian daughters of Pakistani immigrants, the rate was 76 per cent and in general the prevalence in Norway of “fetching marriages” increased between 1996 and 2001. Among Muslim migrants, there are major obstacles to women seeking to divorce, and the Norwegian parliament has adopted a law stipulating that no family reunification through marriage will be permitted unless the wife has been granted the right to divorce under Norwegian law (Bawer; 2003). In the United Kingdom, recent immigration rules require incoming spouses to remain married for a year if they are to stay in the country, but during this period, women are denied the very welfare benefits that might provide funding for abused women to seek shelter and legal advice (Sen; 1999).

CONCLUSION

The pace and scope of migration is increasing everywhere in the world, and is being fuelled by forces that are not likely to change in the near future. Serious and growing economic disparities, political instability, persecution and demographic pressures will continue to push and pull people to move within and between countries. The expansion of the European Union will evidence this, but even if that were not to happen, migration into Western Europe will need to grow anyway if its countries are to meet their need for a low-cost and flexible labour force, and at the same time maintain their social security systems afloat in rapidly aging domestic populations.

Because many of the countries in Western Europe have gone from being exporters of people to net importers in the space of some 20 years, some appear not to have had time to assess and respond to many of the health implications of migration, or to take the steps needed to ensure sound public health and equity in access to healthcare by migrants. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of reproductive health, where today there is little evidence of systematic political or programmatic action to address the complexity of the problem among migrants and their families.

Taking this issue up will not be easy. Migration is a complex process that calls for careful health assessment and management. The fact that so little attention has been given to reproductive health thus far means that in many countries the basic data that might be used to determine needs and priorities has not yet been collected, and while the studies referred to in this report permit some degree of extrapolation, in the future this information will have to be augmented with larger and crossationally comparative data.

Unless this becomes possible, the challenge of protecting reproductive health among the migrants who make up such a vital part of the work force of Western Europe may go neglected and the right of mi-
grants to reproductive health will be denied. In the wake of ICPD 10 and what is known about reproductive health today, there can be no excuse for not espousing and protecting the rights of all people, migrants or otherwise, to it.

There are, of course, other important public health considerations to be borne in mind. If the reproductive health of migrants is not promoted and protected, the health of all Europeans will suffer. Reproductive health affects family and community health as well as individual health, and when major disparities are allowed to emerge and persist between different groups of people, the health of everyone is gradually affected.

Inadequate attention to STIs and HIV/AIDS in one part of a society only means that the consequences will sooner or later be felt by the society at large. These are diseases that do not respect political and social barriers. Similarly, any chronic neglect of contraception and family planning in one sector of society only means that everyone will eventually be called on to pay the social as well as the economic price of the human wastage involved. By the same token, poor maternal care in one social group, means that in addition to the unnecessary and unacceptable suffering imposed on the women in question, society goes on to assume the social and economic (as well as health) burden of poor pregnancy outcome, avoidable maternal and perinatal morbidity, work days lost, and lives damaged.

There is evidence from this brief survey, as well as previous studies, that the reproductive health of migrants in Western European countries is far from sound. Migrants in many countries are also being placed in social situations that inevitably heighten the risk of transmissible reproductive health problems. In others they are being placed in the way of stress-related violence and abuse that could be easily avoided. Everywhere, moreover, migrant women appear not to be using health care services in a rational or healthy manner. They are often arriving late and then not following up as they should be. As a result they are not benefiting from the timely diagnosis and treatment that is generally available today in Western Europe, and their problems are being allowed to evolve until the means of managing them become complicated, costly and less likely to succeed.

Some of the reproductive health problems being confronted by migrants are possibly a carry-over from their previous lives and life settings, but even so they are probably amenable to better management. Many other problems are more socio-genic in nature, products of a cultural and political insensitivity to the legal, economic and psychosocial conditions migrants are often expected to function in. While not necessarily simple problems, they are ones that could be overcome in cost-effective ways that would benefit society at large as well as the migrants themselves.

The lack of attention that has been given to the reproductive health of migrants, however, partially reflects the comparatively little attention that has been given to reproductive health issues in general. Focusing attention on migrant needs might well help elevate society’s awareness about reproductive health in general, and the need for it to be fostered and nurtured as an integral part of social development and millennium goals.

References


Bawer, B. A Problem with Muslim Enclaves, June 30, 2003, Monday, OPINION; Christian Science Monitor, Boston.

BMJ. Archives of Disease in Childhood 2002; 87:301; *British Medical Journal Online*.


www.world-tourism.org

REVERSING THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS:
WHAT ROLE HAS MIGRATION?

John K. Anarfi
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
University of Ghana, Legon

Introduction

In the year 2000, the world set for itself an agenda made up of eight basic items now known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The task was to achieve these goals by the year 2015 and among them was the halting and reversing of the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although migration has taken a centre stage in development discourse in recent times, it is not mentioned specifically in the MDGs. Considering the fact that with HIV/AIDS human beings are vectors and victims at the same time, human mobility then emerges as an important factor in the spread of the disease. It therefore stands out that, while migration can certainly serve as a constraint to achieving the HIV/AIDS-related goal, it could also contribute to the realisation of the goal if properly managed. What role, then, can migration play in the effort?

HIV/AIDS and migration are two salient features of the latter half of the twentieth century up to date. It is estimated that 4.8 million people became newly infected with HIV in 2003, more than in any one year before. Today, an estimated 37.8 million people (range: 34.6–42.3 million) are living with HIV, and 2.9 million people (range: 2.6–3.3 million) were killed in 2003, bringing the total deaths by AIDS to over 20 million since the first cases of AIDS were identified in 1981 (UNAIDS, 2004). It has been suggested that AIDS has become pandemic due to intensified population movement and the development of rapid means of transportation (Gallo, 1987). The International Organization for Migration estimates that the number of international migrants increased from 105 million in 1985 to 175 million in 2000 (IOM, 2003), while a similar number of people may move within national borders (UNAIDS, 2004).

The spread of any infectious disease can be accelerated in a situation of large-scale migration, especially in the face of inadequate facilities to contain the disease. This observation has already been made in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa. The spread of tuberculosis from South Africa to the towns and villages of the neighbouring countries in the fifties and sixties by mine workers who migrated to the South African mines is well documented (Packard 1989). More recently, from the late 70s to the early 80s, this pattern of disease spread has occurred again in Eastern and Central Africa with HIV/AIDS, fuelled by what Baldo and Cabral (1990) have termed Low Intensity Wars (LIW). Free movement of people, including commercial sex workers, to where business is profitable, has also been blamed as partly responsible for the high HIV/AIDS incidence in the ex-British colonies such as Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania (Konotey-Ahulu 1989).

Previously, governments’ main concern was that incoming migrants might bring HIV with them. While this scenario still applies, there is increasing recognition that migrants may be more vulnerable than local populations to acquiring the infection during migration and that they may spread the infection upon return to their respective homes (Hamilton 2003). In brief, the distinct yet sequential processes of both
contraction and spreading of the disease characterises the double dynamic relationship between migration and HIV/AIDS.

Migration and HIV/AIDS

Due to sustained differences in disease risks between different locations, migration is emerging as a major determinant of health for individuals and communities. New arrivals may have health characteristics, which differ from those of the background communities. There are also secondary health-risks associated with mobile populations that may influence the non-mobile communities through which these populations move or in which they settle (Macpherson and Gushulak, 2001). No disease or condition illustrates this situation more than HIV/AIDS.

The health consequences of population movement depend on

♦ the scope and volume of the movement;
♦ health determinants related to the migratory process; and

The three are not mutually exclusive and they tend to reinforce each other.

Scope and Volume of Population Mobility

Although with certain contagious diseases an individual carrier can cause their relocation and subsequent epidemic, the speed and extent of spread could be intensified by the magnitude of the movement. It is estimated that one in every thirty-five people in the world is an international migrant. A recent estimate indicates that 663 million international journeys took place in 1999 and it is predicted that international arrivals globally will exceed one billion persons per year early in this century (World Tourism Organisation, 2000).

A large proportion of those movements are for tourism and pleasure travel, including sex tourism. The health consequences of these categories of movement are well documented (Macpherson and Gushulak 2001). Other forms of movements are by no means insignificant and they are making their impacts on health especially in the less-developed parts of the world. Included in these other forms are undocumented migrants estimated at 10 million to 15 million. A combination of “push” and “pull” factors create and continue to sustain the movement of people all over the world. They include social, political, economic, academic and environmental pressures, and the opportunity for personal or family improvement. Civil conflicts or environmental disasters can also trigger off large movement of people.

Some of the socially deleterious effects related to population mobility could have a great effect on the spread of HIV/AIDS. One of such effects is human smuggling and trafficking. The fact that these are done on the blind side of the law means that the victims have no rights nor any protection. Some of the abuses they often suffer could include forced sexual intercourse, which could lead to infection including HIV. The inhuman condition under which the people are trafficked could result in ill-health which would require treatment such as blood transfusion. If the health delivery system in the area where this occurs is very poor, the victim stands the risk of getting contaminated which could include HIV infection. Also included in the socially deleterious effects of population mobility is gray-market labour including commercial sex work. High prevalence levels of HIV have been found among commercial sex workers in many countries (Cox 2000; McMahon
and many migrants are known to patronise sex workers (Anarfi 1993; Painter 1992). The unfortunate reality is that migrants in general and commercial sex workers in particular, often lack access to social programmes and certain mainstream health facilities. The result is that the only opportunities open to them for accessing treatment when they are sick is to result to quacks, thereby exposing themselves to contamination which could include HIV infection.

**Health Determinants Related to the Process of Movement**

The process of movement comprises the pre-departure phase, the transportation or movement phase, and the post-arrival phase (MacPherson and Gushulak, 2001). Population movements are known to bridge disparities in health. With HIV/AIDS, West Africa illustrates this point very clearly. Until the country was engulfed in civil war recently, Cote d’Ivoire was the main immigration country in the West African sub-region where about 25 per cent of the people living there were non-nationals. Incidentally, it has a higher HIV/AIDS prevalence rate than any of the countries surrounding it. This implies that even before people move from their own countries to enter Cote d’Ivoire, they have to contend with a high probability of getting infected. Travel between environments with different health risk profiles places large numbers of people in locations where their health is subject to new influences and outcomes.

The speed of travel these days has generally reduced travel times considerably. With respect to HIV/AIDS, that would be considered a positive development as migrants spend very little time in transit, and are therefore not exposed to much risk. However, significantly large numbers of people still travel by land and sea, involving journeys that span over thousands of kilometres and are often hazardous. Both drivers and passengers who participate in some of these journeys are known to get involved in behaviours, which expose them to sexually transmitted infections including HIV. The ghost towns and villages, which strung along the transnational highways at the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the East African country of Uganda tells the whole story.

The post-arrival phase of the migration process is the most critical in the spread of HIV/AIDS. Migrants’ behaviour is often different when they are away from home and the social norms that guide and control their behaviour in stable home communities is often missing. Some people travel long distances so that they can indulge more in activities their own societies frown upon (e.g. sex tourism) or practise a stigmatised profession (e.g. sex work). When they travel without partners, and perhaps because of loneliness or as a result of social pressure, some migrants may engage in behaviours that put them at risk of undesired pregnancies or STIs. People who move from a conservative society to one perceived to be more liberal may be ill-equipped to deal with sexual freedom they encounter, and may end up involving in high-risk sexual practices.

**Health Determinants Related to Movement Across “Prevalence Gaps” of Disease and Health**

Some of the most important challenges to containing the spread of HIV/AIDS relate to the consequences of populations moving among and between existing disease disparities or “prevalence gaps”. The term “prevalence gaps” is commonly used to describe a differential in health risk between two locations or situations that may be crossed or bridged by travel (MacPherson and Gushulak, 2001: 394). Not only has HIV/AIDS portrayed itself in different epidemics in the different regions of the world, it has also characterised itself in different levels of prevalence from region to region and from country to country within regions.

Since the spread of the disease most often relates to the intimate relationship between people (sexual transmission and IUD), moving from a lower prevalence area to a higher prevalence area certainly puts a
migrant at risk of getting infected. For example, in some Southern African countries where prevalence rate among adults is over 30 per cent, it means one out of every three adults will be carrying the AIDS virus. The probability that a visitor will get infected if s/he becomes careless is, therefore, quite high. Given the fact that most population movements in recent times are for short stays, and that migrants eventually return to their places of origin, the relocation of HIV from one place to another becomes apparent. One disturbing fact is that some of the high prevalent countries in the world are at the same time some of the high immigration areas. In Africa, for example, high HIV/AIDS prevalence areas almost overlap with high immigration areas (See Figs 1 and 2). This is where the challenge lies.

Figure 1. HIV Prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001

Migration Promotes Spread of HIV/AIDS

The challenge posed by migration to the achievement of the MDG of halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS is very big indeed. Migration certainly promotes the spread of the disease in a number of ways. First and foremost population movements allow the virus to disseminate. For instance, the Eastern Africa highway linking Mombassa to the Lake Victoria area, considered by many as the focal point of the HIV-1 epidemic, was a major route of spreading the disease in that part of the world. Similarly, migrant workers returning from Cote d’Ivoire seemed to have played a major role in the spread of the disease to their countries of origin, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali in particular. Also, large migration flows in Southern Africa most likely contributed immensely to the spread of HIV in the region, from Zambia to Kwazulu-Natal, and from Namibia to Mozambique (Garenne, 2003).
Migration also contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS through the possible risky behaviours of those who are mobile. In many labour receiving countries in Africa the long distances from local populations and the imbalance between men and women encourage contacts with commercial sex workers (Jochelson et al., 1991). In the Abidjan region of Cote d'Ivoire certain agro-industrial companies organise visits by sex workers to their sites on the weekend following each monthly payday (Kouame, 1993). It has been found that in many countries, a high percentage of sex workers are foreigners. An estimated 30 to 50 per cent of sex workers in European Union countries are from Eastern Europe (Brussa, 2002). In Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, most sex workers come from neighbouring Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria (Ghys et al., 2002). The risk factors associated with commercial sex workers include the large number, and mixing, of partners, the likelihood of offering unprotected sex and high prevalence of STDs, including HIV, among them. The circular nature of migration in many places and the frequent visits puts people at risk at both ends of the migration stream.

The emigration of health professionals from many developing countries including some of those badly hit by the epidemic further compounds the problem of halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. A survey of African countries in 1998 revealed vacancy levels of over 70 per cent for medical specialists in Ghana, and over 50 per cent for nurses in Malawi (UNDP, 2001). This is happening at a time when the disease has already made a big dent on the health sectors of the countries worst affected. For example, the epidemic has contributed to rapid health sector deterioration by increasing burdens on already–strapped systems and steadily depriving countries of essential healthcare workers. Staff losses and absenteeism caused by sickness and death has been on the increase. Studies estimate that AIDS causes between 19 and 53 per cent of all government health employee deaths in many African countries (Tawfik and Kinoti, 2001). In Malawi and Zambia, for example, health worker illnesses and death rates have increased five to sixfold in
recent times (UNDP, 2001). Added to these is the fact that large numbers of uninfected workers are suffering from burnout and emotional exhaustion.

The Positive Side of Migration

Although migration has up until now, been thought of as a deterrent to the control of the spread of HIV/AIDS, it can be argued that migration could facilitate the achievement of the MDG related to it if properly managed. Sending countries often talk negatively about the emigration of their nationals especially the highly skilled ones. However, when the movement is between two developing countries, for example, it could be seen more as brain circulation than brain drain. Migration then becomes a channel for the exchange of qualified health care workers. Nigeria attracted many health care workers from Ghana at the peak of the oil boom. The oil rich Gulf States are home to many health personnel from other developing countries, including some which are badly hit by HIV/AIDS. In a sense, therefore, the Gulf States, with their characteristically low levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence, are serving as sanctuaries for the migrants given the fact that AIDS is decimating health workers in some of their countries of origin (UNAIDS, 2004).

Unfortunately, the exodus of health personnel from developing countries is mostly to developed countries. An on-going study in Ghana has observed that many doctors and nurses are leaving because of lack of job satisfaction due to the absence of relevant tools and equipment. Health workers, who go to work in advanced countries therefore, acquire skills they would otherwise not have. When they eventually return their skills become beneficial to their home countries. Ghana now has a cardio thoracic centre fully equipped with the state-of-the art machines. The centre was established when a Ghanaian specialist returned from Germany with the machines. Now the specialist is the Chief Executive of the country’s leading hospital and the centre attracts patients from other countries.

Remittances from labour migration have become important sources of income throughout the world, including Africa. This increased income, often sent on a regular basis, confers a socio-economic advantage to households with links to international migrants. This situation can translate into health benefits for those left behind. Increased income may mean better access to health services in countries where fee for service operates. “Health seeking” is thought to be more typical of return migrants from industrialised than industrialising nations. For example, a scheme set up by Ivorian migrants in 2001 in France (MEDIREX) created a health insurance scheme that migrants could subscribe to and insure dependent residents in Cote d’Ivoire. A similar scheme was later set up by Ghanaians in Ghana for expatriate migrants to insure their Ghanaian dependents as well as providing a month’s health insurance for their visit to Ghana each year (Tiemoko, 2004).

Research on the outcomes of international migration also points to the accompanying spread of ideas about health from industrialized countries. Hadi (1999) found indications that morbidity rates tend to be reduced in his study of Bangladeshi households where international migration was a part of the livelihood strategy. He argued that this is partly the result of increased wealth, which facilitates the attainment of a better quality diet and improved water and sanitation systems. Another factor, however, is the cultural effect of the migrant’s exposure to Western secular societies, where health concerns are part of daily lifestyle discourse. This in turn influences the migrant’s own attitude to health, and such attitudes tend to be disseminated on return.

Thus it could be seen that migration could have far-reaching positive effects on health in general and on HIV/AIDS specifically if a little interest were shown in it. Unfortunately there has been far less interest in migration as a livelihood strategy, or in the welfare of migrants, even though this relates much more directly to policies for the alleviation of poverty. UNAIDS has emphasised that the epidemic’s deep and multifaceted impact on households and communities makes it crucially important to address AIDS within a poverty-reduction context. Yet to date, few countries have incorporated meaningful AIDS components into their poverty-reduction plans (UNAIDS, 2004:50). A way forward, therefore, would be factoring migration into the responses to HIV/AIDS at the household, community and national levels.
Factoring Migration into Responses to HIV/AIDS

The most recent global report indicates that there has been a general improvement in the response to HIV/AIDS worldwide, but still there is need for improvement. A major roadblock is the lack of national capacity to scale up AIDS initiatives to critical coverage levels (UNAIDS 2004). While every effort is needed to sustain and consolidate the preventive drive, a combination of initiatives is also needed to strengthen the coping capacity of AIDS-affected households to address the complex and inter-related challenges they face (Nalugoda et al. 1997; Lundberg et al 2000). Experience has shown that the natural course of the epidemic can be changed with the right combination of leadership and comprehensive action (UNAIDS, 2004). Migration, a major driving force behind the spread of the disease, could play an important role in the process by turning it around to facilitate on-going responses or inject it into new initiatives.

Some household responses

Households have evolved many different responses to the effect of HIV/AIDS, some very innovative. A few to which migration could be related are discussed below.

A World Bank study observed that in Rakai, Uganda, households became considerably smaller, possibly because children were sent to relatives, or adults left to search for employment (World Bank, 1999). In societies defined by extensive labour migration systems, including many of those hardest hit by the AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa, women head the majority of households, especially in rural areas (UNAIDS, 2004). The combined effect of migration and HIV/AIDS deaths, often brings the best out of women. It means women now can assert themselves and take control over their own affairs and that of their children. With little assistance such women perform wonders, that is, if they are spared by the disease. For example, Whitehead (2002:595) finds that male-out-migration in North-East Ghana leaves women to look after their dry season onions, noting that, “This was one of a number of changes in gender relations that were entwined with the changing levels and kinds of commoditisation and the decline in some of the non-market spheres of provisioning”.

A Food and Agriculture Organisation study asserts that an AIDS-affected household’s response depends on the resources it can gather together (FAO, 2003). It observes that when possible, families liquidate savings, borrow money and seek extended family support. This is where migrant remittances come in handy. The case of the two West African countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, where transnational migrants contribute towards the health insurance of their relatives back home is a good example.

Household responses can also differ between urban and rural settings. In urban settings, households often resort to informal borrowing and using their savings. Again here households can fall on the extended networks brought about by the emigration of their members for support. Rural households, on the other hand, tend to sell assets, migrate or rely on child labour (Mutangadura, 2000). In this case, migration becomes a survival strategy for the affected household. Experience has shown that people become protection-conscious when they directly encounter someone with AIDS or AIDS death. Thus, against all odds, the migrant member will work hard and contribute to the upkeep of the household back home. Rehman (2000) finds that 30 per cent of remittances from contract workers in Singapore were used in Hoglakandi, Bangladesh, for the maintenance of households through the purchase of food and clothing. Similarly, a study of relatively highly qualified returning migrants to Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire found a surprisingly high proportion had remitted to family members to supply the basic subsistence of their parents and siblings (Black et al, 2003).

Some Community Level Responses

There is evidence that AIDS-affected households rely heavily on relatives and community support systems to weather the epidemic’s economic impact. These networks lend money, provide food and assist
with labour and childcare. This development can certainly be facilitated by migration because it is known to enhance social capital. This has been found to be very powerful in transnational migration (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Rogaly (2003) documents how people in Jalpara, West Bengal, had five decades worth of history, knowledge and contacts involved in moving between source and destination areas, commenting that migrants see the source and destination area as part of a home territory that they circulate within. Also, people from the copper belt in Zambia feel equally at home in their village of origin as in Lusaka as their networks of kin and friends allow them to move easily between the two areas (Samuels 2001). Social capital indeed, has assumed prominence in the recent globalisation drive and is changing the face of migration worldwide. Of particular importance are the skills gained by people in building interpersonal relationships and social ties, and the transmission of values and norms. Such skills are highly transferable and can be used to bring about positive social change in home regions.

To push the HIV/AIDS agenda forward, both targeted and broad-based poverty reduction measures have been suggested (UNAIDS, 2004). This approach calls for a blend of welfare programmes aimed at supplementing efforts of poor households, with community-based ones meant to provide families with direct financial assistance so they do not have to sell productive assets to cope with AIDS costs. Also suggested are programmes to build and strengthen basic infrastructure, especially water and sanitation, reduce caregivers’ day-to-day burdens, and increase households’ abilities to cope with AIDS burdens. Programmes could appeal to the patriotic spirit of transnational migrants, which is found to be very high particularly among African migrants, towards this end. For example, in the Kayes area of Mali, Martin et al (2002) report how remittances have been used to provide clinics. Other examples could be found in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and several other African countries. The Mexican government’s “$3 (US dollars) for 1 (US dollar) remitted” scheme which is expected to create 7000 jobs in the garment sewing industry, is another good example of how migrants invest in public works or development initiatives (Widgren and Martin, 2002).

It is further suggested that any response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic must derive from an understanding of how households obtain their livelihoods, targeting as many aggravating factors as possible and integrating AIDS into policies and programmes to achieve food security and rural development. Other valuable responses should aim at securing women’s and children’s rights to retain land and assets, thereby improving the security of land tenure. It is in this respect that migration could become valuable. Watkins (2003) looks at how households involved in migration as a livelihood strategy transform the remittances and savings into investments in family and kinship ties and the maintenance and re-enforcement of relationships that are important for the security of the household. These relationships, in turn benefit families staying put through extending loans and credit and assisting them with the cultivation of land. Other studies on Ghana have observed that migrant remittances are spent on land agricultural inputs so that HYV rice may be grown (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Another landscaping study on Ghana observed that more and more transnational migrants are spending on land both for housing and agricultural purposes.

**National Responses**

At the national level, governments must take a serious look at improving working conditions and wages in affected countries as a way of keeping health professionals from moving abroad. An International Organization for Migration programme called “Migration for Development in Africa”, helps African countries to encourage their qualified expatriates to return, and to retain professionals who might otherwise be tempted to leave. The programme operates in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda (IOM, 2003). This is a welcome development. But in lieu of eventual return, countries can take measures to make use of their qualified expatriates to come home periodically to assist in specific assignments. This would require a deliberate attempt by governments to regulate the emigration of their highly skilled professionals. By this arrangement, governments should find a way of being part of the negotiation in some form of bilateral agreement. There should be a clause in the contract which gives the right to the government of the sending country to tap on the expertise of their expatriate professionals if and when necessary, as is the case in the
world of football. Already certain individual professionals organize groups of experts, including non-nationals, to offer free medical care in certain specific areas from time to time. This could be institutionalised and at least one world-class hospital set up specifically for the purpose, could be part of the arrangement.

Conclusion

HIV/AIDS caught mankind unawares. In response, almost all earlier studies were geared toward finding ways of controlling the spread of the disease. Therefore, when it became clear that migration was a major factor in the spread of the disease, all effort was to find out how it contributes to the process. The result is that we seem to know so much about how migration promotes the spread of HIV/AIDS. The two key findings are that, 1) population movements allow HIV to disseminate; and 2) the possible risky behaviours of those who are mobile.

The reality, however, is that the so-called negative influences of migration could be turned around to yield positive results if a little interest is shown in the process. Throughout the world the main weapon being used to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS is education aimed at sustaining and reinforcing awareness and knowledge of the disease. Ultimately such educational campaigns are meant to bring about socially acceptable behavioural change in people. UNAIDS (2004) has suggested that the wide variety of conditions facing migrants requires that HIV prevention be carefully tailored to the specific circumstances of different groups. Migrants could therefore be specifically targeted with specially packaged messages which could influence their behaviour. In this regard, the increasing attention on prevention among mobile populations that regularly cross international borders is a welcome development. The recently launched joint sub-regional HIV prevention and AIDS care programme along the Abidjan-Lagos Migration Corridor is a good example (UNAIDS, 2004). Along such routes, migrants would be made to disseminate awareness and good behaviour messages and practices using the same migration dynamics which have been found to disseminate the virus.

The process could be moved a step further if migration is deliberately factored into responses to HIV/AIDS at the household and community levels. Migrants’ remittances could be harnessed and channelled into the coping mechanisms of affected households and communities. To push the agenda forward, both targeted and broad-based poverty reduction measures have been suggested. Migration could be factored into both measures by appealing to the patriotic spirit of transnational migrants from affected communities. Again affected households can fall on the extended networks or social capital brought about by the emigration of their members for support when gathering together resources to cope with the presence of AIDS. Finally, to secure women’s and children’s rights to retain land and assets as a way of improving the security of land tenure in favour of affected households, migrants’ spending on land should be encouraged and possibly supported with legislation. All these efforts could be supplemented at the national level with measures aimed at retaining health professionals in the affected countries. They can also make use of the expertise of their health professionals abroad by finding a way of bringing them to assist periodically, if and when they are needed. If it has been done successfully in a trivial area like football, it could equally be done in a vital area like health. Countries involved from both North and South must start talking.

References


Tiemoko, R. (2004), Research proposal on Health Insurance schemes, to be funded by Migration, DRC. See also: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/artike.phd?ID=38203


5

MIGRATION AND GENDER
It took about a hundred years – between the time when Ravenstein (1885) referred to the migration patterns of women and men, and the 1980s, when research on women in migration flourished – before women resurfaced in the migration literature. In the intervening years, although women migrated, their movement was regarded either as part of family migration, or their migration was assumed to be similar to men’s. The 1970s ushered in a new appreciation of women in migration as census data in many parts of the world revealed significant numbers of women on the move, and the fact that they were moving independently of their families.

Feminist scholarship contributed much to the (re)discovery of migrant women. Bringing women in as subjects of analysis, the initial literature that came out of this perspective attempted to recover or compensate for the lack of attention to migrant women in the previous years. Willis and Yeoh (2000) note that the literature on women in migration has been enriched over the years by the use of a variety of methodological approaches, particularly the use of more qualitative approaches; an expansion of the regional foci (which is in keeping with the more global character of migration from the 1970s); and the diverse ways in which gender has figured in the consideration of the determinants and consequences of migration. From an exclusive focus on the migration experiences of women, one trajectory was the development of a gender perspective. The latter is not about women alone; rather it relates the experiences of women vis-à-vis men’s. It recognizes that gender, the social construction of women’s and men’s roles, is a core organizing principle of social life. Moreover, as an organizing principle, it recognizes that women and men not only occupy different social locations, but that in relation to men, women occupy an unequal and disadvantaged position (UNDAW, 2005; Yamanaka and Piper, 2003; Piper, 2003).

The crossing of borders opens up life-changing possibilities for migrants. The assumption, however, that migration entails a wholesale change from less favorable to better circumstances is not that straightforward. This is especially tricky when considering the relationship between migration and gender. Sometimes, the typical question is, to what extent does migration result in more gender equality? The question can, in fact, be posed the other way around: to what extent does gender figure in migration processes? This paper reviews the relationship between migration and gender by considering their linkages in two ways: one, by examining how notions of gender influence the migration processes of women and men, and two, by examining the outcomes of migration on women and men. The third part of the paper underscores the gender dimensions that may have implications for migration management.

For the most part, this paper focuses on the gender dimensions of international migration, an arena that seems to have received much more attention than internal migration. It is recognized though that the scale and magnitude of internal migration is greater than international migration, and that the latter may be linked to the former, i.e., the idea of a two-step migration, which entails an initial movement to the urban...
centers, followed by international migration. The different tracks in which the work on internal and international migrations has developed also needs to be reconsidered as part of a more general framework of human mobility. Such a rethinking would also open up a broader understanding of similar or distinct questions/issues across space of differing scales (i.e., regional, national, international). I should mention that owing to my greater familiarity with the migration experience in Asia, a large part of the paper is based on data and insights from this part of the world.

Levels of International Migration by Gender

That migration also wears a female face is suggested by the fact that women comprise close to half, 49 per cent, of the world’s international migrants in 2000. The significant share of women in international migration is a pattern that has been noted since 1960 (Zlotnik, 2003); in other words, the “feminization of migration” was already underway even before the literature on female migration flourished (Table 1).

In general, the developed regions have a more balanced share of male and female migrants than the developing regions. The window for family reunification, which has worked favoring female migrants, provides some explanation in shaping this situation. This admission category is female predominant in all countries of traditional immigration: the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Even in countries that have adopted de facto settlement – such as the Western European countries after the 1970s – large numbers of female migrants have arrived under family reunification schemes, following the earlier wave of labour migration consisting of male migrants.

In regions or countries where labour migration has been considerable, the needs of the labour market seem to influence the gender composition of migrants. When large-scale labour migration to the Gulf countries started in the 1970s, majority of migrants were men, in keeping with the need for workers in the infrastructure projects undertaken by the oil-rich countries. The completion of these projects from the late 1970s led to a change in the demand for workers. Migrant women came to participate in migration to the Gulf in response to a demand for medical personnel, nurses, sales persons, cleaners, domestic workers, and other workers. In East and Southeast Asia, the participation of women in labour migration from the 1980s was also a function of demand, specifically the demand for domestic workers (and entertainers in the case of Japan, and recently, South Korea). Demand, thus, is a significant factor in labour migration – moreover, the demand factor has, to some extent, modified social constructions of women and men as migration actors as will be elaborated in the next section.

Gender and Migration

Gender and the Possibility of Migration

Gendered notions of space reflect the acceptability of migration for women and men. Traditionally, the public sphere is regarded as male, while the private sphere is a female domain. In some traditional cultures, migration is a male preserve. For example, the notion of migration as a journey of achievement applied only to men in some traditional cultures in Southeast Asia (Aguilar, 2002). In cultural contexts which practice (or value) the seclusion of women, women’s mobility is a transgression and female migrants are considered suspect. Migration as part of the rite of passage for young men’s transition into adulthood or seclusion as ideal for women have been replaced – or challenged – in more contemporary times by migration for work, a prospect that is increasingly becoming a possibility for women and men alike.

Patterns of internal migration provide a clue on the acceptability of women on the move. Studies on internal migration in the 1970s suggest that Latin America was quite exceptional because of the significant participation of women in rural-to-urban migration. In subsequent years, other regions exhibited increasing levels of autonomous migration among women, which later expanded into international migration. Economic
pressures on the one hand, and demand factors, on the other, changed the migration chances of women and men, and in the process, also changed age-old norms about the spaces allowed women and men. In Africa, for example, the traditional pattern of migration within and from the region was “male-dominated, long distance and long term,” leaving women behind to assume family responsibilities and agricultural work (Adepoju, 2004; see also Pittin, 194). Shrinking job opportunities for men, however, had prompted increasing female migration both within and beyond national borders recently (Adepoju, 2004). South Asia is also one region where male migration has been the norm in rural-to-urban migration while women figure mainly in rural-to-rural migration, a migration which is associated with marriage. These traditional patterns have given way to higher levels of female migration in the face of economic opportunities. In Bangladesh, the establishment of the garments industry in Dhaka called for women workers, setting in motion unprecedented levels of rural-to-urban female migration. Similarly, in other parts of the world, as households struggle to meet their needs, migration increasingly became part of their survival strategies. In response to the demands of the labour market, households refashion their decisions on which members will be sent out. For example, in the Philippines, if necessary, children left behind would prefer their fathers rather than their mothers to migrate (ECMI/AOS-Manila, SMC and OWWA, 2004). Husbands would also prefer to work abroad; however, since it is relatively easier for women to find work overseas, husbands had to acquiesce to their wives’ departure and to adjust to their stay-at-home status (Asis, Huang and Yeoh, 2004; ECMI/AOS-Manila, SMC and OWWA, 2004).

Whereas traditional or customary migration seems to privilege men’s options, labour migration has somewhat equalized the migration motivations of women and men. Male and female migrants alike generally articulate economic reasons for migration – in developing regions, migration is usually undertaken to improve the family’s economic conditions. Women’s reasons for migration, however, may be motivated by other non-economic factors. An important part, although less explicit, of women’s migration might also be the search for more open milieus. Gender-related factors, such as surveillance of daughters, or lack of socially accepted options to get out of a bad marriage,5 or fleeing from domestic violence, are conditions that can “push” women out. In this regard, migration functions not just as an economic safety valve, but as an avenue to allow women passage into safer, more enabling environments.6

Gendered norms about migration not only inhabit individual motivations or household decisions but also state policies. In Asia, the increasing feminization of migration refers specifically to three countries of origin – the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The share of female migrants in these countries constitutes 60 to 80 per cent of migrant workers legally deployed annually.7 In the case of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, being relative latecomers in the sending of migrant workers to the Gulf countries, both captured a niche of the Gulf labour market by deploying domestic workers. The other major labour sending countries – Bangladesh, India and Pakistan – have chosen to send only male workers. The reason given for restricting female migration, particularly the migration of domestic workers, is to protect women from abuse and exploitation. In Indonesia, media reports of the widespread problems faced by migrant women have invited comparisons with other countries which are equally economically disadvantaged – e.g., Bangladesh and Pakistan – but have refused to send migrant women until some protective mechanisms are in place (Chin, 1998 and Momsen, 1999, as cited in Silvey, 2004:1 46).8 Oishi (2002) has suggested that men’s migration is seen more in terms of economic criteria while policymaking regarding women’s migration is value-driven, i.e., influenced by values on women’s employment and their socio-economic status.

Gender concerns are very much evident in the issue of trafficking in persons, especially women and children. Although trafficking has been more broadly defined beyond prostitution or sex work, most trafficked persons continue to be trafficked for this purpose, and most trafficked persons are women and children.9 On the supply side, gender inequality can predispose women and girls to be trafficked because they are less valued. Some of the modus operandi of trafficking adds to the vulnerability of women and girls to be trafficked – e.g., offers of marriage free families the burden of having to raise dowry to marry off their daughters. Also, the fact that families do not have to raise a placement fee (a requirement in labour migra-
tion in Asian countries) works to the advantage of traffickers. Studies suggest that traffickers, in fact, have been found to target families during the lean months, approaching families with offers of jobs as domestic workers, sales or restaurant workers to women and girls.

Gender and the Demand for Migrants

As mentioned earlier, international labour migration is demand-driven. Male and female migrations, however, do not necessarily respond to the same labour demands. Feminist scholars have argued that mainstream approaches in migration discuss it exclusively in terms of economic production, without paying as much attention to social reproduction, which is essential to support economic production. Reproductive work or care work is premised on the voluntary work of women – when done by female family members, such “work” is regarded as labour of love (or maternal love), but is downgraded to “unskilled work” when it is done for pay by non-family members. Intraregional migration in Asia clearly illustrates the gendering of labour migration: male migration operates to transfer labour in economic sectors such as construction, manufacturing, agriculture and the service industries; female migration operates to transfer reproductive labour.

The disproportionate share of women in domestic work and entertainment (as well as in the caring and nurturing skilled professions, such as nursing) signifies the specificity of female migration. The transfer of care work operates like a care chain (or social dumping, according to Truong, 1996), with migrant women at the center – they take on the care work of women in more developed countries, while simultaneously passing on their care work responsibilities to other women in their countries of origin. The phenomenon has invited several interesting labels, e.g., “social dumping” (Truong, 1996) or “care crisis,” and the migrant women who take part in this kind of labour transfer have been referred to, among others, as “servants of globalization” (Parreñas, 2001) or as “global woman” (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003). While the transnationalization of care work has thrust the domestic into the global arena, the issues confronting women in this kind of labour migration remain painfully private. They work in the intimate setting of a household in which they are paid strangers; they provide care to other people’s children or parents, while they leave their own children or parents to be cared for by others; they move between families and households, but they are not completely part of their own families and the families of their employers. The lack of access to social support and the low regard for the work that they do push migrant domestic workers to further marginalization in the receiving countries. The problems of migrant domestic workers, in particular, remain in the private sphere. The onus of worker’s protection is left to the initiatives and negotiating skills of the domestic worker on the one hand, and the good will of the employer. Thus, finding a good employer is foremost in the minds of aspiring domestic workers. Migrants cannot risk pre-terminating a contract because of the placement fees paid to recruitment agencies and brokers and the specter of unfulfilled goals. At least in the Asian context, transferring employers is not easy because the entry, stay and work of migrants are linked to an employer. If they run away, they become unauthorized.

Although family migration has its own dynamics, the preponderance of women in marriage migration suggests that demand factors are at work. Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea have recorded a remarkable increase in international marriages as well as a notable change in the pattern of such marriages. Up to about the mid-1970s, such marriages usually transpired between foreign men (mostly Westerners) and Asian women. Since the rise of intraregional migration, international marriages have been increasingly contracted between local men and women from other Asian countries. As may be noted, the countries that have shown increasing incidence of international marriages are also the same countries that have experienced an influx of migrant workers. In part, labour migration is related to the phenomenon of international marriages (thereby transforming temporary labour migration into a permanent migration, contrary to the expectations of receiving countries), in part, it is driven by the “demand” for “traditional” women. A shortage of brides has emerged as problematic in rural areas in some countries as a result of local women migrating to the urban areas. The proportion remaining single has also been increasing among women, a trend that may suggest
the declining significance of marriage, or perhaps more specifically “traditional” marriage. Men, in turn, seek for brides elsewhere in an attempt to find women who embody “traditional” qualities that have disappeared among local women. The participation of business-oriented organizations in matchmaking men and women across the borders has muddied the terrain of international marriages. The marketing of mail-order brides (and its more high-tech incarnation, Internet brides) has introduced many irregularities in marriage migration – with some women ending up victimized in the process.12 Migration industry players have also been found to use marriage migration to facilitate the unauthorized entry of migrants. In either case, women are typically marketed as brides. Whether negotiated by women themselves or with the participation of the migration industry, international marriages characteristically involve women crossing borders to join their husbands.

The “demand” for women for specific types of work or as brides can render women vulnerable to unauthorized migration, including trafficking. Although there are distinctions among unauthorized migration, smuggling and trafficking, in reality, migrants’ legal status can shift from one category to another. Interestingly, the definition of trafficking under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons has two parts: how trafficked persons move, and what happens to trafficked persons. Up until now, most of the research and anti-trafficking programmes have focused on the migration aspect: profiling persons who have been trafficked, identifying routes of trafficking, describing modes of trafficking, and describing the purposes to which trafficked persons are used. What has been relatively neglected is the latter part: what happens to people who have been trafficked? Turning to this question opens up the issue to a broader consideration of migrants who move under legal or unauthorized circumstances. When we consider the consequences part of the definition of trafficking, we find that the violations are not limited to trafficked persons but could apply as well to those who migrate under legal or unauthorized channels. Although legal migration generally provides more protection, the enforcement of protective mechanisms may be limited – or absent as in the case of migrant women in the domestic or entertainment sectors. In the Asian context, legal migration refers mostly to state regulations on how people move. It is focused more on regulating or controlling the admission, stay and work activities of migrants in receiving countries – and is much less focused on the working and living conditions of migrant workers. This shortcoming implies that even when migrants are legal, they can be rendered vulnerable and at risk to abuse and exploitation. A migrant domestic worker, for example, may have a legitimate work permit, and is defined as a legal migrant by her country of origin and country of destination. However, if her conditions are such that her passport is held by her employer, she is not given a day off, she works for 16-18 hours a day, she is maltreated, she does not receive her salary, these are traffic-like conditions. The focus on the conditions of trafficked persons and other migrants would demand more comprehensive approaches.

Migration Outcomes: Does Gender Matter?

The Role of Migration Policies

Migration policies present a point of departure in tracking the potential consequences of migration for people on the move. Some migration policies are gender-neutral in intent, but they may have different consequences for men and women; on the other hand, some migration policies are laden with gender implications. Under family migration, for example, the admissibility of immigrants under the family, work or business/investment categories appears to be gender-neutral. The gender patterns that emerge are beyond the provisions of the policy. For example, business/investment routes tend to be selective of men, who tend to have more economic resources than women. As had been discussed, women dominate in the category of family migration. Classified as “dependents,” women may be rendered disadvantaged in terms of access to training programmes in language, skills acquisition or cultural orientation that would ease their transition in their new environment. This classification fails to acknowledge the roles and responsibilities of women in family migration. Prior to migration, women engage in “migration work” (Salaff, 1997) – seeking informa-
tion, raising funds, contacting kin who are potential sources of assistance – to realize the migration project. Following migration, women take on employment or provide unpaid labour to family-based businesses to contribute to the material adaptation of their families. By focusing only on principal immigrants, the policy inadvertently neglects the needs as well as contributions of those classified as dependents.

Under labour migration, some policies are explicitly gendered, which can generate different outcomes for women and men. Comparing policies for male migrants in the construction sector and migrant women in domestic work in Singapore, Huang and Yeoh (2003) conclude that gender does make a difference in these two groups’ access to support, the degree to which the state exerts surveillance on the health conditions of migrants, the valorization of their skills and competencies, and state efforts to provide recreational facilities to migrants. Because labour laws do not cover migrant women in the domestic work sector, migrant women have little recourse when they encounter problems. In this light, the support and assistance provided by Church-inspired organizations are critical. Media coverage of migrant domestic workers who encountered extremely harsh conditions has also helped in conscientizing the public and the state to do something to protect migrant domestic workers. In the case of state regulation concerning the health conditions of migrants, migrant women are subjected to greater state surveillance than male migrants. All migrant workers are required to go through the standard medical examination, but in addition, migrant women have to undergo a pregnancy test every six months and those found pregnant are immediately repatriated. On the issue of skills, in the construction sector, as workers acquire more skills, this can have corresponding increases in their position and salaries, as well as the levies paid by employers. When domestic workers acquire more skills (a number of studies indicate migrant women enrolling in various skills and livelihood programmes – e.g., Ogaya, 2004), there is no mechanism to credit their new competencies. Finally, the issue of recreation places for migrant workers is stark in Singapore given its size. While the state has provided recreational programmes and spaces for male migrants (the state has also intervened in requiring construction companies to provide decent housing for their workers), no such initiatives have been developed for migrant women, presumably because women are perceived to be easier to manage; moreover, the responsibility of policing migrant domestic workers has been relegated by the state to the employer via the security bond of S$5,000. Fearful of forfeiting the bond should the worker run away, employers tend to keep a tight watch on the domestic workers under their employ.

Roles and Statuses on the Move

The social location of migrants can be considered as dynamic, depending on the stage of migration and migrants’ points of reference. As foreigners, migrants face the condition of “otherness,” which can be a source of prejudice and discrimination against them – gender, age, nationality, class and other social categories can amplify or modify the treatment of migrants while they live and work in other countries.

At the beginning of the journey, the act of migration itself distinguishes migrants from non-migrants in their countries of origin. Considering the large numbers of potential migrant workers, those who are able to migrate may be seen by the non-migrant population as the lucky ones. For migrant men, leaving to work in another country may not present a dramatic change; rather, it is an act that is in keeping with their role as economic actors or providers. Their roles as husbands or fathers may be affected by the separation, but since men’s links to their families are less central than are women’s, their absence is not expected to erode their place in their families. For women, labour migration represents more than just the migration for work. Leaving the family is a break from the traditional notion of the home as women’s place; migration also serves as the launching pad of women into the world of paid work.

While living and working in other countries, migrants earn more than their wages back home. Their higher earnings earn for them a higher economic status in relation to non-migrants in their countries of origin. Collectively, the remittances migrants send home are greatly valued by their governments – in the Philippines, migrant workers are considered as the country’s new heroes on account of their economic
contributions. In terms of income, migrants’ economic status in the countries of origin may increase. In terms of social prestige, however, the low skilled work migrants work at may be diminished (despite higher income). Moreover, if migrants used to work at more skilled jobs prior to migration, they may experience not only de-skilling but contradictions in their class and social positions, particularly with respect to their country of origin. In relation to the local population in the countries of destination, migrants are generally at a disadvantage, economically and socially.

At least in Asia, labour migration is temporary, and as such, return is built into the system. Unless migrants have fulfilled their objectives, their return migration may signal a return to economic uncertainty. If return migrants are unable to sustain the economic gains from migration, their economic status may be jeopardized. In the absence of viable self-employment, business or local employment, migrants may reconsider re-migrating. The return migration of migrant women (particularly those who were in domestic work or entertainment overseas) poses particular difficulties, largely because the option to seek local employment working at the same job is not attractive. Income-wise, it is not feasible to find comparable income and the low regard for domestic work is another consideration. Migrant women who had undergone skills training in other areas (e.g., computers, secretarial training) while they were working abroad are likely to have difficulties in competing with younger and better trained candidates. Migrant women who had ever worked as entertainers also have to deal with the social stigma attached to their previous work experience.

In the non-economic realm, during their absence, women and men confront different dilemmas. Migrant women may have transcended borders, they may have contributed to the economic welfare of their families via remittances, but they may still be found wanting because they are not present and unable to provide care for their families. Despite their attempts at transnational mothering, women internalize the guilt of leaving their families behind. They are constantly reminded of this lapse in their day-to-day life: they carry out care work in a family context, but they are paid strangers in their employer’s home; they take care of other people’s children or parents, while their own children or parents are cared for by other people; they move from one family or household to another, but they are not completely part of their family of origin or their employer’s. Aside from economic concerns, return migration also raises questions about the tenacity of gender roles. What happens to reconfigurations in gender roles (which emerged during migration) when migrants return?

Women, Men and Children Left Behind

To keep labour migration temporary, receiving states do not allow family reunification for less-skilled migrant workers (they do for the skilled and professional migrants). Families, thus, are kept apart not by choice but by state policies. Although the emotional displacement is somehow eased by easier access to communications, the separation is real, the full impacts of which are not easily observable, particularly over the short term. A topic that has not been studied adequately is the impact of migration, particularly extended migration, on marriages.

Families experience displacement with migration. When men migrate, the impact of their departure on the families left behind is cushioned by the presence of wives who assume the dual roles of being a father and a mother. Findings from research indicate that the women left behind manage to pull the family together in the absence of their husbands. The same conclusion does not hold true when it is the women who migrate. Female migration turns gender roles upside down. Women leave to provide for their families, and their incomes become the major source of their families’ sustenance. Findings from studies suggest that women expand their roles in the course of migration, but the men left behind generally tend to cling to their old roles. In particular, left behind men do not readily assume care work, instead other female family members fill the void left by migrant women. The impact of migration on the children left behind seems to more palpable when it is the mothers who migrate. Studies in the Philippines comparing well-being indicators of left-behind children (father-migrants, mother-migrants, and both parents are migrants) and children
of non-migrants reveal that in general children of migrant-mothers do not fare as well as other categories of children (ECMI/AOS-Manila, SMC and OWWA, 2004).

Conclusion

Despite encountering problems and difficulties, migrants tend to assess their migration experience in a positive light. Aside from the economic benefits of migration, migrants acknowledged learning many things - most of all, learning about themselves - from their migration experience. Migration can also be a pathway to gender equality, but its potential to facilitate such a change is constrained by significant obstacles, beginning with policies. International discussions concerning migration management provide an opportunity to consider viable interventions to promote better migration processes and outcomes for all migrants. Linking discussions on migration management with other international endeavors, such as the Millennium Development Goals, would promote concerted efforts to bring about desired changes.

The need to integrate gender dimensions in managing migration is fundamental to the promotion of safer migration. Discussions concerning managing migration need to go more in the direction of protection issues, which means taking a closer look at the working and living conditions of migrants. Government involvement and regional discussions in migration management have to progress beyond deployment issues on the part of countries of origin, and controlling the admission, stay and activities of migrants on the part of countries of destination. A review of migration policies must be undertaken to detect provisions that disadvantage migrants, especially women migrants.

The protection of migrant domestic workers remains a major challenge, and the solutions transcend migration management and encompass the whole issue of care work. It is an unregulated sector rendering women – both local and migrant – in this line of work vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrants and Members of Their Families does not provide much elaboration on the protection of migrant women workers in this sector. As mentioned earlier, in Asia, migrant NGOs and Church-based organizations are providing critical support to migrant domestic workers. Migrant women themselves have been observed to form support groups and organizations – Hong Kong presents many good practices in this regard – which show their capacity for empowerment and change. However, more support is needed from states, particularly in the area of establishing standards to provide basic minimum guarantees for protection – standardized wages can be a starting point. Furthermore, international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), also need to recognize and consider the work and advocacy of migrants’ associations and migration-related NGOs. With the dual trend of the labour market has increasingly become global labour, and work arrangements are increasingly becoming more informal, there is a need to make space for actors other than employers, trade unions and governments.

The current discussions on migration and development can also be expanded beyond remittances to address the fundamental conditions that launched migration and which sustain continuing migration. The difficulties that returning migrants experience in reintegrating in the local labour market/local economy hint at persisting failure of development in the countries of origin. Without much choice, women and men will take a chance at migration and hope that their journey will give their families a crack at a better life.
### Table 1. International Migration, 1960-2000: Total Number and Per Cent Female *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>75,900,698</td>
<td>81,527,177</td>
<td>99,783,096</td>
<td>154,005,048</td>
<td>174,933,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>32,084,671</td>
<td>38,282,819</td>
<td>47,726,643</td>
<td>89,655,849</td>
<td>110,291,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>43,816,027</td>
<td>43,244,358</td>
<td>52,056,453</td>
<td>64,349,199</td>
<td>64,642,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8,977,075</td>
<td>9,862,987</td>
<td>14,075,826</td>
<td>16,221,255</td>
<td>16,277,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>29,280,680</td>
<td>28,103,771</td>
<td>32,312,541</td>
<td>41,754,291</td>
<td>43,761,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>14,015,392</td>
<td>18,705,244</td>
<td>22,163,201</td>
<td>26,346,258</td>
<td>32,803,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America / Caribbean</td>
<td>6,038,976</td>
<td>5,749,585</td>
<td>6,138,943</td>
<td>7,013,584</td>
<td>5,943,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>12,512,766</td>
<td>12,985,541</td>
<td>18,086,918</td>
<td>27,596,538</td>
<td>40,844,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2,134,122</td>
<td>3,027,537</td>
<td>3,754,597</td>
<td>4,750,591</td>
<td>5,834,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR (former)</td>
<td>2,941,687</td>
<td>3,092,512</td>
<td>3,251,070</td>
<td>30,322,532</td>
<td>29,468,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Tables 1 and 2, UN (2005: 8 and 10)*

* The italicized figures refer to the per cent female of all international migrants.*
Endnotes

1. The attention given to families left behind has come out of the broader regional focus of more recent migration studies.
2. The themes of “Gender, Migration and Governance” are taken up in a special issue of the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 12(1-2), 2003.
4. Patterns of female migration in the Philippines were observed to follow more the Latin American than the Asian pattern; this has not changed in recent years. The participation of Filipino women in international labor migration can be seen as an extension of the mobility allowed women in Filipino society (see Asis, 2005).
5. For example, some observers have read the migration of Filipino women as de facto divorce, a graceful exit out of a difficult marriage.
6. An interesting development in this regard is the UNHCR’s move in 2002 to recognize gender-related claims as meeting the refugee definition (UNDAW, 2005).
7. In Indonesia, men are the majority of unauthorized migrants, and in general, unauthorized migration is larger in Indonesia than legal migration.
8. Despite the restrictions or bans on the migration of domestic workers to the Gulf countries, women manage to migrate to these countries under unauthorized or trafficking channels (see various issues of *Asian Migration News*, http://www.smc.org.ph/amnews/). Contrary to their intent, thus, restrictions or bans can lead to more dangerous forms of migration.
9. It is important to ask why men are relatively absent in profiles of trafficked persons.
10. Some Filipino domestic workers feel that they have become a part of their employer’s family, and in turn, they consider their employers as family. Despite this state of affairs, domestic workers are aware of the bottom-line, that they are paid workers (see, for example, Asis, Huang and Yeoh, 2004).
11. In Malaysia, some government officials have aired concerns on international marriages between local women and migrant workers. The concern comes from the fear that migrant workers may be using marriage to stay on in Malaysia, and anxieties about cross-cultural marriages.

References


Background and Introduction

Presented within the framework of the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on “International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals”, Marrakech, Morocco, 11-12 May 2005, this paper illustrates the problem of trafficking in human beings and provides an overview of a comprehensive human rights based approach to combat it. Due to the fact that trafficking disproportionally affects women, special emphasis is placed on the nexus between trafficking and gender and on the Millennium Development Goal Nr. 3, Promote Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women.

This paper reflects the personal experiences of the author in her work with anti-trafficking policy makers and practitioners in Europe, on the one hand, as well as her membership in, and the findings of, the European Union Expert Group on Trafficking in Human Beings.1

The Trafficking Phenomenon

The Universal Definition of Trafficking

Since the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (hereafter, the Trafficking Protocol) in 2000, an internationally agreed definition of trafficking in persons is available.

According to Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol,

“(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;”

* The views expressed in this paper do not reflect the official position of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), where the author holds the position of Director of the Department for Consultancy Services.
There are a number of important and innovative aspects to this definition:

First, the protocol transcends the limitations of earlier international instruments focusing only on trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, but covers all forms of exploitations, and it covers the exploitation of men, women and children alike.

Second, international border crossing is not a defining criterion, trafficking may and does also occur within the country – a phenomenon referred to as internal trafficking – the movement takes place within a country. However, in the majority of cases (legal or illegal) border crossing takes place since most of trafficking occurs in an international migration context. and involves some kind of agent or intermediary, recruiter, transporter, final exploiter, that derive profit from the long term exploitation of the trafficked victims.

Third, in order to define an act as trafficking, some form of distortion of free will of a person is necessary. The Protocol respects the free will of persons to take informed and self-determined decisions about their own lives, labour and migration choices. The EU Expert Group, in its report to the European Commission, confirms this view in stating that “from a human rights perspective, trafficking in human beings has to be defined as a complex phenomenon violating the trafficked person’s will and right of self-determination and affecting her or his human dignity…”

Fourth, and linked to this, the Protocol notes the irrelevance of consent where trafficking means are used, with the exception of children where consent is always irrelevant. Article 3(b) asserts that “The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;”

With regard to the means, the Protocol lists an array of means that are utilized by the perpetrators in order to realize the trafficking scheme, i.e. the exploitation of the victims, thereby reflecting the current, often “softer”, modus operandi utilised by traffickers. Means range from outright physical violence, use of force and coercion, to the abuse of power, but also the abuse of a situation of vulnerability and, importantly, the deception of the victim. Thus, the deception of the victim is sufficient to make it a trafficking case, and this often is the recruitment method of traffickers, i.e. to partly or fully deceive the victim on the future work/services/living conditions. Accordingly, although a person may consent to migrate, to be smuggled, to carry false papers, to participate in prostitution or to work illegally abroad, this does not imply the person’s consent to forced labour or slavery like exploitation, including in the sex industry, and, consequently, does not exclude the person being a victim of trafficking; and the original consent of the person is rendered irrelevant.

Exploitation is defined as the ultimate purpose of the trafficking scheme. All activities of traffickers are geared towards the aim of the long term exploitation of their victims, be it for forced sexual services, domestic servitude, forced labour, and the like. Reality may be blurred at times and it may not be clear whether a case, especially forced labour, is smuggling or trafficking, but it is the exploitative outcome which will clearly demarcate a case as trafficking.

**Trafficking versus Smuggling**

As stated, trafficking in human beings does not by definition involve the crossing of international borders, however the majority of trafficking occurs in an international migration context and hence involves the crossing of borders, illegal, semi-legal, or legal, and/or subsequent violation of states’ immigration laws, e.g. via illegal work, or visa abuse or overstaying. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants is frequently confused, since trafficking to some extent bears resemblance to smuggling and at times it is only the exploitative outcome that clearly defines a case as a trafficking or a smuggling/illegal migration case.
It is however necessary to clearly distinguish between trafficking on the one hand, and smuggling on the other hand, since the two phenomena require different responses and entail different State responsibilities towards a victim of trafficking on the one hand and a smuggled migrant on the other. Thus, trafficked victims have a right to assistance, protection and redress, all too often fail to be identified as victim but are mistakenly detained and summarily deported as illegal migrants. This is not only in contradiction to international human rights standards but it also deprives the criminal justice system of important evidence against the perpetrators.

The parallel United Nations Protocol on smuggling in migrants provides guidance on the difference between the two phenomena. According to Article 3 (a) of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, “‘Smuggling of migrants’ shall mean the procurement to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”.

The following self-explanatory scheme illustrates the differences between smuggling and trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT</th>
<th>SMUGGLING</th>
<th>TRAFFICKING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of crime</td>
<td>Crime against State - no victim</td>
<td>Crime against person - victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(violation of immigration laws/ public order; the crime of smuggling by itself does not include crimes which might be committed against the smuggled migrants)</td>
<td>(violation of human rights; victim of coercion and exploitation that give rise to duties by the State to treat the individual as a victim of a crime and human rights violation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why do we fight it?</td>
<td>To protect sovereignty of the State</td>
<td>To protect human rights of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of crime and relationship smuggler/smuggled migrant and and trafficker/victim</td>
<td>Commercial relationship between smuggler and migrant ends after illegal border crossing achieved and fee paid</td>
<td>Exploitative relationship between trafficker and victim continues in order to maximize economic and/or other gains from exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Organized movement of persons for profit</td>
<td>Organized recruitment/transport and (continuous) exploitation of the victim for profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal border crossing</td>
<td>Illegal border crossing is a defining element</td>
<td>Neither illegal border crossing nor border crossing required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Migrant’s consent to illegal border crossing</td>
<td>Either no consent or initial consent made irrelevant because of use of force, coercion, at any stage of the process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** ICMPD Anti-Trafficking Training Manual for Judges and Prosecutors in EU Member States, Accession and Candidate Countries, Draft as of May 2005.
The Scope of Trafficking

For a variety of reasons it is close to impossible to have an exact assessment of the scope of trafficking. The scarcity and unreliability of data on human trafficking, nationally, regionally and globally, is attributable to several factors, including the absence, until recently, of clear and harmonised definitions on trafficking and smuggling, the wide-spread confusion between illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking; the nature of the crime which is largely invisible and clandestine, taking place in the informal sectors of society; and which for a variety of reasons is not investigated on a priority basis. Presently only a fraction of trafficked victims are identified, especially cases of forced labour or services, e.g. domestic servitude, where access to victims is difficult and where the practice often is to focus on migration offences such as illegal stay or work/employment; all these victims are therefore missing from trafficking statistics. There is also a lack of, or insufficient documentation and collection, collation and analysis of data at national and regional levels, as well as a scarcity of research and evaluation of policies and measures. Due to this, data and statistics are extrapolations from the data on assisted victims of trafficking, held by NGOs, or the IOs, like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), data held by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), or the International Labour Organization (ILO), intelligence information as well as the estimated gains of organized crime networks.

Global estimates on the scale of human trafficking range considerably, from half a million to several million per year. The US Department of State presents figures for the year 2004 of an estimated 600,000 to 800,000 men, women and children trafficked across international borders each year, some 80 per cent of whom are women and girls, and up to 50 per cent are minors. These data do not reflect the number of victims trafficked within their own countries. The ILO has recently published a global estimate of persons in forced labour as a result of trafficking amounting to 2,450,000, with global profits generated by this labour exploitation of USD 32 billion. In the same report, ILO estimates that a total of that 2.5 million are estimated to be trafficked at any given point in time, of which a minimum of one third are trafficked for economic purposes. Regarding gains for the organized crime syndicates, the EU Organised Crime Situation Report of 2004 asserts that globally the trafficking in human beings business is in the order of EUR 8.5 to 12 billion per year. This firmly places human trafficking among the largest and most lucrative businesses of organised crime worldwide.

Who are the Victims?

There is no uniform type of victim of human trafficking, and victim profiles range from young to old age, high or low level of education and training, from urban or rural areas, and include men, women and children, and ethnic minority groups, such as Roma in Europe. The background and age of the victims may depend on the purpose for which they are trafficked; in Southeastern Europe, for instance, victims tend to be females aged between 18 to 26 years, who are mostly subjected to forced prostitution. Children and elder, handicapped, persons, are targeted for begging in the destination countries.

As mentioned above, estimates are that around 80 per cent of all victims are women, who are mostly trafficked for sexual exploitation, or domestic servitude and similar “female” sectors. Men tend to be more subject to trafficking for forced labour.

While victims (especially minors) at times may be sold or abducted, the majority of persons seek an improvement of their current life situation, and are misled and or in other ways trapped into a trafficking scheme. Trafficking thrives when there is a position of vulnerability, i.e. poverty, discrimination, inequality in the countries/regions of origin, as well as the demand for exploitative labour in destination countries/regions, especially in unregulated, informal sectors of the destination countries’ economies, an absence of labour standards and rights or, where they exist, the insufficient enforcement of these standards. Above all,
the vulnerability of migrants on intermediaries/traffickers in light of restrictive migration possibilities, and their vulnerability due to their irregular status or irregular work in the destination countries are root causes of human trafficking. Women’s vulnerability is disproportionately higher (see below).

A Comprehensive Policy Response to Human Trafficking

The need for a human rights framework to counter human trafficking and the need for a comprehensive response

While constituting a serious crime issue, trafficking in human beings is first and foremost a violation of human rights of the persons affected. In her first report as the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Sigma Huda emphasised that “trafficking represents the denial of virtually all human rights”.\(^{10}\) Trafficking is both a cause and a consequence of human rights violations\(^ {11}\), and it therefore takes human rights based policy response in order to adequately tackle it.

Such an approach recognizes that States have an obligation, under international human rights law, to protect the rights of individuals to exercise their human rights, to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations as well as provide victims of human rights violations with adequate remedies.\(^ {12}\)

Anti-trafficking responses should not only comply with existing human rights norms, but also should not undermine or adversely affect the human rights of the groups affected, in particular trafficked persons, but also female migrants, asylum seekers or prostitutes. In particular, it should be ensured that anti-trafficking policies “do not create or exacerbate existing situations that cause or contribute to trafficking by instituting policies and practices that further undermine or adversely affect the human rights of individuals, such as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of movement, the right to leave one’s own country, to migrate legally and to earn an income”.\(^ {13}\) The Expert Group has therefore called for the development of a ‘Human Rights Assessment Model’ “…as an instrument to monitor and evaluate the human rights impact of anti-trafficking laws, policies and practices.”\(^ {14}\)

In order to effectively tackle human trafficking, a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach must be taken, comprising and balancing repressive strategies, aimed at suppressing the organized crime networks and prosecuting the traffickers, as well as empowering strategies towards potential and actual victims of trafficking that enable persons to protect themselves from trafficking and/or recover from the crime and re-start self-determined lives, including assistance and protection. Full co-ordination and co-operation of all relevant actors, especially law enforcement and the NGO sector, is also indispensable.

Elements of a comprehensive anti-trafficking responses – Good practice example: SEE Regional Guidelines on Anti-Trafficking Responses (Strategies/Action Plans)

Southeastern European governments that as a consequence of the Balkans war turned into a central regional hub of global human trafficking have in the course of their intense anti-trafficking efforts over the past years developed a range of innovative policies and practices to counter human trafficking\(^ {15}\). The work has culminated in the elaboration of a model comprehensive anti-trafficking response, based on and reflecting international and EU/ European standards and commitments, as well as the accumulated good practices from the SEE region and beyond\(^ {16}\), which can offer a model and useful guidance also for other parts of the world. For this reason, the main elements of this model strategy are outlined:

First, practical experience has shown that States are in need of comprehensive anti-trafficking responses (strategies and action plans), with built-in mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and regular review of these plans so as to keep the anti-trafficking response in line with new developments and to be able
to respond to the rapidly changing modi operandi of the traffickers. This also necessitates central data and information management, e.g. via a national rapporteur, or a central national anti-trafficking agency.

Such national anti-trafficking strategies are a tool to gather all relevant stakeholders, especially also NGOs, in order to arrive at a shared understanding of the situation regarding human trafficking, the challenges posed and a concerted, co-ordinated response involving all different actors, i.e. relevant ministries, local authorities, law enforcement, consular staff, border police, aliens/immigration police and special investigators, prosecutors, judges, NGOs, international organizations and other civil society representatives, as well as labour inspectors, trade unions, employers, social workers, health workers, child protection agencies etc. Institutionalised co-ordination and co-operation of all agencies and stakeholders involved, at the strategic/policy level as well as at the operational level, and also at local, national and regional levels must be ensured.

The document contains a comprehensive guide on the entire sets of measures to be taken, at strategic and operational level, by a government in order to counter human trafficking. These include prevention, support and protection of victims and witnesses, investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators, and, most importantly, the supporting/co-ordination framework that is needed to implement an anti-trafficking response.

**Assistance and Protection as Well as Prosecution**

Comprehensive assistance and protection for victims of trafficking, irrespective of their preparedness or willingness to cooperate with the authorities and testify in court, is the cornerstone of a human rights based anti-trafficking response which also has been seen to enhance the prosecution of the perpetrators and conviction rates while also contributing to breaking the trafficking cycle by offering victims a real chance to re-start self-determined lives. Regrettably state practice does not sufficiently reflect these principles. Such a scheme must ensure that all trafficked persons have access to adequate remedies (justice, fair treatment, assistance and support, safety and protection, restitution, compensation, reinstatement of rights as well as the regularisation of their status. Assistance and protection must begin with victim identification systems; regulation of the legal stay for victims (including a reflection and stabilisation period for all presumed trafficked victims, followed by a temporary residence permit for identified victims for a period of six months or until the end of legal proceedings, or at times a permanent residence permit); social support and protection to all victims of trafficking, as well as special protection schemes for victims appearing as witnesses; access to civil procedures, witness protection and victim-sensitive judicial treatment of trafficked persons. Where appropriate, access to asylum procedures must also be ensured. Lastly, a durable solution should be found for the trafficked person, which could be (re-) integration, social inclusion in the country of destination, re-settlement in a third country, or return and reintegration in the country of destination; this return should take place on a voluntary basis and upon completion of a risk assessment for each individual case; moreover, sustainable reintegration plans, including livelihood options and minimising the risk of stigmatisation and re-victimisation, would be the only way to effectively break the trafficking cycle, although this is at present rather the exception than the rule.

In order to ensure that the necessary and appropriate assistance and protection reaches the individual trafficked person, institutionalised multi-agency coordination mechanisms must be established. Focusing on the process management of individual trafficking cases/victims such a mechanism should regulate the co-operation of all involved actors and cover the entire sequence of measures from identification, assistance and protection, participation in and support during legal proceedings and legal redress, to return/resettlement and/or social inclusion of the victims in their destination-, origin- or a third country. Due consideration should also be given to cross-border aspects, especially safety plans to include relatives/loved ones in countries of origin, pre-return risk assessments in the countries of origin, return and reintegration plans for each victim as well as mutual legal assistance in the case of the transfer of victims to court in another country.
Finally, the investigation and prosecution of trafficking aims at investigating trafficking crimes, prosecuting and convicting traffickers while restoring the human rights of the victims and offering her/him legal redress and compensation. A balance must be struck between prosecution needs and the process of the victim’s recovery, thus avoiding re-victimisation. Measures should comprise proactive and reactive investigation, with a call for more pro-active police work to gather intelligence and evidence other than the victim testimony, e.g. via parallel financial investigation. The confiscation of proceeds of crime, while seriously hurting the organised crime networks, would also be a means of offering compensation to victims, e.g. by establishing a compensation system for victims of trafficking. The implementation of anti-corruption measures is a further crucial component in the anti-trafficking response.

Prevention is Key in the Anti-Trafficking Response

Prevention is the key element of the anti-trafficking response. Although the UN Trafficking Protocol imposes on State parties an obligation to take preventive measures these often tend to fall short of the desirable levels.

Preventive measures should be multi-disciplinary and address all root causes of trafficking, i.e. the supply side, by promoting sustainable development with particular focus on women, minorities and children, as well as a set of measures to address the demand in the destination countries. They should also contain measures to allow for safe and legal migration options to potential migrants as well as ensure labour and protection standards for workers/migrants in destination countries. Awareness raising and education measures targeting potential and actual victims of trafficking and clients, warning of the dangers of trafficking and informing on safe and legal migration alternatives, as well as administrative control measures are essential anti-trafficking measures. Multi-disciplinary and multi-agency administrative control groups, involving especially also the labour inspectorates and other services/actors monitoring and/or enforcing labour standards are crucial in order to monitor vulnerable sectors of the economy (e.g. construction, garment industry, sweat shops, agriculture, the sex industry, domestic work etc.) in order to detect trafficking/exploitative situations.

The main thrust of preventive measures is the reduction of vulnerability to trafficking and re-trafficking, and to increase the livelihood options of at risk groups and individuals. At the supply side, measures should include the empowerment of general at risk groups as well as imminent risk groups, and include efforts to spur socio-economic development, employment generation, gender equality, and anti-discrimination measures. Specific measures should also be taken to reduce the vulnerability of re-trafficking of returned victims via targeted return and reintegration assistance, including the creation of economic livelihood options.

States should foster a strong link between specific anti-trafficking measures as well as a range of existing national action plans, notably national employment plans, anti-discrimination plans, development plans, child protection plans, gender equality plans, national migration plans. Governments and foreign technical and development cooperation agencies should consider the trafficking aspect in their programming; at present, local community development, and socio-economic development and employment generation schemes, micro-credit schemes and the like are often not accessible to women. These programmes should open up, and even actively target women in general, groups that are at risk of being trafficked and returned trafficked victims in particular, so as to support their social and economic reinsertion.

The promotion of regular and managed migration is another key factor in reducing the vulnerability to human trafficking. Legal and safe migration options should be available as an alternative to irregular migration, thus decreasing the dependency on the abusive intermediary networks. Bilateral labour agreements as well as intensified cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination are indispensable. Special measures need to be taken to address the gender dimension of migration.
Policies aimed at promoting regular and managed migration should be such that they are transparent and accessible; raising awareness of safe migration policies and practices should be offered. Policies should minimise the vulnerability of migrants and include the regulation and monitoring of intermediary agencies (employment agencies, travel, study, tourism, au pair etc.); especially short-term work permits or visas should not be linked to a specific employer or even type of employment; also the criminalisation of the retention of ID documents and other documentation by a person other than the document holder is essential. 20

Lastly, a set of measures need to be taken to address the demand side in destination countries and to prevent and/or disrupt the exploitation of human beings. As for trafficked victims, it has been mentioned that trafficking mostly occurs into the unregulated, unprotected, informal sectors of the destination countries’ economies, with migrants being un-skilled or de-skilled. Even if legal migration schemes will be enhanced, these are not likely to sufficiently target the informal sectors.

Destination countries should therefore take a standards based approach to trafficking and migration; concretely, to foster migrants’ rights and migrant workers’ rights both for the formal and informal sectors; to ensure the enforcement of these labour and protection standards; and to find ways to reach out to the informal sectors, e.g. via the self-organisation of workers in these informal sectors. Trade unions and migrant associations, but also employers are essential partners in this.21 Anti-discrimination standards need also to be enforced.

The Nexus Between Human Trafficking and Gender, and in Particular the Millennium Development Goal Nr. 3, Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

*Trafficking is not gender neutral and disproportionately affects women*

Although according to the Trafficking Protocol it is not defined as gender-based crime, trafficking is not gender-neutral and disproportionately affects women. Not only are the majority of victims of trafficking women, and this is likely to hold true even if and when trafficking for forced labour (more typically male, and hitherto under-documented) also receives the same attention and is documented as such, but the impact of trafficking on women tends to be more severe in that women are in general also subject to more severe and devastating forms of exploitation.

Trafficking is a consequence of the special vulnerability of women. The UN Division for the Advancement of Women notes that “in all societies, to a greater or lesser degree, women and girls are subjected to physical, sexual and psychological abuse that cuts across lines of income, class and culture”.22 First, women and girls are subjected to human rights violations such as discrimination and/or the violation of economic and social rights in their places of origin. Women are more affected by gender violence, gender discrimination in education, gender inequality in the work place (characterized by occupational segregation, the disproportionate representation of women in informal employment) resulting in a greater economic insecurity and a propensity to migrate despite dangerous illegal migration schemes.

Further, as Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, has pointed out that while trafficking “is a particular violent form of movement”, trafficking must be understood in the “broader context of violations that are committed against women in the course of their movement and migrations”.23 Despite the fact that women constitute an estimated 50 per cent of the world’s migrants, women experience unequal access to the formal migration channels, through less information on migration processes, but also due to the fact that there is fewer established migration routes and networks servicing women. Moreover, due to the fact that the sectors for which female demand exists are for the major part informal, unregulated as well as unprotected, formal migration channels remain limited, and women will remain more
frequently subject to illegal migration channels, rendering them more dependent on intermediary networks, among them traffickers.24 Women also suffer more acutely from exploitation in these typically ‘female’, unregulated and unprotected sectors in countries of destination. “Thus in particular women’s inability to access regulated migration and their propensity to work in unregulated unskilled sectors leaves them more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation”.25

Moreover, the impact of trafficking crime is in general more severe on women, due to the fact that the type of exploitation suffered by the majority of female victims (in largely unprotected sectors) tends to also have the more devastating and traumatising impact on the victims.26

Female victims of trafficking, who more often than not are severely traumatized, are at risk of re-victimisation and re-traumatisation from the law enforcement in the destination countries, in terms of condescending treatment (on grounds of their being exploited in the sex industry) or insensitive treatment during investigations and/or court proceedings (e.g. direct confrontations with the perpetrator).

Often victims are returned home with no or insufficient conduct of risk assessment prior to their return, or with no or insufficient reintegration assistance, resulting in victims’ actual and/or perceived physical and/or psychological endangerment, re-traumatisation, or re-trafficking; at times even the prosecution of returned victims by the local authorities. Women in particular may be subject to severe stigmatisation in the home communities, on account of their actual or assumed involvement in the sex industry in the destination countries. The sad consequences of this are not only the sustained traumatisation of the victims, but the fact that they often fail to re-start self-determined and economically viable lives and remain in the trafficking cycle, either re-trafficking or at times turning into traffickers themselves.

Anti-trafficking policies may not only have an aggravating effect on female victims of trafficking but also on women more generally. Restrictive migration policies and migration control policies may impair especially the chances of women to improve their livelihood, and hence to achieve potential empowerment, through migration. It is especially women migrants that are denied visas to destination countries or may be refused entry at the borders on grounds of being a (potential) trafficking victim.

In sum, the nexus between trafficking and gender equality is intricate. Not only is trafficking a consequence of lack of gender equality and empowerment, it further obstructs the empowerment of women, not only for those affected as victims, but more generally for women that may be deprived of the opportunity to migrate and attain better life standards and more empowerment on account of anti-trafficking (migration control) policies.

**How the Attainment of the Millenium Development Goal Nr 3, Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, Contributes to Counter Trafficking**

The progression towards the fulfilment of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in general, and in particular goal nr. 3, the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women, will be an important contributing factor in eradicating the root causes of many global problems, including the large-scale trafficking of human beings.

Over time, the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women (through education, employment and access to political decision making) is an important step in reducing the vulnerability of women and hence their preparedness to migrate at any cost, with a great risk of ending up in a trafficked situation.

The MDG addresses the persistent gender gap in the countries of origin, i.e. gender violence and abuse, gender discrimination in education or training and the workplace. Addressing these gender disadvantages will in the longer run offer women sustainable socio-economic development alternatives to migration. Moreover it will qualify female migrants for formal sectors in the destination economies.
Raising education levels and professional training of women and girls may however also entail short-term consequences in terms of fostering trafficking unless more legal migration possibilities exist and/or other measures are taken to prevent abusive and exploitative migration. As is the case with development in general, enhanced educational levels will have the indirect effects of raising expectations and aspirations that cannot be met in the local/rural community, or in the same country, hence the propensity to move will rise in the short run, and unless migration possibilities and safeguards against the exploitation of migrants are taken, trafficking for a variety of purposes may actually go up in the short or medium run.

Having stated this, it is apparent that it is neither desirable nor feasible that migration especially of women be reduced or stopped, bearing in mind also the empowerment potential offered to women through migration, and the continuous need for migration. It is therefore essential to work towards regular, managed and safe migration schemes, as an alternative to current migrant exploitation through traffickers. In this context, special attention must be given to a gender perspective on migration. In addition to addressing the gender-based causes of migration on the supply side (in the countries or origin), it is crucial to address the “gendered violations during migration”, i.e. during the recruitment, pre-departure, in transit and on site in the destination countries, and to take measures to ensure access of female migrants to formal migration channels, and to formal sectors of the economy, which offer more protection and labour rights.

Moreover, the typically “feminized job sectors” work should be considered to be recognized as formal work offering legal protection. However bearing in mind that women are often concentrated in sectors that are not likely to be regulated as work and consequently do not fall under labour protection regimes, a range of other measures should be taken in countries of destination to ensure protection to all migrant workers and especially women in these vulnerable sectors, and to reduce the demand for such exploitative work or services through e.g. labour market measures, employer sanctions, enforcement, self-regulations (codes of conduct) etc.

Concluding Remarks

By way of conclusion, some key recommendations and issues for further consideration are listed:

1) Trafficking in human beings must be understood as human rights violation. Comprehensive anti-trafficking policies therefore need to be based on a human rights framework and comprise both repressive strategies targeting the perpetrators as well as empowerment strategies targeting the victims of crime and offering them redress and a fair chance to re-start self-determined lives. Victims of trafficking should be seen as agents rather than objects, who are capable of informed decisions over their lives, but whose free will and right of self-determination has been violated/distorted by the traffickers and whose human dignity has been affected.

2) Governments must not tolerate this modern form of slavery and take ownership, and assume responsibility for designing, implementing and regularly reviewing comprehensive anti-trafficking responses, strategies and action plans, involving all relevant stakeholders and especially the NGO sector. This response must including multi-agency coordination at the strategic as well as the operational levels. Comprehensive victim assistance and protection schemes must be at the core of the anti-trafficking response.

3) Governments should take measures to foster awareness raising and training for all relevant local and national authorities and actors, and the public at large, to promote an understanding of human trafficking, end the tolerance of this modern form of slavery and take action against it.

4) A more complete analysis of the phenomenon of trafficking through analysis and research is needed, especially on the nexus between trafficking and gender. A sound system for informa-
tion management (collection, analysis and dissemination) is needed at the national, regional and global levels, on the basis of harmonised definitions (UN Definition).

5) Prevention policies must take a prominent place in the anti-trafficking response, addressing the root causes, both the supply side and the demand sides of trafficking; and fostering legal and safe migration possibilities.

6) Address the supply side of trafficking by way of reducing the vulnerability to human trafficking, with special focus on women and children by creating viable alternatives to migration. Progress in attaining the MDG Nr 3, gender equality and empowerment of women, is crucial in this regard. However, while gender equality and empowerment of women will decrease the vulnerability to trafficking in the longer run, short term the propensity to migrate with a trafficking outcome may be increased, especially for women who still are disadvantaged in their access to more formal and safer forms of migration. Policy measures must take this phenomenon into account.

7) Foster linkages and synergies between general national action plans on economic and social development, gender, etc, and anti-trafficking action plans; governments and development-cooperation agencies should in their work consider measures that prevent human trafficking as well as assist in the social and economic reintegration of returned victims of trafficking; open up for at risk group in general and returned trafficked victims in particular; thus enabling women to attain skills in sectors that are less prone to exploitation.

8) Open up for legal, regular and managed, gender-sensitive, migration possibilities, ensuring full access of women migrants to these formal migration channels.

9) Governments need to address the demand for cheap exploitative labour in destination countries and take labour market and other measures to reduce the informal, unprotected sectors of the economy.

10) In light of the persistence of informal, unregulated and unprotected economic sectors, which are predominantly female (sex, domestic work), “reduce the invisibility of exploitation” through effective administrative controls by multi-agency groups to regulate and monitor vulnerability in order to detect forced labour/services.

11) Entertain measures to introduce/strengthen labour and protection standards also for the informal sector, encourage formal and informal organisation of workers in formal and also informal sectors, including self-organisation.

Endnotes

1 The EU Expert Group was set up by the Commission in 2003 as a consultative group, comprising 20 members of varying professional backgrounds in relation to human trafficking and appointed as independent experts. The mandate of the Expert Group is to submit a report, as well as issue opinions on its own initiative, to the European Commission on a future EU policy to prevent and combat human trafficking. The Expert Group has submitted its report to the Commission on 22 December, 2004; European Commission, Report of the Expert Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, Brussels, 22 December, 2004; The report is accessible via the EC website: www.europa.eu.int

2 The movement has the function to dislocate the victim and increase her/his dependency on the trafficker. It can be argued that the harbouring or receipt of a person, listed as activities in the Protocol, for the purpose of exploitation suffice to classify an act as trafficking, thus totally eliminating the aspect of movement. This is in line with the definition of human trafficking as contained in the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 which “do[es] not require that a trafficking victim be physically transported from one location to another…It is the state of servitude that is key to defining trafficking. As such, “trafficking” denotes the act of placing someone in servitude and everything done knowingly that surrounds or contributes to it.”. Cf. The US Department of State (2005). Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 2000, Trafficking in Persons Report, released by the Office to Monitor and Combat Traffick-
ing in Persons, June 3, 20; online version: introduction: Trafficking in Persons defined (accessible at: www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/).

3 Cf. EU Expert Report. p.16. The EU Expert Group therefore asserts that the main focus of anti-trafficking policies should be on combating the exploitative outcome of human trafficking and that “States should focus on the outcomes of forced labour or services, slavery or slavery like practices - which are inherently coercive - rather than the movement or coercion elements, which should be seen as preparatory to these outcomes…”. Moreover, in consideration of differing scopes of legislation regarding human trafficking, or its actual implementation, the Expert Group suggests that states should take measures “to adequately criminalize any exploitation of human beings under forced and/or slavery like conditions, independent of whether such exploitation concerns a trafficked person, a smuggled person, an illegal migrant or a lawful resident”. Cf. EU Expert Report. p. 56.

4 This does not apply to children, defined as any person under eighteen years of age, where consent is irrelevant in any case. Cf Article 3 (c) of the Protocol: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article”.

5 In line with this, the EU Expert Group asserts that the main focus of anti-trafficking policies should be on combating the exploitative outcome of human trafficking and that “States should focus on the outcomes of forced labour or services, slavery or slavery like practices - which are inherently coercive - rather than the movement or coercion elements, which should be seen as preparatory to these outcomes…”. Moreover, in consideration of differing scopes of legislation regarding human trafficking, or its actual implementation, the Expert Group suggests that states should take measures “to adequately criminalize any exploitation of human beings under forced and/or slavery like conditions, independent of whether such exploitation concerns a trafficked person, a smuggled person, an illegal migrant or a lawful resident”. Cf. EU Expert Report. p.56.

6 ICMPD, Draft Anti-Trafficking Training Module for Judges and Prosecutors in EU Member States, Accession and Candidate Countries. Vienna. (2005); for more information see www.icmpd.org and www.anti-trafficking.net

7 The US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (2005); online version; Introduction.


9 Cf. Limanowska, Barbara, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2004 – Focus on Prevention in: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, the UN administered province of Kosovo, Published by UNDP, March, 2005.


11 According to Mary Robinson, former High Commissioner for Human Rights, “trafficking and related practices such as debt bondage, forced prostitution and forced labour are violations of the basic human rights to which all persons are entitled. The right to life, to equality, dignity and security; the right to just and favourable conditions of work; the right to health; the right to be recognised as a person before the law.”. Statement delivered at the OHCHR/COE Panel Discussion: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. A European Convention?. Palais des Nations, Geneva, 9 April 2002. http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/E67E7C3664630619C1256B970031AD16. For detailed guidance on the human rights framework please refer to: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking. Geneva (2002).

12 For extensive legal argumentation please refer to the EU Expert Report, pp. 138.

14 It is crucial to watch for the unintended consequences of repressive strategies such as restrictive migration policies which may increase the markets for irregular migration and the dependency on trafficking and smuggling networks, thus increasing the vulnerability of (potential) migrants, or which may restrict the freedom of movement. Furthermore, using trafficked persons as witnesses without corresponding protection may lead to the physical endangerment of victims, thus producing unintended repercussions of anti-trafficking policies. Cf. EU Expert Report p. 62f. See also: Limanowska, Barbara, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2004, p. 2.

15 In response to the upsurge of trafficking from, to and through the SEE region, SEE governments and actors developed innovative anti-trafficking policies and practices, notably in the framework of the Stability Pact Task Force on Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe (SPTF), initiated during 2000 by the Austrian chairmanship of the OSCE. This forum offered a unique platform of all relevant state and non-state actors as well as international organisations, developing a comprehensive regional strategic framework as well as institutional mechanisms for the fight against human trafficking. Many of the innovative policy approaches tested and developed in the SEE region are now also replicated in the wider Europe and beyond; The Special Representative on Trafficking in Human Beings of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ms. Helga Konrad, is instrumental in this regard; (cf. www.osce.org ).

16 ICMPD, Regional Best Practice Guidelines for the Development and Implementation of a Comprehensive National Anti-trafficking Response, Vienna (2005). ICMPD has facilitated the development of these guidelines for and with 10 SEE countries/territories and international organizations engaged in anti-trafficking activities in SEE in the framework of the Programme for the Enhancement of Anti-trafficking Responses in South Eastern Europe (SEE). Governments in the region have already established basic national co-ordination structures (governmental anti-trafficking coordinators, as well as national co-ordination committees) and have elaborated anti-trafficking strategies and action plans some years ago. The guidelines now serve as a basis for the drafting of new and/or revision of existing national anti-trafficking strategies and action plans in SEE. They are a living document and will be continuously developed in the course the a.m. programme in 2005 and beyond. Cf. www.imcpd.org; as well as www.anti-trafficking.net.

17 The Italian experience, according to which victims of trafficking, under Article 218, are granted assistance, support and legal status independent of their cooperation with law enforcement, is quoted as proof of this assertion. There is still a wide spread fear that unconditional temporary residence permits to victims of trafficking may invite abuse. Current practice in many European countries links assistance, protection and legal stay of victims to their assistance in criminal proceedings. Cf. the EU Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings (OJL 203, 1.8. 2002), offering a temporary residence permit to victims who are prepared to co-operate with the authorities, leaving it up to the EU member states to grant an initial reflection period, if any. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 May 2005, has made some progress. While still linking the residence permit to victims of trafficking to their willingness to cooperate and assist in legal proceedings, the Convention contains a provision requiring Parties to provide for an initial recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days, during which the victim may stabilise and decide on whether s/he wants to press charges or not (Art. 13). Furthermore, Art. 14 of the Convention allows for the possibility to deliver residence permits to victims not only on the basis of the persons’ cooperation with law enforcement authorities, but also on the basis of their personal situation. See: Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Strasbourg, (2005); accessible via www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Trafficking.

18 The OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has coined the term ‘National Referral Mechanism’, which OSCE participating States, as part of the OSCE Action Plan Against Human Trafficking, have agreed to implement nationally Cf. OSCE/ODIHR, National Referral Mechanisms: Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons, A Practical Handbook, Warsaw (2004).

19 See EU Expert Report, p. 127.


26 However there is currently scarce data available on the impact of the different forms of exploitation of the victims.

MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
With tens of millions forcibly uprooted from their homes each year, any discussion of migration’s impact on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) must consider the impact of population movements that are involuntary or forced in nature. Hundreds of cases of involuntary displacement caused by large-scale development projects in particular have shown that without adequate preventative measures, involuntary displacement causes impoverishment. That involuntary displacement causes impoverishment has obvious implications for the achievement of the MDGs and global efforts to reduce poverty. In addition to impoverishing those displaced, involuntary displacement has serious negative consequences for host communities and nations, including increasing pressure on resources and social services, increasing competition for jobs, increasing social tensions and inter-group clashes, causing the decline of health conditions, and spawning environmental damage from increased population density and resource use. The disorder created by involuntary displacement is so severe that some consider it a global security threat.

In recent years, increasing attention has focused on one group of displaced people termed environmental refugees. Although calculations are imprecise, the Red Cross has estimated that there are as many as 25 million environmental refugees, exceeding the population of traditional refugees fleeing political persecution. Some preliminary projections show that as a result of global warming and the deterioration of environmental conditions worldwide, there could be 50 million environmental refugees by 2008, and 150 million by 2050. Some argue that the term can be a tool for confronting global environmental inequalities that have wealthy industrialized nations responsible for the majority of global environmental damage and economically poor nations suffering the brunt of that damage.

Still the concept has critics. Some are concerned about the term itself and its use of the word refugee. Since 1951, refugee has had a strict legal meaning. Extending the term refugee to those displaced for reasons other than traditionally recognized forms of persecution and to populations not necessarily crossing borders alarms some who worry it could undermine the fragilely held rights of traditional refugees. Others have criticized the environmental refugee concept analytically. One called it “unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical terms.” Another found it “simplistic, one-sided, and misleading.” Others argue that the term is a dangerous depoliticization of displacement’s causes and potentially a tool for anti-asylum groups to argue that many refugees are not fleeing legitimate persecution.

This paper argues that the environmental refugee term is provocative and potentially useful but ultimately a problematic concept that should be better defined if it is to be constructive analytically or prac-
tically, if it is to be used at all. Many populations are called environmental refugees simply because their displacements involve an ecological feature. This is inaccurate and misleading because it misidentifies the causes of involuntary displacement by singling out the environment—more accurately, the non-human environment—and ignoring the causal role played by political, economic, and social forces.

Most often, those called environmental refugees are better understood as victims of various kinds of involuntary displacement. In many cases, so-called environmental refugees are actually victims of forced displacement and the full-fledged expropriation of lands and resources by governments and non-state actors, often in apparent violation of international laws. Others called environmental refugees are the victims of other kinds of involuntary displacement involving less direct force. These displacements are caused in part by the non-human environment but are often more closely linked to particular political and economic decisions and decision-makers or to pre-existing poverty, which itself is produced by global political, economic, social, and historical forces.

In this paper I will critique the concept of environmental refugees precisely because it misidentifies the causes of displacement. This is dangerous not simply for academic analytical reasons, but because it can impede work to prevent and react to displacement and to hold accountable those responsible for displacing populations. In this vein, I will make suggestions about ways of preventing involuntary displacement, of holding accountable those responsible for displacement, and of protecting those who are displaced. Because involuntary displacement will happen despite the best prevention efforts, I will also describe a successful model to prevent the impoverishment of displacees, which may have applicability to other migrants and efforts to achieve the MDGs.

Defining Environmental Refugees

Who and what then are environmental refugees? The term’s use traces to the 1970s but widespread interest in the concept came with the United Nations Environment Programme’s 1985 publication of Essam El-Hinnawi’s booklet by the same name. El-Hinnawi’s definition of environmental refugees has been widely accepted by those taking up the term: Environmental refugees are “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.” El-Hinnawi identified several categories of people as environmental refugees and others have added additional groups. The following list outlines those whom proponents of the concept have called environmental refugees. They are victims of:

1. **Catastrophic weather and geological events identified as “natural” disasters**, including earthquakes, typhoons/cyclones/hurricanes, tornados, volcanic eruptions, floods, and drought;

2. **Famine**;

3. **Disease epidemics**;

4. **Desertification and land degradation**, including soil and forest degradation, salination, erosion, and water supply exhaustion;

5. **Global warming**, including flooding from sea-level rise, food and water scarcity, alteration of monsoon patterns, and increased storm intensity;

6. **Development projects**, especially dam and other infrastructure construction with wide environmental effects;
7. **Industrialization and natural resource exploitation**;

8. **Environmental and technological accidents and pollution**, closely related to #7, including toxic spills, nuclear reactor accidents, and environment-fouling dump sites;

9. **Warfare effects**, including wartime defoliation, ecocide, unexploded landmines and ordinance, and general environmental destruction;

10. **Environmental policy implementation**, especially conservation policies making land off limits to habitation and use.10

**Confusing the Causes of Displacement**

The breadth of such a list combining divergent phenomena from earthquakes to wars to dam construction to global warming is cause alone for skepticism. There is some unity in the concept in that the non-human environment plays a role in each category and that those displaced by each would not typically be considered a traditional refugee fleeing political persecution. Still the environmental refugee concept is, as currently defined, generally unhelpful, clouding rather than clarifying both our understanding of and action on human displacement.11 The concept’s core problem of misidentifying the causes of displacement stems from El-Hinnawi’s definition and the name itself. Both identify the non-human environment as the primary cause of displacement despite El-Hinnawi’s acknowledgement that “environmental disruption” is “triggered” (i.e., caused) by “natural and/or” human forces. This combines two distinct phenomena: those supposedly occurring naturally in the non-human environment and those caused by human activity. Close inspection shows that few if any examples of environmental refugees are caused solely or even primarily by the non-human environment. As one critic has said, the term “implies a mono-causality which very rarely exists in practice.”12

**Calling a Spade a Spade: Involuntary Displacement and Expropriation**

The concept of environmental refugees is particularly misleading because in misidentifying causality in the non-human environment, the term directs attention away from the main actors and the political and economic forces primarily responsible for most forms of displacement. In what follows I will show how half the list of phenomena producing so-called environmental refugees are actually examples of involuntary displacement and the expropriation of land and resources from the vulnerable poor, while the other half has more complex causality largely stemming from human economic and political forces.

Upon examination of the second half of the list (6-10), one sees that many of those considered environmental refugees are victims of involuntary displacement and what can be called expropriation or dispossession: the de facto or de jure taking by various means, including those environmental, of people’s lands and other resources upon which their livelihoods depend.13 Far from being entirely natural processes attributable only to the non-human environment, in many cases we can identify the specific human actions, laws, and individuals responsible for producing displacement and expropriation. It is only the means of displacement that are environmental. As a result, there is no reason to call these populations environmental refugees. In the case of the victims of warfare effects and perhaps others, many would already qualify as traditional refugees, making the word environmental superfluous and damaging to rights outstanding.

A few examples help make the point:

1. Development Projects: World Bank-financed dam construction projects seize lands, relocating on the order of ten million annually;14
2. Industrialization and natural resource exploitation: Extractive mining in Southern Africa seizes lands and resorts to “primitive displacement and resettlement practice[s], far beyond our time and age,” which “impoverish affected populations materially and grossly violate their human rights”\(^{15}\)

3. Environmental and technological accidents and pollution: The Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, India, displaces at least 200,000 and kills more than 2,500;\(^{16}\) Shell Oil, supported by the Nigerian government, functionally expropriates lands, water, and other resources through hundreds of oil spills that have ruined the Niger Delta, making habitation unsustainable and forcing people to leave their homes;\(^{17}\)

4. Warfare effects: The U.S. military defoliates Vietnamese forests with Agent Orange to displace farmers and villagers for military purposes;

5. Environmental policy implementation: Governments in Central and East Africa create national parks and game reserves, preventing the use of lands and resources formerly essential to groups’ livelihoods and displacing populations in “brutal violation...of the populations’ basic human and customary rights.”\(^{18}\)

**More Complicated Causality I: Political-Economic Decisions and Decision-Makers**

In the first half of the list (1-5), determining the causes of displacement is more complex and needs to be better established by supporters of the term. Placing emphasis on environmental causes by calling displacees environmental refugees oversimplifies the phenomena described. In cases from the first half of the list, one finds, as Stephen Castles explains, “complex patterns of multiple causality, in which natural and environmental factors are closely linked to economic, social, and political ones.”\(^{19}\)

The case of desertification and related forms of land degradation is an important one. Advocates of the environmental refugee concept often make no direct link showing that desertification causes displacement. They tend to rely instead on correlations between areas vulnerable to, or suffering from, desertification and areas from which migrants emanate.\(^{20}\)

My point is not that land degradation and desertification are not happening. They are. But the connection to displacement is more complex than many admit. In some cases those said to be victims of desertification may be the victims of expropriation by eviction and government land privatization. In other cases evidence suggests that the more immediate causes of displacement may be political and economic processes affecting the vulnerable poor including global agribusiness competition, imbalanced trade practices, and government agriculture subsidies that have left small farmers unable to support themselves and forced to leave their lands.

Mexico is frequently cited as an example of land degradation producing displacement and environmental refugees. Contrary to the land degradation argument, social theorist David Harvey links large-scale rural Mexican migration to the Mexican government’s privatization of collectively held lands and the lowering of import barriers under NAFTA. He writes, “Cheap imports from the efficient but also highly subsidized agribusinesses...in the United States drove down the price of corn and other products to the point where small agricultural producers could not compete. Close to starvation, many of these producers have been forced off the land to augment the pool of the unemployed in already overcrowded cities.” Similar displacement linked to global agribusiness and land privatization has been occurring in India, Japan, China, and Taiwan.\(^{21}\) In these and other cases we may be able to identify governments, corporations, and individuals with much more direct responsibility for displacement than the non-human environment.

In other cases, the degradation of lands may arguably be the more immediate cause of displacement. But even here, the underlying reasons why the land became degraded in the first place may have more to do
with long-standing impoverishment structured by political, economic, and historical forces than with purely "natural" non-human environmental forces. In other words, involuntary displacement involving degradation of the non-human environment seems more often and more directly caused by political, economic, social, and historical forces than by strictly ecological factors.

More Complicated Causality II: Global Warming and Structural Causation

Much of the attention given to environmental refugees has focused on estimates that millions may be displaced this century as a result of rising sea levels and other likely effects of global warming. Evidence is overwhelming that global warming is a phenomenon attributable to human impact on the non-human environment. Calling those displaced by global warming environmental refugees thus again misidentifies the causes of displacement by focusing attention away from the human economic, technological, and political causes of global warming and any displacement it may produce. The term also focuses attention away from the nations and corporations primarily responsible for the warming.

While one can rarely point to a single political or economic decision or particular actors principally responsible for global warming-related displacement, there is a strong argument for an indirect form of structural economic and political causation. Although there may be no intent to displace in the burning of fossil fuels by wealthy industrialized nations, involuntary displacement may soon be the result of their activities for increasing numbers of populations in poorer nations forced from their lands to escape rising sea levels, flooding, and other weather-related changes. Andrew Simms and others argue that these effects of global warming and the displacement it may produce are severe enough to constitute a form of "persecution" that makes those affected refugees in a strict legal sense. “Don’t you think that being forced to live in worsening poverty on land that without warning could flood or turn to dust is a form of persecution?” Simms asks. “Whether deliberately or due to sins of omission, these consequences are the result of economic and political decisions.”

More Complicated Causality III: Poverty and So-Called Natural Disasters

This is not to argue that the non-human environment does not play an important role in causing displacement and human migration. Other examples from the first half of the list have more complicated causes than involuntary displacement and expropriation alone. With events called “natural disasters,” including earthquakes, cyclones, tornados, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis, like the recent one in the Indian Ocean, poverty may be as much of a causal factor in creating displacement as the non-human environment.

Take the earthquake example. In a relatively poor nation like El Salvador, earthquakes have caused thousands of deaths and displaced many more amidst massive destruction. In California, in the United States, by contrast, earthquakes of equal or greater magnitude have caused far lower levels of death and displacement amidst relatively limited property destruction. The environmental phenomenon is the same, but its effects, including the extent of displacement, are drastically different. This is largely because socio-economic conditions of the place where the disaster occurs significantly determine the extent of damage and displacement. And this is because it is the poor who are affected most severely by so-called natural disasters. For reasons having to do with poor housing quality, weak infrastructure, limited choice about where one lives, and limited disaster prevention and emergency services (like a tsunami warning system), the impact of catastrophic disasters and the displacement they produce are heavily influenced by political and economic factors. In short, political-economic forces shape poverty, and poverty shapes the vulnerability of people to disasters and thus to displacement.

With disasters like floods, drought, famine, and disease epidemics, political, economic, and social forces are even more determinant in shaping land use and abuse and determining whether extremes of rainfall
and temperature become disasters or are simply unusual weather conditions. Political and economic forces can be equally important in shaping the response to disasters: Witness how some governments have used disasters as opportunities to deny responsibility for displaced populations or to sell off lands to developers instead of resettling populations.

**Preventing Involuntary Displacement**

This critical review of the environmental refugees concept has not been an argument to ignore the non-human environment’s role in migration. Indeed there are already islands disappearing as a result of rising sea levels and the potential for mass global-warming-related displacement is very real. I have attempted to show instead how more work needs to be done to identify and understand the causes of involuntary displacement said to produce environmental refugees.

If the term environmental refugees is to be used, scholars and practitioners should develop a precise and limited definition for the term and the displaced people to whom the term should apply. Such a definition should insist on emphasizing displacement’s multiple causes and the causal interaction of political, economic, and social forces with the non-human environment. Use of the term should also locate environmental refugees within a larger typology of involuntary displacement focused on the causes and agents of displacement.

Understanding causality is important first, for preventing and moving toward the elimination of all forms of involuntary displacement; second, for holding the agents of displacement responsible for the damage they do to displaced peoples; and third, for helping to determine the appropriate rights due to the displaced. When involuntary displacement is caused by the de facto or de jure expropriation of lands and resources by identifiable state and non-state actors, prevention will involve:

1. The extension and enforcement of international laws prohibiting forced displacement to wider categories of involuntary displacement and the creation of parallel national laws;
2. The extension and enforcement of strict national and international environmental regulations;
3. Holding those responsible for involuntary displacement and ecological damage legally accountable for their unlawful actions through prosecution of offenders and the imposition of serious penalties for violations; and
4. The creation of a monitoring and investigative body responsible for policing the proper and limited use of involuntary displacement worldwide. Such a body could require any projects involving involuntary displacement to register planned displacement and plan for and meet minimum resettlement standards, assess the causes of non-registered involuntary displacement, and recommend punishment and compensatory actions for violations of international displacement norms.

When involuntary displacement is related to phenomena like desertification and global warming that have more complex and diffuse causality and agents, prevention will require precise understandings of causality and action along political, economic, and ecological lines. Despite the complexity, in many cases it will be possible to identify particular laws, treaties, and actions directly responsible for producing involuntary displacement. In these cases, preventative efforts should involve holding individuals and state and non-state entities accountable for the displacement they create.

**Preventing Involuntary Displacement’s Main Effect: Impoverishment**

While efforts should focus on preventing involuntary displacement, we need to be prepared to prevent and mitigate involuntary displacement’s harmful effects when people are uprooted. Here I turn to the
work of former World Bank sociologist Michael Cernea and his Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model. Cernea originally designed the model for use with displacement caused by large-scale development projects and by 2001, one observer found it to be the dominant model in the field.\textsuperscript{27} In recent years, increasing numbers of scholars and practitioners have used the model and helped refine its applicability for other forms of displacement, including refugee and other conflict settings, mining-related displacement, and other government population transfers.\textsuperscript{28}

Based on findings from hundreds of cases of involuntary displacement globally, the model shows that without proper preventative measures, the forced uprooting of people has remarkably similar effects: Involuntary displacement results in “massive loss and destruction of assets, including loss of life; unemployment, sudden drop in welfare and standards of living; prolonged uprooting, alienation and social disarticulation; cultural and identity loss; severe long-term stress and psychological effects; political disempowerment,” and other damage.\textsuperscript{29} In short, says Cernea, involuntary displacement causes impoverishment.\textsuperscript{30}

The strength of the IRR model is that the model identifies involuntary displacement’s main risks as a guide for poverty prevention. The model then offers a framework for reversing the risks and rebuilding displaced people’s lives. The model identifies eight specific risks that, without preventative measures, together produce overall impoverishment. They are:

1. Landlessness
2. Joblessness
3. Homelessness
4. Social marginalization
5. Food insecurity
6. Increased morbidity and mortality
7. Lost access to common property resources
8. The shattering of community ties, social capital, and communal life.

Each risk has varying intensities depending on the context, Cernea explains, and each has differing impacts on groups within populations (e.g., women, children, and the elderly). In specific cases there are also likely to be additional or slightly modified impoverishment risks (e.g., cultural fragmentation, educational deprivation, and ethnic discrimination).\textsuperscript{31}

Although in recent years Cernea and other scholars have explored expanding the applicability of the IRR model from its original context of involuntary displacement in development projects to refugees and other displaced peoples, this extension has been insufficiently tested and theorized.\textsuperscript{32} Cernea’s model, as originally conceived, does not account for the specific dynamics of refugee and non-development-related involuntary displacements, which often involve violence and trauma. While it is a powerful step to stress the similarities between the experiences of various displaced groups, the model could be improved by better adapting it to different displacement situations through the exploration of important experiential differences between affected populations. These situations could include those in which the non-human environment plays an important role and perhaps even other migrant groups.

Colleagues of mine and I recently found the model valuable when we used it to document the impoverishment suffered by the people of the Indian Ocean’s Chagos Archipelago as a result of their expulsion from their homelands during construction of the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia.\textsuperscript{33} As we found in our research, the model, whether used in its original context of development-induced displacement or in other situations, always demands examining the specificity of the displaced people and the displacement process at hand. In the case of any involuntary displacement in which the non-human environmental plays a role, several important factors stand out as requiring special inquiry and attention. These would include the
degree of environmental change occurring, the nature and history of a population’s relationship with their non-human environment, and the speed and nature of the displacement. As we found with the people of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago, a close ethnographic understanding of a displaced population and a detailed understanding of the displacement process itself are particularly helpful to teasing out the complexity of displacement. That is, Cernea’s model serves not as an end point of understanding but as a framework and catalyst for the understanding of the complex effects of displacement in people’s lives. In Cernea’s own words, “The model is not a single key to all doors (pass-partout in French): it is fashioned to open the door of understanding development-caused displacement, but this key can serve (as other scholars have found…) also as an already patterned cognitive tool which, with some adjustments, could possibly open other displacement ‘locks.’”

Reconstructing Livelihoods: A Strategy for Action

When displacement happens, as in the case of catastrophic weather and geological disasters, like December’s Indian Ocean tsunami, the IRR model also provides a framework for reconstructing people’s livelihoods and preventing impoverishment. Most emergency aid efforts feature a confused jumble of well-intentioned but ill-coordinated assistance. The IRR model provides a strategic template for comprehensive reconstruction that the UN and other agencies could employ in a coordinated fashion and in different contexts.

The model’s framework revolves around reversing the same eight impoverishment risks. This provides eight “counter-risk” strategies to be pursued in concert to prevent impoverishment and reconstruct the livelihoods of the displaced. The eight reconstruction strategies are:

1. Land-based resettlement
2. Reemployment
3. House reconstruction
4. Social inclusion
5. Improved health care
6. Adequate nutrition
7. Restoration of community assets and services
8. Social network and community rebuilding.

As with the eight impoverishment risks, other strategies are also likely to be relevant in specific reconstruction cases (e.g., cultural rebuilding, educational improvements, and discrimination prevention). Although reconstruction requires fundamental policy shifts and adequate financial investment, Cernea provides evidence that the use of his model has had replicable successes reconstructing livelihoods and preventing impoverishment. Moreover, with involuntary displacement’s potential for increasing impoverishment and preventing realization of the MDGs, “The most effective safeguard for the hosts’ [and displacees’] interests,” Cernea explains, “is an adequately designed and financed recovery plan for the resettlers.”

Cernea's IRR model thus proves useful in several ways in preventing poverty and specifically in efforts to achieve the MDGs. With its accumulated body of evidence from involuntary displacement globally, the model serves as a warning that displacement—even when serving the best of development intentions—generally causes the impoverishment of the displaced and other destabilizing societal effects. When displacement happens, the model provides a strategy for poverty prevention and the successful resettlement of displaced populations.

Conclusion: Prevention, Responsibility, and Rights

Given the problems identified here and by others about the environmental refugee concept, the question remains about the value of using the term. On the one hand, the term is clearly overly broad and
misleading in misidentifying the causes of displacement and ignoring the economic, political, and social forces responsible for much involuntary displacement. Politically and legally, the term may endanger the rights of traditional refugees.

On the other hand, in limited use, the term may have already made progress toward carefully extending rights and protections to vulnerable groups falling outside the traditional refugee definition. Particularly for the tens of millions potentially threatened with displacement caused by global warming, the term may be an effective way to focus attention on the dangers of climate change and eventually to secure for those displaced the rights of political refugees.

Ultimately, no matter the terminological choices, it will be critical to remember that the causes and agents of most forms of involuntary displacement are often not actor-less features of the natural environment but are identifiable political, economic, and social actors and actions. This will then mean strengthening international legal norms prohibiting all forms of forced displacement, extending these norms to other displacees, regulating the strict use of consensual relocation, and punishing state and non-state violators. This will also mean adopting policies that address the root causes of most types of involuntary displacement. In addition to poverty reduction strategies and environmental initiatives aimed at poorer nations, this will mean broader efforts to stop the practices of wealthy nations that prevent economic development in poor countries, like global trade, investment, and intellectual property rules stacked against less developed nations and conflict-fueling arms and diamond trafficking.

Perhaps this focus on causes and holding the agents of displacement responsible for their actions is made best by groups as disparate as the Arctic’s Inuit, the government of the Pacific island nation of Tuvalu, and the state of New York, in the United States. Each, to different degrees, has been pursuing “global-warming lawsuits”: Facing displacement and the destruction of their livelihoods from climate change in the Arctic, rising sea levels likely to sink islands in the Pacific, or general harms related to global warming, the suits seek to establish liability and win compensatory damages from the industrialized nations and utility company polluters primarily responsible for global warming.

Endnotes

4 See e.g., Andrew Simms in Aziz Ahamed and Andrew Simms, “Should the UN Actively Embrace the Concept of Environmental Refugees?,” The Ecologist 32, no. 2 (2002): 18-21; Townsend.
5 Black, 1.
7 See Castles; Black.
9 El-Hinnawi, 4.
See El-Hinnawi; Diane C. Bates, “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change,” *Population and Environment* 23, no. 5 (2002): 465; Ruth E. Baker, “Determination of Environmental Refugees: Cases for Inclusion and Expansion,” *Macalester Environmental Review* 18 September 2001; available at http://www.macalester.edu/~envirost/MacEnvReview/determination.htm; Internet; accessed 18 February 2005. Some have added another category in those displaced by wars over resources, which they call “environmental conflicts.” Evidence suggests however that there are few wars primarily fought over natural resources and that there is rarely a direct causal link between conflicts over resources, war, and subsequent displacement. Even when resources are a primary source of conflict, it is not clear why those displaced should be considered environmental refugees and not traditional refugees or displaced persons. See Castles, 5-7; Black, 8-10.

This way of understanding displacement focuses on the causes and agents of displacement and follows from Michael M. Cernea, “The Typology of Development-Induced Displacements: Field of Research, Concepts, Gaps and Bridges,” paper for Workshop on Typologies of Relevance to the Study of Forced Migration, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 22-23 September 2004, 11-13. Others have created taxonomic divisions based on a displacement’s location, intentionality, or speed of onset. I find each to be of subsidiary significance in understanding displacement, with location being a political issue related to refugee status and rights, intentionality being, practically speaking, insignificant to those displaced, and onset being of marginal importance. In addition to Cernea, see also Bates.


El-Hinnawi, 36-37.

See Townsend.

Cernea, “Concept,” 231.

Castles, 5.


Harvey, 160-161.

See e.g., Myers.

Ahamed and Simms, 20.

See Cernea, “The Typology,” for one example.


One useful way to understand such multiple causality comes from the analytic model of anthropologist Paul Farmer. Farmer’s model says that analysis must be “geographically broad,” suggesting that we look beyond the local site of displacement to see the actions of the powerful in an increasingly interconnected world. Analysis must be “historically deep,” suggesting that the history of lands and their peoples, including histories of colonial resource exploitation, slavery, and subsequent southern underdevelopment predicated on northern development, have a causal bearing on displacement. And analysis must account for the intertwined factors of “gender, ethnicity (‘race’), and socioeconomic status,” which have been “shown to play a role in rendering individuals and groups vulnerable to extreme human suffering” like that of involuntary displacement. See Paul Farmer, “On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below,” in *Social Suffering*, eds. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 274.


32 Though see Cernea, “Concept,” 195-258.
35 Michael M. Cernea, personal communication.
37 Ibid., 32.
38 See Aceves, et al.
39 Castles, 11-12.
7

MIGRATION AND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Introduction

One of the most widely accepted claims by economists is that international free trade generally augments the welfare of trading partners, and the gains from trade are positive and beneficial for all participants. It would seem then natural and logical to believe that they would applaud measures that encourage labour mobility within and between nations to increase the efficient use of labour resources. There might be some justifiable concerns about cities becoming too crowded, or about remote areas becoming depopulated, or about brain drain from poor regions, but these seem generally to be regarded as exceptions to the general idea that labour mobility within and between nations can and has facilitated desirable economic growth, and that it represents one of the most important mechanisms for interregional and international risk-sharing.\(^1\)

On the other hand, except perhaps for a few specialists in regional or international economics, there are only a handful of economists who are willing to speak out in favor of migration across national borders. Generally, even many of the politicians who would never dream of advocating trade restrictions for economic reasons feel little need to hesitate in condemning “economic” migration as a threat to the employment and other prospects of their electorates. In this regard, Harris (1995) would seem to be more accurate in characterizing the threat that politicians really fear as being to the whole concept of the nation state, rather than to the economic interests of their electorates, especially as those residents who seem most likely to be adversely affected by immigration — unskilled workers who are themselves recent immigrants — are quite likely to lack influence or political power\(^2\).

The obvious question for the economist then is whether any model can possibly justify this stark contrast between the apparently widespread desire to promote trade on the one hand, while restricting migration on the other. To the extent that steps toward free trade are really beneficial, is there anything fundamentally different about migration that prevents it from conferring similar benefits? On the other hand, if international migration is likely to harm the economic interests of some existing residents of a nation, why is it any different from free trade, which can also harm the interests of those holding significant stakes in industries destined to become uncompetitive or obsolete?

\(^*\) The views expressed in this article are the responsibility of the authors only and do not represent necessarily their respective institutions.
Cross-border mobility in all its forms is the essence of economic globalization, but the international movement of labour remains a rather limited and restricted phenomenon in the emerging global economy. If goods and capital may migrate at will, effortlessly crossing national boundaries, why are obstacles placed on the movement of people? Wealthy and industrialized capitalist countries, where the rules of politics and economics necessitate that money and goods move unrestricted around the world, do not extend similar options to labour. These countries acknowledge the inevitability of globalization with respect to finance and commodities whilst deploying enormous efforts on maintaining barriers to the free entry of labour. Sovereign nation-states acquiesce to the benefit of capital, yet they erect rigorous barriers when migrating underprivileged workers seek parity with the populations of rich countries.

Historical perspective

Migrations are as old as human history. It has been said that a Roman Emperor had complained some 2000 years ago that the Tiber River in Rome was overflowing with the Orontes (a small river in eastern Lebanon near Baalbeck), in reference to the large numbers of Phoenicians migrating to Rome. However, starting from the 1600s and the emergence of European colonial and mercantile interests, as well as the conquest of the New World (the Americas), free or cheap labour in the form of slaves and indentured workers was shipped between continents to work plantations, mines and construction projects. Industrialization and economic expansion in Western Europe, Australia and North America in the last two centuries facilitated new movements of people to build railways, ports and cities, and work in the new factories. Thus, during the 19th and early 20th century, mass movements of workers to the countries of the North were encouraged because the lands of the ‘New World’ needed people and labour.

Immigration to North America slowed down during the depression era of the 1930s, but a very sharp increase was noted again in the post World War II period when immigration laws were relaxed, enabling a greater flow of migrants. This also coincided with the migration stream from the newly decolonized countries to their former colonialist states (i.e. French Africa, such as Senegal, Algeria, Morocco to France, and Zaire to Belgium). Later, in the last half of the twentieth century “global trends favored the controlled movements of temporary workers on a ‘guest’ basis, with entry for immigrants restricted to highly skilled workers, business investors, or those with family already in the country of destination” (Hirst and Thompson, 2000, p. 276).

Within the regions of free trade agreements such as the European Union, where in principal many constraints on labour mobility across national boundaries have been removed, relative labour migration rates remain rather low. In North America, although the NAFTA explicitly excludes freedom of movement of persons (with some exception for high skilled university graduates), this has not curtailed the enormous flow of illegal migrants between Mexico and the USA.

Demographic trends

The International Migration Policy Programme - United Nations Population Fund report (IMP-UNFPA, 2004) has shown people migrating on an unprecedented scale. Although most international migration flows occur between neighboring countries, interregional migration directed to developed countries has been growing. It is estimated that one out of every 35 persons is an international migrant. This is equivalent to about three per cent of the world population. According to the IMP-UNFPA report, these numbers are “expected to grow as migration pressures, created by the development gaps between poor and rich countries and fuelled by the process of globalization and demographic dynamics, will result in further migration” (Ibid, p. 2).

It is also estimated that the number of international migrants in the world in the new millennium is in excess of 175 million, and is expected to reach 230 million by the year 2050 (Ibid, p. 12). While most
migrate for economic reasons and in pursuit of a better life, about one third of the total migrants were forced to leave for other reasons, such as natural disasters, environmental destruction, and persecution. The proportion of women is about 49 per cent of all foreign workers.

Europe was the largest host of international migrants, with 56 million migrants in 2000, followed by Asia, and Northern America. Indeed, these three regions hosted most of the international migrants (84 per cent) in the world. In the USA alone, there were 16.7 million immigrants between 1970 and 1995 followed by 13 million in the Russian Federation and 7 million in Germany (IMP-UNFPA report, 2004).

Foreign workers have also flowed in recent years into the newly industrializing countries in East and Southeast Asia. In the 1980s alone, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) economies were estimated to have experienced a net outflow of over 1,764,000 people (Stahl and Appleyard, 1992). For the whole of Asia in the same decade, an estimated net outflow of 3,341,00 persons was experienced (Arnold, 1989). The Middle East with its huge oil industry was the pulling force, with Saudi Arabia hosting 3.4 million migrant workers between 1970 and 1995. In the United Arab Emirates 74 per cent of its population are foreign workers and in Kuwait over half of its residents are non-nationals (Stalker, 2000).

Other main recipients are Japan, and the newly industrialized economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. In 1995, Singapore hosted 350,000 foreign workers, representing about one-fifth of its labour force (Ibid.). Although these movements are constant, numbers however remain fluctuating, depending on the political and economic climates of both sending and receiving countries. Nonetheless, it is expected that more workers will continue to flow through porous borders in search of stability and income.

Migration and Economic Efficiency

The study of migration is at the core of labour economics because the analysis of labour flows—whether within or across countries—is central to labour market equilibrium. Workers respond to regional differences in economic outcomes by voting with their feet. These labour flows improve labour market efficiency.

For example, suppose there are two regional labour markets, one in a Northern country and one in the South, and that these two markets employ workers of similar skills. Suppose further that the current wage in the North exceeds the wage in the South. Under some conditions, the wage differential between the two regions will not persist once the economy attains a competitive national equilibrium. After all, the wage differential encourages some Southern workers to move to the North, where they can earn higher wages and presumably attain a higher level of utility. The flow of Southern workers into the North would raise the Southern wage and depress the Northern wage. If there were free entry and exit of workers in and out of labour markets, the national economy would eventually be characterized by a single wage (See Figure 1).

The single wage property of competitive equilibrium has important implications for economic efficiency. The theory of labour demand demonstrates that the wage equals the value of marginal product of labour in a competitive market. It is this parity between the real wage and marginal physical product that attains profit maximization for employers in a purely competitive market. As workers move to the region that provides the best opportunities, they eliminate regional wage differentials and allocate labour to where they make their maximum contribution. There will be no incentive for labour to move, and the economy would have attained its maximum output as workers of given skills will have the same value of marginal product of labour in all markets. This allocation of workers to employers, which equates the value of marginal product across markets is said to be a Pareto efficient allocation because it maximizes national income and because no other redistribution can raise national income.
An Economic Model of Migration

In 1932, Sir John Hicks argued that, “differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration”. Practically, most modern studies of migration use this hypothesis as the starting point and view the migration of workers as a type of human capital investment (Sjaastad, 1962). In this restrictive human capital approach, workers calculate the value of the opportunities available in each of the alternative labour markets, net out the cost of making the move, compare likelihood of finding employment, and choose whichever option maximizes the net expected present value of lifetime income (Todaro, 1969; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987).

Suppose there are two labour markets where a particular worker can be employed. The worker is currently employed in region i and is considering a move to region j. The worker, who is t years old, earns Wit dollars. If he were to move, he would earn Wjt dollars. It costs mij dollars to move from i to j. These migration costs include the actual expenditures incurred in transporting the worker and his/her family, as well as the dollar value of the “psychic cost”—the pain and suffering that inevitably occurs when one moves away from family, neighbors, and social networks. These costs are netted out from the destination wage either as a one-time payment or as lasting psychological cost that must be taken into account each year t. It is possible for mijt to be negative. This could be the case of persons running away from oppression and violence in their place of origin. In that case, mijt becomes an advantage rather than a cost to migrating to the new destination. Like all other human capital investments, migration decisions are guided by the comparison of the present value of lifetime earnings in the alternative opportunities.

The net gain to migration from origin i to any destination j is given by:

\[ \text{NetGain} = \sum_{k=t}^{T} \left( \frac{(1-u_{jk})(W_{jk}-m_{ijk})-(1-u_{ik})(W_{ik})}{(1+r)^{k-t}} \right) \]

* The terms in the equation are often multiplied by another probability (one minus the probability of getting caught) in order to take account of undocumented migrants.

Where \( r \) is the discount rate and \( T \) is the age of retirement, \( W \) is the net wage rate (net of transfer cost) and \( u \) is the unemployment rate. The worker moves if the present value of the net expected gains is positive.5

A number of empirically testable propositions follow immediately from this framework:

1. An improvement in the economic opportunities available in the destination increases the net gains to migration. This includes either a higher wage or a lower unemployment rate, and raises the likelihood of worker movements.
2. An improvement in the economic opportunities at the current location decreases the net gains to migration, and lowers the probability of worker movements.
3. An increase in migration costs, both financial and emotional, lowers the net gains to migration, and reduces the likelihood of a move.
In sum, migration occurs within this narrow neoclassical framework when there is a good chance that the workers will recoup their human capital investments. As a result, migrants will tend to gravitate from low-income to high income regions, from high unemployment to lower unemployment regions and the larger the expected income differential between the regions or the cheaper it is to move, the greater the number of migrants.

It must be noted that income maximization and utility maximization are not equivalent. If migration is sought to maximize utility, it will introduce a number of interesting twists into the study of migration decisions. For instance, equation (1) ignores why there are regional wage differences in the first place, implicitly assuming that the international or national labour markets are in disequilibrium, in the sense that different regions offer different opportunities to the same worker. However, wage differences may partly reflect compensating wage differentials that reward workers for the varying set of amenities that different regions may offer (Roback, 1982).

The wage can be expected then to be relatively lower in more pleasant localities. Even though a particular worker might face different wages in different labour markets, the worker’s utility would be constant across labour markets. The wage differentials that are the focus of the human capital approach, determining the migration decision in equation (1) are the ones that persist after the analysis has factored in regional differences in the value of amenities and deficiencies.

The New Economics of Migration

Neoclassical migration theory is rooted in labour market disequilibria that produce expected wage gaps across national boundaries. A new paradigm, however, has emerged indicating that migration stems from market failures outside the labour market. When prospects of future markets are non-existing, or if markets are incomplete, imperfect or inaccessible as is typically the setting in many developing economies, households who cannot access viable incomes and capital markets in the home country tend to send a member or more abroad as insurance against risks and/or to assure access to capital. If wages and opportunities abroad are higher and plentiful, international migration offers a particularly attractive and effective strategy for minimizing risks and overcoming capital constraints (Stark, 1991; 1986). This immediately takes the emphasis from the individual (the core of neoclassical economics) to the household (society) and away from absolute income correction to relative income determinants where “relative deprivation” is a greater incentive for migration than the wage gap (Stark and Taylor, 1989).

Furthermore, the linkage between the migrants and the sending community contradicts the neoclassical human capital model assumptions and outcomes. In the neoclassical model, migrants relocate permanently wherever they can maximize net expected lifetime incomes, and they play little or no role in the economic life of the sending community. Remittances have no place in the neoclassical model but are key variables in the new economic model of migration. They are a major objective for the sending emigrating member and the receiving family.

Family Migration

The neoclassical discussion of immigration has generally focused on the behavior of a single worker as he or she compares employment opportunities across regions and chooses the location that maximizes the present value of expected lifetime earnings. Most migration decisions, however, are not made by single workers, but by families. The migration decision, therefore, should not be based on whether a particular member of the household is better off at the destination than at the origin, rather whether the family as a whole (nuclear and even extended) will benefit (Mincer, 1978).
Suppose that the household is composed of more than two persons, a husband, a wife, a child, parents and even grandparents. Let the change $\Delta PVH$ be the change in the present value of the husband’s earnings stream if he were to move geographically from region $j$ to region $i$—net of migration costs. And let change $\Delta PVW$ be the same change for the wife, and let change $\Delta PVC$ be the change in the present value of the child’s long term earning stream and welfare, whereas $\Delta PVp$ represents the change in the present value of the earning stream of the parents. If the husband was single, he would migrate if the “private gains” of $\Delta PVH$ were positive. If the wife was single, she would migrate if $\Delta PVW$ were positive. The nuclear family unit (that is, the husband, the wife and the child) will move only if the net gains to the nuclear family are positive, or if the sum of $(\Delta PVH + \Delta PVW + \Delta PVC) > 0)$.

The optimal decision for the nuclear family unit is not necessarily the same as what is optimal for a single person. Suppose, for example, that the woman would move on her own if she were single, for she gains from the move (that is, $\Delta PVW > 0$), but that the husband’s loss exceeds her gain (so that the sum of $(\Delta PVH + \Delta PVW) > 0$). Hence it is not optimal for the nuclear family to move. The wife is, in effect, a tied stayer. She will sacrifice the better employment opportunities available elsewhere because her husband is much better off in their current region of residence and vice-versa if the situation was reversed.

In the case of the extended family, the condition becomes the sum of $(\Delta PVH + \Delta PVW + \Delta PVC + \Delta PVp) > 0)$. It could be the case that the nuclear family may have to accept migration in order to support remaining parents or other family members by sending remittances that would augment the parents’ earnings even when their own net gains may decline by immigration.

**Individuals, Families and the Nation**

Typically, the migration decision is made by persons or families, but there are also societal and national consequences to consider. It can be easily seen that nations lose when the individuals that migrate have not paid fully for their education and skills. This gives rise to the brain-drain phenomenon where poor sending countries subsidize rich receiving countries. It is certainly a problem when one considers the increase in welfare of individuals and families through migration but neglects the welfare losses to societies and nations. Remittances sent back by migrants may fall short of the total human capital loss incurred by society at large, giving rise to the issue of the asymmetry of losses and gains from migration of individuals versus societies.

**Network Theory**

Kinship ties, friendship and shared community origins are hypothesized to increase migration flows because they reduce the psychic and risk costs of immigration. These network connections constitute a valuable social capital that migrants can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment, and better wages and working conditions (Boyd, 1989). Several historical and empirical studies of immigration have recognized and confirmed that the concentration of particular nationality and ethnic groups in certain cities facilitated the migration of the same groups to these cities (Levy and Wadycki, 1973). There is a rich literature on the immigrant multiplier effects where family members secure the entry of other family members. By allocating immigration papers along family ties, American, Canadian, and Australian laws reinforce and validate the operations of migrant networks (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990).

**Segmented Labour Market Theory**

Both neoclassical migration theory and the new economic theory conceptualize migration decisions as the outcome of rational economic calculations by individuals or families responding to objective market forces or constraints. Segmented labour market theory of migration takes a different perspective, where
immigration responds to demand driven forces within structural imbalances of advanced economies (Piore, 1979). Capitalism gives rise to segmented labour markets where a primary market which generates high paying secure jobs coexists side by side with secondary market that is typically generating insecure, low paying jobs, and hazardous and unpleasant working conditions. Immigrants become desirable and are sought to fill jobs in the secondary market where residents shun away from certain occupations. Immigration policies in North America are perfect examples of engineered barriers to mobility for unauthorized migrants, therefore substantiating segmented labour markets.

Substantial evidence from Canada and the USA indicate that the returns to education rise with the length of stay in the country (Chiswick and Miller, 1988). In this respect, segmented labour markets theory is a complementary theory to both the neoclassical theory and new economics theory of immigration.

World Systems Theory

An international division of labour has emerged in the wake of globalization forces and the extension of capitalism into distant regions. Labour-intensive production is characteristic of developing countries and capital intensive production is now concentrated in a few cities in advanced countries. Non-capitalist structures and patterns of social and economic organization have crumbled. Large groups of people have lost their secure patterns of living and working and have become a large pool of potential migrants. Unskilled workers saw their wages fall as the demand for their skills dimmed, while skilled workers experienced major wage increases as the demand for their skills escalated. Globalization according to the world system creates large pool of highly mobile labour in developing countries while simultaneously creating the linkages and connections to advanced countries’ labour markets (Rumbaut, 1991).

Available evidence suggests that industrialization and agricultural development as indicators of capitalist market development are instrumental in inducing migratory flows according to the world systems theory, particularly when they occur under unfavorable demographic and economic conditions, and where the communities affected are connected to the larger world markets and centers (Ricketts, 1987).

Factors in Labour Migration

In recent years, the issue of foreign labour has become increasingly serious economically, politically, and socially. Rich and industrialized countries are magnets for labour migration. In response to increasing labour shortages and relative high wages, ever-larger numbers of foreign workers are entering and often times illegally engaging in unskilled work under poor, and even dangerous working conditions. Many of these countries strictly prohibit the entry of foreigners for unauthorized work while opening doors more widely for highly skilled and specialized workers.

Resistance to movement of people is thus driven by economic and political policies designed to enhance local labour quality by attracting a select group of workers, while erecting barriers to others. The combination of slow demographic growth, earlier retirement age, and a dwindling pool of high school and college graduates in effect guarantees that many industrialized nations will face labour shortages at various points during economic cycles, thereby creating the demand to supplement their human resources (Johnston, 1991).

High Skilled Labour

Consequently, borders have been open by rich and industrialized states for professional, technical and skilled immigrants, in contrast to a dwindling acceptance rate of semiskilled and unskilled workers. These trends have been noted in all countries of the North, such as Canada, Australia and Europe. In the
United States, the greatest proportional contribution to the skill level of the immigrant intake is made by those in the independent, business and employer migration categories and business migration programmes (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor, 1994).

Movement of skilled labour manpower reflects the ‘workers-to-work’ trend, in contrast to unskilled labour manpower movement of ‘work-to workers’. Many developing countries are unable to create the sufficient numbers and types of jobs to employ these educated workers, leading to a growing pool of professionals that are willing to emigrate in search of better opportunities (Hugo, 1990). For example, comparing university graduates, China and Brazil rank third and fifth respectively in the world in the number of science graduates; Brazil, China, Mexico, Republic of Korea and the Philippines are ahead of France and the United Kingdom in the number of engineering graduates (Johnston, 1991). India has a large emergent information technology industry with over four million technical workers, second only to the USA (Embassy of India website, 2001). These high skilled workers can potentially be part of an international labour market in which they share common skills, a common language (usually English) and common values.

The exodus of skilled labour, a phenomenon often referred to as the ‘brain-drain’, has sparked passionate debates; some countries embrace it as an alternative solution to the social problem of being unable to provide high skilled people with qualified jobs, a way to reduce chronic unemployment, and a provisional solution to alleviate economic problems. It is also deemed to be an important source of foreign currency and national income. According to a World Bank report, it is estimated that remittances from overseas resident and nonresident workers have reached $126 billion in 2004, 65 per cent of these funds sent to developing countries. Since 2001, remittances to developing countries have increased by $41 billion (World Bank, 2005).

The International Organization for Migration confirms that “remittances to developing countries represent a large proportion of world financial flows and amount to substantially more than global official development assistance, more than capital market flows and more than half of foreign direct investment flows to these countries” (Sorensen, p. 3, 2004). The IMP-UNFPA report indicates that remittances substantially augment GDPS for countries such as Albania, El Salvador, Eritrea, Lebanon, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Yemen. These remittances represent 138.2 per cent of official development assistance (IMP-UNFPA, 2004).

REMITTANCES: TOP RECIPIENT COUNTRIES (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Billions US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danish Institute for Development Studies (2004)

REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per cent of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danish Institute for Development Studies (2004)
The money sent home supplements income and the industrial skills and experiences these workers bring back to their countries of origin can represent an important source of technology transfer. Therefore, employment of foreign workers plays a useful role in supplementing the revenues and technical knowledge of labour-sending countries. Supporters of liberal capitalism view such migration as a normal part of the economy, where skilled labour gravitates to places and opportunities, benefiting both sending and receiving countries. Others however, including some international organizations and many labour exporting countries, view the concept of the brain-drain as a liability, where the exodus of educated people represents wasted human resources for the sending countries and is a part of the ongoing pillage of poor countries by rich, industrialized, and colonialist driven nations (Gaillard, 2001).

Unskilled Low Wage Labour and Illegal Migrants

High skilled workers, however, make up only a small percentage of economic migrants. The bulk of guest workers are low skilled laborers in pursuit of a better life in greener pastures. They are also the ones who receive most attention by the media and social agencies. They are usually illegal migrants who clandestinely enter a given national territory. Stories abound of Chinese immigrants discovered in Seattle or Vancouver in a container, or others suffocating to death in the back of a truck passing through the British Channel port of Dover smuggling human cargo. There are also many accounts of raids on employers in the southwestern United States seeking illegal Mexicans, or in German construction firms employing undocumented Turkish workers.

This type of migration is contributing to growth in illegal employment or non-standard job contracts that elude regulations and government authority and create a hotbed for abuses. Illegal workers run the risk of unfair exploitation and human rights violations. Since their employment is illegal, neither they nor their employers notify the authorities that they are working. This means that it is virtually impossible to keep track of them, or afford them any protection. Moreover, many of these illegal workers are at the mercy of underground brokers who find them jobs and dictate their terms of employment. This leaves them exposed to a variety of potential abuses, including restrictions of their freedom of movement, violation of their contracts, and embezzlement of their wages. These workers are vulnerable because of their illegal status, and their ability to make complaints about unfair treatment is further limited by their lack of knowledge about their host country and their inability to speak the local language. Women are particularly vulnerable and are often prey to illegal traffickers who force them into sweatshop labour, domestic servitude, or sexual slavery. According to the US State Department between 45,000 and 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States every year (International Labour Organization, 2002).

In spite of this, however, the numbers of illegal or low skilled migrants are not decreasing. This is due in part to globalization and the growing disparities between rich and poor countries, which continue to exert pressures for massive labour migration (Stalker, 2000). A basic premise of globalization is the capital’s search for ever-cheaper labour and cost effective production. Economic demands intersect with social contexts, giving rise to specific forms of labour needs. Employers may not be able to lower wages to increase their profits because they are likely to meet resistance from workers unions and other organizations, hence they work around it by hiring low cost labour, which often time consists of unskilled or semi-skilled foreign workers. Indeed, as Stalker observed, “virtually all the international labour flows in this century have been deliberately initiated by the industrialized countries (1994, p. 29).

For example, for some industries like agriculture, allowance can be made to import cheap labour from third world countries for a temporary period. Canada has a ‘Foreign Worker Recruitment’ programme designed to allow employers to recruit foreign workers without adversely affecting employment and career opportunities of Canadians. Traditionally, these indentured laborers come from Mexico or the Caribbean Islands for a few months every year, earn minimum wage, and live in substandard housing provided by
their employers. They are not taking jobs from local citizens because the work they perform is considered ‘undesirable’ and therefore it does not undermine the local supply of the labour market. Proponents of such programmes view it as a form of aid to developing countries, whereby temporary legal migrants are offered work and wages, thus alleviating poverty and unemployment in their own countries. Conversely, others regard it as imperialism at its best. Rich countries profiting from the human resources of the developing world through exploitative practices by pilfering the skilled workers of the sending countries, offering them lower remuneration compared to wages offered to local citizens, and avoiding the expenses both of educating workers and of providing for their retirement.

The New Paradigm

The risk of the internationalization of labour markets is often associated with the exploitation of human resources within the context of labour force expenditure. At the macro level, the significant factors for changes in the movement and composition of population migrations include industrial structural changes and diversification, trade liberalization and technology, which are driving regionalization and globalization into a borderless economic system. The negative aspect of the increasing relocation or redistribution of jobs in a global economy and, particularly in a climate of high unemployment in developing countries, has created concerns over the “delocalization” of jobs rather than of people (Arthuis, 1993). The globalization of transnational corporations, increased foreign investment and a new capitalism have focused on bringing work to workers, not out of concern for the unemployed in developing countries, but for the purpose of increasing profits and having maximal returns on investments. This is achieved through the payment of lower wages to these workers, and in minimal expenditures in lax health and safety standards that are prevalent in these countries. It results in workers exploitation, as well as producing serious destabilization of societies even within national context. This is evident, for example, in rural to urban migrations, which is causing demographic explosions and increased poverty in third world cities. Even within developed countries, internal migrations of workers seeking employment in urban centers are changing the face of demographics and distributions of wealth in these countries.

Therefore, in countries of the North, the increased importation of labour-intensive products, such as textiles and clothing, has replaced the importation of labour (Matsunga, 1992). This is in sharp contrast to protectionist measures – reflected in heavy customs levies on imported goods – that were the norm in the pre-free trade era. Conversely, during these periods, migration of people was a simple boat-ride to countries such as Canada, Australia, and the USA. The goal in this paradigm shift is to accommodate capital’s need for expansion in new markets and increase profits by reducing overhead. For example, according to Stalker, global exports in 1996 amounted to about 29 per cent of world gross domestic product, while only 2.3 per cent of the world’s population migrated in search of better work prospects (Stalker, 2000).

The Benefits of Labour Migration

Nonetheless, international transfers of labour can provide a number of benefits. First is the opportunity to take advantage of quantitative and qualitative complementary distribution of labour resources. Not surprisingly, this is particularly beneficial to the recipient economy, allowing it to mitigate bottlenecks and mismatches in labour resources by importing the types of labour that are in short supply. This would contribute to an increased production and a more efficient economic performance in the recipient country. It will also enhance economic development at the broader, regional level. The complementarity of labour force among different – especially neighboring – states benefits both sending and receiving countries, as well as the broader region as a whole.

The degree and effectiveness of laws and regulations regarding migration of labour vary widely from country to country. Economic needs often dictate that authorities turn a blind eye to illegal movement
of people. Illegal migrations have contributed to the creation of a large black market of labour in many industrialized countries. Often it is socio-political pressures driven by protectionism, racism and colonialist ideologies that lead to tighter controls and stricter enforcement. Clearly, migration is affected by international as well as national politics; international factors interact with domestic structures and policies, influencing labour migration flows, and who gets to be invited or barred. In spite of this however, the question remains as to why no regime has developed a system to regulate migration that is comparable to the liberal regulations for trade, money, and finance. According to Hollifield, “[t]he answer maybe obvious: liberal states have had few incentives to cooperate in controlling migration, because states and employers were able to obtain foreign labour without international cooperation” (1992, p. 2). Moreover, the political-economic characteristics of labour, as a factor of production, are as different from those of capital, goods and services as to prohibit most types of international regulation. As Myron Weiner aptly states, “migrants differ from other international transactions in one fundamental respect: migrants themselves have their own will” (1990, p.75). Yet, they are also an expendable commodity and are often treated as disposable pawns in a global economy.

Conclusion

In summary, the international movement of labour should, theoretically, be welcomed for its potential benefits for both the sending and the host country. But so far, globalization has been very one-sided. World trade is increasing but it is mainly concentrated among rich countries. Meanwhile, the labour force of low-income countries is growing at a fast rate, and if enough adequate jobs are not available, many workers will look for them elsewhere in the global village. Governments ought to relax the rules and make allowance for the inevitability of people’s movement. Foreign workers do benefit their host as well as their sending countries; and unless governments and nations address this issue, it will continue to generate many undesirable problems and consequences socially, economically, and politically.

Figure 1. Effects of Trade and Migration on Wages
Endnotes

1 See, for instance, the papers by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), as well as by Blanchard and Katz (1992).

2 In this connection, the “specialists” should definitely include Bhagwati (1983, 1984), as well as Brecher and Choudhri (1981), Grossman (1984), Hamilton and Whalley (1984), Kemp (1993), and also Razin and Sadka (1999). Most of the extensive literature on migration, however, discusses the impact of immigration (or occasionally emigration) on national or regional economies, especially labour markets. Where economic costs and benefits are assessed at all, the benefits to the migrants themselves and to their families are often disregarded. Certainly it is rare to pay attention to measures of world rather than national welfare.

3 According to UNHCR, there were some 12 million refugees worldwide in 2001. Asia remains the major host region for refugees worldwide, followed by Africa and Europe. Most refugee host countries are safe neighboring countries of countries in conflict (i.e., Iran and Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, Guinea bordering Sierra Leone, Tanzania bordering the DR Congo, etc.), other countries, such as the United States and Canada, have well established refugee resettlement programmes, or a tradition of hosting refugees such as Germany.

4 The terms in equation (1) are often multiplied by another probability (one minus the probability of getting caught) in order to take account of undocumented migrants.

5 Many empirical studies have been carried out to test some of these hypotheses. For a comprehensive account of some of this work consult Douglass Massey et.al. 1994.

References


Gaillard, M., Brain Drain to Brain Gain, UNESCO Sources, March 2001, Issue 132, p4, 3p, 3bw.


This paper is concerned with the relationship between international migration and social-economic development. It gives particular attention to the relationship between migration and development in the context of contemporary globalization. Part 1 provides a brief background review of the nature of globalization. Part 2 examines the assumptions in several models of the relationship between migration and development. Part 3 examines the opportunities for introducing new migration and development policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty in migrant sending countries. Attention is given to those policies that are reinforced by current globalization patterns. The paper closes with a short summary of the main conclusions reached.

Part 1. Globalization

Globalization is a multi-dimensional process that involves inter-linked economic, cultural, and social change (Held et al. 2000). There is universal agreement that contemporary globalization is uniquely shaped by modern high-speed communications technologies (satellite phone links, the spread of cellular phones, digitalized data transfer, video conferencing, live international news coverage, etc.), fast airplane travel for passengers, and low-cost, high volume international freight (containerized transport, etc.) to speed the flow of trade goods. It is also understood that these technologies lead to a “compression” of time and space (Castells 1985, 1996). Geographically distant places are immediately accessible through communication channels, physically accessible within hours or a day of travel; and the goods they produce arrive overnight by air or within weeks by sea and truck. However, beyond these widely accepted assumptions, many questions remain (see Chart 1).

Chart 1. Questions and Debates Regarding Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Glocal” change?</th>
<th>Is globalization only a top-down process driven by powerful global forces, or is it equally or more a bottom-up “glocal” process in which local responses shape global change?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and inequality?</td>
<td>Given that globalization has the potential to promote economic growth and reduce poverty, why is it also sometimes associated with greater economic inequality?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony and conflict?</td>
<td>Given that globalization can promote economic, cultural and social links that bring people together, why can it also be associated with greater social conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration conundrum?</td>
<td>Globalization generates pressures for expanded international migration. At the same time it encourages more restrictive migration policies and promotes undocumented migration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The term “Glocal” refers to a fusion led by local actors, on the basis of their interests and values, with global interests and values (Robertson 1995). For some observers, the notion of “glocal” is hardly relevant. From their perspective, globalization is fundamentally a “top down” economic process in which powerful capitalist institutions in “core” capitalist nations promote trade, structural adjustment, and related institutional changes for all nations in the international community. For other observers, “glocal” processes are central. For them, the globalization process involves local interests looking outward and selectively incorporating and transforming global opportunities and values in ways that then transform the global system. For example, migrants organize a “home town” association and send delegates and development project money to their origin communities, they transform the international system; national political and cultural communities take on an increasing transnational character, playing a role in poverty reduction in “home” communities and generating new transnational forms of citizenship.

Harmony and conflict are transformed in globalization, but they do not disappear. In his controversial book, Clash of Civilizations, Huntington (1996) argues that the global world is actually becoming more deeply fractured along major historical cultural fault lines. Even if one views this perspective as an erroneous distortion and over simplification, it is obvious that a time-space compressed world leads simultaneously to stronger new and old solidarities as well as to the opening of new and old fractures. The balance between these two is difficult to sort out. For example, international migration leads to the formation of multicultural nations. But even within multicultural nations that promote immigration through various settlement and social-economic incorporation policies one may find hostility and racist marginalization of newcomers, including backlash rejection of those who are economically successful (Simmons 1998a, 1998b). In the worst cases, the process is associated with targeted assaults on members of minority groups and so-called “race riots” when anger in the minority community overflows.

Globalization leads to increasingly polarized tendencies with respect to international migration and to chaotic migration process, as migration pressures and efforts by receiving states to control these pressures come into conflict (Castles and Miller 1998). It is widely if not universally understood that globalization tends to generate pressures for increased international migration, particularly from less developed to more developed nations. At the same time, global forces lead migrant receiving states to favour “designer” (ready made for local labour market needs) immigrants, and to exclude the many others who would like to come (Simmons 1999). Migrants then enter in large numbers without documentation or they purchase counterfeit documents. Some employers in receiving countries, moreover, become complicit in the process by hiring (sometimes even recruiting) the undocumented migrants to meet their needs for low-cost workers. Not surprisingly, immigration is one of the most controversial policy areas in migrant-receiving nations around the world. This is one of the reasons why sober and useful discussion of important links between migration and poverty-reducing development are often sidelined in national and international policy discussion.

Part 2. International Migration

Expanding international travel and international migration are de facto tightly linked elements of contemporary globalization. This is to say, they are overlapping and in part define and reinforce each other. However, they are not entirely the same. And they can be conceptualized as being potentially quite separate under different circumstances.

For the sake of simplicity, one may distinguish four main conceptual frameworks on the relationship between globalization and migration. Each of these frameworks rests on particular assumptions that may or may not apply to factual historical periods and cases. These four main conceptual models are shown in Chart 2. They are elaborated below.
## Chart 2. Relationship of Globalization to International Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Predicted outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical trade theory</td>
<td>Global trade will reduce pressure of international migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-classical development</td>
<td>Global trade will increase pressure for international migration (at least in the short to medium term).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational communities</td>
<td>Global trade, migration and cultural contacts generate transnational communities that tend to re-generate existing migration flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial-states</td>
<td>Globalization will tend to generate skill-selective immigration policies in immigrant receiving states, thereby reducing overall international migration (or driving much of it “underground”).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predicted outcomes associated with each perspective in Chart 2 arise through different assumptions. Some of these assumptions correspond more clearly than others to the conditions found in contemporary globalization.

**Classical Trade Theory**

With expanding international and global trade, pressures for people to move from one country to another will decline. This will happen insofar as investment capital will flow more quickly and less expensively than people in response to wage differences across nations. In the current global situation, one sees a mix of cross-national capital and labour flows, presumably because the capital flows are not sufficient to equalize wages, at least in the short- to medium-term.

**Neo-classical Development**

In the economic development process, pressures for international migration from poor to wealthy nations will initially increase as developing countries shift from labour intensive production to capital intensive production. This will happen because of an enormous farm labour dislocation in developing countries and the inability of industry in these countries to provide alternative jobs, thereby leading workers to migrate to manual and low-wage service jobs in wealthier nations. These assumptions seem to fit well with global migration and development trends from the 1970s to the present (Massey 1988; Martin 1993, 1997).

**Transnational Social-political Communities**

While economic links and forces may initiate international migration flows, once such flows are underway they can and generally do take on a life of their own. Migrants form their own ethnic transnational communities in receiving nations (Basch et al 1994). These communities replicate in varying degrees the cultural and social institutions of their home countries. They build churches, temples and mosques. They establish newspapers and other media outlets (radio and TV programmes) in their home language and cover home news. They invite cultural and sports groups from their home country to visits. Members travel and send remittances “home” to provide support and stay in touch with friends and kin (Massey et al. 1990). How long such transnational communities tend to remain vibrant can vary widely from one historical case to another, depending on particular circumstances.
Entrepreneurial States

Globalization will tend to generate new immigration policies in immigrant receiving states that seek to selected desired migrants and overall limit inflows. This will happen because the export-led economic growth model that underlies global “free trade” initiatives is one involving trade and economic competition between states. As a result, immigrants are assessed particularly in terms of their potential role in increasing national production. In effect, immigrants with high levels of human capital (schooling, job skills, etc.) and/or high levels of financial capital and business experience will be preferred (Simmons 1999; Cheng and Yang 1998). If low-skill and low-wage workers are also required, migrant receiving nations will prefer to have such workers enter under temporary visas.

For the recent past and the first decade of the 21st century there is little doubt that all of above models with the exception of the Classical Trade Theory are highly relevant to any understanding of what is taking place. (Classical Trade theory may also be partially applicable over the longer term and in the future.) In effect, globalization creates and/or reinforces opposing forces over the short- to medium-term within a complex field. Globalization creates a potential for very high levels of international migration. It also strongly reinforces the development of restrictive state policies to restrict international migration to levels far below its potential.

One result of the tension between increased migration potential and rising immigration restrictions is the prevalence of “undocumented” migration. The undocumented migrants are fearful of discovery and deportation, hence they are also vulnerable to being “trafficked” and exploited in dangerous, low-wage working conditions, without access to proactive laws and institutions (Salt 2000).

One might imagine a much more positive future scenario where employment opportunities have increased in migrant origin countries to the point where workers do not need to migrate elsewhere to get jobs and find opportunity. Those who do migrate will do so for positive “pull” reasons primarily. Migrant destination states will face reduced pressure from migrants they do not seek to attract, and will provide even better incentives for those they do want. Opportunities for traffickers will decline, as will the abuses and risks faced by migrants. Borders would become open to easy travel for all.

Attaining the positive future outlined above will require enormous effort to overcome contemporary global inequality and poverty. The question arises whether and to what extent it is possible to link migration and development policies in ways that would attain this future. We turn to this question in the next section.

Part 3. Policy Options

This section examines four migration and development policy questions. First, under what circumstances and to what extent can unemployment and low wages in migrant sending countries be reduced through accelerated emigration? Second, can development be enhanced by the return of skilled migrants to their home countries? Third, what policies will improve the welfare and development impact of migrant remittances? Fourth, what is the development potential for transnational community projects? Each question is examined in terms of the contemporary globalization context.

Fostering emigration?

High levels of unemployment and low wages in migrant sending countries arise when there are more workers than jobs. The most direct solution to this problem is to increase investment in job-creating and
income generating enterprises. This is the main objective of development agencies and national economic policies. However, a supplementary policy of interest to many developing countries is to encourage the out-migration of workers in the expectation that this will reduce labour supply and lead to downward pressure on unemployment and upward pressure on wages. The downside risk is that the workers who depart will take with them valuable human skills (and even financial capital) that will further reduce development prospects in their home country. This is of course commonly referred to as “brain drain” (see below).

The best documented historical example of the role of emigration leading to reduced labour supply and rising wages is that of massive migration from Europe to North America in the mid- to late-19th century and the early 20th century (Thomas 1954). Wages rose not only because of the magnitude of labour emigration, but also the significant industrial development taking place in Europe (driven in part by the demand for industrial goods in the Americas). A similar but more limited process occurred after World War II. During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, as Europe struggled to recover from the devastations of the war, unemployment was high and wages were low. Correspondingly, many workers and their families emigrated to Australia, Canada, the United States and other nations. Eventually the outflow from Europe came to a halt when labour became scarce due to the combined effects of emigration and economic expansion.

The labour demand effect of out-migration works best when emigration and new investment take place at the same time. For example, it has been argued that very large emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States from the 1930s to the 1970s was associated with rapidly rising wages in Puerto Rico in part because of operation “bootstrap” and other investment plans that also benefited Puerto Rico in this period (Friedlander 1965).

If emigration is large enough, it can eventually affect labour demand and wages even in large nations. But the process can be slow. For example, about 10 million Mexican born individuals live in the United States. This is about 10 per cent of the population of Mexico. The migrants come from various parts of Mexico, but principally they are from a number of Northern and Western Mexican states. More recently the out movement is increasing faster in other states. Yet there is little sign even in the states of major exodus that wages are yet rising due to increasing labour shortages.

Contemporary globalization places a major constraint on the potential for using out migration policies to drive down unemployment and to drive up wages in migrant sending countries. This is because there are no major “new frontier” countries interested in and capable of absorbing the large numbers of low-skilled, unemployed and marginally employed workers in the less developed nations. As a result, opportunities for the use of emigration as a coordinated policy of migrant sending and receiving nations are more restricted. Nevertheless, some exceptions and new possibilities may be noted.

Spain and Ecuador have no formal agreement to jointly administer the very large flows of Ecuadoreans who have been moving to Spain recently. Yet, the process falls within understandings arising from the long historical links between these two countries, their common traditions, and their complementary labour market challenges (labour shortages versus over supply, respectively). Of course, the positive impacts on development in Ecuador arising from the flow of migrants will be greater to the extent that the emigration is accompanied by significant investments in employment generating economic activities in Ecuador. Unfortunately, such investments have remained in short supply over the recent past.

International cooperation in the area of trade policy can also generate increased labour demand in migrant sending nations. Policies that increase agricultural production, including that for exports, from migrant-origin nations can lead to a significant increase in the demand for workers in these nations. This
outcome is obvious when the crops require a great deal of manual labour, such as is the case for certain varieties of rice, many fruits and vegetables, and export crops such as highland coffee and cut flowers. Low wage nations have an inherent cost advantage in producing such crops. Their advantage may persist even when agriculture is highly mechanized through the use of tractors and fertilizers, because some tasks (such as packing for export) may remain labour intensive.

Two possible changes in trade policy would be particularly relevant for increasing agricultural production in less developed nations. One policy change would reduce or eliminate the agricultural import tariffs imposed by developed nations to protect their own farm sectors. There is little question that this move would have a positive impact on agricultural production, labour demand and development in less developed countries.

The other possible policy change involves the elimination of export subsidies provided by developed nations to manage over supply of agricultural products. Sometimes these subsidies are hidden in low-cost or free shipments of food to very poor countries as part of international aid. Large food production subsidies provided by the United States, Europe and other countries tend to drive poor farmers in less developed countries out of business (Oxfam 2005). The impact of eliminating these subsidies on developing nations appears to be complex. Initially the policy shift would drive up food prices in food-importing countries. Nations with a capacity to respond to higher food prices by increasing their own food production would then realize positive development benefits, including increased labour demand. However, very poor nations without the capacity (in terms of land, capital, roads, ports, etc.) to respond to rising food prices by increasing their own production would, in contrast, simply face higher prices for the food they must import. The urban poor in these countries would suffer most (the rural poor have access to subsistence agriculture). These complex policy outcomes are still being assessed and debated (see Tokarick 2003; Cline, 2004; Panagariya 2004).

Brain Drain or Brain Gain?

The well known “brain drain” argument draws attention to the way in which migration can siphon off valuable human skills and constrain development in migrant origin countries (Bhagwati 1998). While the argument has been around for many years, it may be noted that it seems particularly relevant in a period of intense economic globalization through the expansion of exports and trade. In the context of global competition between trading states for higher national productivity (to generate exports) migrant receiving states become ever more focused on recruiting the very most skilled immigrants. These wealthier states thereby increase their own economic prospects. On the other hand, migrant sending nations lose their very most skilled (and expensive to train) scientists, technologist, engineers and other workers. This greatly depresses their capacity to import and transform technology for development.

The negative impact of emigration on human resources in migrant origin countries seems to be particularly great for smaller developing nations (such as the Caribbean island states or Central America) that have limited capacity for inventing or importing/adapting new technologies. In general, around the world, small less developed countries lose a higher proportion of their high-skilled workforce to developed countries than do other less developed nations (Economist 2005; for source data see Dumont and Lemaitre 2004). When skilled migrants leave these smaller countries, they are less likely to return. Larger developing nations (like India) not only lose a smaller proportion of their high-skilled workforce to migration, but they also have a greater capacity to attract a return migration of skilled professionals and workers who have benefited from further training and experience abroad.

The most commonly cited positive example is the return of highly skilled computer programmers from Europe and North America to India. This happened largely in response to the rapid growth of private software firms in India, reflecting India’s low-cost, high-performance niche in this area within the global
economy. However, other nations such as Korea have had in place for some years policies that encouraged Koreans to complete professional and scientific degrees in the developed countries, particularly the United States, and then to return home. Obviously such a policy will work better when complemented by other policies and private investment patterns creating a high demand for these skilled professionals and workers.

Enhancing Remittance Flows?

For many migrant sending countries around the world, remittances are a major source of foreign earnings. In some countries migrant remittances are the most important source of foreign exchange, exceeding the revenues generated by the next leading “export” (be it cotton, coffee, tourism, etc.). It is understood that remittance flows are facilitated by easy communication with the home family (via telephone) and the ability to transfer funds internationally through money transfer agencies. In consequence, remittance receiving states and international agencies have been very keen to learn more about the development impacts and possibilities of remittance flows.

Studies of migrant remittances show that the funds are sent overwhelmingly to family members in the home country and that they are used by those family members primarily for day-to-day consumption purposes, including improved housing (Russell and Teitelbaum 1992; Simmons 1997). The remittance receiving households are therefore far better off in terms of housing, clothing, food and access to health services, for example, than they would be if they did not receive any remittance income. Some studies go a further step to assess whether over time those households that receive remittances are better off than households who do not receive remittances. Those receiving remittances are in fact better off, controlling for other factors that influence household income. In sum, there is little doubt the family welfare is improved by migrant remittance flows.

A number of studies also point to migrant remittances being used for the purchase of land, farm or business equipment. These suggest an immediate positive impact on production, productivity, the provision of services and other development outcomes. However, this may not actually be what happens in all cases. For example, land is sometimes acquired simply as a form of savings (or even for the prestige and pleasure of owning land in the home community). Other observers have noted that some families and entire communities can become entirely dependent on remittances, to the point that their members are no longer interested in taking local jobs and children drop out of school because they see a better future in migrating abroad to jobs that require little schooling (Mills 1988).

Do migrant household remittances have any impact on long-term future development? The evidence seems to suggest that migrant remittances do have a positive effect on such matters as health and the school attainment of children in recipient households. In addition, studies of large flows of remittances to particular communities and regions suggest that the “multiplier effects” of remittances can have an appreciable potential impact on local jobs and incomes (Durand et al. 1996). But doubts remain. It has been observed in some cases that a high inflow of remittances can lead local youth to abandon school at a young age on the assumption that their future lies not in further studies but in migration and employment as unskilled or semi-skilled workers abroad (Mills 1988). Others have noted that the goods that remittance receiving households purchase may tend to “filter” away from local employment toward foreign owned firms and even back to wealthy nations. For example, consumer goods in parts of Mexico are now increasingly provided by multinational (American) firms such as Wal-Mart. With free trade and the increased flow of food grains into Mexico (along with a decline in Mexican corn production) when remittance receiving families buy imported wheat flour or rice, their purchases eventually benefit the foreign producer.

It is useful to think of policies that would facilitate remittance flows and enhance their impacts. One policy being explored by the Inter American Development Bank is to encourage greater competition among
money transfer agencies and lower remittance-sending fees (IABD/MIF 2004). The cost of sending remittances from the United States and Canada to Central America and the Caribbean in 2004 could be as high as 15 per cent of the total remitted, depending on the amount and the agency used. Even normal fees in the range of 5-7 per cent appreciably reduce the amount of money the sender has available to transfer to his/her family. The International Monetary Fund, the Inter American Development Bank and other development agencies are now actively exploring programmes with money transfer agencies, banks and credit unions that would bring down transfer costs (see Chami et al. 2003; Nishikanye 2004; Orozco 2004; Ratha 2003).

A second, complementary policy would encourage money transfer institutions (including agencies, banks and credit unions) to compete with one another for the provision of additional financial services (savings accounts, credit, etc.) for recipient families. Broader, more accessible and lower-cost financial services would provide an additional support to local welfare and development in migrant-origin communities.

Transnational Community Projects?

Migrant communities have independently, without any outside encouragement, created various “home town associations” and “alumni associations”. These associations are often primarily concerned with organizing a pool of money to fund projects in the communities from which they emigrated. In some cases, the collected funds go primarily to cultural events, such as special religious and civic festivals in their home communities. The main outcome of this kind of collective project is therefore cultural maintenance. Some migrants may return from time to time to their home community to participate in these meaningful festivals. Those who cannot return can still participate vicariously at a distance, with the aid of phone calls and videos sent by mail from the home community.

In other cases, the collected funds go primarily to community infrastructure projects, such as repairs to the church, the building of a public plaza, or scholarships, furniture and computers for local schools. These projects have an inherent development potential and have therefore become a focus of policy interest by remittance receiving nations and international development agencies. One of the best established and known national cases is that of Mexico where various levels of government (local municipality, state and federal) have provided matching funds to enhance the impact of money contributed by US-based Mexican home town associations for development projects, such as paving streets, supplying electricity, extending water mains, etc. to better particular communities. Other countries are aware of the potential for such projects and are in the process of developing similar policies and consulting with their “diaspora” abroad on possible interest in these and other ventures. Critical observers of such ventures have, at the same time, warned that there is a danger that the remittance receiving nations are “abandoning” their own development projects and policies and allowing funds from home town associations to substitute for what the state would and/or should spend on development projects.

Policy and programme experimentation will lead to better knowledge of the longer term impact of “investments in development” by home-town associations. Globalization creates new spaces for such experimentation. The daily telephone communication between family members still in the home communities and those who have migrated abroad allow the migrants to participate directly (not just vicariously) in collective and institutional projects intended to better their home communities. These projects lead to two completely interdependent and self-sustaining outcomes: transnational community solidarity (through a common culture and identity) and improved welfare and development prospects in home communities. Policies favoring simply the economic outcomes need to be complemented by other policies that reinforce transnational culture and identity. The latter would be served by policies that create multicultural spaces in receiving countries, dual citizenship, and voting rights for migrants in their home countries.
Summary and Conclusions

Globalization creates a mix of promising opportunities and difficult challenges for poverty reduction through migration and development policies and programmes. This paper focused on the opportunities for new policy development. The possible new policies cover a wide range of approaches, including specifically: changes in trade agreements and other complementary investment policies to reduce unemployment in sending countries and out-migration from these countries; return migration policies to minimize brain drain in migrant sending countries; enhanced money transfer and banking projects so that migrant remittances will have a greater positive impact; and the promotion of transnational community development projects. Several of these policy options have only been examined in specific regional contexts; others have not been examined at all. New experimentation with them will further clarify their potential for reducing poverty and achieving other Millennium Development Goals set by the United Nations.

References


PANEL ON PARTNERSHIPS: CASE STUDIES
Je voudrais tout d’abord rendre hommage à l’initiative du FNUAP d’avoir organisé cette rencontre du groupe d’experts sur une question d’actualité et très préoccupante, à savoir la migration, et remercier les organisateurs de nous avoir offert cette opportunité pour échanger nos idées et débattre d’un sujet qui prend de plus en plus d’ampleur dans le monde contemporain.

Sujet à la fois complexe et pluridimensionnel, la migration touche des dimensions variées et variables, la documentation et les études qui s’y réfèrent restent hétéroclites, les statistiques plus ou moins fiables et les recherches anthropologiques en la matière qui décèlent les comportements les rôles et les positions des migrants ainsi les représentations sociales les concernant demeurent quasiment absentes.

Dans cette intervention sur « l’impact économique, social et culturel de la migration : cas du Maroc », je voudrais partager avec vous ma réflexion sur la question comptant surtout sur le débat et l’échange d’expériences qui pourrait enrichir cette contribution, comme je proposerai un certain nombre d’hypothèses de travail et une analyse personnelle, qui aiderait à nourrir notre réflexion sur la question et la faire évoluer.

En effet, l’analyse de la migration au Maroc ne se présente pas comme un cas isolé. C’est une partie d’un tout, engageant plusieurs paramètres, politique, économique social et culturel, et se jouant sur plusieurs espaces, à la fois local, national, régional et international.

Aussi, la migration au Maroc ne peut-elle être appréhendée en dehors de son cadre maghrébin, Méditerranéen et international, étant donné les mouvements de populations qui se développent, s’accélèrent sous l’impulsion de la mondialisation, la facilitation des transports et des moyens de communications, le développement de l’audiovisuel, la multiplication des systèmes de réseaux. Ce qui nécessite des études à divers niveaux, des recherches pluridisciplinaires pour cerner les différents problèmes qu’elle pose et aboutir éventuellement à des solutions plus appropriées et qui tiennent compte à la fois des intérêts et des droits des migrants, de la souveraineté des États, des évolutions démographiques et de la participation des migrants au développement des pays d’accueil et d’origine.

Le migrant en général et le migrant marocain en particulier évoluent dans un espace mouvant et à multiples facettes. Autonome et dépendant, il est un être mobile par excellence, se situant dans l’entre deux, entre l’espace du pays d’origine et celui du pays d’accueil, il transite entre plusieurs espaces, plusieurs cultures et différents mondes.

La circulation incessante entre le Maroc et le pays de destination, le maintien de la double résidence : une qui correspond à la vie professionnelle et active et l’autre liée aux vacances aux loisirs et au maintien des
relations familiales. De même que l’essor des naturalisations, la multiplication des politiques d’intégration dans la pays d’accueil d’une part, les efforts d’attraction des immigrés, l’importance de leurs transferts, leur implication dans des projets de développement dans les pays d’origine d’autre part, les mettent à l’interface entre deux modes de vie, deux rythmes de développement, entre deux cultures et deux civilisations différentes. Ce qui fait d’eux des vecteurs de développement et de réels intermédiaires sociaux culturels.

Le Maroc a toujours été une zone de migration. Sa position géostratégique, tête de pont entre l’Afrique et l’Europe, la proximité de l’Europe, 14 km qui le sépare de l’Espagne par le détroit de Gibraltar, ses frontières poreuses et difficiles à contrôler au sud –est 3500 km, et 3500 km de côtes atlantique et Méditerranéenne font de lui une réelle terre promise pour la migration.

Mais, pourquoi les migrations dans les pays du Maghreb et les mouvements de populations au Maroc mobilisent-elles autant l’opinion publique, les médias et préoccupent-elles autant les responsables du Nord et du sud?

Sans doute parce que, la migration est devenue un phénomène de société, le mouvement s’intensifie de par le monde, l’Europe terre d’accueil privilégiée se referme sur elle-même, se préoccupe davantage de questions sécuritaires, et de lutte contre le terrorisme, surtout après le 11 Septembre 2005. Alors que le Maroc vit une restructuration profonde de ses institutions politiques et son système économique, essaie de juguler ces flux avec la participation de l’Europe, avec qui il entretient une relation étroite, structurée autour d’un partenariat, dont l’objectif est l’instauration de la paix, la stabilité et une prospérité partagée, consacrée par un accord d’association et la nouvelle politique du voisinage.

Le Maroc est ainsi pleinement impliquée dans la dynamique migratoire internationale selon trois modalités

♦ D’abord dans son rôle traditionnel d’émission des flux, principalement destinés vers l’Europe, et actuellement vers les pays du Golfe, les USA et l’Australie.
♦ Ensuite comme espace de transit migratoire vers les pays de destination traditionnels, c’est-à-dire l’Europe
♦ Enfin en tant que pays d’immigration surtout irrégulière en provenance des pays subsahariens.

Aussi, la question migratoire est devenue une dimension structurante dans les relations euro-méditerranéennes voire les rapports euro-africains.

L’intervention qui suit sera structurée autour de deux parties, traitant essentiellement de la migration du Maroc vers l’Europe.

La première partie dressera l’état des lieux de la migration au Maroc, en présentant un bref historique et traçant la grande évolution des flux migratoires durant ces trois dernières décennies.

La seconde partie tendra d’apporter plus d’éclairages sur les différents impacts de la migration sur l’économie marocaine, sur l’évolution sociale et culturelle en focalisant davantage sur le volet économique.

Première partie : Mouvements migratoires au Maroc

Si le Maroc a été considéré depuis longtemps comme un pays d’émigration principalement orientée vers l’Europe, il est devenu au cours de cette dernière décennie un pays de transit et surtout d’immigration provenant des pays subsahariens.

Les chiffres sur la migration subsaharienne au Maroc sont très fluctuants, ceux dont on dispose ne représentent que le nombre de personnes en situation irrégulière arrêtées ou celles qui ont été rapatriées.

I. L’émigration marocaine vers l’Europe est très ancienne

Ancien pays sous protectorat français et espagnol, le Maroc a gardé des liens étroits dans les domaines économique et culturel avec les métropoles, liens qui ont été consacrés par le traité de Rome en 1957, qui soucieux de préserver les courants commerciaux traditionnels, comporte un protocole spécifique avec le Maroc. Vers la fin des années 1960 des accords purement commerciaux ont été signés avec les trois pays du Maghreb.

La solidité des relations économiques entre les deux rives de la méditerranée s’était renforcée par des flux migratoires qui étaient constitués au départ par des soldats pour accueillir après des ouvriers, s’étendre aux familles et atteindre les compétences.

Les contingents de soldats

En matière d’émigration, la France a toujours puisé dans les ressources humaines maghrébines. Aussi, la première vague d’émigration a pris naissance quand la France fit appel aux «bras maghrébins pour faire tourner les usines dont les ouvriers partirent en guerre, ainsi, plus de 500 000 maghrébins furent ainsi réquisitionnés au Maroc, en Algérie et en Tunisie »2 La même opération se renouvela durant la deuxième guerre mondiale. La guerre avait également besoins de soldats et les Maghrébins furent appelés et enrôlés souvent de force pour faire la guerre aux côtés des alliés.

La fin de la guerre, la grande perte en hommes qu’elle a engendrée et la destruction de toute une économie ont renforcé les flux migratoires d’origine maghrébine. La France et l’Europe avaient besoin d’une force de travail abondante et bon marché pour développer leurs économies.

Une émigration de main d’œuvre

Ce type d’immigration a été planifié par les pays d’accueil. Le recrutement des ouvriers se faisait en concertation entre les pays d’accueil et d’origine, les ouvriers étaient soumis à certaines épreuves de forces et sélectionnées selon les exigences du secteur dans lequel ils vont travailler.

Un père marocain racontant son recrutement en 1974 comme ouvrier forestier en France témoigne que «des français sont venus à Khénifra. Ils ont fait passer des épreuves de forces aux candidats à l’émigration: une chaîne reliée à un compteur sur laquelle tirait le candidat, si la barre n’atteint pas le point 140, il est exclu, si elle va au-delà il est retenu; il y avait dit-il près de 2000 candidats, 186 seulement ont été sélectionnés. D’autres méthodes de recrutement se limitaient juste à l’examen scrupuleux des mains »

Cette migration de travail s’est étendue en dehors de la France pour atteindre des pays comme la Belgique, la Hollande et plus tard l’Allemagne, une émigration qui concernait les hommes seulement, dont l’objectif était de ramasser un petit pécule pour construire une maison ou ouvrir un commerce dans leur pays d’origine.
Le regroupement familial et l’immigration féminine


La crise pétrolière en 1973 avait marqué le début d’une mutation dans la politique migratoire européenne, qui conduisit au regroupement familial. Elle indiquait également une nouvelle orientation des migrations vers le sud de l’Europe (Italie, Espagne) et à un déplacement lent des travailleurs, qui s’est accen-tué à partir des années 1980 des champs traditionnels dans lesquels ils étaient insérés (industrie, exploitation minière) vers de nouveaux espaces de plus en plus ouverts (bâtiment, services, agriculture, les professions libérales et le travail indépendant).

A partir de ce moment, on assiste à une féminisation de la migration. Entre 1975 et 1982, relate Camille Lacoste Dujardin, les femmes maghrébines sont deux fois plus nombreuses que les hommes à entrer en France, en faveur du regroupement familial.

Une immigration saisonnière

Cette migration concerne les travailleurs employés avec des contrats de courte durée. Ils sont souvent employés dans l’agriculture, on les appelle les OMI. Recrutés par l’Office des Migrations Internationales, pour six mois, prolongeables de deux mois. A la fin de son contrat, le travailleur dispose de dix jours pour regagner son pays. Ces contrats ont été souvent signés entre la Tunisie, le Maroc et la France dans le cadre de conventions bilatérales.

« La région, les Bouches du Rhônes en France ou l’agriculture recourt à une main d’œuvre étrangère depuis quelques décennies comptabilise la moitié des quelques 10 403 contrats existants en France en 2001. Dans cette région, les droits des travailleurs ne sont pas respectés, le renouvellement des contrats se fait sous une grande pression et les travailleurs saisonniers transformés en clandestins doivent payer une sorte d’impôt à l’employeur avant de reprendre la travail. »

Les saisonniers en général ne représentent qu’un fragment de la migration. D’ailleurs, avec la mise en place du traité de Maastricht qui instaure un plafond pour les permis de travail, l’immigration légale se trouve insérée dans un ghetto, ce qui a engendré à partir de ce moment un renforcement de l’immigration irrégulière.

Une immigration irrégulière

L’Europe a toujours été un foyer propice pour l’immigration. La proximité de l’Europe, son attractivité au niveau économique et culturel, la présence d’une communauté maghrébine bien installée voire intégrée, l’impact des médias à travers les différentes chaînes de la TV, qui offrent une image séduuctive et éblouissante des pays européens incitent nombre de jeunes à quitter leur pays d’origine pour chercher du travail, pour étudier, pour réussir une mobilité sociale plus grande ou tout simplement pour assouvir leur curiosité.

Seulement, la fermeture des frontières européennes, les restrictions imposées à la politique des quotas, les problèmes relatifs au renouvellement des permis de travail, les difficultés d’obtenir un visas, ajouté au chômage des jeunes du Sud et surtout les diplômés, la fermeture des horizons et la limitation des perspectives d’avenir qu’ils engendrent font que les flux de main d’œuvre irrégulière s’accroissent et se multiplient.
Ces mouvements répondent toutefois à l’appel de certains secteurs d’activité en Europe, qui recourent structurellement à la main d’œuvre étrangère, illégale au vu et au su des pouvoirs publics, spécialement à un moment où la concurrence internationale fait rage.

La main d’œuvre irrégulière se trouve ainsi aspirée par une économie souterraine comme le relève Bichara Khader et plus particulièrement le secteur informel, et « c’est parce que les pouvoirs publics sont impuissants à régler l’économie souterraine qu’ils s’acharnent sur l’immigration clandestine ». Ce genre de migration se trouve accaparé par les secteurs de l’agriculture, du bâtiment et des services, surtout domestiques, pour des pays comme l’Espagne et l’Italie, la France. Ces travailleurs sont malléables et corvéables à merci. Un immigré surtout clandestin est une force de travail, provisoire, en transit c’est à dire révocable à tout moment.

A rappeler le cas d’El Jido en Espagne où des émeutes xénophobes ont éclaté en Février 2000 contre les ouvriers immigrés marocains, et qui ont généré un mouvement de protestation aussi bien dans les pays du nord que ceux du sud. Dans ce cadre, Le forum civique européen a dépêché une commission sur place qui a publié un rapport détaillé « El Jido, terre de non droit » publié aux éditions Golias, où il expose une réalité peu connu de l’exploitation inhumaine des immigrés, souvent irréguliers, dans l’agriculture et surtout dans le secteur des fruits et légumes

Le Forum Civique Européen s’est vite rendu compte que cette question ne concerne pas l’Espagne seulement, il y a également d’autres régions qui sont affectées, dont les Bouches du Rhônes par exemple. Aussi, une enquête fut lancée au niveau européen pour éclaircir davantage la face cachée de ce secteur de production, ce qui aboutit à la publication du livre « le goût amer de nos fruits et légumes. L’exploitation des migrants dans l’agriculture intensive ». Mai 2002.

Ces migrants irréguliers sont généralement privés de toute protection. Leur expulsion peut advenir à tout moment. Exploités, ils ne répliquent pas, mal traités, ils adoptent le silence. Les autorités publiques les condamnent, la police les traque, la plupart des employeurs continuent à les faire travailler tout en niant leurs droits les plus élémentaires.

Aucune loi ne les protège ; la convention sur la protection des travailleurs migrants et leurs familles qui date de 1990 n’a été signée par aucun pays européens.

Si l’immigration légale a été contenue, l’immigration irrégulière n’a été ni éliminée, ni même réduite. La tragédie des patéras, des noyades d’immigrés dans des zodiac surchargés a fait prendre conscience aux responsables des deux rives de l’existence de filières mafieuses, pour le passage des clandestins vers l’Europe, des filières qui se développent partout dans le monde avec un trafic humain estimé à près de 15 milliards de dollars et qui donne lieu aux violations les plus abjectes de l’être humain.

Migrations des compétences

Si l’émigration clandestine est stigmatisée, celle des cerveaux est nettement appréciée voire sollicitée. La demande se fait de plus en plus renforcée pour une émigration des compétences. Romano Prodi, devant les députés européens réunis à Strasbourg le 1er mars 2001 a indiqué que « l’une des manières d’accroître la taille de la population active de l’UE serait de faire venir en Europe des jeunes possédant des qualifications dont nous avons besoin ». 

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 185
La politique de quotas se développe partout, certains pays européens qui ont un manque grandissant dans les secteurs des services demandent des médecins, des infirmiers, des aides infirmiers, des enseignants, des techniciens dans différentes branches et surtout des informaticiens de haut niveau.

Le Maroc devient alors un des fournisseurs d’une force de travail qualifiée, formée et prête au travail, faisant fi de l’investissement engagé par le pays dans sa scolarisation et sa formation. On peut craindre ainsi le glissement vers une vision utilitariste de la politique migratoire mise au service du libéralisme économique.

Un grand risque est encouru par les pays d’accueil et ceux d’origine. Les premiers vont voir le fossé se creuser entre les groupes des immigrés ; entre une élite, privilégiée et choyée grâce à tout un système de dérogations et une masse d’immigrés résidents ou illégaux soumis à une discrimination et à un rejet de plus en plus accentué. Tandis que les seconds vont subir les conséquences négatives de ces départs, étant privés de la force la plus dynamique, et la plus qualifiée de leur pays.

Il est à relever que la gravité de cet exode généralisé des compétences tient à la certitude que la connaissance est aujourd’hui la source fondamentale de la création de richesse et le facteur primordial de la compétitivité internationale.

A coté de ces différents types de migration, on ne peut omettre deux mouvements de population qui prennent de plus en plus d’ampleur ces dernières années, et qui nécessitent plus de vigilance et d’engagement de la part des États, à savoir la migration des femmes et surtout celle des mineurs.

**La migration des femmes**

Si en 1975, la migration des femmes s’est opérée dans le cadre du regroupement familial, et que nombre d’épouses, de mères, d’origine souvent rurale, illettrées dans la quasi-totalité des cas, ont pris la route vers la rive nord, on assiste, et ce depuis les années 1980 à une émigration féminine de grande envergure, d’une main d’œuvre urbaine, célibataire, mais aussi veuve ou divorcée, et scolarisée vers l’Europe et plus particulièrement l’Espagne et l’Italie, ainsi que vers d’autres pays arabes comme la Libye, et les pays du golfe.

Les femmes migrantes vivent doublement le calvaire de l’immigration illégale, nombre d’entre elles tombent entre les mains de passeurs, qui les exploitent, les violent, les poussent à la prostitution. Les plus réticentes sont abandonnées, maltraitées et soumises aux pires sévices.

**La migration des mineurs**

Migration économique ou comme stratégie familiale, la migration des mineurs s’est accélérée au cours de ces dernières années. Attirés par une Europe riche et prospère, séduit par l’expérience des adultes émigrés, une nouvelle tendance se développe chez les enfants de quitter le pays pour travailler, pour avoir leur indépendance, pour se libérer des contraintes familiales, pour devenir adulte avant terme. Des groupes de migrants potentiels se constituent et d’autres modes de pensée et de modèles de comportements sont en train de se créer parmi les écoliers, les enfants de la rue ou les jeunes apprentis.

Ces jeunes enfants se trouvent généralement entre les mains de passeurs qui les exploitent, les intègrent dans des réseaux de prostitution de drogue, de mendicité. Employés également par des réseaux clandestins, ces jeunes arrivés en Europe constituent un vivier de délinquance.
Les résidents marocains en Europe

La communauté marocaine installée à l’étranger représente près de trois millions de personnes dont plus des trois quarts vivent en Europe. L’immigration de travail des années 1960, s’est transformée en immigration d’installation où l’idée de retour s’amenuise, voire disparaît pour laisser place à une politique d’intégration et à revendication de plus en plus forte de la prise en considération de l’immigré, de ses droits et de son intégration dans l’espace européen dans lequel il vit.

Le retour devient plutôt un mythe, les marocains à l’instar de la population maghrébine préfèrent vivre en Europe, malgré la racisme et la xénophobie que de revenir au pays. L’immigration marocaine devient une immigration durable, ce que refusent d’admettre les partisans du retour au pays, et dont les politiques se sont avérées un échec.

Même les retraités choisissent de rester en Europe, circulent entre les deux pays dans un va et vient toute l’année et qui s’accentuent durant les vacances d’été.

Le beur, qui a été scolarisé, qui parle la langue du pays d’accueil remplace l’ouvrier illettré, la féminisation accrue de la main d’œuvre et son insertion dans les professions socialement valorisées, le rapprochement progressif des comportements démographiques européens, le glissement de la main d’œuvre immigrée vers des statuts d’indépendant (hôteliers, restaurateurs, commerçants, avocats, médecins ou vers la petite et la moyenne entreprise) témoignent de la mobilité lente, mais réelle de la population marocaine migrante et son insertion dans les pays d’accueil.

Reste, que les conditions de vie des migrants résidents en Europe sont encore bien difficiles pour la grande majorité. S’il existe des succès individuels, elles s’inscrivent dans des logiques plutôt individuelles, elles ne sont aucunement le résultat de stratégies collectives.

La population marocaine immigrée demeure encore sous intégrée, notamment les deuxième et troisième génération. Vivant des déficits importants au niveau de l’éducation et la formation, l’accès à l’emploi et au logement, elle est soit exploitée, travaillant dans des emplois non conformes à sa formation avec des salaires de bas niveaux, soit réduite au chômage. Ce qui la conduit non seulement à une marginalité professionnelle mais à une marginalité sociale.

Les politiques nationales européennes continuent à osciller entre l’assimilation, l’intégration et la nouvelle citoyenneté. Cette dernière qui se fonde sur l’égalité des citoyens en droits et devoirs est encore à un stade élémentaire.

II. Le Maroc, pays de transit

Un flux migratoire important se développe depuis 1990 en provenance des pays subsahariens vers les pays du Maghreb pour passer en Europe. Un flux qui s’est accentué dans les années 1997 / 98 et qui est généré par la situation qui prévalait et qui continue à prévaloir en Afrique, dont les conflits interethniques, la pauvreté, le chômage, la sécheresse, la maladie avec les ravages du sida rendent la population de plus en plus démunie et vulnérable, incitant les plus jeunes à quitter les lieux et s’aventurer sur les terrains les plus dangereux pour arriver en Europe, lieu de prédilection, lieu de sécurité, où les droits de l’Homme sont respectés.

Certes, l’Afrique subsaharienne est entrée dans une grande régression économique depuis les années 1980. Le rapport de la CNUCED en 2002 atteste que la population qui vit dans l’extrême pauvreté en Afrique
est passée de 56 pourcent entre 1965/69 à 65 pourcent entre 1995/99. D’ailleurs, d’après la CNUCED 32 pays africains font partie des PMA parmi les 48 qui existent de par le monde.

La communauté internationale réagit frileusement à cette situation catastrophique en Afrique. Les recommandations des Nations Unies de consacrer 0.7 pourcent du PIB des pays riches au développement des pays pauvres est restée lettre morte. Le versement actuel est de 0.25.

Cette carence de l’aide est aggravée par un endettement pesant, puisque le dette extérieure de l’Afrique subsaharienne a été multipliée par 3.3 en 20 ans, passant de 60.6 milliards de $ en 1980 à 206 milliards de $ en 2000.

Cette situation de pauvreté renforce la tendance de départ massif vers l’Europe. Or, pour y accéder il y a le passage obligé par les pays du Maghreb. En effet, des relations traditionnelles privilégiées lient le Maroc au pays de l’Afrique subsaharienne, notamment le Sénégal, la Guinée le Mali et le Niger, etc. L’influence des sultans marocains était très grande dans cette région, les échanges commerciaux florissants et les liens religieux étroits.

Le Maroc a également et depuis plus de trois décennies ouvert les portes de ses universités aux étudiants africains, créant une Agence de Coopération Internationale au sein du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, qui prend en charge ces étudiants et leur accordant des bourses d’état. Actuellement de nombreux étudiants africains poursuivent leurs études dans des institutions publiques et privées au Maroc et une majorité de cadres africains occupant des postes de responsabilités dans les pays d’Afrique francophone ont été formés au Maroc.

La stabilité qui caractérise le Maroc et la prospérité économique dont il jouit ont incité nombre d’africains à traverser le pays en toute sécurité, voire s’y installée pour une longue durée attendant leur passage vers l’autre rive.

Maroc, pays d’immigration

Les migrants sub-sahariens en quittant leurs pays opèrent sur deux niveaux. Choisir un pays de transit où ils pourraient vivre sans problèmes, et accéder en Europe par le circuit le plus proche avant de se rendre dans le pays de leur choix. Le Maroc est toujours prisé à cause de sa proximité de l’Europe et à cause de l’existence de différentes portes de sortie vers l’Europe.

L’enquête menée par le BIT en Août 2002 sur « l’immigration irrégulière subsaharienne à travers et vers le Maroc » donne des indications très précieuses sur les caractéristiques des migrants irréguliers, des parcours entrepris, les problèmes et les déceptions rencontrées.

A notre grande surprise, les migrants subsahariens ne sont pas des illettrés, où des personnes sans qualification. L’enquête révèle que 42 pourcent des migrants subsahariens ont des diplômes supérieurs, et 43 pourcent sont passés par le lycée ou sont bacheliers. Ce sont généralement des jeunes, d’origine urbaine à niveau d’instruction variable, mais généralement élevé.

Installation dans les pays de transit

Au niveau des grandes villes maghrébines, ces prétendants au paradis se comptent par centaines, sinon par milliers. Les mouvements sont tellement fluctuants qu’il s’avère difficile d’avoir des chiffres officiels fiables.
Pendant la période de transit dont la durée reste fluctuante selon les migrants, ils vivent dans une grande précarité et parfois dans un dénuement total. Ils ont des difficultés à être logés et à travailler. Quand ils trouvent un emploi, c’est toujours un travail au noir, mal rémunéré ou ils sont souvent mal traités et exploités.

La peur des descentes de la police suivie d’arrestations et d’expulsions accentue leur mobilité au sein où entre les pays du Maghreb. La communication avec les nationaux se trouve parfois bloquée notamment pour les immigrés qui parlent anglais.

Les exploits des migrants irréguliers posent avec acuité la question de violation des droits humains. Si les jeunes migrants sont exposés aux plus grands dangers lors de la traversée du désert, ils sont également guettés par la misère et la mort le mauvais traitement et l’exploitation dans les pays de transit et lors du passage en Europe.

La plupart des expulsés reviennent souvent dans les pays qui les ont rejetés ou choisissent d’autres voies dites plus sûres.

En s’installant au Maroc, les migrants subsahariens vivent dans des camps provisoires qu’ils ont créés eux-mêmes (création de deux camps dans le Nord du Maroc aux portes de Ceuta et Melilla: celui de Ben Younech par référence à la forêt où il se trouve, et un autre Gourougou, un nom africain. Ils créent également de nouveaux espaces dans la ville, avec l’apparition de nouvelles territorialités et de nouvelles marges qui ne sont plus la périphérie mais qui préfigurent de nouveaux centres. On assiste à une mondialisation des métropoles.

Le Maroc consacre un budget important destiné à la prise en charge de ces personnes en transit, au transport de celles reconduites aux frontières ou dans leur pays d’origine.

L’Europe ferme ses portes

La Méditerranée occidentale est actuellement marquée par de grandes inégalités entre les deux rives. Si le PNB des pays de l’UE s’élève à 8500 milliards de $, celui des pays du sud n’atteint que 509 milliards de $. De même que le revenu par habitant en Europe est de 22700$ alors qu’il n’est que de 2280$ dans le sud.

Certes les pouvoirs publics européens tentent de fermer les frontières et de faire de l’Europe une forteresse quadrillée et protégée par un arsenal juridique, gardé par des militaires, des barbelés, des radars et de hauts murs. La lutte contre l’immigration clandestine est une des priorités des pays européens et de l’union européenne, notamment après le 11 Septembre, quand l’amalgame entre migration clandestine et terrorisme devient récurrent, voire une norme difficile à dissiper dans les rangs des populations et des responsables politiques. La lutte contre ce fléau engendre une persécution de l’immigré, et notamment, l’irrégulier jamais réalisé dans le passé, et une violation de ses droits humains tels qu’ils sont prescrits par les conventions et déclarations internationales.

Le Maroc pays de tradition migratoire vers l’UE demeure très préoccupé par Le sort réservé à la communauté marocaine à l’étranger, à la migration clandestine de ses citoyens vers l’Europe, aux mouvements des populations subsahariennes sur son territoire et à la migration des compétences. Préoccupations légitimes étant donné l’impact grandissant des flux de populations vers l’Europe et à travers le Maroc sur le développement économique et social du pays.
I. L’IMPACT DE LA MIGRATION SUR LA CROISSANCE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL DE LA SOCIETÉ MAROCAINE

Les migrants ont toujours joué un rôle essentiel dans le développement économique et des pays d’accueil et d’origine, faisant entrer plusieurs paramètres en jeu dont les transferts des résidents à l’étranger, le coût des compétences qui émigrent et le déficit qu’ils génèrent pour le pays d’origine ainsi que les dépenses consacrées aux contrôle des frontières, la réduction de l’immigration irrégulière et la prise en charge des irréguliers en transit. Ainsi, les retombées économiques de la migration peuvent être positifs mais parfois négatifs.

D’ailleurs, Les rapports des migrants à la loi induit une distinction des catégories diverses de migrants auxquels correspond des niveaux de droit ou de non droit. Nous avons :

♦ les migrants réguliers qui ont un permis de séjour et résident légalement dans le pays d’accueil
♦ les naturalisés qui ont acquis la nationalité du pays de résidence
♦ les migrants sous contrats
♦ les irréguliers qui résident illégalement, mais ne sont pas identifiables par leurs papiers
♦ les irréguliers qui résident illégalement mais sont identifiables par leurs papiers d’origine

Quelques interrogations, voire des hypothèses de travail seraient nécessaires pour aborder ce second chapitre, dont les suivantes :

1 / Plus l’immigré est intégré dans le pays d’accueil plus l’intérêt pour le pays d’origine se renforce, les transferts augmentent et l’investissement dans des projets de développement s’accroît.

2 / Plus l’immigré est instruit et hautement qualifié, plus ses transferts sont orientés vers l’investissement.

3 / Plus le niveau d’intégration augmente, plus la propension de retour diminue, et plus les transferts diminuent, notamment chez la troisième génération, alors que les liens intenses avec le pays d’origine augmentent les chances de rapatriement d’argent et de retour.

4 / Quand les migrations sous contrat se développent, les transferts augmentent.

5 / La migration contractuelle tend à faire orienter les transferts des migrants vers l’immobilier et l’équipement beaucoup plus que vers des activités productives.

6 / Plus le pays d’origine adhère aux normes universelles, se démocratise, instaure l’état de droit et protège les droits de l’homme, plus le migrant s’intéresse à son pays, s’investit dans son développement et renforce les liens avec ses anciens concitoyens.

7 / Plus le niveau d’instruction du migrant augmente, plus il assimile la culture du pays d’accueil, plus il accepte la sienne, la valorise, et tend à exprimer fièrement son appartenance à une double culture, et son adhésion au patrimoine culturelle de l’humanité tout en focalisant sur la diversité des cultures.

8 / Peut-on espérer le retour de la migration des compétences, si les structures économiques dans les pays d’origine ne sont pas mises à niveau.

9 / La migration de transit surtout quand elle se prolonge a-t-elle un impact sur la stabilité et le développement du pays.
On ne peut infirmer ou confirmer scientifiquement ces hypothèses, l’absence d’études, de données de base existantes ne nous permet de répondre que partiellement à ces questions.

Quant à l’impact économique de la migration nous devons constater deux sortes d’impact par référence à la population migrante cible.

1 / impact de la communauté marocaine à l’étranger et des autres émigrés marocains sur le développement économique du Maroc.

2 / impact des migrants subsahariens sur l’économie marocaine.

1. Le rôle des migrants marocains dans le développement économique de leurs pays

Les orientations de la politique nationale en matière de migration ont accordé une grande importance à la participation des marocains résidents à l’étranger dans le développement socio-économique du pays. Sa Majesté Mohamed VI a clairement défini dans son discours du 20 Août 2001 la nouvelle politique globale et intégrée à l’égard des MRE, qui vise à « assurer une mise à niveau parfaite des organismes, institutions et associations qui s’occupent des migrants, afin de les hisser au niveau des enjeux vitaux que représentent l’émigration pour le développement du Maroc, pour sa modernisation et pour son rayonnement extérieur ».

Quand on se réfère à la politique du gouvernement à l’égard des MRE, on relève quatre objectifs:

1 / promouvoir et orienter les investissements des marocains émigrés afin d’en constituer un levier pour dynamiser le développement économique durable,

2 / transférer les connaissances et les expertises scientifiques et technologiques nécessaires au développement du Maroc,

3 / inciter le tourisme national destiné à la communauté marocaine, en lui consacrant des offres compétitives à travers des méthodes novatrices adaptées aux aspirations et aux ambitions des jeunes émigrés,

4 / soutenir les efforts déployés pour l’amélioration des conditions d’accueil de la communauté marocaine à l’occasion de son retour au pays.

L’émigration marocaine en Europe, la présence d’une forte communauté qui y vit a des retombées très positives sur le développement socio économique du pays, que ce soit au niveau de l’emploi, des transferts de devises, du tourisme, des projets de développement ou l’échange d’expertise.

Au niveau de l’emploi

Malgré toutes les réformes structurelles, les efforts investis dans le développement économique du pays, les demandes d’emplois continuent à augmenter au Maroc, le chômage n’a pas décru, et un grand nombre de jeunesalphabétisés et avec des diplômes cherchent les meilleurs moyens pour quitter le pays.

Ces départs vers l’extérieur soulagent le pays de cette pression constante sur les pouvoirs publics pour procurer du travail à ces jeunes chômeurs, sous qualifiés, aux diplômés. L’émigration devient ainsi un amortisseur des tensions sur le marché du travail, voire un moyen de régulation du marché de l’emploi.

A relever que même des personnes qui disposent d’un emploi stable, d’un revenu de cadres supérieurs émigrent, cherchant ainsi à améliorer leurs conditions d’existence et celles de leurs enfants, une promotion
sociale certaine, ou un désir de vivre ailleurs, échappant à certaines contraintes sociales qui sont encore ancrées dans la société marocaine.

**Au niveau des transferts**

La contribution des immigrés au développement de leurs pays d’origine est fondamentale. D’ailleurs, les migrations en général sont motivées par un besoin économique. L’argent épargné et transmis à la famille peut être considéré comme un investissement. Toutes les études concourent à affirmer que la contribution financière des immigrés à leur pays d’origine est de loin plus importante que les montants consacrés à l’aide publique au développement.

Les transferts des marocains à l’étranger représentent l’une des principales sources de devises du royaume avec les recettes de tourisme et les exportations de phosphates.

Ces transferts sont passés entre 1997 et 2003 de 23 à 37 milliards de dirhams par an. Soit 2.1 à 3.3 milliards d’euros environ.

Par leur importance, ces transferts constituent l’une des bases essentielles du fonctionnement de l’économie marocaine et le bien être de la société.

Au niveau macro-économique, ces fonds couvrent une partie du déficit de la balance des paiements. Ils contribuent à hauteur de 13 pourcent dans le total des dépôts bancaires.10

A ces transferts en argents, il faut ajouter les transferts en nature (vêtements, meubles, articles électroménagers, voitures voire du matériel divers et outillage) qui occupent une place non négligeable. Ainsi, une enquête ponctuelle couvrant deux foyers de l’émigration marocaine Nador et Tadla évalue ces transferts entre 30 pourcent et 50 pourcent des transferts financiers11.

Le problème, c’est que les transferts ne sont pas toujours destinés à l’épargne ou l’investissement productif, une grande partie est allouée aux dépenses de subsistance et utilisée comme soutien aux ménages défavorisés et comme vecteur de réduction de la pauvreté. Jamal Bourchachen atteste que « Ces transferts profitent aux ménages sous forme de création d’emplois et de distribution des salaires. Ils seraient à l’origine d’une baisse du taux de pauvreté au Maroc de 23.2 pourcent à 19 pourcent ; autrement dit 1.2 millions de marocains auraient échappé à la pauvreté grâce au soutien financier des émigrés opérés sous forme d’investissements et de divers transferts »12.

Une recherche menée par l’Institut National de Statistiques et d’Economie Appliquée révèle que le montant global des investissements des MRE ne peut être déterminé, et les chiffres disponibles montrent que les MRE sont majoritairement orientés vers des investissements improductifs, notamment dans l’immobilier avec plus de 83 pourcent du total. Le reste, les 17 pourcent sont employés comme suit : 12 pourcent consacrés au commerce, 3 pourcent à l’industrie et 2 pourcent à l’agriculture.

Conscient de cette situation, l’état tend à prendre des mesures incitatives en

♦ renforçant et en améliorant la politique d’accueil des immigrés
♦ donnant une plus grande impulsion à l’intégration et la participation des immigrés dans le développement économique
♦ incitant les banques à adopter une politique de proximité à l’égard des RME
♦ Cherchant de nouvelles pistes pour inciter les MRE à investir au Maroc. Ce qu’ils ne font pas suffisamment malgré les mesures prises en matière de simplification des procédures administratives et la création des Centres Régionaux d’Investissement.

Toutefois, si les générations des parents restent très attachées à la grande famille résidente au Maroc, lui envoient de l’argent et répondent à ses besoins fondamentaux, quand ils sont pauvres, en chômage ou en tant que personnes âgées, on se demande si la situation ne va pas évoluer pour les jeunes de la 2\ème et surtout la 3\ème génération dont les liens familiaux avec le pays d’origine se relâchent de plus en plus ?

« L’enjeu des 10 prochaines années sera pour le Maroc de savoir séduire la 3\ème génération moins décidée à investir dans le pays disait Olivia Marsaud »\textsuperscript{13}, et la conseillère en communication du Ministère des MRE de souligner que la 3\ème génération ne fait pas de transferts, ne montre aucune volonté d’acquérir des terrains dans le pays, et il est exceptionnel qu’elle possède des comptes bancaires au Maroc ». Je peux ajouter et selon des témoignages divers qu’elle est plus orientée vers la participation à des projets de développement dans les secteurs économique et social.

Concernant l’utilisation des transferts, on peut relever trois tendances :

♦ La première génération, pour qui l’Occident était une transition, intervenait par des investissements essentiellement sociaux
♦ La seconde génération mieux intégrée et dont l’Occident constitue un tremplin pour une promotion sociale et le développement d’une classe sociale moyenne supérieure ou supérieure, les Investissements étaient plutôt orientés vers des projets productifs
♦ Pour la troisième génération instruite et naturalisée, elle s’oriente vers le développement d’investissement direct et développe des initiatives d’entreprises basées sur une logique partenariales avec des investissements plus structurés\textsuperscript{14}.

Niveau tourisme

Les mobilités des marocains à l’étranger vers le Maroc s’accentuent ces dernières années et concernent toutes les catégories de migrants. Mobilités qui s’effectuent toute l’année avec un point culminant pendant les vacances d’été.

En 2002, 65 pourcent des marocains établis à l’étranger sont rentrés dans le pays d’origine, le nombre de véhicules a été estimé à 250.000, en plus de ceux qui rentrent par avion, dont le nombre ne cesse de croître.

En se rendant dans leur pays, les MRE exercent un impact touristique capital. Ils traversent les différentes régions du pays, visitent les sites touristiques, séjournent plus longtemps que les touristes étrangers (22 nuitées contre 7 nuitées).

Les dépenses des MRE durant leur séjour au Maroc se font dans les régions d’origine ou ils passent une grande partie de leurs vacances. Ainsi, l’activité économique, commerciale et touristique se trouve très ranimé (transactions commerciales, activités immobilières, dépenses pour fêtes familiales, achats de produits et de services sociaux).

Le transport se trouve également très ranimé, les 250.000 véhicules ramenés exercent un impact important sur les compagnies maritimes, les compagnies d’assurances, la distribution du carburant et sur les activités autoroutières.
**Intervention des migrants dans des projets de développement**

Plusieurs immigrés marocains participent non seulement au financement du développement dans leurs pays d’origine, mais contribuent par des projets de développement. A part les transferts des immigrés en matière financière, ils sont également à la source de flux immatériels (transferts de savoir faire, médiation culturelle, création de réseaux).

Les associations dans les pays d’accueil se multiplient, destinés au départ à faciliter l’insertion des nouveaux arrivés et l’intégration de la 2ème et 3ème génération, elles ont commencé par s’orienter vers des projets de développement dans les pays d’origine, spécialement leur région d’origine en intervenant dans les domaines de l’irrigation, du développement rural de la formation et surtout en donnant une impulsion aux secteurs sociaux, (éducation, santé, tourisme…etc).

Certaines associations de migrants, nées dans les pays surtout européens sont totalement dédiées au bien être des marocains.

Ces associations investissent surtout dans les infrastructures du village natal. Les résultats sont très encourageants, un grand nombre de villages furent ainsi électrifiés, des ouvrages hydrauliques mis en place, des dizaines de dispensaires construits, plusieurs écoles réaménagées et des centaines de kilomètres de routes construites.

Ces interventions locales généralement gérées par des associations villageoises font revivre les provinces et donnent plus de rayonnement à la région.

A travers ces actions, les immigrés dont nombre parmi eux continuent à être l’objet de racisme et de xénophobie dans les pays d’accueil, réaffirment leur appartenance au pays d’origine et leur insertion dans les pays d’accueil. Ce qui les incite à exprimer leur choix ultérieur de rester à l’étranger ou de rentrer au Maroc.

Ces déplacements entre les pays d’origine et les pays d’accueil, nourries par une volonté de soutien et d’aide au développement du pays d’origine constituent un moyen de socialisation important pour la nouvelle génération et un moyen de l’initier progressivement à la culture et la civilisation du pays d’origine et de resserrement des liens entre les marocains des deux rives.

**Niveau transfert d’expertise**

Si la première génération des migrants en provenance du milieu rural reste rattaché à l’amélioration de leur bien être et celui de leurs familles, la 2ème et 3ème génération qui reste liée au pays est motivée et mobilisée par l’idée d’entreprendre de grands projets qui s’avèrent un défi et pour la société d’accueil et pour celle d’origine.

L’entrepreneuriat émigré encore à ses débuts est un phénomène aux multiples facettes. Il apparaît comme une source nouvelle de richesse, d’emplois et d’apprentissage technique et technologique. Le retour des compétences après quelques années passées en Europe demeure crucial pour le Maroc. Avec ces jeunes c’est un entrepreneuriat d’un genre nouveau qui s’insère dans le tissu économique, de nouveaux experts, hardis, performants et prolifiques en initiatives contribuent à une nouvelle mise à niveau économique et un développement effectif du pays.

Conscient du rôle que pourraient jouer les investissements des MRE et les nouveaux experts rentrés au pays, dans le parachèvement du tissu économique, les pouvoirs publics ont pris une série de mesures pour asseoir la crédibilité de l’environnement national des affaires et de renforcer les relations des MRE avec le pays d’origine.
Un dispositif de soutien a été mis en place pour faciliter le partenariat émigré à savoir

♦ Des réformes de l’environnement institutionnel et administratif
♦ La création d’organismes publics ayant pour mission la promotion de l’acte d’entreprendre par les MRE tout en favorisant le retour au Maroc et la mise à niveau de l’économie marocaine
♦ La création de la banque A Amal
♦ Création de la Fondation Hassan II
♦ Création de programme pour coopération entre entreprises et pour entrepreneurs débutants
♦ Création des centres régionaux d’investissement

2. Les immigrants subsahariens au Maroc

Le fléau de ce mouvement constitue un handicap pour l’économie marocaine et cause une certaine instabilité sociale.

Les migrants subsahariens vivent dans des conditions de pauvreté et de dénuement total, vivent de la mendicité ou récupèrent les restes à manger dans les marchés. Ils rencontrent beaucoup de difficultés pour trouver un travail, étant donné que la situation économique au Maroc, marquée par un taux de chômage élevé, ne permet pas aux migrants de trouver du travail que très rarement. Si on ajoute les trois années de sécheresse, on peut constater que le monde du travail est totalement fermé pour cette catégorie de main d’œuvre.

Pour gagner de l’argent certains immigrés s’adonnent à une économie de bazar, c’est-à-dire la vente d’objets artisanaux ramenés de chez eux, on les retrouve également dans le petit commerce de trottoirs ou dans le bâtiment, renforçant ainsi le secteur informel. Via ce commerce, ils entrent en interaction directe avec la population locale, Ainsi, se fait progressivement le passage d’un nomadisme à des sédentarités temporaires qui peuvent durer entre deux mois et trois ans.

La situation de manque et de fuite les incite à entreprendre des activités illégales, comme la vente de la drogue, falsification et contrefaçon de documents de voyage ou de billet de banque, proxénétisme et prostitution. (Le dernier exemple des immigrants de Sierra Léone qui trafiquaient de la poudre d’or falsifiée à des bijoutiers de Casablanca.

Les migrants subsahariens vivent généralement dans la misère, exclus du monde de travail à cause de la pénurie d’emploi et de leur situation irrégulière, ils ne font qu’augmenter la taille du secteur informel, et s’impliquer dans des activités illégales, ce qui représente un danger pour la stabilité du pays.

Reste que ces immigrés dont nombre d’entre eux étaient munis d’une certaine somme d’argent à leur arrivée au Maroc, sommes destinées généralement aux passeurs, se trouvent en train de la dépenser pour répondre à leurs besoins les plus élémentaires.

Mehdi Lahlou ajoute que ces immigrants de passage au Maroc reçoivent aussi des transferts d’argent par le biais d’institutions bancaires, tels que Western union. Mais ces transferts dont ils disposent ne sont pas investit dans des projets de développement à cours ou moyen terme mais sont souvent dépenser pour la survie du migrants, sa sécurité et la réalisation de son espoir, de traverser vers l’autre rive.

Le Maroc ne peut faire face à ce nouveau fléau de la migration irrégulière qui s’accroît de jour en jour. S’il dispose de plus d’atouts que d’autres pays africains, son économie ne peut juguler la demande d’emploi des nationaux eux-mêmes. Par ailleurs, l’économie marocaine est incapable de procure du travail à des immigrants subsahariens, quand on prend en considération que 20 pourcent de la population marocaine vit au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté, ce qui pousse nombre de jeunes marocains à quitter le pays.
Aussi, des mesures multiples ont été prises pour arrêter ce fléau et ce dès 2003 avec :

♦ la promulgation de la loi qui criminalise la migration irrégulière et toutes les personnes impliquées dans ce processus. Le décret d’application a été publié en Novembre 2003
♦ la création de la direction de la surveillance des frontières, dont la mission est la mise en œuvre opérationnelle d’une stratégie nationale en matière de lutte contre le réseau de trafic des êtres humains et la surveillance des frontières
♦ la Création d’un observatoire pour la migration dont la mission est de collecter des données, entreprendre des recherches, et élaborer des programmes de sensibilisation
♦ le Maroc bénéficie également d’un fond de 45millions d’Euros accordé par l’union européenne pour construire un dispositif pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière

Si le Maroc se protège par un arsenal juridique et des instruments de plus en plus sophistiqués pour la surveillance et le contrôle de ses frontières; c’est pour :

♦ orienter ses efforts pour le développement économique et social
♦ promouvoir de l’emploi pour les nationaux
♦ assurer la paix et la stabilité pour ses citoyens
♦ alléger ou supprimer les fonds alloués aux contrôle des frontières, au démantèlement des réseaux, et aux rapatriements des irréguliers

A souligner qu’au cours de la décennie 1990-2003, 65 000 personnes ont été arrêtées et 1600 réseaux ont été démantelés.

Au Maroc, il n’existe pas de politique de gestion des immigrés subsahariens Irréguliers en dehors du volet sécuritaire (contrôle, arrestation, reconduction aux frontières). Plusieurs associations caritatives apportent aide et secours à cette population démunie et persécutée.

Le Maroc en tant que pays signataire de la convention pour la protection des travailleurs migrants et leurs familles 1990, et qui tend à protéger les migrants travailleurs réguliers ou irréguliers n’a pas présenté son rapport annuel sur la mise en œuvre de cette convention. Ce qui exprime que le migrant irrégulier n’est protégé par aucune loi internationale et reste une personne hors la loi.

**Conclusion**

Aucun pays, dans n’importe quel continent ne peut régler à lui seul la question de la migration dans ses différents aspects. Aussi, devient-il urgent de mettre en œuvre une politique commune qui ne serait pas seulement fondée sur des mesures sécuritaires et policières, mais plutôt sur une gestion plus humaine des flux migratoires et une contribution renforcée au développement des pays d’origine.

Seulement, la lutte contre l’émigration irrégulière ne doit pas se faire au détriment des flux réguliers et organisés de migrants qui reflètent l’intensité des échanges humains, économiques et culturels qui ont toujours constitué la richesse et la prospérité de la Méditerranée.

L’instauration dans les pays d’accueil ou les pays de transit des programmes relatifs à la protection des migrants, la lutte contre toutes les formes de discrimination à leur égard, le respect des chartes, conventions régionales et internationales des droits de l’Homme rendraient aux migrants légaux et irréguliers leur dignité.

De même que l’intégration régionale des pays du sud, avec la création d’un grand marché régional capable d’attirer les investissements et canaliser cette force de travail qui cherche à quitter le pays, la mise
en œuvre des accords de Cotonou, le soutien financier de l’Europe, les délocalisations de certaines activités et la promotion de l’investissement vers les pays du Sud pourraient sûrement contribuer à la réduction des flux migratoires vers le Nord.

La migration ne signifie pas un échange purement économique, une force de travail contre des transferts en devises. Elle englobe tout ce qui fait la richesse de la personne humaine, sa capacité d’échange et de communication, sa compréhension et son respect des normes et des valeurs. Ainsi comprise, la migration devient un désir de l’autre et non seulement un besoin de l’autre.

Seule une concertation et une coopération entre les différents partenaires pourrait permettre des réajustements des flux migratoires, et ce, dans le respect des droits des individus, des intérêts de la collectivité et la promotion du développement économique des pays d’origine et des pays d’accueil.

Endnotes

5 Patrick Herman : Le goût amer des fruits et légumes. Le monde diplomatique Avril 2003 ; p 7.
8 Lucile Barros, Claire Escoffier, Mehdi Lahlou, Pablo Purames, Paolo Ruspini. L’immigration subsaharienne à travers et vers le Maroc. BIT. Genève 2002.
9 La politique du gouvernement Jettou en direction des RME. IN développement humain, protection et solidarité ; publication du MINISTRE DES MRE. Lundi 21 Juillet 2003.
10 En Mars 1969 fut mis en place un réseau bancaire ( Banque Al Amal )destiné à la collecte de l’épargne dans les pays d’immigration afin de contrecarrer les échanges illégaux, de contribuer à la réinsertion des MRE dans le pays d’origine, et réaliser des projets relatifs à la création d’entreprises par les MRE.
Introduction

Australia is one of the nations most influenced by international migration with 23.1 per cent of its population being foreign-born, 19.8 per cent Australian-born with at least one parent foreign-born and a further 2.5 per cent at any one time being temporarily present. Over the postwar period immigration has been transformed from being dominated by people of European origin to those from the Asia-Pacific and, to a lesser extent, Africa; from predominantly unskilled to skilled and from being almost totally settlers to a complex mix of permanent and temporary newcomers. Australia’s immigration has been more explicitly shaped by policy than most nations, not only by deliberate government intervention but also because its island character has made it more possible to control migration than in most countries. As with other immigration countries, Australian migration policy has been developed largely with national interests in mind. However, with the shift in thinking about the linkages between migration and development in recent years there has been increased interest in the effects of Australia’s immigration on countries of origin. The present paper first briefly examines the complexity of the relationship between migration from “South” to “North” nations and their effects on social and economic development in origin countries. The paper then analyses some key features of Australian immigration policy, which impinge on immigration from South countries. It then takes in turn a number of the effects of immigration on origin countries and considers the situation with respect to Australia. Finally some possible future developments in the area are speculated on.

South-North Migration and Development in Origin Areas

Research on population mobility, both internal and international, has long shown that it involves both benefits and costs for the movers, their destination and their origins. Until recently, however, the overwhelmingly dominant discourse in relation to South-North migration has been of the “brain drain” of selective emigration from poor countries whose development suffers from the loss of scarce highly trained people (Adams 2003). The pejorative focus was strengthened by discussions of people smuggling and trafficking. However, there has been increasing acknowledgement that the effects of migration are more complex and indeed that emigration can have positive impacts in origin areas. Moreover, it is argued that policy interventions at both origin and destination can facilitate the positive effects and ameliorate the negative impacts on origin nations (Adams 2003; Ellerman 2003; Hugo 2003a; Asian Development Bank 2004; House of Commons 2004; Martin 2004; Lucas 2004; Newland 2004; Johnson and Sedaca 2004; IOM 2005). This is not to minimise the negative effects of selective emigration of highly skilled migrants. Recent OECD work has indicated that 88 per cent of immigrants to those nations have secondary education or higher qualifications but, that except in relatively small nations, South countries do not lose a high proportion of their highly skilled persons to OECD nations. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that in small nations “brain drain”
can have a devastating quantitative and qualitative impact in robbing the country of the talent most likely
to facilitate economic and social development. Even in large nations the qualitative loss of the “best of the
best” can have impacts out of proportion to the numerical loss.

Revisionist interpretations stressing South-North migration’s positive impact on development have
focused on the following areas:

♦ The North-South flow of remittances that result from South-North migration. Remittances from
the 176 million international labour migrants alone amounted US$130 billion in 2003 of which
$79 billion went to developing countries and all remittances including those going through non-
formal channels may amount to $300 billion (Asian Migration News, 1-15 January 2005). For
some countries (e.g. Philippines, Sri Lanka) remittances exceed the value of export of goods
or services. Several countries are looking at ways to capture more foreign exchange from their
diaspora by offering such concessions as preferential banking treatment and high interest rates
(Hugo 2003a). Moreover, remittances are regarded by many as a more reliable and effective
source of development funds in South nations than Official Development Assistance because
it goes directly to individuals, families and communities.

♦ Secondly, the diaspora can be both a direct source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and be
effective “middlemen” to channel FDI towards the home country. Biers and Dhume (2000)
report that several overseas Indians who had reached upper management positions in Western
Multinationals helped convince their companies to set up operations in India. Hewlett Packard,
being a prime example.

Cases par excellence here are China and Taiwan where the spectacular economic growth of
recent years has been heavily influenced by investment from a diaspora of 30 to 40 million
overseas Chinese (Lucas 2003).

♦ Thirdly, the diaspora can be a bridgehead into expansion of the economic linkages of the home
nation. Korean Americans were the bridgeheads for the successful penetration of the United
States market by Korean car, electronics and white good manufacturers. Canadian based studies
have shown that a doubling of skilled migration from Asia saw a 74 per cent increase in Asian
imports to Canada (Head and Reis 1998; Lucas 2001).

♦ Fourthly, diaspora networks have become important in transmitting information and in knowl-
edge transfers both formally and informally. Lucas (2001 22) has shown how professionals
in origin and destination countries have maintained strong linkages so that ideas flow freely in
both directions. In Taiwan, for example, meetings of local and diasporic scientists are held.

♦ Fifthly, there can be significant dividends to the home country if expatriates return, especially
when they are highly skilled in areas in demand in the local labour market and have expanded
their knowledge and experience while overseas and return with a network of overseas contacts
that can benefit their work at home.

While there can be no doubt that emigration can have positive developmental effects in origin areas
one has to guard against turning a blind eye to its negative effects. If the “brain drain” literature of the 1960s
and 1970s can be criticized as ignoring the complexity of migration effects by focusing only on one effect
perhaps some of the current writing, as Ellerman (2003, 38) points out “is excessively optimistic about the
impact of migration in the South”. What is required is a deep understanding of the complexity of the effects
of South-North migration in order to identify areas where policy intervention can maximise positive effects and minimise negative effects.

**Australian Immigration Policy and Patterns**

Immediately after World War II the imperatives of Australian immigration policy were demographic and economic. On the one hand, there were massive labour shortages in the postwar boom period and labour – skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled – was needed for the massive growth in manufacturing. Also, there was a ‘populate or perish’ argument in the aftermath of the nation being almost invaded by Japan during the war. With the end of the ‘long boom’ in the 1970s, structural change, the movement of offshore and labour intensive industry and the associated reduction in manufacturing employment and increases in unemployment, immigration policy was redefined to involve a planned numerical intake made up of a number of policy components:

♦ Refugee and Humanitarian Movement – designed to resettle refugees.
♦ Family Migration – enabling family members to join earlier generations of immigrants.
♦ Economic (Skill) Migration – involving recruitment of people with skills in short supply in the economy.
♦ Special Categories – involving mainly New Zealanders, people with special talents etc. Over the years there has been a fluctuation in the significance of the various components of immigration. However, as Figure 1 indicates, in the most recent period there has been a deliberate policy to increase the proportion of skilled workers in the immigration intake. The proportion of settlers who entered Australia under the skilled migration categories increased from 29.2 per cent in 1995-96 to 62.3 per cent in 2003-04.

Table 1 shows that the mix of migrant visa types varies between the various regions of origin of immigrants to Australia. It will be noted however that skilled migration from both Asia and Africa is substantial, especially the former among whom skilled migration makes up 58 per cent of settlers compared to 46.2 per cent of the total intake.

---

Table 1. Australia: Visa Categories of Settler Arrivals, 2003-04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skill (%)</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family (%)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian (%)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (%)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No.</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>42,358</td>
<td>16,050</td>
<td>111,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIMIA

1 Minus New Zealand

The biggest change in Australian immigration in the last decade is that whereas in the first five post-war decades Australia emphatically eschewed acceptance of temporary workers in favor of an overwhelming emphasis on settlement migration, there has been a reversal with a number of new visa categories designed to attract temporary residents to work in Australia (Committee of Inquiry Into the Temporary Entry of Business People and Highly Skilled Specialists 1995; Birrell 1998). As a result there was an exponential increase in non-permanent migration to Australia so that while in 2001-02 there were 88,900 incoming permanent settlers to Australia there were a total of 340,200 foreigners granted temporary residence in Australia in that year (Rizvi 2002). On June 30, 2004 there were 590,566 people in Australia on a temporary basis of whom more than 300,000 had the right to work (DIMIA 2005, 73). Temporary migration is even more selective of skilled people than permanent migration.

Another aspect of Australia’s contemporary migration which needs to be considered is the fact that emigration has increased to the extent that there is now a diaspora of around 1 million Australians living and working in foreign countries. It has been shown (Hugo 1994; Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2001; 2003) that this emigration has been selective of the young and skilled and indeed there has been concern in Australia of a brain drain (Wood 2004). In fact it is more accurate to characterise the situation as either representing “brain gain” or “brain circulation”. There is an overall net gain of skilled people through migration, with skilled immigrants significantly outnumbering skilled emigrants. However, there is a net loss to some other OECD nations, but an overall net gain when less migration from developed countries is included.

In summary, in examining the effects of immigration on the development of South nations, the following dimensions of Australian immigration are significant:

♦ Australia’s international migration has had an increasing South-North dimension with increased inflows from Asia and the Pacific and, to a lesser extent, Africa.
♦ Australia’s migration is increasingly selective of skilled persons.
♦ Student migration is increasingly being seen by both migrants and governments as a prelude to permanent settlement in Australia.
♦ The avenues by which skilled nations of “South” countries can enter Australia have multiplied.
The Migration and Development Discourse in Australia

The focus in the migration and development literature is largely on what less developed origin countries can do to enhance the contribution of their expatriates to economic and social development at home. However, since OECD nations like Australia espouse a wish to encourage and facilitate the progress of less developed nations, it is important to ask whether there are some policies and programmes relating to migration and the diaspora which can facilitate and enhance their positive developmental impacts in origin areas. Before examining this issue in the Australia context, however, it needs to be pointed out that such policies and programmes confront some barriers including the following:

♦ The raison d’être of Australia’s immigration programme is to recruit highly talented individuals and retain them so that they contribute to the nation’s international competitiveness. Indeed this focus in the Australian programme has strengthened over the last decade. Hence, to call for measures which could be seen as diluting that effort is to push against the gradient of policy rhetoric at least that with respect to migration.

♦ The whole area of development assistance in Australia is quite divorced from immigration within the government structure. Moreover, development assistance is usually concerned with what can be done in less developed nations rather than policies and programmes initiated at home. The fact that development assistance and migration are represented by different ministers and different government departments and agencies presents a barrier.

♦ The neo-liberalist governments which dominate in OECD nations like Australia do not appeal as being sensitive to policy advice which is based in part on ethical considerations, altruism, social justice and fly in the face of what are perceived as “market forces”.

♦ The rapidly ageing demographies of many OECD nations like Australia result in immigration being seen as not only providing access to a pool of talent but also, however limited, ameliorating the closing gap between the numbers of working age citizens and those in the retirement ages.

♦ Countries can argue that even if they were to develop policies which pressure migrants to return to their homeland and restrict the extent to which South to North migration occurs it will reduce their competitive position vis-à-vis other OECD nations who do not adopt such a stance.

♦ Restrictions on South-North migration and South-North migrants will involve selective discrimination against these groups compared to North-North migrants and hence violate the human rights of the individuals involved.

Nevertheless, there are things that receiving nations can do, which at worst, can reduce the negative effects of brain drain, and at best, can have positive impacts on economic and social development in origin nations. Moreover, there is a constituency within Australia and other OECD nations for these initiatives and there is also evidence that win-win scenarios are possible whereby countries of origin and destination and migrants themselves can both benefit as a result of migration.

At present there is no explicit Australian federal government policy on migration and development, but it is possible to identify two recent periods when there have been discussions within government on migration and development issues.
(a) In the early 1990s there was investigation into the possibility of Australia introducing concessionary entry schemes to some Pacific Islanders. The main discussion was within the Australian Development Assistance Agency (AusAID).

(b) Since 2004 these discussions recommenced especially within the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA).

In both cases the main focus of discussion has been on Australia’s migration relationship with Pacific Island nations. While the concentration here will be on the contemporary situation, it is important to summarise briefly the situation in the early 1990s.

There has long been recognition of the importance of remittances in Polynesia. Bertram and Watters (1985) labeled the countries of the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Kiribati and Tuvalu MIRAB (migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy) economies to highlight the dependence on remittances. Tonga and Western Samoa had long had substantial remittances which in 1989 were estimated to make up 59.6 per cent and 35.1 per cent of the GDP (Fairbaim 1991a and b). However, in the early 1990s, surveys by two Australian researchers, John Connell and Richard Brown of Samoans, Fijians and Tongans in Australia and their home communities drew particular attention to the scale and significance of remittances and their potential for development in the small Pacific nations. Australia’s immigration policy toward Pacific Islanders differed from that of New Zealand which incorporated concessionary policies toward some Pacific Islanders such as:

- residents of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau who are New Zealand citizens
- a quota scheme for Western Samoa
- work permit schemes for Kiribati and Tuvalu

In 1995 AusAID commissioned an investigation, which among other things, discussed the implications of the New Zealand policies for Australia (Appleyard and Stahl 1995). They concluded that it was possible to divide Pacific nations on the basis of their factor endowments and potential for sustainable development based on them into:

- “unfurnished” – Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands
- “partly furnished” – Tonga and Western Samoa
- “fully furnished” – Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu

For “unfurnished” nations it was recommended that neighbouring developed countries like Australia provide “at least limited access to their labour markets, either on a permanent or temporary basis”. For “partly furnished” countries it recommended a transitional programme where migration is facilitated in the short term and policies be put in place in them involving “transformation of the islands” comparative advantage away from export of labour services toward domestically-based productive activities” (Appleyard and Stahl 1995, 9). With the remainder they argued that there was no need to introduce any concessionary migration programme. This view was in opposition to that aired in a report to the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, a semi autonomous research arm of DIMIA which existed at that time (Fincher 2001) by Cuthbertson and Cole (1995). They argued that (p. xiv) “it is possible that increasing the migration option of people in the South Pacific Islands might actually discourage efforts to improve domestic policies ...(it) is not clear that the net effect of remittances (and aid) is conducive to long term economic viability and prosperity”. They opposed Australia offering expanded migration opportunities for Pacific Islanders because it has a non-discriminatory immigration policy which would lose its integrity if concessions were offered to a particular group. This is still an argument which is made strongly within DIMIA.

The Appleyard and Stahl recommendations were not acted upon when they were presented in 1995. Turning to the contemporary discourse, again it has focused predominantly on the Pacific. It has been particularly around two dimensions:
The role of remittances in the development of Pacific economies. To a lesser extent, the possibility of Australia adopting a temporary labour programme to allow unskilled workers from the Pacific to enter Australia to work in areas such as agricultural harvesting.

The AusAID (2004, 29) Pacific Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009 in a section entitled Research and Analysis identifies a number of areas where deeper analytical work is needed on causes and constraints to assist development outcomes. One such area is labour mobility where it is stated:

“with a strong correlation between labour mobility and poverty reduction (particularly in regard to remittances) research is required into how best to harness its potential for poverty reduction. Labour mobility is a complex, fluid and growing pattern and responses to it should be flexible, targeted and well grounded in empirical research.”

The World Bank has commissioned a study entitled “Promoting Regional Integration Through Labour Flows in the Pacific: Rationale, Impact and Mechanisms”. It is investigating three questions:

(a) Have remittances had a development impact in the Pacific? This involves household survey work to examine effects on household income and consumption, impact on poverty, income inequality, demand for education and health.
(b) Can labour mobility between the Pacific and Australia be a win-win for both? This will estimate labour surplus in the Pacific and labour shortages and its fiscal impact in Australia within the context of the contemporary discussion on regional integration.
(c) How can social and political risk be managed in sending and receiving countries? This reviews existing agriculture guestworker schemes to assess their success, structure, etc. in order to establish best practice.

These initiatives have been largely under the auspices of AusAID but the development of migration policy in Australia is very strongly influenced by DIMIA. The Department has operated for more than half a century as a separate government ministry and developed a strong corps of highly experienced and skilled immigration and settlement professionals. Successive governments in Australia have relied significantly on DIMIA advice in both development of immigration policy as well as operationalising it. They would have a major input into any discussions of whether or not to adopt concessional migration arrangements with the Pacific. At present there is no specifically articulated DIMIA policy on this issue, the Department is actively monitoring the global debate on the nexus between migration and development as well as making some initial assessments of the feasibility of temporary unskilled labour schemes involving workers from the Pacific. The writer’s personal perception is that it would take a great deal to convince DIMIA officials to support such a scheme for the same reasons that the Appleyard and Stahl (1995) recommendations were not adopted a decade earlier, namely that any concessional migration scheme would be seen to compromise the integrity of the immigration programme. Moreover, there is skepticism that such schemes would have substantial beneficial effects for the migrants and the origin areas. From a government perspective as well, the last two Ministers for Immigration have pointed to significant unemployment levels in Australia and argued that agricultural employers need to improve the wages and conditions offered to seasonal workers to solve their perceived labour shortage.

Accordingly, it is a little early to speak of an Australian government policy on migration and development although it is definitely on the “radar screen” of two government departments and there will be increased debate on the issue over the next year. Accordingly in the following discussion the emphasis is not so much on existing government policy as on the wider public and government discourse around migration and development issues and in exploring some of the possible future avenues of policy intervention.
Migration Policy

The first way in which receiving areas can have a positive developmental impact in origin areas is by factoring origin country considerations into the immigration policy development process. Any unilateral attempt by OECD countries like Australia to selectively exclude immigrants from “South” nations is not acceptable from the perspective of the rights of individuals involved and is impractical given the current priorities of the OECD nations. It could be readily argued that any efforts in this direction would need to be multilateral since a single nation could argue that if they excluded highly skilled migrants from less developed countries those migrants would simply move to an alternative OECD destination. In the Australian context, the government emphatically argues that “Australia’s primary objective is to ensure that migration to Australia is in the national interest” (Ryan 2005, 1).

There has been some debate in Australia about the issue of brain drain from less developed countries to Australia. This has recently particularly focused on the increased numbers of medical personnel involved in this flow. Table 2 shows that while there is a degree of circularity in the flows, the net gain to Australia is strong in the Asia and African movements while that with the UK and Europe is more circular. It is interesting that there is a net loss of permanent migrations to North America. Many of the doctors and nurses from Asia and Africa go to rural and remote areas in Australia where there is an overall shortage of medical personnel (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2003). This has led to a debate in Australia about the ethics of such mobility (Reid 2002; Scott et al. 2004).

Table 2. Australia: Arrivals and Departures of Skilled Health Workers, 1993-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permanent Arrivals</th>
<th>Permanent Departures</th>
<th>Net</th>
<th>Long-Term Arrivals</th>
<th>Long-Term Departures</th>
<th>Net</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (not incl N Africa)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>6483</td>
<td>4804</td>
<td>1679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Oceania</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; UK</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>9166</td>
<td>6803</td>
<td>2363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>-179</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nurses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (not incl N Africa)</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2491</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>4995</td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3130</td>
<td>2218</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>2612</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Oceania</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>-392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; UK</td>
<td>4835</td>
<td>3055</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>18796</td>
<td>15043</td>
<td>3753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>-847</td>
<td>3221</td>
<td>2464</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* DIMIA unpublished data
At the 2001 population census, 5.7 per cent of the Australian medical workforce was born in Africa or the Middle East (2,930 persons) and 16 per cent in Asia (8,348) (AIHW 2003). This compares to equivalent percentages of the total workforce of 2.0 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively. It has been argued that a more ethical approach to recruitment of health workers needs to be adopted (Scott et al. 2004). However Australia, like other OECD nations, has through its contemporary immigration policies, encouraged the flow of skilled personnel from less developed nations. Under the Colombo Plan and other later programmes to train students from Asia and Africa in Australia, students were compelled to return to their homeland for at least 2 years following completion of their studies. This is no longer the case and indeed in recent years Australia has facilitated completing students in some skill areas to gain permanent residence in Australia without returning home. Moreover the increased skill focus in the migration programme has encouraged the outflow of skilled workers from less developed nations.

It is apparent that there is a strong and growing nexus between Australia’s efforts to attract foreign students, most being from less developed countries, and their skilled immigration policies. It is becoming increasingly easy for foreign students to make the transition to permanent residence without returning to their home nation or returning only briefly. Such policies are likely to exacerbate the loss of skilled people from “South” to “North” nations.

Another area of migration policy that needs to be addressed from a migration and development perspective relates to the current overwhelming focus in Australia on skill in migrant selection and “searching for talent”. In fact the demographic and economic change occurring in Australia, like other OECD nations, means that there is growing demand for both unskilled and skilled workers. There may be a growing mismatch between immigration policies focused on skill and a tightening labour market with demand for labour across a broader skill spectrum. While such migration in no way can be a substitute for better education, training and labour force policies in less developed nations, it can relieve “labour surplus” situations in particular areas especially in small economies like in the Pacific and East Timor. In short, there would appear to be a case to look at the full gamut of labour force needs in more developed nations and not just focus on skill and talent search in considering migration.

In recent years falling unemployment levels in Australia have seen a tightening of the labour market which has created demand not only for skilled labour but also for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A specific case in point are growth sectors within agriculture. The particular shortages are felt most strongly in the horticultural sector, which is having increasing difficulty attracting sufficient labour to properly harvest their crops (National Harvest Trail Working Group 2000). Calver (2000) reported that this labour shortage represents a significant constraint on the expansion of the industry which grew by 142 per cent over the decade to 2000 and the 2000 value of production at the farm gate was A$5.1 billion. The wine industry has also experienced massive expansion in the last decade. The federal Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB 1999, p. 14) estimated that there were the equivalent of between 55,000 and 65,000 full time jobs available in harvest areas across Australia.

The shortage of harvesting workers has resulted in many representations to the Minister of Immigration for programmes similar to those in nations like the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to bring in guest workers on a temporary basis. These have usually argued for bringing in workers from the Pacific. The representations have generally come from growers’ organizations although a 2003 Australian Senate Committee (Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee 2005) proposed that agricultural workers from the Pacific be granted special seasonal access to Australia. One of the distinctive features of this proposal was that it explicitly argues that it not only would benefit Australian industry but also could produce economic gains and assist long term regional security and stability in the Pacific. Thus far the government has rejected these proposals using the following arguments:
The high level of unemployment in Australia would suggest that growers are not paying adequate wages or providing appropriate conditions for workers.

It would undermine the integrity of Australia’s immigration programme in that:

(a) it involves unskilled workers;
(b) it is discriminating in that it is only available to people from one region.

It has been questioned whether the Pacific Island workers would indeed gain from the migration because of the high costs of travel in relation to the amount of work available and the wages paid.

The impact of the loss of human resources on the economies of home nations.

There also has been some opposition to the use of migrant workers in harvesting from the Australian Workers Union (The Age, 14 February 2000)

It is interesting that there have been recent calls for a scheme to bring into Northern Australia guest-workers from East Timor as fruit and vegetable harvesters (Asian Migration News, 1-15 October 2004). Again a similar argument to those raised concerning the Pacific could be made namely:

- It meets a labour shortage in Australia.
- It involves workers from a very poor nation with substantial labour surplus.
- It is a small nation where an influx of remittances may have a measurable impact on the local economy.
- It is located very close to Australia and figures strongly in the nation’s security considerations.

A related proposal regarding Pacific migration to Australia has come regarding the small Island of Nauru (2004 population, 12,809). Australia has mined phosphate from the island over a long period. This has now ceased but the mining has resulted in substantial environmental damage and greatly reduced the island’s capacity to support its population. There is now a proposal seeking to allow Nauru citizens to live and work in Australia (Asian Migration News 1-15 August 2004).

**Remittances**

There is a burgeoning literature on the significance of the flow of remittances from OECD nations to less developed countries and their role in poverty reduction (Adams 2003; Hugo 2003a; Asian Development Bank 2004; Johnson and Sedaca 2004; Terry, Jiminez-Ontiveros and Wilson (eds.) 2005). It is stressed that remittances have particular value as a transfer from more developed to less developed countries since they flow directly to families and hence can have an immediate impact in improvement of well-being at grass roots level. The role of the destination countries here is in the realm of facilitating these flows; reducing the degree of rent taking exacted on remittance flows by intermediaries and ensuring that there are safe, quick and reliable channels for migrants to make remittances to their families in less developed countries. Efforts to reduce the transfer costs imposed by intermediaries are needed if the full benefits of remittances are to be realised.

Australia has some 4,105,444 persons who are foreign-born with 968,740 born in Asia, 104,755 born in Africa (excluding South Africa) and 99,361 born in Oceania (excluding New Zealand and Australia). This represents, potentially at least, a significant opportunity for the development of diasporic communities within
Australia which are connected to less developed countries and provide conduits for flows of remittances, investment, technology and knowledge to them. There has been little research in Australia on the relationship between communities from less developed countries who are resident in Australia and their home countries and on the flow of remittances they send. However, with the important exception of the Pacific, the level of outward remittance flow from Australia would seem to be small. Among the reasons for this are the following:

- The increasing emphasis on skill in the Australian migration programme means that the families from which many migrants come are among the better off groups in their home countries so there will not be a pressing need for migrants to remit funds. Indeed for some the opposite is the case. The inflow of funding from less developed countries to Australia from families supporting foreign higher education students studying in Australia is substantial (137,000 in 2003, 85 per cent from Asia). It is estimated that student migration generates A$4 billion\(^4\) annually to the Australian economy (Migrant News, January 2005).

Remittance flows appear to be greater among some groups of migrants than others. Unfortunately there are little data available relating to this in Australia but the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia (LSIA) which involved two groups of migrants arriving in 1993-95 and 1999-2000 who were re-interviewed twice in the first case and once in the second (Hugo 2004a) has some information. Table 3 shows that when the first survey migrants were interviewed within a few months after arrival in Australia less than 8 per cent sent remittances back to relatives. This of course is understandable given that it takes time for immigrants to become established. When interviewed for a third time (1998 - 1999), a larger proportion had sent remittances home to relatives. It will be noted that the largest proportions sending remittances were the refugee-humanitarian migrants who also are the poorest group with the highest level of unemployment and greatest reliance on benefits (Richardson, Robertson and Ilsley 2001). The highest proportions of birthplace groups sending back remittances were drawn from regions which were made up of mostly less developed countries – Pacific (41.4 per cent), South Asia (47.5 per cent), Southeast Asia (42.3 per cent), Middle East (33.1 per cent) and Africa (31.8 per cent).

Table 3. Australia: Remittances sent to Relatives by Immigrants According to Visa Category of Arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>less than $1,000</th>
<th>$1,000- $5,000</th>
<th>$5,001- $10,000</th>
<th>$10,000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Interview</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd interview</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skill</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Interview</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd interview</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Interview</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd interview</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Interview</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd interview</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, unpublished data.
♦ Another issue is that since Australia until recently eschewed temporary worker migration and focused almost totally on permanent settlement of families in migration. This may have had a dampening impact on remittances (Ryan 2005). High levels of remittances tend to be associated with temporary migration whereby migrants leave their families behind in the origin and those families are often almost totally dependent on remittances for their day to day existence. Ryan (2005) argues this is the main explanation of remittances out of Australia being low. He shows how Australia’s Balance of Payments on Current Account include remittances in an “Other Sectors” item. This item has been around A$2.8 billion in recent years. Given that Australia now hosts a significant influx of temporary skilled workers and a minority\(^5\) are from “South” nations (Hugo 2003b), the North-South flow of remittances from Australia would seem to be limited.

There is little doubt however that remittances are already an important element in the economies of many Pacific nations, and despite concerns that emigration and the loss of human resources can stifle local economic development; remittances could play an even bigger role through involvement not only of more migrant workers but also more Pacific nations. Although the Australian government remains opposed to making the significant changes in its immigration policy which a targeted migrant workers scheme would involve, there are some developments which would suggest that this policy might change in the future. These include:

♦ Since September 11, part of the heightened security consciousness in Australia has been a greater recognition of the fundamental importance of maintaining the stability and security of the nations in Australia’s immediate region. This has seen Australia playing an increasing role, especially in countries like Papua New Guinea and the Solomons in enhancing governance structures, capacity building, etc.\(^5\) The extent that the argument can be made that increased remittances can enhance the stability and security of the region, hence, has become a new factor in the longstanding lobbying from grower organisations to access harvesting labour from the Pacific.

♦ Within Australia too there are new pressures for introduction of this movement. The 2003 Senate Committee proposal of a special admissions policy (Inglis 2003) reflects this.

♦ The Australian government is currently examining the whole migration development nexus, especially the role of remittances, and at the least, it would seem worthwhile to:
  (a) establish the extent of remittance flows out of Australia and especially those directed toward poorer nations.
  (b) examine the work currently being undertaken in agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which are designed to facilitate the flow of such remittances, the reduction of the rent-taking and overheads associated with them and the provision of facilities to encourage their productive and effective use by the recipients.

Other Functions for the Diaspora

In Australia the recent emergence of the discussion on migration and development has focused strongly on remittances. However it is recognized that expatriates can have other beneficial impacts on development in their home countries. The key to this is the development of network linkages between the expatriate community and the homeland. This often involves organisation of diaspora communities at destination, a phenomenon which has a long history but which is greatly facilitated by modern information and communication technology (Hugo 2004b). Since the 1970s, Australia has espoused a policy of multiculturalism, which among other things, stipulated that:

“every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage” (Jupp 2002, 87).
Although, Australian multiculturalism places less emphasis on cultural maintenance than that in Canada (Jupp 2002, 84), this has meant that the development of diasporic organizations has not been hindered, and, in some cases has been facilitated by government policy. However, until recently, immigrants were required to renounce their prior citizenship to become Australian citizens. Dual citizenship was introduced in 2002 largely due to lobbying by Australian expatriates (Hugo 2004b).

One issue about which little is known is the role of diaspora in knowledge transfer and the spread of ideas. There is considerable interest in the emergence of networks of academics, researchers, scientists and technologists in the spread of knowledge and in countries maintaining a competitive edge in global innovation and trade (Meyer and Brown 1999). Hugo (forthcoming) shows net gains of academics settling in Australia over the last decade have been mainly from Asia.

Return Migration

One of the ways in which the effects of brain drain can be best negated is when the outflow of skilled workers from less developed countries is circular and not permanent. Hence, removal of barriers at both destination and origin to return migration are important. This includes ensuring the portability of benefits and savings accumulated while the migrants are in the destination. Indeed one could argue that a circular pattern of South-North migration could have significant advantages to the North countries. As indicated earlier, one of the major areas of concern in such nations is the ageing of their populations. What is apparent from research on the effect of migration on ageing is that its impact is marginal because migrants themselves age and contribute to the ageing problem (United Nations 2000). However, if a pattern of circular migration is set up, the migrant workforce is maintained with a young profile because of the outflow of older workers being replaced by an inflow of younger workers.

In an immigration nation such as Australia it is often overlooked that there is a substantial element of return migration among settlers. It is estimated (Hugo 1994; Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2001) that up to a quarter of all settlers to Australia in the postwar period have subsequently emigrated from Australia, although the rates of return vary greatly between birthplace groups. While there are some important exceptions, there is generally a low rate of return migration among immigrants to Australia from less developed country origins. On the other hand, there is a very high rate of return among immigrants from more developed countries like New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom (Hugo 1994; Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2001).

While the introduction of the new temporary migration schemes would seem to be quintessentially circular and favouring return migration, the fact is that, increasingly, Australian settlers are drawn from migrants who have entered the country originally as temporary residents. In the last decade there has been a substantial increase in the number of “onshore” migrants to Australia so that now more than one third of settlers each year are already in Australia. Figure 2 represents the multiple means by which permanent residents of Australia have entered the country in the last decade. Indeed there are government policies which encourage temporary residents to apply for permanent residency. This especially applies to foreign students, some of which are now given special consideration in the points assessment test if they have particular skills or are applying in particular regions which have low levels of population growth (Hugo 2004c). The logic from a national interest perspective is strong – these “immigrants” will experience few adjustment problems since they have already lived in Australia for a period, some already have work and many have qualifications obtained in Australia. There are also indications that potential migrants are developing strategies whereby temporary migration is entered into as a precursor to permanent residency. This is especially the case among students who make up a significant proportion of “onshore migrants”. The bulk of foreign students are from less developed nations. This pattern is in strong contrast to the 1970s and 1980s where there was a policy of compelling foreign students to return to their home country for at least 2 years before being able to apply to return.
Conclusion

Australia is an important destination for both permanent and temporary migration from South nations. Like most destination nations, Australian immigration policy is overwhelmingly formulated in terms of national interest, which in the past has involved little or no consideration of the impact of migration on origin nations. This, however, may change partly because of the global discussion on the migration – development nexus but also because it increasingly can be seen as being within Australia’s national interest to do so. In the post September 11 situation, there has been a rethinking of security considerations in Australia as there has been elsewhere in the world. This has involved a re-evaluation of the nation’s relationship with neighbouring nations and the realisation that enhancing the security, stability and wellbeing of those nations is fundamental to Australia’s security which has seen significant increases in investment, capacity building and strategic interest in those countries. Hence, whereas in the past migration and development considerations may have been small elements in the formulation of migration policy and practice this may well change in the future.

At present it would take a substantial “conceptual leap” for destination governments to factor in the impacts in origin countries as a major element shaping immigration/settlement policy. Migration to Australia is not the answer to remedying low development levels in origin nations but it could contribute to some improvement of the situation in origin areas. However it will take policy intervention to maximize such impacts. At the very least there needs to be the development of a more substantial evidence base on which to consider policy formulation in this area. Moreover, it is important if recommendations are to be considered by government then the implications of migration and development policy for the national interest if the destination needs to be considered. In the post September 11 world it could be argued, for example, that the Australian national interest would be served if neighbouring countries are stable and secure and have populations whose well-being is improving and that migration can play a role in achieving this. It is probable that achievements in this area will be slow and incremental rather than massive and dramatic, as it is realized that “win-win-win” scenarios can be formulated which enhance the well-being of migrants and their families, serve the labour market needs of Australia and have a net positive development effect in the home country.
Endnotes

1 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/12/34107784
2 Information supply by Ms. Manjula Luthria, World Bank Office, Sydney. The study involves two researchers (Richard Brown and John Connell) with long field experience in this area in the Pacific.
3 In fact the industry is heavily reliant on migrant workers. In particular, working holiday makers and recently arrived humanitarian migrants. In addition, it employs significant numbers of foreigners who do not have a visa to work in Australia and work illegally (Hugo 2001).
4 $1 = $US0.78, 4 May 2005.
5 Except in the foreign students category.
6 This has also involved Australia assisting in capacity building of immigration infrastructure in the region (Hugo forthcoming).

References


International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2005. Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners, for Home and Destination Countries: A Policy Roadmap – Paper of the IOM.


Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, 2005. They still call Australia home: Inquiry into Australian expatriates, Department of the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra.


Why is DFID Interested in Migration as a Development Issue?

♦ DFID is interested because migration is an essential part of millions of poor people’s livelihoods. Resourceful men and women move in order to improve their lives and the lives of their families – and they should be able to take up the opportunities and benefits of migrating, without jeopardising their rights or being exploited.

♦ Well managed migration at local, national, regional and international levels has the potential to contribute to poverty reduction. But without effective policies to minimise the negative outcomes, migration could also impede achievements of the MDGs in some situations particularly in the areas of health and education.

♦ DFID’s overall objective is to promote policies and practices that enhance the benefits and minimise the risks of migration to poor people and developing countries. We are in the process of developing a DFID position paper that we hope will be on our external website for consultation before too long.

♦ DFID’s policy paper is likely to be focused on legal economic migration, and on internal and South-South/regional movements of people; this is where there are the greatest movements of people, where most poor people move, and where the poverty impact is greatest. But we recognise the importance of, and linkages to, various forms of forced migration, trafficking, and of course refugees and internally displaced persons.

♦ Within DFID our aim is to ensure that migration is more effectively included in our poverty work, and is included in partner governments’ national development plans and poverty reduction strategies.

♦ In order to do this the Policy Division Migration team will work closely with DFID colleagues in the Africa, Asia and Middle East and North Africa Departments and especially Country Offices to strengthen the evidence base for pro poor migration policies and support innovative migration activities – as well as work with international partners such as the ILO, IOM and World Bank, and other United Kingdom Government Departments.
Migration, Poverty Reduction and Development Links

What can donors and partners practically do to tackle some of the issues? Drawing on some of DFID’s modest experience to date there are five points that I want to focus on: a) the evidence base, b) internal migration, c) remittances, d) gender equality and women’s rights, and e) Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs). We talk a lot about the issues, but implementation is the most challenging task we are facing.

a) The linkages between migration, poverty and inequality are complex and very context specific. We need to look for ways of strengthening in-country capacity for research and analysis and policy advocacy, in universities, think tanks, and other organisations including those of migrants themselves. This will build a stronger evidence base for actions and government policies that can enhance the contribution of migration to poverty reduction. DFID is funding a ‘Migration, Globalisation and Poverty’ research partnership based in the University of Sussex and linked to Universities in Ghana, Dhaka, Cairo and Albania. The South Asia Migration Resource Network (whose coordinator is presenting after me) is a good example of how a research organisation can influence policy makers; they achieved the removal of some of the barriers to overseas migration for Bangladeshi women and so reduced their vulnerability to exploitation.

b) DFID’s focus will be in internal and cross border migration, which for some may be a first step to migrating further afield and entering the global labour market. Millions of men, women and children move within their own countries looking for work – there are 200 million moving within India alone, often from rural to urban or other rural areas. Many of these people are invisible to formal systems, planners and policy makers. Working with partners we can find innovative ways of facilitating the mobility of migrant workers and their families – to ensure that they are able to make informed decisions about routes and destinations, that their rights are protected, and that they do not find themselves in a worse situation without access to health services or housing in their place of destination. Ideas emerging from some of our work on livelihoods in Orissa and West India include inter state passes for migrants, migrant resource centres in places of origin and destination, communication facilities, and savings and remittance services – lessons from these small explorative projects feed into dialogue with state governments and influence wider policies and programmes.

c) We know that cash and non cash remittances reach the poor, and contribute significantly to food security, housing, education and land investment. But the flow of internal and international cash remittances is hampered by weak financial infrastructure and high transaction costs – which means remittances from migrants in many situations are channelled informally – this is not necessarily bad but we need to find ways of including the poorest in the formal financial sector, or at least providing them with more choice. DFID is working with others (including the World Bank) in three partner countries, Nigeria, Ghana and Bangladesh, to find ways to reduce the costs, improve access for men and women by increasing the outreach of formal financial institutions, and improving access to information.

d) In terms of gender equality and women’s rights – new opportunities and social change can challenge existing ideas of gender and women can become empowered through contributing remittances or taking on new roles in the absence of men who migrate. But there are also risks – women are often less able to claim their rights and can end up in vulnerable situations. UNIFEM, supported by DFID, is doing some influential work in the Asia region on promoting policies that empower women migrant workers in their countries of origin and employment. One output of the programme is advocacy with regional bodies such as SAARC and ASEAN.
for better protective measures for women migrants. Women’s increasing participation in the
global labour market has important implications for gender equality in countries where the status
of women is low. In relation to the trafficking of girls DFID is supporting ILO in the Mekong
Region and China on the development of good practice in reducing the vulnerability of girls
through encouraging them to stay in school longer and enhancing their chances of employment
when they leave.

e) Some innovative programmes for migrants have been introduced in some Asian countries but
less so on the African continent – but the majority of national development plans and poverty
reduction strategies do not yet recognise the importance of migration to national development or
seek to increase the benefits and opportunities for poor migrants or more broadly poverty reduc-
tion. Donors and partners (including civil society groups) will need to work hard to ensure that
migration is mainstreamed into country poverty reduction and growth strategies. Government
officials in Ghana are aware that in a few years time at least 50 per cent of the population will
live in urban centres, and that skilled health and other professionals will continue to leave the
country. The Government is keen to develop a policy framework for managing migration and
wants to make sure that the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy takes the impacts of migration
into account. These include the key pillars of social protection for vulnerable groups including
internal migrant workers, labour markets and employment, health service development and
access to health and education services by migrant workers, and trade.

Some of the Issues Donors Will Need to Think About

In the context of PRS processes donors will need to think more about:

♦ what a country led approach and the development of a PRS means in a regional context where
so many of the movements of people are across borders, where international migration is
an important employment strategy, and some regional agreements (eg ECOWAS) advocate
interregional passports for the free movement of labour.
♦ what mainstreaming migration into PRSs really means in practice and policy terms for
developing country governments – including institutionally. Departments of Immigration
or the Interior often have a rather narrow remit, but internal, cross border and international
migration are cross sectoral - and a lead department may not be obvious. Some countries
such as Bangladesh established a Ministry for Migration. Ten years ago Departments of
Trade were not talking to other Ministries - now they are slowly starting to as part of the
PRS process. Evidence suggests that line Ministries are often only marginally involved in
the PRS process – and may not be aware of the broader issues.
♦ how we/donors are going to respond coherently to the capacity building needs of partner
governments and regional organisations such as SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA and the AU
as they get to grips with this agenda?

Finally we as donors need to work together to develop coherent approaches to this relatively new
area of development – it’s one that has huge potential for contributing to poverty reduction and the inclusion
of poor people in the global labour market – but also one that offers huge challenges to all of us.
In the new millennium, two strands of thinking are shaping two almost separate discourses on migration. One identifies migration as an essential element of globalisation and development. The other views migration with suspicion and treats it as a threat to the security of receiving states or to their societal-cultural identities. The Department for International Development (DFID), Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) and South Asia Migration Resource Network (SAMReN) share the vision of the first group. We perceive migration, both internal and international, as a major livelihoods option for poor men and women. We appreciate the complexities and diversities of migration. Nonetheless, we consider it an important tool for development and poverty alleviation. We also strongly believe that migration is playing a significant role in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Achievement of the MDGs through migration can be expedited to a great extent through appropriate policy interventions and actions at global, regional, national and grassroots levels.

This paper is divided into five sections including the introduction. Section II provides a brief description of migration-development linkages. Section III identifies the major interfaces of migration and the MDGs. Section IV provides an overview of the DFID-RMMRU and SAMReN partnership in achieving the MDG of reducing the number of people living below poverty line by half. Section V draws conclusions and offers some recommendations for good governance of migration and as result greater progress towards achieving the MDGs.

Migration and Development

Development and migration are closely linked. Studies have stressed that both receiving and sending areas benefit economically, socially and culturally from migration. Migrants themselves and their families also benefit. The developmental impact of migration is, nonetheless, dependent on effective migration governance. Although both internal and international migration contributes to development, there is little quantitative research available which highlights the correlation between internal migration and development. Most of the studies are based on the experience of international migration. In the following, the benefits of migration to receiving and sending areas, and the migrants are discussed. It is important to mention that evidences are mostly from international migration.

In South Asia three types of labour movements are visible. These are – migration within national borders, migration within the region, and migration from South Asia to different labour receiving countries. Destinations and benefits do vary substantially on the basis of the economic power of the migrants. Poorer people usually move within national boundaries or to adjacent bordering countries. They also generate in-
come and contribute to local or national economies. Their number, social and economic contributions are not yet quantified. Therefore, migration development link in South Asia is mostly done through analysis of short-term contract migration and long-term migration.

The number of international migrants stood at 175 million in 2000 (IOM 2003). The stock includes permanent settlers, short-term workers, refugees and asylum seekers. About 60 per cent of the world’s migrants reside in more developed countries and 40 per cent in less developed countries. The numbers of people who move across borders is insignificant compared with those who have decided not to move. In 2003, only 3 per cent of the global population were migrants. It is believed that the largest group of migrants move internally. However, till today, a global figure on internal migrants is not available.

Receiving States

The economic and human development of many states has been associated with population movements over the centuries. Massey et al. (1998) have shown that the industrial growth of Europe owes heavily to migration and colonisation. The US and Australia owe their creation as nation-states to migrants. Massive infrastructural growth and development in the Middle East since the oil price hike of the 1970s were possible through immigration of all categories of workers ranging from highly professional, skilled to unskilled. Similarly, the growing economies of South East Asia depend on steady flows of immigrant workers for their sustenance. Wickramasekera (2002) showed that migrant workers with their labour furnish an often invisible subsidy to the national economies that receive them.

Developed countries depend largely on highly skilled professionals from developing and least developed countries to run research and other programmes targeted towards scientific and technological advancement. Among the world’s high income countries, the US (1999: 370,000 persons), Japan (2000: 129,000 persons) and Canada (2000: 86,200 persons) experienced the largest annual inflows of highly skilled workers. UK (2002: 39,000 persons), Australia (1999-2000: 30,000 persons) and Germany (2000-01: 11,800 persons) followed (IOM: 2003). Movement of knowledge workers therefore is an integral part of global scientific development.

In dominant socio-economic research, immigrants were generally viewed as workers providing cheap labour in advanced economies. Kloosterman and Rath ed. (2003) have shown that in different developed economies immigrants have also acquired a role as entrepreneurs. Due to labour market disadvantages at the entry point, i.e. language barriers, lack of access to employment information and discrimination, a significant number of immigrants have had a greater tendency to turn into entrepreneurs. The self-employment rate of the immigrants is much higher than that of the national population in countries like the US, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, and Belgium. For example in the US, Japanese entrepreneurs have created a niche in farming, wholesaling and retailing in some of the major cities, and Chinese immigrants have more or less monopolised restaurant, laundry and garments sub-contracting sectors. Lebanese kebab stores, Indian fabric and food chains and Thai food stores are also inseparable from the image of a typical city in the West. Pakistani construction and demolition firms in Australia and the US, the Bangladeshi catering industry in England and home construction and repairing firms in New York are some other instances of immigrant entrepreneurship. Kloosterman and Rath ed. (2003) assert that the cosmopolitan outlook of big cities in advanced economies owes a great deal to these immigrant entrepreneurs.

Sending States

In respect to sending countries or areas, confusion still remains about what should constitute gain and loss. Similar migration results have been viewed by some authors as a positive phenomenon, while by others
as negative. International migration of highly skilled professionals, for example, is perceived by many as a brain drain and major loss of investment of human resources to home countries (Wickramasekera, 2000). In some countries, health, education and other services do suffer due to the migration of skilled professionals. Some other studies have, however, established theories around brain circulation and identified highly skilled emigrants as the reserve brains of the sending countries.

Similarly, in the case of internal migration, the dominant thinking in developing countries in the 1950s identified non-return of educated people to their rural roots as one of the reasons for the underdevelopment of the countryside. But there are ample experiences of educated rural to urban migrants becoming instrumental in rural development through influencing the policy-making process.

Singhvi (2001) highlighted the contribution of the diaspora population to social, political and economic developments in their countries of origin. Nationalist leaders like Mazzini and Garibaldi of Italy, Kwame Nkruma of Ghana and Mahatma Gandhi of India were all returnee migrants. The Bangladeshi community of the United Kingdom and USA took active part in the War of Independence of Bangladesh through international campaigns, fund raising and fighting at the front. The diaspora is an integral part of the current phase of Chinese economic development with over 70 per cent of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flow coming from the overseas Chinese. The total population of Lebanon is 3.5 million, whereas its diaspora population is 14 million. According to Ratha (2004), the steady and decisive flow of remittances, meant that the Lebanese government did not face any major economic crisis even after accumulating huge trade deficits over a prolonged period. Certain states of southern India experienced major employment generation through outsourcing by their Silicon Valley diaspora. The previous BJP government (2004) of India formally recognised the role of its diaspora in influencing public policies of their host countries in favour of India during crisis situations like the nuclear explosion or the Kargil War.

In the case of international migration, remittance is considered as important yardstick of migrants’ contribution to their countries of origin. Various figures indicate that the flow of migrant remittances from sending to receiving countries is continuously growing. Official remittances increased from less than US$2 billion in 1970 to US$80 billion in 2000 (ILO, 2002). This does not include informal transfers. Micro-studies in countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have shown that only around half of the remittances are transferred through official channels and the rest find their way through different unofficial methods. Remittances are also transferred in kind. Rivera Batis (1986) showed that remittance in kind adds another 9-17 per cent to official flows to Pakistan and another 8-10 per cent to Yemen’s. Consequently the actual amount of remittance is likely to be at least double the officially recorded figures.

Sixty per cent of the global remittance flow is towards developing countries (Sorensen 2004). This figure is more than global official development assistance (ODA) as well as capital market flows (Gammeltoft, 2002) to these countries. In comparison to foreign direct investment (FDI) in those countries, remittances are over half of the total flow. Moreover, remittances as sources of financial flows are found to be more stable than private capital flows and to be less volatile to changing economic cycles (Ratha, 2003). Sorensen (2004) noted that a 10 per cent increase of remittances in the country’s GDP can lead to a 1.2 per cent decline in poverty. International financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) are increasingly appreciating migrants’ remittance as a tool to promote development. The ILO (Ahn ed. 2004) and IOM (World Migration Report 2000), in their recent literature, have emphasised that countries that initiate pragmatic policies to manage migration will benefit most from it.

It is understood that remittances generated through internal migration are also likely to be significant. Micro studies on different countries have revealed that workers in export processing zones, small service holders, petty traders, transport workers, seasonal agricultural labourers, construction workers and domestic
workers remit a considerable portion of their earnings to their rural households. Unlike international migration, no national or global figures are available on this. Generation of such data is also extremely difficult as most of the transfers take place through informal mechanisms.

**Benefit to Migrants**

A recent study (Ahn ed. 2004) made a comparative analysis of the impact of migration on short-term migrants and their families in five South Asian countries. It reaffirmed that a substantive group experienced positive economic results. However, compared to the 1980s, the rate of positive return from migration has declined. Besides, over the past decade, experiences of failed migration have also registered an increase. Migration can also be socially beneficial for both migrants and the families left behind. Studies on South Asia (Ahn ed. 2004) have highlighted the significant contribution of remittance in creating access for better educational and health care opportunities for the families of migrants.

The above discussion demonstrates that different researches have established strong links between international migration and development. They show that migration can be beneficial to all - the sending countries, the receiving countries and the migrants themselves. Currently, however, the benefits of migration are enjoyed more by the receiving and sending countries than by the migrants and their families.

Internal migration also has strong linkages with development in terms of growth and poverty reduction. Systematic studies should be undertaken to reveal such correlation. A methodology needs to be developed to quantify the extent of internal migration-development linkage at regional and global levels.

**Interfaces of Migration and MDGs**

Migration was not included in the MDG 2000 final document. The relationship between migration and the MDGs has only just started to be explored. Organisers of this expert group meeting (EGM) have identified six core areas of interface between migration and the MDGs. These are poverty reduction; gender equality; improving maternal health and reducing child mortality; prevention of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability and building a global partnership for development. On the basis of the South Asian experience, some more interfaces are observed. They are: primary education, technology transfer and, generation of decent and productive work for young men and women.

A new empirical study based on 74 developing countries (drawn from each major region of the developing world) shows that an average 10 per cent increase in the number of international migrants in a sending country’s population can reduce the level of the population living in extreme poverty by 1.6 per cent. Again, a 10 per cent increase in the share of a country’s GDP lead to a 1.2 per cent decline in poverty (Page and Adams, 2003 in Sorensen, 2004).

**Gender**

Literature on the development impact of migration on women is growing. Global experience shows that the effects of migration on women are culture and context specific. Nonetheless it is recognised that a large number of women who have migrated or those who are left behind by their migrant husbands have experienced positive economic and social empowerment. They were able to ensure effective utilisation of remittances, and successfully create assets. Many of them have developed the capacity to take independent decisions, and their participation in family decision making may also have increased. Left behind spouses of male migrants also go through various types of social transformation. In the absence of the principal household head some manage all activities both in the public and private economic spheres efficiently. Along with other things, their negotiating
power increased substantially while interacting in the wider public sphere. On some occasions, women’s role in public sphere reduced substantially when their husbands returned while on other occasions, women could retain their decision making powers through better negotiations with their husbands.

UNDP and APMRN have jointly published a study on migration and HIV vulnerability on South and South East Asian countries (UNDP, 2004). In some of the receiving countries, migrant workers are stigmatised as a threat to the spreading of HIV/AIDS. The study concludes that contrary to popular belief, health rights of migrants are not respected. This leads to lack of information, adequate health care facilities and avenues of recreation. In such a situation, migrants can fall victim to HIV/AIDS, malaria, jaundice, heat stroke and diarrhoea. Ensuring adequate health care to the migrants is essential for attaining both economic and HIV/AIDS MDGs.

Ahn ed. (2004) demonstrated that in different countries of South Asia, providing better education to children was one of the major reasons for migration particularly of women migrants. Migrants spend a significant proportion of their income on the education of children. In some cases, the education of children did suffer due to the absence of migrants, either male or female. However, Siddiqui (2001) revealed that the drop-out rates of children of migrant families in Bangladesh were not higher than the national average.

Job creation is another important MDG. Migration has been extremely successful in creating overseas jobs in India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Youths constitute the majority of the migrants. Simultaneously, migration has created many types of domestic jobs. Demand for better governance of migration has created jobs in public sector: ministries, agencies, training institutes etc. Jobs have also been created in the private sector. The growth of recruiting agencies, diagnostic centres, travel agencies, airlines, domestic transport services (transportation of migrants, transportation of raw materials for migrants’ enterprises), construction industry - all are linked to migration. Besides, family members of migrants use a certain portion of the remittance for further income generation. The purchasing power of migrant families sustains local business enterprises etc.

**DFID-RMMRU Partnership**

In June 2003, the Department for International Development (DfID), United Kingdom, and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU), University of Dhaka jointly organised a regional conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia. The purpose of this conference was to examine the links between migration, development and poverty in the current phase of globalisation. This conference was an important landmark in migration studies in Asia.

The conference concluded that there is considerable scope for mutual learning from the diverse range of migration governance practices in Asia. To institutionalise the process of sharing, the need to establish a regional network was recognised and recommended. In April 2004, South Asian participants of the conference, under the leadership of RMMRU established the South Asia Migration Resource Network (SAMReN) of academics, researchers, civil society activists and migrant support groups. This network is regional in scope and provides an excellent opportunity for “comparative lesson learning” which addresses “cross-border issues”. In recognition of the contribution of migration to the MDG of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, DfID’s Asia Division provided support to this network.

The long term goal of this network is to help the process of poverty reduction in South Asia through migration. Short term goals are: a) share knowledge and experience; b) develop capacity of young academics and researchers on migration; c) engage in policy advocacy; d) encourage and facilitate data sharing between stake holders of different countries; and, e) provide broad based and reliable information and options to policy makers at national and regional levels.
Major activities to attain these goals are as follows: a) hosting of a website; b) establishment of an automated documentation centre on migration; c) preparation of policy briefs; d) workshop to strategise on advocacy campaigns for safe migration and migrants’ rights; e) residential training workshop for young academics and professionals on migration; f) award fellowship for generating new knowledge on migration; and g) publish and distribute newsletters, monographs and books.

The creation of a website containing information on migration was an important objective of the SAMReN project. Following a detailed discussion at the inception meeting in July 2004, the website was launched on 24 November 2004. It contains information on SAMReN, facts and figures on migration, emigration laws and practices, and civil society initiatives on migration in South Asia. It also hosts information on international legal instruments, ongoing and future programmes under SAMReN and other projects of RMMRU. The website also has a bibliography of migration literature on South Asia and contains the newsletter Udbastu that incorporates SAMReN Bulletin. By the end of April 2005, the total number of visitors to the site was 3,295 – thus confirming the need for information.

Fellowships have been awarded to two Indians, one Bangladeshi, one Nepali and one United Kingdom national this year. During the period 19-28 November 2005, a residential training workshop on Migration, Globalisation, Security and Development has been planned in Rajendrapur, Bangladesh. It is expected that at least twenty participants representing the academia, research, human rights and migrants associations and governments, will participate in the workshop.

Policy Influence: Bangladesh as a Case Study

Making research policy relevant and developing the links between research outcomes and policy development is challenging, but can make all the difference if successful. The RMMRU has had some successes in policy advocacy. Key to their success has been the involvement of policy makers in the identification of policy weaknesses and knowledge gaps.

Migration, both long term and short term, has made a major contribution to the economies of most of the South Asian countries. However, migration was never high on the policy agenda of these countries. RMMRU, an affiliate of the University of Dhaka, commenced its work on migration in 1995. One of the major aims of RMMRU was to emerge as the premier resource centre and think tank on migration in South Asia. RMMRU has successfully linked research on migration to policy makers and influenced pro poor migration policy reform. A brief description of RMMRU’s role in the area of policy advocacy on migration in Bangladesh is discussed below.

On 18 December 1997, RMMRU organised a seminar to commemorate International Migrant Workers’ Day. Policy makers, representing both government and opposition, participated in the seminar along with high level officials from concerned ministries, academics and members of civil society groups. This was the first ever public event on labour migration in Bangladesh. Four sitting and former ministers and several members of parliament across the party lines agreed that labour migration is a neglected area in the public policy discourse of Bangladesh. They formally committed themselves to bringing migration issues into the policy agenda. The participants identified five issue areas and requested RMMRU to conduct the necessary research for generating information. The issues were: state of the rights of migrant workers, recruitment processes, transfer and utilisation of migrants’ remittances, costs and benefits of migration, and female labour migration. Subsequently, RMMRU conducted detailed studies on all these issues.
It also prepared short briefs on different aspects of migration and published them in the newspapers. A few returnee migrants who were trying to form their association got to know about RMMRU through newspapers and contacted RMMRU. Networking among civil society and academics began. Executive committee members of RMMRU also got in touch with ILO and requested their local office to take up migration issues in their work in Bangladesh. The Regional Office of the American Center for International Labour Solidarity, the Solidarity Center, in Colombo, provided support to RMMRU along with other partners from Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India to organise regional conferences on migrant workers. These conferences took place in 1998-99. In 1999, IOM established its regional office in Dhaka. The then Head came to RMMRU office at the University of Dhaka. RMMRU invited IOM to participate in the upcoming conference to be organised by RMMRU and BNWLA in collaboration with the Solidarity Center, Colombo. RMMRU identified the key functionaries of private recruiting agencies in Bangladesh and invited them to the conference. In this process, a group of committed people who want to bring positive changes in life of migrants through policy and action came into being. Until 2003, this mixed group of policy makers, academics, lawyers, government functionaries, members of migrants’ associations, private recruiting agencies and members of international bodies worked with RMMRU in pursuance of policy goals. Once SAMReN came into being in 2004, it provided an institutional framework to support these efforts. Policy advocacy work is now being pursued with greater vigour through different sub-committees.

Policy on Female Migration

The promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women is a key MDG. However, due to the restrictive emigration policy of successive governments, unskilled and semi skilled women in Bangladesh did not enjoy equal access vis-à-vis men or professional women to migration. Research conducted by RMMRU in 1999 on female migrants from Bangladesh showed that a substantial number of women could make positive economic and social advancement in their lives through migration. This indicated that a large number of women would be able to move out of poverty if they were able to participate in the global labour market. Therefore, RMMRU initiated advocacy work to convince the government to withdraw restrictions on female migration - through seminars, workshops, TV programmes, documentary films, newspaper writings, awareness campaign trainings etc. In order to raise the voice of female migrants, RMMRU helped the female migrants to establish their own organisation named Bangladesh Women Migration Association (BWMA). The University hosted the office of the women’s migrant association for two years and the salaries of two office bearers were organised through personal contacts of RMMRU members. Other civil society organisations, particularly the Welfare Association of Repatriated Bangladesh Employees (WARBE) also organised campaigns through workshops, rallies and press conferences.

In the year 2003, the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE) brought in changes in female labour migration policy. This allowed unskilled or semi-skilled women to migrate under special permission once they become 35 years of age. In order to ensure the safety of women who migrate, the government included certain conditions around protection. The security deposit required of the recruiting agents who wish to send women has been increased to Taka 5,000,000. In addition, the government encouraged the private sector to develop training centres for providing specialised professional skills, communication skills and awareness training to female migrants. Aspirant women are trained in the use of domestic appliances, taught basic English and Arabic languages, and given awareness about their legal entitlements in respect to wages, accommodation and medical services. The government is trying to be responsive to policy advocacy and the demands of female migrants. However, equal right to work is still to be realised since permission from male guardian, father/husband is mandatory if a woman wants to migrate (Siddiqui, 2004).
Streamlining Labour Recruitment

RMMRU has been part of two other major policy initiatives in Bangladesh. In 2001, the then caretaker government initiated a process to streamline labour recruitment from Bangladesh. The responsibility of preparing the policy document in collaboration with civil society and private sector was given to RMMRU. The government which came into power after the election of 2001 has implemented three of its key recommendations. It established a separate ministry to manage migration. The policy document articulated this as a demand of the migrants. Secondly, the government has set up the infrastructure for a computerised registration system of those wishing to migrate. Private recruiting agencies are required to employ from among those who have registered. Lastly, the government has created space for the NGOs to participate in providing pre-departure orientation training to migrant workers.

Overseas Employment Policy

There has been a persistent demand from civil society groups for the development of a comprehensive national policy on migration. It was first raised in the 1997 seminar organised by RMMRU. In response to sustained advocacy from different sections of the civil society, the MoEWOE initiated a process of developing a foreign employment policy in 2004. Initial drafts were prepared by the Ministry. At a later stage, a technical assistance committee was formed of which RMMRU was a member. Through consultation with members of the technical assistance committee, Dr. Tasneem Siddiqui of RMMRU prepared an advanced draft. The draft later went through two consultations. During the consultations, the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) suggested some major changes. The Ministry agreed to some of these changes.

The three cases mentioned above demonstrate that in order to effectively influence policy, quality research is needed, alliance with civil society organisations has to be developed, information should be fed to print and electronic media in a consistent manner and relevant government functionaries should be encouraged to become part of the advocacy campaign from the very beginning.

Conclusion

The paper amply demonstrates that international migration is closely linked with development within receiving and sending countries. It is also linked with the MDGs that relate to gender equality, poverty reduction, prevention of HIV/AIDS and creation of jobs for youth. Migration is already playing a vital role in facilitating the achievement of the MDGs. However, many factors operational both in sending and receiving ends impose constraints on migration. This, in turn, affects the contribution of migration to progress on the MDGs. Many of these constraints can be removed through better governance of migration regimes in sending as well as in receiving countries. Global partnership is required to ensure such good governance. DFID and RMMRU collaboration in establishing SAMReN is a good example of such partnership.

Internal migration also contributes to the achievement of the MDGs. The paper reveals that systematic data on the extent and economic contribution of temporary, seasonal or long term internal migration is not readily available. It is of immense importance to provide evidence of internal migration-development linkage through systematic research. Collaborative research at regional level following the same methodology can go a long way in this regard.

Future Scope for Advocacy Through SAMReN in South Asia

There are SAMReN members in all labour sending countries of South Asia. There is enormous scope to do policy advocacy in these countries through SAMReNs network to maximise progress towards
achieving the MDGs through well managed migration. In July 2004, the core members of SAMReN representing Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the management sub-committee of SAMReN identified some major areas for future collaboration, and acknowledged the importance of policy advocacy. It was agreed that SAMReN will prepare proposals to address the nature, extent and impact of female migration in South Asia; human rights of cross border migrants; diaspora and development; sustainable return of skilled and professionals; remittance generated by internal migration; GATS Mode 4; the self regulation of the recruitment industry and migrant welfare programmes in South Asian countries.

Following the Bangladeshi example, SAMReN partners are interested in doing similar policy advocacy in support of female migration in other countries of South Asia. A study will be conducted on the nature, extent and impact of female migration from all South Asian countries. The findings of this collaborative research will form the basis of policy advocacy. The objective of such policy advocacy will be to ensure equal access of all categories of women to overseas employment.

In order to ensure the safe migration of men and women the need for training cannot be over emphasised. Such training should be organised at various tiers targeting different groups of people. To disseminate information on processing migration the training of community leaders and activists at the grassroots needs to be organised. A comprehensive pre-departure orientation programme is likely to go a long way in preparing migrants. Courses on migration for young professionals should be replicated to develop personnel for managing and researching migration. These programmes can be implemented under the auspices of SAMReN. The quality of such training programmes in each country will improve substantially through learning from each other’s experience. This will also encourage and strengthen partnerships in achieving MDGs.

In the context of South Asia, SAMReN members can develop a common methodology to study the linkage between internal migration patterns and development. The recognition of migrants who travel internally is important for local planning. Local level planning usually does not take into account the presence of internal migrants. They miss out from accessing health, education, housing facilities as they are not counted in the national statistics. Internal and cross-border migrants need access to services as well as information on safe migration opportunities. On the basis of the recommendations of collaborative research, SAMReN members can launch advocacy work to ensure the rights of those who migrate internally and regionally.

Endnotes

1 In 1984, the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, coined this term to refer to the Non Resident Indians (NRIs).
2 70 million, one of the largest diaspora of the world.
3 Presentation on remittance in Human Movements and Immigration World Congress under Barcelona Forum 2004.
4 This statement of course does not disregard other valuable contributions of the migrants.
5 It is understood that after 9/11/2001 surveillance on money transfer may have reduced the share of unofficial channel.
6 While highlighting positive development impact of migration it is recognised that a section of migrants face negative economic and social consequences.
References


La migration Arabe présente un panorama fort diversifié allant de la migration forcée, touchant malheureusement plusieurs pays de la région ravagés par les guerres et les conflits, telle la migration des Palestiniens, des Soudanais, des Irakiens, des Somaliens, des Libanais et des Algériens,..., puis la migration régulière de travailleurs et de compétences vers soit les pays Arabes du Golfe ou vers le monde Occidental; Il y a aussi la migration de transit et la migration irrégulière, comme il y a la migration entre pays Arabes non pétroliers, qui est encore mal cernée bien que des fois importante, telle la migration intra Maghrébine, la migration des Egyptiens vers la Jordanie appelée migration de replacement, celle des Soudanais vers l’Egypte... Ainsi dans cette même région, l’on constate l’existence de pays d’émigration aussi bien que de pays d’immigration, et aussi de pays qui reçoivent presque autant de migrants qu’ils en émettent, comme c’est le cas de la Jordanie. Il y a enfin ce rôle relativement nouveau que jouent depuis peu certains pays du sud de la méditerranée, en tant que carrefour de transit pour les migrants d’Afrique et pour les persécutés des conflits et des guerres au Moyen Orient.

La deuxième remarque, est que la pression migratoire prend énormément d’importance dans la majorité des pays Arabes non pétroliers; On estime que plus de la moitié des jeunes de la région souhaitent émigrer (Arab Human Development Report AHDR 2002). Et l’on prévoit que non seulement cette pression persistera, mais qu’elle s’amplifiera même dans les années à venir. Les raisons en sont multiples : on citera entre autre, un taux de chômage élevé (Avec 15 pourcent en moyenne pour la région, c’est le taux le plus élevé compare aux autres régions dans le monde), une importante émergence de jeunes en age de travail (du fait de la transition démographique), les fortes disparités – et la prise de conscience de ces disparités- avec le monde occidental. La région Méditerranéenne souffre en effet, peut être plus que tout autre région dans le monde, d’une forte asymétrie dans presque tous ses indicateurs de bien être; Cette asymétrie étant d’autant plus ressentie du fait de la proximité, de l’ampleur des échanges et de la forte diffusion des moyens de communication et d’information. Enfin, les réseaux sociaux tissés à travers l’histoire commune et de migration jouent à leur tour un rôle important pour stimuler et faciliter la migration.

L’autre fait important à mentionner, est évidemment les politiques de verrouillage continuels des frontières européennes pratiquées vis-à-vis des pays de la région; Cette pratique donne lieu par ailleurs, à de plus en plus de critiques et de distorsions en raison surtout du coût bénéfices juge la
peu rentable et peu justifiée, de l’incompatibilité de ces politiques avec l’ampleur de la coopération économique et commerciale, de l’enjeu géopolitique dans le bassin méditerranéen, des besoins réels –actuels et futurs– des pays européens en matière de main d’œuvre, des droits de l’homme… etc.


♦ Quant à la coopération et au partenariat Euro Arabe ou Méditerranéenne sur la question de la migration, il est à remarquer que la migration a pris ces derniers temps beaucoup plus d’intérêt qu’auparavant, particulièrement dans le cadre du processus de Barcelone, et que plusieurs instances ministérielles et techniques ont été créées, plusieurs réunions de dialogue et de coordination ont été organisées et sont devenues régulières et plusieurs déclarations et accords –bilatéraux surtout- ont été signés et même réalisés.

Cependant cette coopération, aussi bien dans les dialogues et surtout pour les accords, a été consacrée essentiellement aux aspects sécuritaires de la migration dans le bassin Méditerranéen, dans le but de renforcer le contrôle et la poursuite de la migration irrégulière et de transit, et pour combattre les réseaux criminels de trafiquants et facilitateurs de la migration. Cette coopération a négligé par contre de débattre et de reconnaître l’apport et les bénéfices de la migration, de développer des politiques de coopération pour fructifier l’utilisation du potentiel migratoire pour le développement et élargir le partenariat pour faire participer, entre autres partenaires, les immigrants qui sont les premiers concernés…

♦ Venant enfin aux relations entre Migration et Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire (ODM), les données disponibles pour le cas de la migration Arabe montrent que cette migration est un facteur important de réalisation des ODM, et elle pourrait l’être d’avantage dans le futur: L’ampleur des transferts effectués par les immigrants et souvent de leur savoir faire a incontestablement participé à l’amélioration des conditions de vie, de santé et d’éducation des ménages d’immigrés et même de sociétés locales. Elles ont par ailleurs participé, des fois avec succès, à la création d’emploi et à la dynamisation des économies locales.

Cependant l’utilisation des bénéfices de la migration en faveur du développement dans la région est souvent très en dessous du potentiel important que représente les diasporas d’immigrés: Citons surtout qu’une part, des fois importante, des économies des immigrés est transférée par voie irrégulière, ou bien qu’elle est investie dans le pays d’immigration faute d’opportunité dans le pays d’origine, qu’on investit peu dans des projets productifs et de développement local, qu’on est encore pour la majorité des pays de la région à l’étape zéro de l’utilisation des compétences, du capital et savoir faire des centaines de milliers voir des millions d’élites d’origine Arabe dans le monde.

Dans l’autre sens, l’avancement dans la réalisation des O.D.M. pourrait réduire la pression migratoire, ceci parait plausible si on réussit surtout les politiques de création d’emploi, mais aussi la réduction des disparités entre espaces et l’instauration de la paix dans la région.

Dans les paragraphes suivants j’essaierais de développer d’avantage les remarques formulées plus haut, et de démontrer surtout, a partir de l’exemple de la migration Arabe, que la migration dans ces aspects
actuels et surtout potentiels est un facteur important de développement et de réalisation de certaines dimensions des ODM, et que la création de dynamiques de coopération et de partenariat, qui tendra à faire du migrant un acteur et de la migration un facteur de développement, permettrait non seulement de mieux profiter des ressources que procure la migration mais aussi d’améliorer l’image du migrant et de la migration, de réduire la xénophobie et la pression ant migration et d’assurer une migration plus «sécurisée et sécurisante»

LES TRANSFERTS DES IMMIGRES

Sans négliger l’impact des transferts des immigrés sur le développement de l’inflation, de la spéculation foncière, de l’urbanisation et de la réduction des terres agricoles entre autres effets négatifs mentionnés dans certains cas et certaines régions locales, cependant ces transferts auraient surtout participé à l’amélioration des conditions de vie d’un nombre non négligeable de ménages, de l’éducation des enfants, de l’amélioration des conditions de santé ainsi que de la création d’emploi surtout au niveau local, et de la participation donc à la réduction de la pauvreté.

♦ Une source financière considérable: Les transferts des travailleurs à l’étranger vers leurs pays d’origine de la région Arabe sont devenus depuis plus d’une trentaine d’années une source éminente en devises:

Ainsi au niveau de la région (MENA), rien que les transferts par voie régulière vers les pays de cette région atteignent $14 billions en 2001 et autant en 2002, ce qui équivaut à 20 pourcent du total des transferts de l’ensemble des immigrés dans le monde, et à 2.3 pourcent du GDP des pays de la région, occupant ainsi la première place avec l’Asie du sud comparée avec les autres régions (Table 1). Ces transferts représentent 3.8 fois l’Aide Publique au Développement plaçant la région au deuxième rang après l’Amérique Latine et les Caraïbes (Table 2).

Au niveau national, 4 pays de la région figurent parmi les 10 plus importants pays dans le monde en matière de transferts des travailleurs à l’étranger: Le Maroc avec 3.3 billions de dollars, l’Egypte $2.9 billions, le Liban $2.3 billions et la Jordanie avec $2.0 billions (les transferts des Yéménites atteindraient eux aussi le seuil des $2.0 billions). En pourcentage du GDP les transferts de 3 pays de la région les placent parmi les 10 plus importants pays dans le monde: La Jordanie avec 22.8 pourcent, le Yémen 16.1 pourcent et le Liban 13.8 pourcent (Suivi par le Maroc avec 9.7 pourcent).

♦ Cette source est encore plus importante si on considère les transferts par voie irrégulière: Les sommes enregistrées ne représentent en fait qu’une partie des transferts des immigrés, particulièrement pour le cas de certains pays de la région, une partie des fois considérable transite par les réseaux de connaissance. On estime à titre d’exemple que le tiers des transferts des Egyptiens à l’étranger et 85 pourcent ! des transferts des immigrés du Soudan transitent par des voies non régulières. Les déclarations des immigrés de retour Marocains font ressortir que plus que 17 pourcent de leur transferts ne transitent pas a travers les canaux financiers réguliers (INSEA 2000).

Cette persistance des transferts par voies irrégulières serait due essentiellement au manqué de confiance dans les institutions financières officielles, à l’élargissement des coûts de transfert, aux difficultés d’accès aux institutions financières et au manqué d’information. Les guerres et les conflits qui ravagent une bonne partie de la région seraient eux aussi pour beaucoup dans le choix des immigrés d’effectuer leur envoi d’argent à travers d’autres moyens que les institutions en état de guerre.
Les transferts, la source de devises la plus stable: Dans la majorité des pays de la région émetteurs de main d’œuvre, l’ampleur des sommes transférées a persisté et, à quelques exceptions, s’est continuellement amplifiée. Paradoxalement, même les événements les plus perturbants, comme celui de l’attaque meurtrière du 11 septembre, n’auraient pas eu d’effets négatifs sur ces transferts. Certains considèrent même que les événements du 11 septembre ont plutôt incité les immigrés de la région à transférer plus que d’habitude, comme il serait le cas des Marocains à l’étranger (Khachani M.2003).

L’évolution des sommes transférées pour les 2 cas de la Tunisie et du Maroc, à titre d’exemple, montre une courbe ascendante le long des dernières décennies, elles se sont multipliées par 23 fois et 17 fois respectivement au cours des années 1975 et 2001.

Une source considérable d’amélioration des conditions de vie et de la réduction de la pauvreté: Des données disponibles (EUROSTAT 1997, INSEA 2000, OTE 1992, ..) 3rubriques paraissent monopoliser l’essentiel des dépenses et investissements des transferts des immigrés de la région:

(a) La construction privée, l’amélioration du logement et l’achat de terrains pour construction privée.
(b) La consommation privée, y compris pour couvrir les frais d’éducation et de santé, et des biens importent pour la consommation.
(c) La réalisation de petits projets économiques, surtout de petites entreprises de services.

On estime par exemple que 75 pourcent de l’argent des immigrés Egyptiens vont pour les 2 premiers articles (EUROSTAT Egypt Survey 1997), et 83.7 pourcent des investissements des immigrés Marocains vont dans l’immobilier (INSEA 2000).

Cette concentration d’investissement dans l’immobilier, essentiellement pour l’acquisition de logements pour les migrants, a fait de longs débats quant à l’apport de ces transferts sur le développement et l’investissement productif. Il est prouvé cependant que l’investissement dans l’immobilier permet d’une part à répondre à un besoin pressant à des logements décents, qu’à l’amélioration considérable des conditions de santé des ménages, de l’éducation des enfants et de reproduction de la force de travail, ainsi qu’à la création d’emploi et la dynamisation des économies locales.

Plusieurs enquêtes ont montrées en effet que les enfants des immigrés réussissent mieux leur scolarité que les enfants de non immigrés (louhichi 2000, cas de la Tunisie), et que les parents migrants (Enquête Maroc 1997) sont en grande majorité satisfaits de la scolarité de leurs enfants, aussi bien de la scolarité des garçons (90.8 pourcent) que pour les filles (92 pourcent).

Si on considère le grande demande actuelle et prévue sur le marché de logement, estimée pour les 5 pays du sud de la Méditerranée a plus que 3.5 millions d’unités par an, face a un offre qui ne dépasse pas 0.7 million, il est de l’avis de plusieurs qu’il serait très bénéfique pour ces pays d’encourager ce genre d’investissement, de part surtout son coup relativement faible et sa participation à la création de l’emploi et à la survie de plusieurs entreprises, comme celles des menuisiers, des producteurs de briques pour la construction, du fer forge, de la peinture et autres matériaux de constructions (T. M. Youssef, 2002; Khachani, 2004).

Les transferts des immigrés auraient par ailleurs participer a sauver 1.2 millions de personnes de la pauvreté au Maroc réduisant la pauvreté de presque 20 pourcent (Bourchechen 2000). Rien que les 3 pourcent (20 mil. des 700 mil. le total des transferts annuels) des transferts des immigrés Tunisiens investis dans des projets économiques auraient créé 20 000 emploi au cours de la période 1993-1999 (OTE, 2000).
Les transferts des immigres auraient par ailleurs participer à sauver 1.2 millions de personnes de la pauvreté au Maroc réduisant la pauvreté de presque 20 pourcent (Bourchechen 2000). Rien que les 3 pourcent (20 mil. des 700 mil. le total des transferts annuels) des transferts des immigres Tunisiens investis dans des projets économiques auraient créé 20 000 emploi au cours de la période 1993-1999 (OTE, 2000).

L’argent des immigres participent de plus en plus à la réalisation de projets de développement local a travers les ONG: Ainsi l’association Migration et Développement fortement soutenue par les immigres aurait participer a la réalisation d’écoles, de centres de santé et la construction de routes dans quelques 700 villages au Maroc, et ses interventions paraissent s’étendre a l’intérieur du Maroc et dans les pays voisins. On estime par ailleurs que l’investissement des immigres Marocains dans les secteurs de santé et d’éducation atteignent 20 pourcent de l’ensemble de leurs investissements, précédent l’investissement dans l’agriculture et les services (A. Latreche, 2004).

Il faut remarquer enfin que la migration à courte durée, saisonnière ou avec contrat a durée limitée, aurait beaucoup d’apport bénéfiques pour le développement local. La migration des Tunisiens vers la Lybie a titre d’exemple, qui était d’une durée moyenne de presque 6 mois, aurait permis de mieux conserver les activités agricoles de ces ménages et de créer moins de perturbations dans les rapports familiaux comparée a la migration de longue durée (OTE, 1992).

Maximaliser l’apport des transferts des immigres

Cependant la maximalisation des transferts des immigres et l’amélioration de son utilisation pour le développement et la réalisation des Objectifs du Millénaire nécessitent d’importants efforts dont surtout:

La collecte de données fiables et régulières sur le volume, les mécanismes et les utilisations de l’argent de l’immigre, condition intournable pour bien améliorer les politiques.

Informier, rapprocher et améliorer les services facilitant transferts et investissements, et réduire les coûts de transferts souvent trop élevés (estime entre 13 et 20 pourcent des sommes transférées).

Créer/développer des mécanismes pour faire participer l’immigre et des sociétés civiles locales dans la conception et l’application des politiques en faveur d’un transfert et d’investissements pour le développement et la réalisation des Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire.

Développer un partenariat qui unifiera l’argent des immigres avec celui des banques, d’entrepreneurs et d’autres organismes des deux coté pour assurer attraction et investissement productifs et de développement.

LA MIGRATION DES COMPETENCES ARABES: Vers des politiques transformant la perte en profit

Avec la globalisation de l’économie de plus en plus reliée à la science et à la technologie, la migration des compétences et de main d’œuvre hautement qualifiée paraît prendre de plus en plus de l’ampleur. L’ampleur de ce phénomène, particulièrement pour la région Arabe, est méconnue, cependant les quelques estimations disponibles reflètent l’importance de cette mobilité: on estime que 35 pourcent des diplômes des universités de la région Arabe vivent à l’étranger (IOM 1999), à cela il faut rajouter les diplômés des universités à l’étranger, on estime que pas moins de 50 pourcent de ces étudiants ne rentrent pas a leur pays d’origine après l’accomplissement de leurs études, ainsi qu’une partie des universitaires et des hautement qualifiées. Le Rapport Arabe de développement Humain 2003 estime par ailleurs, qu’en 1996 auraient émigrés de la région Arabe 23 pourcent de ses ingénieurs, 50 pourcent de ses médecins et 15 pourcent des diplômes des universités, il estime qu’entre 1998 et 2000 il y aurait plus de 15000 médecins Arabes qui ont émigré. Ces données se recoupent avec beaucoup d’autres données locales ou

♦ Plusieurs rapports globaux ayant traité ce sujet prévoient la continuité, voir le renforcement des flux de migration des compétences qu’au cours des années qui viennent, particulièrement les compétences des pays en développement et vers les pays de l’Europe (les rapports de l’UE, 2000; IOM, 2001; OCDE…). Si on considère, d’une part, la faiblesse des structures, des conditions de travail et des budgets réservés au secteur de R&D dans les pays du sud de la méditerranée, et l’environnement sociétal peu favorable à la recherche et peu attractif des compétences (voir le RADH 2003 consacré à l’état de la connaissance dans la région); et d’autre part les politiques adoptées par les pays de l’Europe pour répondre à un besoin de plus en plus imminent en matière de travailleurs qualifiés (on estime par exemple que l’Europe des 12 aura besoin de 1.6 million spécialistes en IT rien que pour l’année 2003), dont notamment le renforcement des politiques sélectives en faveur des plus qualifiés, l’adoption de lois facilitant le séjour et l’accès au marché de travail des compétences étrangères (le Visa Scientifique en France, le Green Card en Allemagne…) ainsi que l’exonération de taxes et l’adoption d’un ensemble de procédures d’attraction des compétences étrangères (pour un résumé de ces procédures: G.M.Laughlan 2002); on peut prévoir de même l’amplification de l’exode des compétences de la région vers les pays voisins de l’Europe.

♦ Ce thème a été depuis les années 70 assez critique pour les pays et décideurs de la région, avec son ampleur et l’incapacité de faire face il devient crucial. On considère que cette fuite est une perte multiple: D’une part, cet exode s’accélère alors que ces pays, qui s’intègrent de plus en plus dans l’économie mondiale globalisée, éprouvent de plus en plus le besoin en compétences capables d’innover et de doter le pays de capacités concurrentielles; et estime d’autre part que le coût investi dans l’éducation et la formation de ces compétences est trop élevé et non compensé (2 ans d’ingénierie au Maroc coûteraient 1 million de Dirhams –M Mghari 2003), et qu’on paye par contre trop cher les experts internationaux (ils auraient coûté 40 pourcent de l’aide publique au développement pour l’Afrique, -OCDE 1995-).

♦ Plusieurs pays de la région se sont orienté vers l’adoption de politiques plus pragmatiques en essayant de rétablir les contacts avec les associations et réseaux de leurs diasporas à l’étranger, les appelant à participer aux projets divers de développement ainsi qu’à plusieurs des manifestations nationales. Plusieurs de ces pays ont crée des bureaux de TOKTEN (avec l’aide de l’UNDP), des instances politiques ou de réflexions au sein des Ministères de l’E.S.&R et dans les nouveaux Ministères de la Migration. Certains pays comme la Palestine, le Liban et la Syrie sont allé plus loin dans leur réhabilitation du statut et des rôles de la diaspora d’intellectuels et d’entrepreneurs (voir les expériences du TOKTEN dans les T.O. de Palestine, l’expérience du réseau NOSSTIA nostia@net.sy en Syrie et l’expérience pionnière et fort réussie de la Fondation du défunt Harriry au Liban octroyant des prêts de bourses à des milliers de jeunes Libanais et des facilités de leur réintégration professionnelle).

♦ Cette orientation de positivisation de la migration des compétences a été fortement stimulée, et souvent initiée, par les diasporas d’intellectuels Arabes en Europe et aux États Unis qui paraissent de plus en plus réussir leur intégration dans la société civile et le monde de la recherche dans les pays d’accueil. On compte en effet des centaines d’associations et de réseaux électroniques d’ingénieurs, médecins ou spécialistes en ICT…qui se rassemblent très souvent selon le pays d’origine. Ces instances mentionnent presque systématiquement leur désir de venir en aide à leurs pays d’origine (et souvent il s’agit du pays d’origine des parents) et affirment leur désir
de coordonner avec les compétences similaires restées sur place. Il faut noter aussi que le peu de succès que les politiques de revendication de compensation que ces pays ont mené pendant plusieurs années, et l’échec de toute politique de rétention administrative des compétences d’une part, et la réussite, d’autre part, de plusieurs pays de l’Asie du sud, de l’Inde, de la Chine… a rétabli les contacts et intégré leurs Diasporas d’intellectuels dans les processus de développement, ont eu leur part d’influence et d’incitation des décideurs de la région a voir autrement cette migration.

♦ Cependant cette tendance reste encore peu traduite dans la région en politiques nationales efficaces et cumulées, et encore moins en politiques de coopération méditerranéenne ou autre régionale. Alors que les diasporas des intellectuels Arabes dans le monde occidental représentent un potentiel fort important de transfert des connaissances et savoir faire, de la dynamisation des multiples aspects de développement dans les pays d’origine, et de pont et d’intermédiaire économique et culturel, il s’impose de se poser des questions sur les raisons de la lenteur et sur les conditions permettant une meilleure réussite de l’utilisation de ces ressources au développement et à la réalisation des O.D.M., dont notamment:

• Faudrait il réussir les grandes Reformes pour pouvoir impliquer ce capital humain, ou bien le réhabiliter en tant que facteur et acteur décisif dans la réalisation de l’attendue Reforme?
• L’approche régionale Arabe ou sous régionale, Maghrébine ou autre, de la réhabilitation, peut-elle faciliter la tache en offrant plus d’opportunités à ces compétences migrantes a participer, et a créer peut être des cas pionniers ou exemplaires de réussite …?

Intégrer les entrepreneurs migrants

Une des tendances en Amérique et récemment en Europe est la réussite des immigres dans l’entrepreneuriat (ILO, Berlin 2004). Un pour chaque douzaine d’entrepreneurs en Allemagne possède un passeport étranger. Les Maghrébins résidents en Europe, remarque Khachani (2003) se trouvent à la tête d’entreprises d’import export, de transport, de tourisme, d’information, de publicité et de plusieurs entreprises industrielles. L’émergence de cette élite, maîtrisant les langues et cultures des pays de résidence et d’origine, ouvre l’horizon à de nouvelles perspectives de projets bi-nationals servant le partenariat et la coopération entre les deux pays. Il est donc crucial de se demander sur les politiques a adopter, surtout de la part des pays Arabes, pour encourager et attirer l’investissement de cette élite d’entrepreneurs dans une phase ou les politiques de reformes économiques des pays Arabes a le plus besoin d’investissement étrangers et de savoir faire.

Les résultats de l’enquête du Maroc (INSEA 2000), nous fournit a ce propos quelques éclaircissements sur les handicaps d’investissement des immigres dans les pays d’origine et les politiques pour faire face. Ainsi les principaux difficultés et défis rencontrés par les immigres qui ont investi dans des projets économiques dans le pays de résidence ou celui d’origine seraient:

♦ L’absence d’infrastructures et d’environnements propices pour l’investissement au niveau local.
♦ La faiblesse de stimulants et de privilèges comparés surtout a ceux offerts dans le pays de résidence européens: 70 pourcent de ceux qui ont investi dans le pays de résidence ont profité de privilèges contre 24 pourcent seulement pour ceux qui ont investi dans le pays d’origine.
♦ Presque la moitié de ceux qui ont investi au Maroc ont fait face à des problèmes importants se rapportant surtout aux difficultés administratives, du coût relativement élevé, de l’élévation des taxes et du manqué d’informations.
La Migration dans le bassin Méditerranéen: Un potentiel négligé

♦ De part les multiples liens entre le nord Européen et le sud Arabe de la Méditerranée, aussi bien historiques avec des siècles d’échanges et de circulation de personnes de biens et de culture; que géographiques, eg les frontières du Maroc se trouvent à 13 kilomètres de Gibraltar et celles de la Tunisie a une quarantaine de kilomètres du sud de l’Italie; d’échanges, plus de 70 pourcent des échanges extérieurs des pays du Maghreb se font avec l’UE des 12; et de stratégie geopolitical, la coopération Euro Arabe pourrait et devrait faire du potentiel migratoire un facteur efficace de développement, de coopération et de réalisation des ODM.

♦ Alors que ces facteurs de proximité et d’histoire commune, inciteraient à la réduction des inégalités et disparités entre le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée et à encourager les échanges et mobilité y compris des personnes, on constate cependant que c’est la région qui porte le plus de disparité et d’asymétrie (les PPP, purchasing power parité est de $23 600 en Europe contre seulement $4 100 dans les pays Arabes de la Méditerranée pour ne citer que cet indicateur), ce qui forme les conditions d’une forte pression migratoire; et paradoxalement c’est la région ou on pratique des politiques des plus restrictives à la migration depuis quelques décennies.

♦ Encore plus ahurissant le fait qu’alors qu’on reconnaît l’apport multiple de la migration aussi bien pour les pays de réception (actuel et dans l’avenir pour répondre aux besoins aussi bien des secteurs de services et des PME que pour combler le besoin en compétences) –confirmé encore une fois récemment par le rapport ILO 2005 sur la Migration en Europe-, que pour les pays d’origine (sur les balances de payement, la réduction de la pauvreté, l’amélioration des conditions de vie de millions de ménages, et de création d’emplois..), et on reconnaît par la même que les millions d’ouvriers, de compétences et d’entrepreneurs d’origine Maghrêbine résidant dans les pays de l’Europe représentent un potentiel fort important pour le développement; les dialogues et les accords entre les deux blocs, y compris ceux menés dans le cadre du Processus de Barcelone, ne se sont intéresse qu’aux aspects sécuritaires et de contrôle de la migration dans le bassin Méditerranéen.

♦ Pour conclure, plusieurs questions, à propos de la migration dans le bassin Méditerranéen, s’imposent et méritent d’être investiguées, surtout dans un cadre de réflexion sur la participation possible de la migration à la réalisation des ODM:

- Comment peut-on justifier les politiques de fermeture systématique des frontières face à la migration et même a tout déplacement de personnes du sud vers le nord de la Méditerranée, alors qu’on déclare vouloir faire du Bassin Méditerranéen «une zone de paix et de prospérité», qu’on veut libérer les échanges de toute contrainte et créer la Zone de Libre Échanges à l’horizon 2010, que les rapports les plus fiables (UN 2000, OCDE 2002, UE 2002 et l’ILO 2005 entre autres) reconnaissent le besoin imminent des marchés de travail de l’Europe en matière de main d’œuvre étrangère pour répondre aux besoins de certains secteurs économiques et pour rétablir l’équilibre entre la population âgée et celle active (un besoin estime par les N.U. a quelques 14 millions annuellement), qu’on sait que ces politiques vont à l’encontre des droits de l’homme, et à l’encontre d’un mouvement qui a existe de tout temps dans les deux sens de la Méditerranée?.

- Pourquoi les politiques officielles de coopération ont négligées la coopération pour dynamiser l’apport en retour des compétences et entrepreneurs migrants, alors que les expériences montrent que ce potentiel peut jouer un rôle important dans le développement et la création de la société de connaissance, qu’on sait que cette fuite de cerveaux, fortement encouragée par les lois et procédures d’attraction de ces compétences adoptées et de plus en plus renforcées par les pays d’Europe, forme une perte multiple aux pays du sud et un autre handicap a son «décollage» économique?
• Et si la coopération et le partenariat Euro Arabe adopte une vision plutôt positive de la migration, et se concentre d’avantage à fructifier l’apport de la migration au développement, et à créer des dynamiques de partenariat plus large pour débattre et concevoir les politiques de migration ou les représentants des immigrés et leurs élites feront partie prenante; de telles dynamiques seraient-elles à la hauteur de réussir à la fois une migration «sécurisée» et bénéfique pour les deux parties et à améliorer le statut et image des immigrés, fortement biaisés ces derniers temps, réduisant par la même xénophobie et racisme?

**Quelques Remarques concluantes**

♦ Dans le cas de la migration Arabe, comme c’est le cas d’ailleurs pour la migration a l’échelle globale, l’apport de la migration sur les conditions de vie des ménages d’immigrés et assez souvent des sociétés locales est assez importante, permettant de meilleure conditions de santé, d’éducation, d’emploi et de réduction de la pauvreté, elle l’est d’autant plus importante en tant que source de devises. Comme il est prouvé que le potentiel migratoire aussi bien des peu qualifiées et surtout des élites peut se traduire en source sensiblement importante de développement et peut être une source clef de stimulation de l’accomplissement de reformes solides aussi bien économiques, de connaissance que politiques et culturelles. Une source beaucoup plus stable qu’on le pensait et que de plusieurs autres sources d’aide ou d’investissement étrangers, une source très active dans la réalisation des ODM.

♦ Parmi les handicaps majeurs au développement de politiques efficaces de maximalisation de l’apport et des bénéfices de la migration aussi bien au bénéfice des pays d’accueil que pour la réalisation des MDG dans les pays Arabes d’origine:

• C’est d’abord, le manqué de données fiables et régulières sur les multiples dimensions de la migration. Il est impératif que des politiques d’encouragement à la recherche et à l’établissement d’observatoires sur le mouvement migratoire soient mises en œuvre pour pouvoir se procurer les données nécessaires pour mieux gérer le phénomène migratoire ses défis et ses apports.

• Le besoin en matière de réflexions et d’idées innovatrices pour humaniser la migration; reconnaitre l’évidence du phénomène migratoire en tant que facteur inhérent a tout système de développement et pour réhabiliter le migrant dans ses rôles bénéfiques au bien être et à l’enrichissement des civilisations et cultures.

• Le besoin de renforcer et d approfondir les dialogues et concertations et de les étendre a un plus large partenariat impliquant les migrants le secteur prive les organisations de la société civile pour le développement au cote des décideurs des deux sociétés d’accueil et d’origine.

**References**


G.M. Laughlan and J.Salt, 2002: “Migration Policies toward Highly Skilled Foreign Workers”.


Khachani Mohamed, 2003: « Moroccan Migration to Europe» In Arab Migration in a Globalized World» LAS, IOM.

Mghari Mohamed, 2003: “Exodus of Skilled Labor Magnitude, Determinants and Impacts on Development” In Arab Migration in a Globalized World” LAS, IOM.


OTE; 2000: « La Migration des Tunisiens vers l’Etranger, Enquete Nationale» OTE, LAS.

OCDE 1995 Rapport Migration.

Yousef, P.Dhouhe, R.Bhattacharya, :”Demographic Transition in the Middle East”, IMF 2000.


Table 1. Global Remittances 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>$ Billions of</th>
<th>GDP % as of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia and Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Global Development Finance 2003*

Table 2. Ratio (total remittances/ODA) - 2001-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia and Europe</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East and North Africa</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IOM News, September 2004*
Figure 1: Les transferts des migrants

Source: IMF: Balance of Payments Yearbook

Figure 2: Les transferts des migrants

Source: IMF: Balance of Payments Yearbook
Figure 3: Remittances flow during 1980-2002 in Morocco, in million Moroccan Dirhams

ANNEX I

AGENDA

Expert Group Meeting
International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals

Marrakech, Morocco   -   11-12 May 2005

Wednesday, 11 May 2005

Official Opening

9:30 - 10:00 am   Welcoming Remarks – H.E Mme Nezha Chekrouni, Minister-Delegate, MFAC
                   Welcoming Remarks – Mr. Georges M. Georgi, UNFPA Representative - Morocco
                   Purpose/Organization of Meeting – Mr. François Farah, UNFPA/TSD - NY

10:00 - 10:15 am   Migration Trends – Ms. Hania Zlotnik

10:15 – 10:30 am   The Millennium Development Goals – Ms. Ann Pawliczko

10:30 – 11:00 am   Discussion

Session 1 – International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals
Chair: Mr. Georges M. Georgi

11:15 - 11:30 am   Migration as Both a Facilitating and Constraining Factor in the Achievement of the MDGs – Ms. Erica Usher

11:30 – 11:45 am   The Role of Remittances in the Development Process
                   Ms. Colleen Thouez

11:45 – 12:30 pm   Discussion

Session 2 – Migration and Poverty Reduction
Chair: Mr. Alan Simmons

2:00 – 4:00 pm   Linkages Between Migration and Poverty - Mr. Ronald Skeldon
                   Migration and Poverty: Conceptual Issues - Ms. Kathleen Newland

Session 3 – Migration and Health
Chair: Ms. Colleen Thouez

4:15 – 4:30 pm   Migration and the Health System - Mr. Delanyo Dovlo

4:30 – 4:45 pm   Migration and Maternal and Child Health – Mr. Manuel Carballo

4:45 – 5:00 pm   Migration and HIV/AIDS – Mr. John Anarfi
5:00 – 5:30 pm  Discussion

Thursday 12 May 2005

Session 4 - Migration and Gender
Chair: Ms. Hania Zlotnik

9:00 – 9:15 am  Migration and Gender - Ms. Maruja Asis
9:15 – 9:30 am  Trafficking - Ms. Gerda Theuermann
9:30 – 10:15 am  Discussion

Session 5 - Migration and the Environment
Chair: Ms. Erica Usher

10:15 – 10:30 am  Environmental Refugees – Mr. David Vine
10:30 – 11:00 am  Discussion

Session 6 – Migration and Global Partnerships for Development
Chair: Ms. Kathleen Newland

11:15 – 11:30 am  The Economics of Migration- Mr. Atif Kubursi
11:30 – 12:00 pm  Globalization and Migration – Mr. Alan Simmons
12:00 – 12:30 pm  Discussion

Session 7 – Panel on Partnerships: Case Studies
Chair: Mr. François Farah

2:00 – 4:00 pm  Morocco - Ms. Aicha Belarbi
Australia – Mr. Graeme Hugo
Philippines – Ms. Jean D’Cunha
United Kingdom – Ms. Charlotte Heath and Ms. Tasneem Siddiqui
League of Arab States – Mr. Khaled Louhichi

Session 8 – The Global Commission on International Migration
Chair: Ms. Ann Pawliczko

4:15 – 4:45 pm  The Global Commission – Ms. Aicha Belarbi
4:45 – 5:00 pm  Closing – UNFPA
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Mr. John Anarfi
Institute of Statistics, Socio-Economic Research
Accra, Ghana
Tel. 011-233 20- 8135548
Fax: 011-233-215-512504
e-mail: jkanarfi@yahoo.com jkanarfi@isser.ug.edu.gh

Ms. Maruja M. B. Asis
Scalabrini Migration Center
4, 13th St., New Manila, Quezon City, 1112
Philippines
Tel:(63-2) 724-3512
Fax 63-2-721-4296
e-mail: marla@smc.org.ph

Ms. Aicha Belarbi
Global Commission on International Migration
Rabat, Morocco
e-mail: aichabelarbi@hotmail.com

Mr. Manuel Carballo
Executive Director
International Centre for Migration and Health
Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 783 1081
Fax + 41 22 783 1087
e-mail : mcarballo@icmh.ch

Ms. Jean D’Cunha
Regional Advisor/Manager UNIFEM Asia
Pacific & Arab States
Programme on Empowering Women
Migrant Workers in Asia
UNIFEM
5th Floor, United Nations Building
Rajdamnern Avenue
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Tel: + (662) 288 2225
Fax: + (662) 280 6030
e-mail: jean.dcunha@unifem.un.or.th

Ms. Semia De Tapia
Chargée des affaires sociales
Bureau de la CEA pour l’Afrique du nord
Tanger, Maroc
Tel: 212-39-322 346
Fax: 212-39-340 357
e-mail: tapia@un.org

Mr. Delanyo Dovlo
PO Box CT5203
Cantonments, Accra, Ghana
Tel: +233 244760777 (mobile)
+233 21 780711 (Office)
Fax: +233 21 780713
e-mail dovlo@yahoo.com
ddovlo@pcaccra.org

Mr. Lamine Gueye
Démographe
Bureau de la CEA pour l’Afrique du nord
Tanger, Morocco
Tel: 212-39-322 346
Fax: 212-39-340 357
e-mail: lgueye@un.org

Ms. Charlotte Heath
Senior Social Development Adviser
Migration Team, Policy Division
Department for International Development
1 Palace St
London SW1E 5 HE
United Kingdom
Tel: 0207 023 0162 (Ext)
e-mail: C-Heath@dfid.gov.uk

Ms. Aicha Belarbi
Global Commission on International Migration
Rabat, Morocco
e-mail: aichabelarbi@hotmail.com

Mr. Manuel Carballo
Executive Director
International Centre for Migration and Health
Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 783 1081
Fax + 41 22 783 1087
e-mail : mcarballo@icmh.ch

Ms. Jean D’Cunha
Regional Advisor/Manager UNIFEM Asia
Pacific & Arab States
Programme on Empowering Women
Migrant Workers in Asia
UNIFEM
5th Floor, United Nations Building
Rajdamnern Avenue
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Tel: + (662) 288 2225
Fax: + (662) 280 6030
e-mail: jean.dcunha@unifem.un.or.th

Mr. Graeme Hugo
Director of GISCA
Geographical and Environmental Studies
The University of Adelaide
SA 5005 Australia
Tel.: 61 8 8303 5646
Fax: 61 8 8303 3772
e-mail: graeme.hugo@adelaide.edu.au
Mr. Atif Kubursi  
Prof. of Economics  
McMaster University  
Department of Economics  
Kenneth Taylor Hall, Rm 408  
1280 Main Street West  
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada  
L8S 4M4McMaster University, Canada  
Tel.: 905-525-9140 ext. 23809  
Fax: 905-521-8232  
e-mail: kubursi@mcmaster.ca

Mr. Khaled Louhichi  
Director, Population Policy and Migration Department  
League of Arab States  
Cairo, Egypt  
Fax: +202 735 1422  
e-mail: louhichik@hotmail.com

Mr. Pablo Mateu  
Chief  
Reintegration and Local Settlement Section  
UNHCR  
Geneva, Switzerland  
Tel.: +41 22 739 8784  
Fax: +41 22 739 7377  
e-mail: mateu@unhcr.ch

Ms. Kathleen Newland  
Director  
Migration Policy Institute  
Washington, D.C.  
Tel. 202-266-1903  
Fax: 202-266-1900  
e-mail: KNewland@migrationpolicy.org

Ms. Tasneem Siddiqui  
Coordinator of the South Asia Migration Resource Network  
University of Dhaka  
Sattar Bhaban (4th Floor)  
3/3 E, Bijoynagar  
Dhaka – 1000 Bangladesh  
Tel.: 880 2 9360338  
Fax: 880 2 8362441  
e-mail: rmmrubj@aitlbd.net

Mr. Alan Simmons  
Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean (CERLAC)  
Toronto, Canada  
Tel. 519 767-0657  
Fax: 519 767-1651  
e-mail: asimmons@yorku.ca

Mr. Ronald Skeldon  
Department of Geography, School of Social and Cultural Studies  
University of Sussex  
Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9SJ United Kingdom  
Tel. +44 1273 606755 ext.2277, 44 1273 739565  
Fax: 44 1273 673563  
e-mail: R.Skeldon@sussex.ac.uk

Ms. Gerda Theuermann  
Director Consultancy Services  
International Centre for Migration Policy Development  
Gonzagagasse 1 A-1010 Vienna, Austria  
Tel. +43 1 504 46 77 17  
Fax: +43 1 504 46 77 75  
e-mail: Gerda.Theuermann@icmpd.org

Ms. Colleen Thouez  
Chief  
UNITAR, New York Office  
New York, NY 10017  
Tel: 1-212-963 9683  
Fax: 1-212-963 9686  
e-mail: thouez@un.org

Ms. Erica Usher  
Head  
Strategic Policy and Planning  
Migration Policy, Research & Communication  
International Organization for Migration  
Geneva, Switzerland  
Tel: +41 22 717-9491  
Fax: +41 22 798-6150  
e-mail: eusher@iom.int
Mr. David Vine  
Ph.D. Candidate  
Graduate Center, City University of New York  
1701 Park Road, NW, #423  
Washington, DC 20010, USA  
Tel. 202.667.1751; 202.412.9972  
Fax: 212.817.1501  
e-mail: davidsvine@hotmail.com

Ms. Hania Zlotnik  
Director, Population Division  
United Nations  
New York, NY 10017  
Tel. 212-963-3179  
Fax: 212-963-2147  
e-mail: zlotnik@un.org

Mr. Aziz Ajbilou  
Director  
Center for Demographic Research and Studies (CERED)  
Rabat, Morocco

Mr. Abdelaziz Morsi  
CERED  
Rabat, Morocco

Mr. Ahmed Amaziane  
Director  
Multilateral Cooperation Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation  
Morocco

Ms. Nezha Chekrouni  
Minister-Delegate  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation  
Morocco

Mr. Mohamed Khachani  
Prof. Faculty of Law  
University Mohamed V Rabat  
President of AMERM  
Morocco  
Tel./Fax: +212 37 713450  
GSM: +212 61 40 02 87  
e-mail: khachani@iam.net.ma

Mr. Nori Ahmed Salimi  
Adviser  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation  
Morocco

Mr. Youns Tijani  
Chief Division Social Affairs  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Morocco

UNFPA MOROCCO

Mr. Georges Georgi  
UNFPA Representative  
Immeuble de L’ONU  
Angle avenue Mly El Hassan et rue Mly Ahmed Loukili  
Rabat, Morocco  
Tel. (212 - 37) 76 78 31  
Fax (212 - 37) 70 14 82  
e-mail: georgi@unfpa.org

Ms. Naima Ghemires  
National Programme Officer  
Population and Development  
UNFPA - Morocco  
Immeuble de L’ONU, Angle avenue Mly El Hassan et rue Mly Ahmed Loukili  
Rabat, Morocco  
Tel. (212 - 37) 66 12 71  
Fax (212 - 37) 70 14 82  
e-mail: ghemires@unfpa.org

Ms. Mona Benzeriane  
Personal Assistant to the Representative  
UNFPA - Morocco  
Immeuble de L’ONU, Angle avenue Mly El Hassan et rue Mly Ahmed Loukili  
Rabat, Morocco  
Tel. (212 - 37) 76 78 31  
Fax (212 - 37) 70 14 82  
e-mail: benzeriane@unfpa.org
UNFPA HEADQUARTERS

Mr. François Farah
Chief, Population and Development Branch
Technical Support Division
UNFPA
New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel. 212-297-5266
Fax. 212-297-4930
e-mail: farah@unfpa.org

Ms. Ann Pawliczko
Senior Project Adviser
Population and Development Branch
Technical Support Division
UNFPA
New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel. 212-297-5283
Fax. 212-297-4930
e-mail: pawliczko@unfpa.org
1. **Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**
   ♦ Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day
   ♦ Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

2. **Achieve universal primary education**
   ♦ Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

3. **Promote gender equality and empower women**
   ♦ Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015

4. **Reduce child mortality**
   ♦ Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five

5. **Improve maternal health**
   ♦ Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

6. **Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**
   ♦ Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
   ♦ Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

7. **Ensure environmental sustainability**
   ♦ Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources
   ♦ Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
   ♦ Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020

8. **Develop a global partnership for development**
   ♦ Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory. Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction—nationally and internationally
   ♦ Address the least developed countries’ special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction
   ♦ Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States
   ♦ Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term
   ♦ In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth
   ♦ In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
   ♦ In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies—especially information and communications technologies